Flux européens

État belge (Droit de séjour en cas de violence domestique)
Citoyenneté européenne
Selon la Cour, le ressortissant d’un pays tiers victime d’actes de violence domestique commis par son conjoint, citoyen de l’Union, ne se trouve pas dans une situation comparable à celle du ressortissant d’un pays tiers, victime d’actes de violence domestique commis par son conjoint, ressortissant d’un pays tiers

Commission / Portugal (Taxe sur les véhicules)
Fiscalité
Les modalités de calcul de la taxe d’immatriculation des véhicules d’occasion importés au Portugal portent atteinte au principe de la libre circulation des marchandises

Vodafone
Rapprochement des législations
Des options à « tarif nul » sont contraires au règlement sur l’accès à un Internet ouvert

OTP Jelzálogbank e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
La législation hongroise interdisant l’annulation d’un contrat de prêt libellé en devise étrangère au motif qu’il comporte une clause abusive relative à l’écart de change paraît être compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Homoki / Commission
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal annule la décision de l’OLAF de ne pas donner un accès partiel au rapport final de son enquête relative aux projets d’éclairage public réalisés par la société Élios en Hongrie avec participation financière de l’Union

On Friday, together with my learned colleague at both Bar and Faculty Isabelle Larmuseau, I was asked to put my environmental law hat on at the Flemish Parliament. I was heard  on the current scandal hitting Flanders following PFAS (‘forever chemicals’) emissions by 3 M at the port of Antwerp. For background to PFAS see here.

Isabelle’s slidedeck for same is here (updated at 09:28 on 31 August to correct earlier pdf which contained an earlier version of the slides), and mine here. Both are in Dutch, with Isabelle’s focusing on the Flemish environmental law angle (albeit with strong EU law influence, necessarily) and mine on the EU and international law context).

Focus of the debate is on environmental /public health law however for my conflicts followers there is a treat. A civil law suit by Belgian and /or other [the port of Antwerp is very close for instance to the Dutch border. Emissions in air, water and soil (for the latter, particularly if exported) clearly impact Dutch citisens, say] claimants against 3M’s Belgian corporate presence is easily pursued both in Belgium (Article 4 Brussels Ia) and in other Member States (Article 7(2) locus damni). Residual private international law in all these States would fairly straightforwardly allow for the suit to be extended to 3M’s corporate mother, based at St Paul, Minnesota.

The more exciting bit is applicable law. The impact of common US (State) law on forever chemicals suits is well documented. Despite EU courts not willing to apply the punitive damages elements of these suits, an application of the other elements of US tort law may well be very attractive to claimants here. Those US laws are certainly within reach of claimants, using Article 7 Rome II. There is no question the damage ‘arises out of’ environmental damage (unlike the hesitation in Begum v Maran). There is certainly merit in the suggestion that locus delicti commissi is in St Paul, Minessota. Like with its fellow manufacturers and industrial users of PFAS, 3M’s worldwide grip on corporate communication and legal strategy on the issue is tight. More importantly, the decision tree on the manufacture, use and emissions of PFAS is arguably equally located at holding level. Reference here can be made to the relevance of Shell’s holding policy in lex causae determination in the recent climate ruling.

Clearly, via A17 Rome II, Flemish and of course European environmental law would play a role (cue Isabelle’s slidedeck for an excellent starter).

A collective action procedure in say The Netherlands in my view would be an ideal strategy to test these most murky waters.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd. ed. 2021, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.3 (4.54 ff).

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Aldricus – Kulineran itu tidak pernah jauh dari yang bernama travelling . Maka, ketika kamu travelling, kulineran jadi aktivitas yang harus kamu lakukan. Selainnya coba makanan ciri khas tradisionilnya, saat kembali travelling juga kamu harus coba bermacam es krim terbaik ciri khas negara itu.

Walau Rolled Ice Krim kerap kamu temuin di mal-mal di Jakarta, tetapi pasalnya Rolled Ice Krim ini berawal di Thailand dan populer dengan rasa dan toppingnya yang memikat sekali. Jika kamu ke Thailand, harus coba Rolled Ice Krim ini!

Halva Ice Cream

Es cream yang dari Israel ini memang jadi favorite sekali. Dibuat dari kue Halva dan umumnya diberi topping pistasio yang buat dia jadi semakin memikat. Belum juga jika gunakan topping cokelat.

Jepang dengan Mochi Ice Creamnya

Kamu perlu ke Jepang nih untuk merasakan Mochi Ice Krim bikinan Jepang sekali. Dengan bebatan mochi yang halus dan diberi es cream bermacam rasa didalamnya memberinya kamu kesan yang lain saat kembali makan mochi. Belum juga design mochinya bermacam berdasar rasa, Instagrammable sekali dech!

