Flux européens

29/2022 : 22 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-160/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 02/22/2022 - 10:13
Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd e.a.
Liberté d'établissement
Cigarettes à filtre : la méthode établie par l’ISO pour déterminer les niveaux d’émission maximaux de goudron, de nicotine et de monoxyde de carbone, à laquelle renvoie le droit de l’Union, est valide et opposable aux producteurs de cigarettes

Catégories: Flux européens

32/2022 : 22 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans les affaires jointes C-562/21 PPU, C-563/21 PPU

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 02/22/2022 - 09:59
Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal établi par la loi dans l’État membre d’émission)
DFON
Refus d’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen : la Cour précise les critères permettant à une autorité judiciaire d’exécution d’apprécier le risque éventuel de violation du droit fondamental de la personne recherchée à un procès équitable

Catégories: Flux européens

31/2022 : 22 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-430/21

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 02/22/2022 - 09:57
RS (Effet des arrêts d’une cour constitutionnelle)
Droit institutionnel
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une règle nationale en vertu de laquelle les juridictions nationales ne sont pas habilitées à examiner la conformité avec le droit de l’Union d’une législation nationale qui a été jugée constitutionnelle par un arrêt de la cour constitutionnelle de l’État membre

Catégories: Flux européens

Lithuania v Veolia. How the CJEU’s ISDS judgments in Achmea, Komstroy etc revive interest in foreign public law limitations.

GAVC - ven, 02/18/2022 - 16:04

Many thanks Bruno Hardy, counsel at Liedekerke, for reconnecting me with a case I had seen in passing and then lost track off. Bruno also reports on the issues here; there is also a mainstream media report and a more specialised report.

On 18 January the Lithuanian Supreme Court held that the France-Lithuania BIT is no obstacle to Lithuania seizing the Lithuanian courts of a claim that Veolia and consorts unlawfully took over control of heating businesses in a dozen Lithuanian municipalities in 1993-2003, and excessively profited from same. The claim was initially formulated as a counterclaim in ongoing ICSID proceedings (note there are also ongoing commercial arbitration proceedings relating to the case under Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules) and is now pursued in the courts in ordinary, using Article 7(2)’s locus damni gateway.

The SC first of all rejected Veolia’s claim that the case should at the least be stayed until the ICSID ruling has been issued. For the SC, CJEU Achmea (which declared dispute settlement via ISDS in intra-EU BITs incompatible with EU law) implies that the arbitration procedure under the BIT has now lapsed (and this ab initio, hence making the later entry into force of the EU Member States’ BIT termination agreement irrelevant) meaning Lithuania not merely may but indeed it must drop its claims in the ISDS procedure.

From what I understand, the SC did not hold on whether A7(2) BIa is a possible gateway, focusing instead on the fate of Lithuania’s involvement in the ISDS procedure. In a perhaps unexpected ruling, as Bruno reports, the Vilnius Regional Court subsequently found that it lacked international jurisdiction seeing as in its (prima facie unconvincing) view the Lithuanian claim falls under acta iure imperii, hence cancelling out Brussels Ia, instead making the claim subject to residual Lithuanian private international law rules. These seem to direct the suit to France, the domicile of the defendant.

This is where there is a final twist in the tail. What I assume to be the reason for the court to find acta iure imperii (that the claim’s origin and DNA are actions taken by a state in its sovereign capacity) may well result in the French court refusing to entertain the claim as well (potentially leading to the need for a Lithuanian forum necessitatis). Indeed as Bruno points out, under the French SC Guatemala rule, French courts do not rule on cases necessarily involving the application of foreign public law (this echoes some of the issues in Skatteforvaltningen, currently under appeal). The 1975 Institute of International Law’s Resolution on same comes to mind.

The judgment shows very clearly the urgency for a proper debate on the relationship between EU law, the CJEU, ISDS and other forms of international dispute settlement. I fear the rather unnuanced CJEU statements in cases like Komstroy do little to resolve many of the underlying issues.

Geert.

Soriano’s successful appeal on the GDPR jurisdictional gateway confirms the potential for splintering of private GDPR enforcement.

GAVC - ven, 02/18/2022 - 13:01

In Soriano v Forensic News LLC & Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 1952 the Court of Appeal end of December allowed the claimant’s cross-appeal on the territorial reach of the GDPR. I reported the decision at the time but had not yet gotten round to post on it. I reviewed the High Court’s judgment here and readers may want to refer to that post to help them appreciate the issues. Like in my review of the first instance judgment I focus here on the GDPR’s jurisdictional gateway ([75] ff), not the libel issue.

