Flux européens

I am late in reporting  Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 326, in which the Court of Appeal rejected an application for strike-out. I reported on the High Court judgment here and I should add I am instructed for claimant in the case. Oliver Holland, the lead Leigh Day solicitor in the case, discusses its implications together with Rachel Bonner (who was led by Richard Hermer) here.

Coulson LJ held that it is at least arguable (reminder: the specific action that was being discussed was an application for strike-out) that Maran does have a duty of care. His analysis essentially leans heavily on the fact that Maran availed itself of a disposal route, the consequences of which it was much aware of. It is clear that the well-known Bangladesh route to escape health, safety and environmental standards for the dismantling of ships, is questionable under the Basel Convention on Hazardous wastes and their disposal, and that shipowners have been using privity of contract in an attempt to shield themselves from any liability for consequences which are neither unexpected nor infrequent.

Others have written on the duty of care issue and I will focus on the A7 Rome II discussion: the lex specialis for environmental damage – on which I have a paper forthcoming (but to find more time!).  At 78 ff Coulson LJ firstly links the requirement of causality (the use of the flimsy ‘arising out of’) to the non-contractual obligation claimed (here: corporate duty of care), rather than the one immediately following the damage (here: negligence, recklessness causing death). That duty of care does not, it was held, ‘arise out of’ environmental damage. [82]: ‘In essence, it is the duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the sale of the vessel for demolition purposes did not endanger human life or health. That duty did not arise out of environmental damage; it had nothing to do with environmental damage at all. It arose out of the complete absence of workplace safety.’ And at 86: ‘even if the court had to consider whether the death (rather than the duty) arose out of environmental damage, the result would be the same…the death arose out of the absence of safe working practices and, in particular, the absence of a safety harness.’ Support is found in scholarly sources suggesting a narrow interpretation of A7; other sources are not discussed (despite having been submitted) and I continue to be convinced such limiting interpretation is not supported by the travaux. Males J, in his mostly concurring opinion, agrees that the last thing on A7 is far from said although he, too, holds that A7 is not engaged in casu.

Lord Justice Coulson obiter considers locus delicti commissi (which would be  the alternative lex causae under A7) and at 91 succinctly holds (pro memoria: obiter) that this would not have been England. There is authority I would suggest for the opposite finding and the judge’s interpretation of Arica Victims, I submit,  leaves room for discussion: at 91 he correctly refers to the Ovre Norrland Court of Appeal having pointed to ‘key decisions’ having been made in Sweden. These to me seem present in current case, too (and here: located in England).

At 110 ff the ordre public argument under A26 Rome II, which could displace the shorter statute of limitation of the Bangladeshi lex causae, for the longer English one, is succinctly dismissed as not meeting A26’s high hurdle. This leaves a narrower (and perhaps curiously indirect) ‘undue hardship’ argument under the E&W Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 to be discussed as a preliminary issue at the remanded trial in the High Court.

A most relevant case, also highlighting the many unresolved issues under A7 Rome II.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.54 ff.

Commission / Pologne (Régime disciplinaire des juges)
Principes du droit communautaire
L’avocat général Tanchev invite la Cour à juger que la législation polonaise sur le régime disciplinaire des juges est contraire au droit de l’Union

The European Commission published yesterday its assessment of the UK application to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention (the document is only available in two EU official languages, as well as in English). Its conclusion:

“the Commission takes the view that the European Union should not give its consent to the accession of the United Kingdom to the 2007 Lugano Convention. For the European Union, the Lugano Convention is a flanking measure of the internal market and relates to the EU-EFTA/EEA context. In relation to all other third countries the consistent policy of the European Union is to promote cooperation within the framework of the multilateral Hague Conventions. The United Kingdom is a third country without a special link to the internal market. Therefore, there is no reason for the European Union to depart from its general approach in relation to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Hague Conventions should provide the framework for future cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom in the field of civil judicial cooperation”.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/communication-assessment-application-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-accede-2007-lugano-convention_en

The official version of the different agreements concluded in December 2020 between the European Union and the United Kingdom has been published yesterday (30 April 2021) at the Official Journal of the European Union. This version replaces retroactively the one used until now. The official version is available in all official languages of the European Union as well as in English. Please find the English version attached (with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement starting page 12 of the pdf).

brexit-final-version-of-agreeements-and-related-documentsDownload

Banco de Portugal e.a.
DFON
La reconnaissance inconditionnelle d’une mesure d’assainissement rétroactive d’un établissement de crédit est contraire au droit de l’Union si elle implique que le client ne puisse plus poursuivre une procédure judiciaire au fond entamée contre la « banque relais » à laquelle le passif en cause avait antérieurement été transmis