Itali dengan Gelatonya

Gelato di italia

Di Jakarta memang sudah ada beberapa Gelato sich, tetapi pada intinya Gelato yang asli tiba dari Italia. Kamu tidak perlu ngeraguin kembali keautentikan rasa dan kehalusan gelatonya, kamu tentu suka. Kamu perlu ikhlas terbang jauh ke Italia nih untuk coba Gelato terenaknya.

Prancis dengan Foie Gras Ice Creamnya

Es cream tidak hanya dapat dipaduin dengan topping yang manis-manis seperti cokelat, keju atau beragam rasa buah-buahan yang lain lho. Kamu perlu coba ke Prancis untuk coba Foie Gras Ice Creamnya yang dibuat dari dalam hati angsa. Tidak boleh salah, Foie Gras ini harga setinggi langit sekali, tidak bingung jika es krimnya akan lebih mahal dibanding rasa es cream lainnya. Tetapi, untuk kamu pencinta es cream, kamu harus coba terbang ke Prancis dan coba Foie Gras asli sananya!

India dengan Kulfi Ice Cream

Karena ada Kulfi Ice Krim, alasanmu untuk berkunjung India jadi semakin. Masalahnya, es cream tradisionil ini tidak hanya jadi favorite beberapa orang lokal saja, penjualannya sudah capai di beberapa negara, bahkan juga sudah menyebar di Australia dan sekitaran.

Iran dengan Faloodeh Ice Cream

Sudah pernah coba mie pasta yang dijadiin dessert? Nach, kamu perlu terbang jauh ke Iran untuk coba Faloodeh Ice Creamnya ini. Mie Vermicellinya dibikin dari tepung jagung dan dapat di gabungin dengan topping sesuai dengan selera.

Turki dengan Dondurmanya

Salah satunya alasan kamu kerap membeli es cream Turki yang di Jakarta tentu karena performa beberapa stafnya, kan? Umumnya, beberapa penampil yang di Jakarta mnegutamakan kecepatan tangan. Jika kamu ke Turkinya langsung, kamu akan kagum dech beberapa penampilnya dapat mengusung satu loyang es krimnya cuman dengan 1 tongkat tanpa jatuh! Walau sekalian pegang es cream yang besar dan berat itu, mereka tetap mainkan kecepatan tangannya, lho!

Filipina dengan Cheese Ice Creamnya

Nach, untuk kamu fans es cream sekalian pencinta rasa keju, kamu harus melipir ke Filipina nih untuk coba Cheese Ice Creamnya yang super populer.

Spaghetti ice cream

Jerman punyai langkah lain untuk nikmati es cream yakni dibuat jadi spaghetti. Umumnya, topping yang disodorin selai strawberry dengan es cream rasa vanilla, menjadi penampilannya betul-betul serupa spaghetti betulan.

The post Negara yang Wajib Dikunjungi Karena Es Krim Terbaik appeared first on Aldri Blog.

The Council Conclusions on the Protection of Vulnerable Adults across the European Union have been published this week at the OJEU (C 330I, 17.8.2021, p. 1).

Extract : « The Council invites the Commission to:

On civil law matters

— assess possible actions to encourage further Member States to ratify the 2000 Hague Convention as swiftly as possible;

— conduct a thorough study aimed at carefully reflecting on and assessing how the European Union could further strengthen the protection of vulnerable adults in cross-border situations;

— consider the possible need for a legal framework within the European Union to facilitate the free circulation of judicial and extrajudicial decisions on the protection of vulnerable adults in civil matters, which might also include powers of representation, and advance directives on medical treatment;

— present to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a report on the results of the study, accompanied, if necessary, by legislative proposals ».

It is likely that the issue will become more and more pressing as time passes since no European country reaches the demographic survival rate (renewal of population : 2.1).

Yesterday (10 August 2021), the Hague Conference issued a press release according to which, on 23 July 2021, New Zealand ratified the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for it on 1 November 2021.