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑301/20 (UE, HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank AG), which is about the Succession Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 69 du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […], lu conjointement avec l’article 70, paragraphe 3, de ce règlement, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il y a lieu de reconnaître les effets de la copie certifiée conforme d’un certificat successoral européen qui était valable lorsqu’elle a été présentée la première fois, mais qui a expiré avant que l’autorité compétente prenne la décision sollicitée.
À titre d’exception, en cas d’indices raisonnables que le certificat successoral européen a été rectifié, modifié, retiré ou suspendu dans ses effets avant la décision de cette autorité, celle‑ci peut exiger la production d’une nouvelle copie ou d’une copie prorogée ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=240556&text=&dir=&doclang=FR&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=12509605

Cressida Mawdesley-Thomas has overview of the facts and issues in Johnson v Berentzen & Anor [2021] EWHC 1042 (QB) here. Stacey J essentially confirms the conclusions of Tipples J in Pandya.

The case concerns the extent of the ‘evidence and procedure’ exclusion from the Rome II Regulation on applicable law in the event of non-contractual obligations.  For the reasons I outlined in my review of the latter (readers please refer to same), I continue to disagree. With counsel for claimant I would suggest Pandya wrongly interpreted A15(h) Rome II in concluding that the provisions of A15 (‘scope of the law applicable) are to be construed widely , and the evidence and procedure exclusion (not: ‘exception’), narrowly.

Something for the Court of Appeal to look into, I would suggest.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.79 ff.

 

Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne
Agriculture
Avocat général Pitruzzella : les produits bénéficiant d’une AOP sont protégés contre toute forme de parasitisme commercial

X (Mandat d’arrêt européen - Ne bis in idem)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La Cour clarifie la portée du principe ne bis in idem applicable lors de l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen pour des faits qui ont déjà fait l’objet d’une condamnation antérieure dans un pays tiers

Ubezpieczeniowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny
Rapprochement des législations
La conclusion d’un contrat d’assurance de la responsabilité civile automobile est obligatoire lorsque le véhicule concerné est immatriculé dans un État membre et qu’il n’a pas été régulièrement retiré de la circulation

Stadt Karlsruhe (Reconnaissance d’un permis de conduire renouvelé)
Transport
Un État membre peut refuser de reconnaître un permis de conduire simplement renouvelé dans un autre État membre après qu’il a interdit à son titulaire de conduire sur son territoire

Natumi
Agriculture
Le droit de l’Union interdit l’ajout de l’algue Lithothamnium calcareum dans la transformation de denrées alimentaires biologiques telles que des boissons biologiques à base de riz et de soja aux fins de leur enrichissement en calcium

In WWRT Ltd v Tyshchenko & Anor [2021] EWHC 939 (Ch) and following an earlier Worldwide Freezing Order, Bacon J engages with Article 34 Brussels Ia’s forum non conveniens ‘light’ regime.

The proceedings are brought by WWRT ltd against Mr Serhiy Tyshchenko and his ex-wife, Mrs Olena Tyshchenko. The claim is founded on an allegation that the Defendants carried out an extensive fraud on the Ukrainian bank, JSC Fortuna Bank during which time the bank was (it is claimed) ultimately owned by Mr Tyshchenko. The bank was subsequently declared insolvent and was liquidated, in the course of which a package of its assets, including the disputed loans, was sold to Ukrainian company Star Investment One LLC.  Star in turn sold those rights and assets to WWRT in March 2020. WWRT’s case is that following those two assignments it has now acquired the rights to bring the claim relied upon in the present proceedings, which is one in tort under Article 1166 of the Ukrainian Civil Code.

In current proceedings, defendants contest jurisdiction, on the basis of 3 alternative grounds:

Firstly, the principle of ‘modified universalism’ (which I have discussed ia here) which should ground a stay under common law so as to prevent WWRT from bypassing the Ukrainian insolvency proceedings. The suggestion is that CJEU Owusu did not deal with a potential stay to allow the judge in one EU Member State to stay proceedings so as to support insolvency proceedings in another Member State. Bacon J held [57], in my view justifiably, that even if indeed the CJEU in Owusu did not specifically deal with this issue, its reasoning (particularly the insistence on predictability and legal certainty) extends to the current scenario. Insolvency proceedings may well (and indeed clearly) fall outside BIa’s scope, however the claim at issue is one in tort, which falls squarely within it. At 62 ff he discusses obiter that even if such stay would have been theoretically possible, he would not have exercised his discretion to grant it.

Secondly, at 89 ff, a stay by analogy with A34 BIa. It is seemingly common ground between the parties and the judge that the bankruptcy exclusion in A1 BIa precludes the express application of A34 if the pending action in the third State is in the nature of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. Support is found in Baker J’s views in BB Energy. This is not a settled issue. Neither is much discussion, pro or contra, of the in my view unjustifiable finding of reflexive application of A28 Lugano in JSC Commercial Bank v Kolomoisky [2019] EWCA Civ 1708. The more sound rejection of an A34 stay in the case at issue  in my view lies in the judge’s obiter finding at 95 that the proceedings in E&W are not ‘related’ to those in the Ukraine.

Thirdly, a more straightforward argument of lack of domicile of one of the defendants in the UK, hence room for a forum non conveniens stay. This argument was in fact dealt with first, at 38 ff, with Bacon J  holding on the basis of a pattern of settled residence that domicile was in fact established. At 98 ff he holds obiter that even if A4 hence BIa had not been engaged, he would not have allowed a stay on forum non grounds.

In conclusion, the freezing orders were continued.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, para 2.539 ff

WWRT v Tyshchenko aor [2021] EWHC 939 (Ch)
Principle of modified universalism should not be used to circumvent A4 BIa, Owuso; A34 held not to apply viz foreign #insolvency proceedings
More on the blog soonhttps://t.co/nt2vDo9BFN pic.twitter.com/p54PKkBH2Y

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 23, 2021

I apologise I could not find a snappier title to this post however Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion in C-30/20 Volvo Trucks yesterday (no English version had been published at the time of writing) does cover a lot of issues.

Applicant ‘RH’ brings a follow-on action, based on the EC finding of a cartel in the truck manufacturers market. Volvo contest Spain as the locus delicti commissi under A7(2) BIa, however that element is neither referred to the CJEU nor picked up by the AG. That is unfortunate for there is in my view most certainly scope for clarification as I discuss here.

There is also discussion whether A7(2) assigns international jurisdiction only, or also territorial jurisdiction. The referral decision in the end only refers the latter question to the Court. The Advocate General engages with quite a few more and I am not sure the CJEU itself will be inclined to entertain them all.

On that issue of territorial jurisdiction, the AG refers in particular to CJEU Wikingerhof to confirm with some force that A7(2) assigns both international and territorial jurisdiction. Other cases (and in particular AG Opinions) eg in CJEU Löber v Barclays already suggested the same and the overwhelming majority of scholarship has the same view, even if not always explicitly expressed. The AG in current Opinion refers ia to ratio legis, and the clear contrast in formulation between eg A4 and A7.

Next the AG discusses at length locus damni. CDC and Tibor-Trans (markets affected) are the core judgments which the discussion is anchored upon. The discussion here is  rounded up at 94 with the suggestion by the AG that in principle it is the location where the goods (here: the trucks) are purchased, which qualifies as the locus damni. He then revisits the awkward (see my handbook at 2.458) identification of registered office as locus damni, as it has been put forward by the CJEU in CDC. flyLAL further picked up on that discussion and the AG here, too, reviews that judgment. He concludes in the case at issue at 110 that the place of registered office of the claimant should be a fall-back option in case the locus damni does not correspond to the place where that claimant carries out its activities. None of this makes the application of A7(2) any more straightforward, of course.

Finally, the AG concurs with the view expressed by a number of Member States and the EC that the Member States should be able to employ their internal CPR rules to vary the principled territorial consequence of A7(2), which could to lead to a specialised court in the specific case of competition law. Here I disagree, despite the suggested limitation of not endangering effet utile (ia per CJEU Joined Cases C‑400/13 and C‑408/13 Sanders and Huber) and I do not think the justification (at 127 ff) for competition law specifically, justifies special treatment different from say intellectual property law, consumer law, environmental law etc. Claimants will be encouraged to dress up claims as relating to competition law if the centralised court is their court of choice, which will further endanger predictability.

A most rich Opinion and as noted I wonder how much of it the CJEU will be happy to engage with.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.12.2.8.

Opinion Richard de la Tour this morning. Volvo Trucks. Brussels Ia, determining locus delicti commissi, locus damni in #cartel cases.
Room for national CPR rules to concentrate A7(2) jurisdiction.https://t.co/TZZxPUBJzu

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 22, 2021

In C-73/20 Oeltrans Befrachtungsgesellschaft v Frerichs the CJEU held yesterday – no AG Opinion had been requested.