Source : https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=814

The Court delivered earlier this week (2 August 2021) its decision in case C‑262/21 PPU (A v B), which is about the impact of a transfer decision under Regulation no 604/2013 on the terms “wrongful removal or retention” under Article 2 Brussels II bis (adoption of the transfer decision followed by its annulment without the tranferred persons being authorised to return). The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 2, point 11, du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que ne peut constituer un déplacement illicite ou un non-retour illicite, au sens de cette disposition, la situation dans laquelle l’un des parents, sans l’accord de l’autre parent, est conduit à emmener son enfant de son État de résidence habituelle vers un autre État membre en exécution d’une décision de transfert prise par le premier État membre, sur le fondement du règlement (UE) no 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des États membres par un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride, puis à demeurer dans le second État membre après que cette décision de transfert a été annulée sans pour autant que les autorités du premier État membre aient décidé de reprendre en charge les personnes transférées ou d’autoriser celles-ci au séjour ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=F6B1AEDDB2F275B0B192DEE518C60676?text=&docid=244847&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4913022

Décès de M. Barna Berke, juge au Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Puigdemont i Casamajó e.a. / Parlement
Le vice-président du Tribunal de l’Union européenne rejette la demande de suspension de la levée de l’immunité parlementaire de MM. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó et Antoni Comín i Oliveres ainsi que de Mme Clara Ponsatí i Obiols

This guest  post was written by Ahmed Alzaabi, a legal researcher based at Abu Dhabi. It is great material for comparative conflicts purposes, as it highlights issues like ‘clearly demonstrated’ choice of court, hybrid jurisdiction clauses, and lex contractus for choice of court. Geert.

Introduction

The Dubai International Financial Center Court of Appeal (DIFC CA) delivered an interesting judgment in Goel and others v Credit Suisse (Switzerland) Limited [CA-002-2021} on 26 April 2021, which addresses the DIFC Courts opt-in jurisdiction. It is the most important decision since the opt-in clauses came into force in 2011. The case deals with personal guarantees entered into by Goel and others as Guarantors, and Credit Suisse AG as Lender. A term of the guarantee agreements refers to the jurisdiction of the “Courts of Dubai”.

An ex parte application was filed before the DIFC Court of First Instance (CFI) and was dismissed by H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani on ground that the words “Courts of Dubai” were not specific, clear and express as required by Article 5(A)(2) of the DIFC Judicial Authority Law[i] (“JAL”) to opt-in into the DIFC jurisdiction.

The application was appealed and determined by Justice Wayne Martin, who ruled that the DIFC CFI has the jurisdiction to hear and decide any substantive claim filed by the Respondent. Justice Wayne Martin issued a world-wide freezing order (WFO) against the Guarantors and the order was appealed on the basis that the jurisdiction term in the Guarantee Agreements refers to the Courts of Dubai, and not to the DIFC Courts, therefore, the DIFC Courts shall have no jurisdiction to decide on this matter. The DIFC CA dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of Justice Wayne Martin.

Overview of the dispute:

• Description of the parties. Credit Suisse AG (was a DIFC Establishment), and Credit Suisse (Switzerland) LIMITED (Respondent) are both subsidiary banks wholly owned by a Credit Suisse Group (a company registered in Switzerland). Goel and others (Appellants) are shareholders and directors of GP FZC (a parent company of GP Group of companies and offices all over the world).

• Facts. On 13 May 2016, the Appellants entered into Guarantee Agreements with the Credit Suisse AG guarantying the performance of various borrowers of GP Group under a Credit Facility Agreement. Furthermore, on September 2016, Guarantee Transfer Agreements were signed between the Credit Suisse AG and the Appellants providing for the transfer of the rights and obligations of the guarantees to benefit the Respondent. The Appellants undertook to perform their obligations toward the Respondent as if the Respondent has been a party to the original Guarantee Agreements. At the time of signing the Guarantee and Transfer Agreements, the Credit Suisse AG was a “DIFC Establishment” within the definition of DIFC JAL. Neither Appellants nor Respondent were a DIFC Establishment.

The Guarantee Agreements provide in its clause 16 that the governing law is the Law of the Emirate of Dubai and the Applicable Federal Law of the United Arab Emirates. Clause 17 of the Guarantees (enforcement provision) refers to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Dubai, and clause 17.1 entitles the lender, Credit Suisse AG, to initiate legal proceedings before any other competent court. On the other hand, clause 7 of the Guarantee Transfer Agreements[ii] refers to the applicable law and jurisdiction, which states that any contractual or non- contractual obligations of the Transfer Agreements shall be governed by the Laws of the Emirate of Dubai, and the applicable Federal Laws of the United Arab Emirates. In addition, any dispute arising out of the Transfer Agreements which relates to any provisions of the Guarantees (as transferred and amended) shall be subject to the same jurisdictional provisions of the Guarantee Agreements.

• Proceedings. The Respondent filed an application before the DIFC CFI requesting for a world-wide freezing order (WFO) to restrain the Appellants from dealing or disposing of their assets until the determination of the Respondent’s substantive claim. The CFI dismissed the claim on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, and stated that the order sought would have been granted if the court has the jurisdiction, as the Respondent made all the grounds for making such order. The Respondent appealed that decision, and the CA allowed the appeal and upheld that the judge of CFI should have granted that order on the basis that there is a good arguable case to the extent that the court has the jurisdiction. The CA added that, the CFI judge should have leave it open to the Appellants to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. Following this decision, the WFO was issued on 13 September 2020 and served on the Appellants. The Appellants filed an application to challenge the court’s jurisdiction arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that decision, and requested to dismiss the proceedings. Justice Martin, the assigned judge to hear the Appellants’ application, dismissed the application and held that DIFC Courts had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the Respondent’s substantive claim and the WFO against the Appellants, and he published his interesting reasoning for that decision on 4 October 2020.

• CFI Decision. It was common ground for the judge and the parties that the applicable law governing the guarantees are the laws of the Emirate of Dubai and the applicable Federal Law of the United Arab Emirates. Justice Martin referred to Article 6 of the JAL, which provides that “the Court shall apply the DIFC Laws and Regulations, except where the parties have explicitly agreed to another law to govern the dispute, provided that that law doesn’t contradict with the public policy and morals”. Accordingly, he pointed that this article clarifies that the parties may select another governing law than DIFC Laws. However, the choice made by the parties will not place the dispute outside the DIFC Courts jurisdiction.

Justice Martin then focused on whether the Court has the jurisdiction to enter the WFO in support of the Respondent’s substantive claim. He had to determine a question of if the Respondent could establish that the claim against the Appellants passed through one or other of the “gateways” to the jurisdiction of the CFI as stipulated in Article 5 of the JAL. His finding was that the only available “gateway” is Article 5(A)(2) of the JAL, which states the following: “the Court of First Instance may hear and determine any civil or commercial claims or actions where the parties agree in writing to file such claim or action with it whether before or after the dispute arises, provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions”. He further noted that the Respondent submitted and Appellants denied that clauses 17.1 and 17.2 of the Guarantee Agreements constitute an agreement in writing within the meaning of Article (5)(A)(2) of the JAL.

Justice Martin analysed the UAE Civil Transactions Code as a governing law applied to the contract and cited Articles 258 and 265, which address the intention of the parties to a contract. He also looked at a commentary on the Civil Transactions Code approved by the Ministry of Justice. The result of his analysis is that: “the both UAE legal system and the common law require the Court to confirm the join intention of the parties. The joint intention could be ascertained by interpreting words which the parties have used to record their agreement objectively, as they would be understood by a reasonable business person having the knowledge of the circumstances known to the parties at the time they entered into their contract”.

Justice Martin then referred to three prior decisions of DIFC Courts (Sunteck, Taalem, and IGPL), in which the CA rejected the proposition that the words “Dubai Courts” mean only non-DIFC Courts. He extracted from these three decisions the following propositions:

(a) it is not mandatory for the contract to specifically refer to the jurisdiction of the “DIFC Courts” to consider the gateway to the jurisdiction specified by Article 5(A)(2) of the JAL;

(b) the Court is to determine the question whether the joint intention of the parties meant to select the jurisdiction of DIFC Courts to hear such kind of dispute;

(c) that question could be resolved by referring to the natural and ordinary meaning of the jurisdictional words as the parties would have been mutually understood them having regard to the circumstances, the nature of the agreement and the context in which the words are used;

(d) if the Court concluded that the parties intended to refer to the DIFC jurisdiction when using the words recorded in their contract, those words will satisfy the requirements set by Article 5(A)(2) ““specific, clear and express provisions”;

(e) the words (Dubai Courts) or (Courts of Dubai) in their natural and ordinary meaning refer to all courts established in the Emirates of Dubai, including the DIFC Courts and the non-DIFC Courts;

(f) if one of the parties was a DIFC establishment at the time of signing a jurisdiction agreement, the other party would have taken into consideration and understood that the DIFC Courts, by default, would have the exclusive jurisdiction within Dubai to hear and determine any dispute arising out of that agreement. It would require a clear and express words to come to the result that the parties’ mutual intention is to exclude the jurisdiction of DIFC Courts.

Justice Martin selected the IGPL among the other two decisions, although it was an opt-out and not op-in case, but it shares common facts which are relevant to the question that the judge has to decide. The similarities with IGPL being (a) the relevant agreements were governed by the applicable Laws of UAE; (b) the words used in the jurisdiction agreements were identical (c) one of the party was a DIFC establishment at the time that the jurisdiction agreements were signed. Given those similarities, Justice Martin was bound to apply the reasoning in IGPL to conclude that clause 17.1 of the Guarantee Agreements indicates the mutual intention of the parties at the time that the agreements were signed. He highlighted that Credit Suisse AG was a DIFC Establishment at the time the guarantee agreements were signed. This constitutes a strong indication that the mutual intention of the parties was to include DIFC Courts within the meaning of the words “Courts of Dubai”. There was no indication of mutual intention of the parties to exclude DIFC Courts jurisdiction.