Applicant ZM has been the liquidator in the insolvency of Oeltrans Befrachtungsgesellschaft, established in Germany. Insolvency proceedings had been opened in April 2011. The Oeltrans group includes Tankfracht GmbH, also established in Germany. An inland waterway contract (a charter party) existed between Tankfracht and Frerich, established in the Netherlands, under which Tankfracht owed Frerich EUR 8 259.30. Frerich was to transport goods by vessel for Tankfracht from the Netherlands to Germany. In November 2010, Oeltrans paid Frerich the sum owed by Tankfracht,  ‘on the order of Tankfracht’. The application does not give any detail as to the circumstances of that ‘order’.

The liquidator seeks the repayment of that sum on the basis of the lex concurcus’, German law, insolvency pauliana. Frerichs contend that on the basis of A16 European Insolvency Regulation (‘EIR’) 2015 (in fact, the A13 almost identical version of the EIR 2000), such as applied ia in C-54/16 Vinyls Italia), Dutch law, the charter party’s lex contractus per the Rome I Regulation, shields it from the German Pauliana.

The core question is whether the impact of that lex contractus extends to payments made by third parties. In technical terms: whether effective contractual performance by third parties, is part of A12(1)b Rome I’s concept of ‘performance’ of the contract being within the scope of the lex contractus.

The CJEU, referring to Lutz and Nike, confirms the restrictive scope of A16 EIR. At 31-32 however it upholds the effet utile of A16, which as ia confirmed in Vinyls Italia, is to protect the legitimate expectations of a party contracting with a counterparty who subsequently enters insolvency proceedings, that the contract will continue to be governed by the lex contractus, not the lex concursus. ‘Performance’ per A12 Rome I is held to include performance by a third party. Many scholarly sources support the same conclusion, and e.g. Plender and Wilderspin, as well as McParland refer in support to the Guiliano-Lagarde report to the Rome Convention. I realise the CJEU does not refer to scholarly sources yet surely it could have referred to the Giuliano-Lagarde report to shore up its conclusions so succinctly formulated.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 3.98, paras 5.132 ff.

Challenge to acts that are detrimental to creditors – applicable law – interplay between Rome I/Insolvency Regulation https://t.co/xWSg8rFCWl

— Michiel Poesen (@Poesen_m) April 22, 2021

In Vestel Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. & Anor v Access Advance LLC & Anor [2021] EWCA Civ 440 – also known as Vestel v Philips, the Court of Appeal has rejected an attempt to establish jurisdiction for the Courts of England and Wales in a stand-alone competition law damages case.

Hacon J had earlier rejected jurisdiction in the claim which at first instance was formulated as an abuse of dominance claim. That claim was now reformulated with Birss LJ’s permission [30], with the relevant tort being the tort of patent infringement, and in effect the claim a negative declaration relating to that patent. That a claim for declaration of non-liability in tort (‘a ‘negative declaration’) may be covered by A7(2) BIa, was confirmed by the CJEU in C-133/11 Folien Fischer. In the case art issue, it would require Vestel to show it had not infringed a valid IP right. However Birss LJ holds that Vestel’s claim, aimed at obtaining a FRAND declaration for the patented technology (Vestel needs a licence for the technology patented by Philips, and wants it at FRAND terms: Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory).

The declarations sought by Vestel, after dropping the abuse of dominance plea, are in this form [49]: i) A declaration that the terms offered are not FRAND; ii) A declaration that the terms of Vestel’s counter-offer are FRAND; and  iii) Alternatively, a declaration as to the terms which would be FRAND. these, is it held, are not declarations of non-liability in tort. Vestel have not been given right to access the IPRs. They seek that right in specified terms. They cannot claim that a hypothetical right of entry can proactively ground jurisdiction on the ground that the non-existing access has not been transgressed. As Birss LJ puts it: ‘Vestel’s position is like that of a trespasser with no right to enter the property claiming that if they had permission then it would not be a trespass.’

This was a creative jurisdictional attempt. I think it justifiably failed.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.198; para 2.454.

Vestel v Philips
CA rejects attempt to ground E&W jurisdiction, unsuccessfully argued as an A7(2) abuse of dominance before the High Court (see https://t.co/5uMH0fbZrY as a negative declaration of #patent infringement per CJEU Folien Fischerhttps://t.co/R1S3Eu3iwn

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2021

Lin v Gudmundsson & Ors [2021 EWHC 820 (Ch) is an application to annul the bankruptcy of Mr Gudmundsson by his ex-wife. She argues inter alia that the bankruptcy order should not have been made because England was not Mr Gudmundsson’s COMI.

At 54, Briggs J (presumably so led by counsel) oddly holds that the EU Insolvency Regulation (‘EIR’) 2015/848 only defines COMI in its recital 13. Odd, for that was the case under the previous Regulation, 1346/2000, not the current one which does define COMI in the text of the Regulation proper (Article 3(1) – see Heading 4 of my overview here). However that issue is of minor importance for the real hesitation I have with the judgment is

that the judge despite the EIR’s specific instruction that COMI needs to be determined proprio motu, retreats to the default adversarial nature of common law proceedings and defers to the claimant’s concession ‘that even if the court were to find that Mr Gudmundsson did not have his COMI in England and Wales it should not exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy order’ [57]; and

that the judge resorts to section 265(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986’s jurisdictional anchor (“in the period of three years ending with the day on which the petition is presented …a place of residence in England and Wales”) instead of the autonomous concept of ‘habitual residence’ in the Regulation. The meaning of that concept was recently discussed by the CJEU in C-253/19 Novo Banco.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, Chapter 5, para 5.95.

Lin v Gudmundsson & Ors [2021 EWHC 820 (Ch)
Failed application to annul bankruptcy finding
Includes not altogether convincing COMI determination on the basis of the EU #insolvency Regulationhttps://t.co/uonkiljhuP

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2021

AG De La Tour delivered today his opinion in case C‑30/20, which is about Article 7.2 Brussels I bis and Article 101 TFEU. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“L’article 7, point 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012, concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, doit être interprété en ce sens :

–        qu’il désigne la juridiction compétente de l’État membre dans le ressort de laquelle, notamment, le dommage direct s’est matérialisé ;

–        que, dans le cadre d’une action en réparation du préjudice causé par une infraction au titre de l’article 101 TFUE consistant notamment en des arrangements collusoires sur la fixation et l’augmentation des prix de biens, le lieu de la matérialisation du dommage se situe dans l’État membre du marché affecté par cette infraction au sein duquel des surcoûts ont été subis. La juridiction territorialement compétente est, en principe, celle dans le ressort de laquelle se trouve le lieu de l’acquisition de ces biens, par l’entreprise exerçant son activité dans le même État membre, laquelle doit être déterminée en fonction de critères économiques. À défaut de concordance entre le lieu de la matérialisation du dommage et celui de l’activité de la personne lésée, l’action peut être introduite devant la juridiction dans le ressort de laquelle la personne lésée est établie, et

–        que les États membres ont la faculté de choisir de concentrer le traitement des litiges devant certaines juridictions, dans le cadre de leur organisation juridictionnelle, sous réserve du respect des principes d’équivalence et d’effectivité. En particulier, dans le domaine du droit de la concurrence, les États membres doivent veiller à ce que les règles qu’ils établissent ou qu’ils appliquent ne portent pas atteinte à l’application effective des articles 101 et 102 TFUE ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=240225&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4884262

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑73/20, which is about the Insolvency Regulation and Rome I:

“Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings and Article 12(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) must be interpreted as meaning that the law applicable to the contract under the latter regulation also governs the payment made by a third party in performance of a contracting party’s contractual payment obligation where, in insolvency proceedings, that payment is challenged as an act detrimental to all the creditors”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=240225&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4884262

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in joint cases C‑152/20 and C‑218/20, which is about Rome I. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« 1) L’article 8 du règlement (CE) no 593/2008 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, lorsque la loi régissant le contrat individuel de travail a été choisie, il y a lieu d’exclure les autres lois qui, à défaut de choix, auraient été applicables en vertu des paragraphes 2, 3 ou 4 de cet article, pourvu que la première offre au travailleur un niveau de protection égal ou supérieur à celui assuré par les dispositions auxquelles il ne peut être dérogé par accord de la loi qui aurait été appliquée en l’absence de choix.

2) Les règles relatives au salaire minimal du pays où le travailleur salarié a exercé habituellement son activité peuvent, en principe, être qualifiées de « dispositions auxquelles il ne peut être dérogé par accord en vertu de la loi qui, à défaut de choix, aurait été applicable », au sens de l’article 8, paragraphe 1, seconde phrase, du règlement no 593/2008. La primauté de ces règles dépendra de leur configuration dans l’ordre juridique de référence, ce qu’il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier.

3) Les articles 3 et 8 du règlement no 593/2008 doivent être interprétés en ce sens que le choix, explicite ou implicite, de la loi applicable à un contrat individuel de travail doit être libre pour les deux parties, ce qui n‘est pas le cas lorsqu’une disposition nationale impose d’insérer dans ce contrat une clause de choix de la loi. Ces articles n’empêchent toutefois pas qu’une telle clause soit préalablement rédigée dans le contrat par décision de l’employeur, à laquelle le travailleur donne son consentement ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=240242&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4884308