The judge stated the following circumstances which support the proposition that the words ‘Courts of Dubai’ should hold ordinary meaning to include DIFC Courts: “(a) the agreements are all in English language (the DIFC Courts operate in English); (b) Credit Suisse AG is a Foreign Company, incorporated in Switzerland; (c) a number of the borrowers under the Credit Facility Agreement were incorporated in foreign jurisdictions; (d) the Guarantors are all Indian nationals with Indian passports; and (e) clause 17.3 of each Guarantee expressly recognises the prospect of enforcement proceedings in foreign jurisdictions. These circumstances support the proposition that the parties have intended to refer to a court within the Emirate of Dubai which has an international characteristic as well as an onshore court of Dubai.

• DIFC CA Decision. The Appellants challenged the CFI decision after the permission of appeal has been granted and provided that the CFI does not have jurisdiction to determine the substantive claim against the Appellants including the WTO application. The appeal was unsuccessful. The CA upheld that the jurisdiction clause used in the contract was a solid agreement to opt-in to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction in accordance with article 5 (A)(2) of the JAL. The CA added that when the term “the courts of Dubai” is used in an agreement, it has an ordinary meaning that refers to all courts incorporated within the Emirate of Dubai, including DIFC’s and non-DIFC’s Courts. Furthermore, the CA confirmed that the intention of the parties when they signed the agreement with a DIFC Establishment did not change the obligations on the Appellants when the Guarantee Transfer Agreements are signed in favour of a non DIFC Establishment. The CA then looked at the question of whether the clarity of the term “the courts of Dubai” is enough for the purposes of the gateway to jurisdiction within Article 5(A) (2) of the JAL.  The CA added that if as a matter of contractual construction, the parties had intended to agree that the DIFC Courts should have jurisdiction over their disputes, it would be a triumph of form over substance to hold that they failed because they did not use the term “DIFC Courts. On that note, the CA ruled that the parties’ contract was “specific, clear and express” enough to opt-in to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Court.

The CA highlighted in its conclusion that the construction of terms such as “courts of Dubai” will rely upon their context. Moreover, the transactions’ history matter in this case is significant to the constructional conclusion.

• Conclusion. This case points out that the parties wishing to include or exclude DIFC jurisdiction should use a clear and express language in their contract to minimise jurisdictional disputes risk and avoid any ambiguity.

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Browitt [2021] FCA 653 is a great addition to the comparative conflicts binder, particularly from the angle of ‘consent’ in business to consumer contracts. It also engages a classic tripartite relation between the consumer, signing a contract with a travel agent, whose GTCS in turn incorporate the GTCS of the carrier.

The case follows on from the December 2019 volcanic eruption at Whakaari.  (Mrs Browitt), for herself and as representative of the deceased estates of her late husband Paul and late daughter Krystal, and Stephanie (Ms Browitt), a daughter who survived the eruption with horrific injuries, are suing Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd (RCCL), a Liberian registered company headquartered and operating in Miami, Florida, in the courts at Miami. There are applicable law and procedural advantages (incl discovery and trial (both on culpability and level of damages) by jury).

RCL Cruises Ltd (RCL) and RCCL apply for anti-suit in the FCA arguing that the Browitts were passengers on the Ovation of the Seas pursuant to a contract of carriage between the Browitts and RCL as the disponent owner and operator of the vessel. They seek a declaration that it was a term of the contract, signed at Flight Centre in Victoria, Australia, that any disputes between the parties would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New South Wales.

The list of issues to be determined is long but I repeat it here anyways for they highlight the complexity of issues following a routine purchase of a cruise:

(1)    Was Flight Centre the agent of Mrs Browitt, RCL or both?

(2)    Were the RCL AU terms, including the exclusive jurisdiction clause, incorporated into the contract of carriage by: (a)    reference in the Flight Centre terms and conditions signed by Mrs Browitt on 14 February 2019? (b)    the text of a Royal Caribbean brochure? (c)    links on the RCL AU website? (d)    links in emails? (e)    links in the electronic guestbook?

(3)    As to the construction of the RCL AU terms: (a)    is RCL entitled to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction clause to restrain the Florida proceedings? (b)    is RCCL entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause? (c)    did the purchase of insurance exclude the operation of the terms (cl 1)? (The respondents later dropped reliance on the purchase of insurance as excluding the operation of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, so this issue fell away.) (d)    does the contract of carriage apply to shore excursions (cl 25)? If not, does the exclusive jurisdiction clause nonetheless operate to restrain the Florida proceedings? (e)    does the exclusive jurisdiction clause permit a proceeding to be brought in the Federal Court of Australia sitting in New South Wales, and if not, what consequence follows from the commencement of this proceeding (cl 1, cl 37/38)? (f)    does the exclusive jurisdiction clause cover the Florida proceeding?

(4)    Is RCCL entitled to relief on the basis of the RCL AU terms?

(5)    Is the Florida proceeding vexatious and oppressive such that RCL and RCCL are entitled to an anti-suit injunction?

The judge held that although the Browitts were bound by the RCL AU terms, the Florida proceeding is not in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement in those terms because RCCL is not a party to the agreement and RCCL does not enjoy the benefit of it. Also, there is no basis for the alternative case that the Florida proceeding is in any event vexatious and oppressive such as to justify an order restraining Mrs Browitt and Ms Browitt from pursuing it.

Terms and conditions were available on relevant websites and brochures, shown to and browsed by Mrs Browitt but not for the purposes of terms and conditions. Rather, as one would expect, for details of the journey, vessels etc. Unlike a quote, the eventual invoice included as part of the document three pages of booking terms and conditions. Some of those were highlighted in the copy made available to Mrs Browitt  Mrs Browitt could have read the GTCS but there was no inidcation she had or had been specifically pointed to them. Nothing in either version of the invoice, i.e., that which was printed for and signed by Mrs Browitt and that which was emailed by the agency, identifies which of RCCL and RCL was offering the cruise or operating the vessel.

The judgment, which I would invite readers to consult, eventually boils down to limitations of ‘agency’, privity of contract, and clear determination of contractual clauses. It does not decide for the Browitts on the basis of a particular concern for the weaker party in a classic B2C transaction, rather on the need for parties clearly to think through their spaghetti bowl of overlapping arrangements and GTCs when hoping to rely on them in court.

Geert.

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd v Browitt [2021] FCA 653
Consumer contracts, exclusive choice of court, privity (and sloppy drafting)
|Federal Court clears the way for victims of the White Island Volcano to sue in Florida https://t.co/qGjGc4DUaQ

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 13, 2021

C (A Child) [2021] EWFC 32 involves an application brought by a mother (M) against the father (F) in relation to their daughter (C). M was born in Russia and is a citizen of Finland. Her mother and step-father live in France, where C was born in August 2014. F was born in Sweden and is resident in Monaco. Does the English court have jurisdiction to hear M’s application?

F had made his own, clearly pre-emptive application (ia involving a denial of fatherhood – later corrected by the DNA testing) in Monaco about a week earlier than M’s. That application is translated at [3] and it unfortunately illustrates the quasi inevitably acrimonious nature of these kinds of applications. In March 2021 the courts at Monaco declared they had jurisdiction for the father’s parentage and subsidiary maintenance claim. The father incidentally in late December 2020 also issued pre-emptive proceedings in Grasse, France, with a view to establish an EU court being seized prior to Brexit date.

F cites a wide variety of CJEU authority re the maintenance regulation’s forum shopping potential which eventually fails, inter alia for [47] it is the maintenance creditor, not the debtor, which the EU system aims to protect (reference also to Villiers v Villiers).

At 15 ff counsel for F argues reflexive effect of the Maintenance Regulation’s lis pendens rule, referring pro inspiratio to Ferrexpo. Munby J adroitly describes the theory of reflexive effect as being one of domestic, i.e. English law, not EU law. He rejects reflexive effect of the lis pendens rules, mostly [57] because of the very different nature of maintenance obligations. (For similar reasons he distinguishes [58] the Court of Appeal’s reflexive effect of the Lugano lis pendens rules in Privatbank – which in my view was wrongly decided).

Argument rejected therefore for reflexive effect of the EU Maintenance Regulation 4/2009.  Habitual residence of M was found to be in E&W, amongst an acrimonious parties’ to and fro on abusive forum shopping and maintenance tourism.

An interesting judgment.

Geert.

C (A Child) [2021] EWFC 32
Argument rejected for reflexive effect of EU Maintenance Regulation 4/2009 (hence stay of E&W proceedings) viz father resident in Monaco
Habitual residence found to be in E&W
Munby J ending with the below rebuke on costs https://t.co/EvLBrP9dNZ pic.twitter.com/FGe6JcjyZh

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 23, 2021

 

« From 5 to 9 July 2021, the Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met for the ninth time. […] The Experts’ Group discussed the scope of the possible draft Convention on legal parentage (draft Convention) and the scope of the possible draft Protocol on legal parentage established as a result of an (international) surrogacy arrangement (draft Protocol). The Group discussed in particular the desirability and feasibility of including domestic adoptions in the scope of the draft Convention; legal parentage established as a result of a domestic surrogacy arrangement in the draft Convention or draft Protocol; and domestic adoptions in the context of a (domestic / international) surrogacy arrangement in the draft Convention or draft Protocol.

The Experts’ Group will meet again in November 2021 and in 2022, before submitting its final report for the 2023 CGAP meeting ».

The report of the ninth meeting is available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a29ca035-f4d9-469f-9ff9-cd9fca1918c8.pdf. One finds in it the Aide-mémoire of the meeting.

Windhorst v Levy [2021] EWHC 1168 (QB) has been in my in-tray a little while. The court was asked to consider whether registration of a German judgment under Brussels Ia should be set aside when the judgment debt in question was subsequently included within a binding insolvency plan, which is to be recognized in E&W pursuant to the European Insolvency Regulation  – EIR 1346/2000 (not materially different on this point to the EIR 2015). Precedent referred to includes Percival v Moto Novu LLC.

Appellant argues the registration order should be set aside as the initial 2003  judgment is no longer enforceable, having been waived as part of a binding insolvency plan, which came into effect by order of a German court on 31 August 2007 (“the Insolvency Plan”), and which this court is bound to recognize under the Insolvency Regulation.

In CJEU C-267/97 Coursier v Fortis Bank SA (held before the adoption of the EIR) it was held that enforceability of a judgment in the state of origin is a precondition for its enforcement in the state in which enforcement is sought. However that judgment then at length discussed what ‘enforceability’ means, leading to the Court holding that it refers solely to the enforceability, in formal terms, of foreign decisions and not to the circumstances in which such decisions may in practice be executed in the State of origin. This does not require proof of practical enforceability. The CJEU left  it to ‘the court of the State in which enforcement is sought, in appeal proceedings brought under [(now) Brussels Ia], to determine, in accordance with its domestic law including the rules of private international law, the legal effects of a decision given in the State of origin in relation to a court-supervised liquidation.’

The respondent contends that, applying the test laid down in Coursier v Fortis, the 2003 Judgment plainly remains enforceable in formal terms under German law.

The judge, at 52 ff, refers ia to CJEU Prism Investments and Salzgitter to emphasise the very narrow window for refusal of recognition, and holds [56] that the German judgment clearly is still formally enforceable in Germany (where enforcement is nota bene only temporarily stayed pending appeal proceedings). The effects of the German insolvency plan, under German law, are not such that the 2003 judgment has become unenforceable [58].

The request for a stay of execution is also denied, seeing as the appellant chose not to pursue a means available to it under German law and before the German courts, to seek a stay (it would have required it to put down the equivalent sum as court security).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.560 ff, 5.141 ff.

Brussels I (not Ia; no material difference), Insolvency Regulation EIR
Whether registration of DE judment should be set aside when debt subsequently included in #insolvency plan, to be recognized under EIR
Windhorst v Levy [2021] EWHC 1168 (QB) (6 05 2021)https://t.co/B23rsMDykA

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 7, 2021

Winslet & Ors v Gisel, The Estate of [2021] EWHC 1308 (Comm) is a brilliant example to teach the ‘looking over the fence’ method for determining forum contractus under Article 7(1), for contracts that do not fall within the default categories and whence the CJEU De Bloos place of performance bumps into the limits of harmonisation following CJEU Tessili v Dunlop. Confused?: the judgment certainly helps.

Claimants, domiciled at England, seek to recover from the estate of a late friend, a considerable sum by way of repayment of principal in respect of a number of interest-free loans between friends (the borrower domiciled at France).

At [16] Butcher J holds (despite considering the broad interpretation of ‘services’ by the AG in Corman-Collins /Maison du Whiskey) ‘In my judgment, the simple provision of money to a friend, which is not undertaken as part of a business of lending money, probably does not qualify as the provision of a service’ (per A7(2), GAVC – reference is made to C-533/07 Falco Privatstiftung v Weller-Lindhorst [29]: “The concept of services implies, at the least, that the party who provides the service carries out a particular activity in return for remuneration.”

The answer to the question ‘what is the place of performance of the obligation to repay’ therefore leads to Rome I per CJEU Tessili v Dunlop and to Article 4(2) Rome I. [26]

‘In the context of banking services, it is, at least ordinarily, the lender that renders characteristic performance of a loan agreement in providing the principal sum to the borrower’ (reference to CJEU Kareda). [27] ‘The question of which party renders the characteristic performance of a loan agreement outside the sphere of financial services has been viewed as rather less clear cut.’ [32] ‘pursuant to the contracts of loan which are in issue, claimants loaned money in return for a promise to repay.’ They, it is held, rendered characteristic performance under the Loans.

As a result, the Loans are governed by English law, as England is the place where each claimant has his or its habitual residence, and English law therefore determines the place of performance, which it does at the creditor’s place of residence or business (contrary it would seem to the position under French law.

Superbly clear analysis.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.401 ff.

A classic De Bloos, Tessili v Dunlop looking over the fence quagmire.
A7(1) forum contractus 'goods', 'services', 'neither' issue.
Winslet & Ors v Gisel, The Estate of [2021] EWHC 1308 (Comm)https://t.co/LlwbfpJaWR

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 7, 2021

In ID v LU & Anor [2021] EWHC 1851 (Comm) Pelling J discusses a challenge to jurisdiction in which each of the parties are Ukrainian nationals. Brussels Ia applies but is only engaged viz one of the defendants. Claimant and second defendant are both domiciled and resident in Ukraine. The first defendant is a Ukrainian national who is and was at all material times domiciled in an otherwise unidentified EU Member State.

Claimant alleges that the second defendant approached him requesting that he move his corporate banking business to the second defendant, a Bank. Following discussions, the claimant agreed to do so and considerable funds  were placed with The Bank. The claimant’s case is that he agreed to do so only after the second defendant agreed that he would undertake personal responsibility for all monies that the companies placed with The Bank. The claimant alleges that it was expressly agreed by the claimant and second defendant that this oral agreement was governed by English law.

There was more tro and fro however I focus here on the jurisdictional challenge. With reference to Article 4 BIa and the most recent authority of Vedanta, the judge holds that in principle the defendant with EU domicile has a right to refuse to be sued other than in his place of domicile. However that defendant acknowledged service, indicating an intention to defend the claim but not to contest jurisdiction. This leads the judge to conclude, after some discussion, that there is A26 BIa submission (aka voluntary appearance).

Next follows an important discussion on the circumstances in which a defendant who voluntarily submits, may serve as an anchor defendant under the English residual rules.  It would certainly not be possible under Brussels Ia. The relevant rule in the practice directions (this is ‘Gateway 3’) reads

“3.1 The claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court under rule 6.36 where –… 3) A claim is made against a person (‘the defendant’) on whom the claim form has been or will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and  – a) there is between the claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a necessary or proper party to that claim.

Second defendant argues claimant is not entitled to rely on Gateway 3 because the first defendant is not a defendant who is to be treated as being a person on whom the claim form has been or will be served because the court has jurisdiction over the first defendant only because he has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court. The overall nature of the discussions on this issue essentially discuss the need to avoid abuse. Of note in this respect is the judge finding [41] that there is ‘no evidence that suggests that there was any agreement reached between the claimant and the first defendant by which the first defendant agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court prior to the issue of the Claim Form in these proceedings or for that matter afterwards.’

Nevertheless the judge holds that the current authorities in particular the Court of Appeal in the Benarty [1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 361, continue to not permit a claimant to rely on an anchor defendant who has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction when he could not otherwise have been served in accordance with the CPR. Obiter he holds that while there is a real issue to be tried against the second defendant, the contract gateway for jurisdiction (which would require English law to be the lex contractus) is not engaged. No clearly demonstrated will exists for English law to be lex voluntatis per Rome I [76] and [80]

There is no plausible evidential basis to submit that that the governing law identified by either Article 4(2), 4(3), or 4(4) [of Rome 1] would be English law. The Tripartite Agreement was, if made: (a) agreed between three Ukrainians who reside (or resided) in Ukraine and/or [The EU Member State]; (b) agreed in, variously, [The EU Member State], Ukraine, and France; (c) premised on a further agreement said to have been agreed in Ukraine, between two Ukrainians, in respect of deposits made by Ukrainians into a Ukrainian bank; (d) to be performed outside England. No party has provided any evidence of any connection between themselves, or the Tripartite Agreement, and England”

Neither does the tort gateway help [83]:

There is no evidence that at any stage any of the contact that took place leading to what the claimant contends to be the inducement of a breach by the first defendant of the Tripartite Agreement took place otherwise than in either Ukraine or The EU Member State.

At [86] ff England is, equally obiter, held to be forum non conveniens.

Lack of jurisdiction against the second defendant is confirmed. One imagines there might be ground of appeal given the change to the practice directions’ formulation after the Benarty and the need to clear up this principled issue.

Geert.