Claimant’s case on A3 (2)(a) GDPR is set out as arguing that Defendants, to the extent that they are data controllers, offer services to readers in the UK irrespective of payment. As for A3.2(b), it is contended that the website places cookies on readers’ devices and processes their personal data using Facebook and Google analytics for the purpose of targeting advertisements, with Facebook Ireland Ltd and Google Ireland Ltd operating as the registered joint data controller. Further, it is submitted that Defendants were collecting and obtaining data about the Claimant and were monitoring his behaviour within the UK and the EU with a view to making publishing decisions.

CJEU authority discussed, on the meaning of ‘establishment’, is Weltimmo, Google Spain and Verein fur Konsumerenteninformation. At [78] ff Warby LJ relies to my taste somewhat excessively on the European Data Protection Board’s Guidelines 3/2018 on the Territorial Scope of the GDPR, holding [97] that defendants’ offer and acceptance of subscriptions in local currencies (Sterling cq Euros) is a “real and effective” activity that is “oriented” towards the UK and EU – that the effort only yielded 6 UK and EU subscriptions in total is irrelevant: defendants did more than merely making their journalism accessible over the world wide web. 

The result is that jurisdiction in E&W under the GDPR gateway is upheld – as is therefore, the potential which I predicted for extensive splintering of private GDPR enforcement, in contrast with the EU’s stated intent to have one-stop shop public GDPR enforcement.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.9.2.5, para 2.258 ff.

Service out, 'establishment' and 'services', territorial reach of the #GDPR https://t.co/iyVsTQcUvo
For review of the High Court judgment see https://t.co/KBZ4s4VHVz https://t.co/cLi12uuFk7

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 21, 2021

Kwok v UBS. Cockerill J helpfully on Lugano, economic loss and branch jurisdiction.

GAVC - jeu, 02/17/2022 - 11:11

In Kwok & Ors v UBS AG (London Branch) [2022] EWHC 245 (Comm) Cockerill J holds on forum damni (Article 5(3) for purely economic loss, and branch jurisdiction (Article 5(5) for the English courts under the Lugano Convention. Defendant is Switserland based and the proceedings clearly were initiated prior to Brexit.

On A5(3) locus damni, all parties and the judge agree that CJEU authority is not easy to disentangle and does not unequivocally point into one direction: see eg [84] ‘the authorities are not entirely pellucid on what they do say.’

The bank, defending, argues ia that a rule of thumb under (limited) English authority is that in a case of negligent misstatement the damage will occur where the misstatement is received and relied upon. Cockerill J distinguishes the authority from current case and also points out [82] that all cases concerned predate the CJEU authority particularly in Lober and Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, and that ‘the tide of authority is against the proposition that loss is suffered wherever a claimant ultimately feels it’ [85]. Having summarised the lines of interpretation following from CJEU authority, she concludes [113]

Once the focus is on actual manifestation (of damage, GAVC) the most natural analysis is to view the damage as occurring where and when the Acquired Shares were liquidated.

here, London, where the shares claimants had invested in were held and where the funds they had invested were depleted; the loss crystallises, manifests, becomes certain and irreversible with the sale of shares and that loss of claimants’ Monetary Contribution which had merged into the shares  [115].

The account, where the damage was first “registered” or “recorded” was in London with the defendant itself (as in CJEU Kronhofer) [117]. The Universal Music-instructed ‘special circumstances’ cross-check also points to London: [118]

London was the place at which it had been agreed by all parties that the Acquired Shares would be held, and all of the contractual documents UBS entered into (albeit for a transaction at one remove from the Claimants) were to be in English and governed by English law. It was therefore entirely predictable and foreseeable from November 2014 that the parties might sue or be sued in London in relation to the Investment and dealings with the Acquired Shares.

Branch jurisdiction under Article 5(5) is dealt with obiter [120] ff. Cockerill J holds [138] that was is needed inter alia per CJEU flyLAL is ‘sufficient nexus’, sufficiently significant connection does not require involvement in the tortious acts [140]. This is supported, Cockerill J holds [148] by the fact that UBS London’s thoughts and actions will be relevant to the trial. There will be a need to investigate UBS London’s conduct and intentions both (i) at the time of the representations and advice given by UBS and (ii) late events and the loss resulting therefrom.

A good judgment to assist with the economic loss jigsaw.

Geert,

Tort jurisdiction (purely economic loss) and branch jurisdiction, A5(3) and (5) #Lugano Convention, both upheld

Kwok & Ors v UBS AG (London Branch) [2022] EWHC 245 (Comm) https://t.co/ev68gReQzx

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 9, 2022

28/2022 : 16 février 2022 - Arrêts de la Cour de justice dans les affaires C-156/21

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 02/16/2022 - 10:00
Hongrie / Parlement et Conseil, C-157/21 Pologne/Parlement et Conseil
Principes du droit communautaire
Mesures de protection du budget de l’Union : l’assemblée plénière de la Cour de justice rejette les recours formés par la Hongrie et la Pologne contre le mécanisme de conditionnalité qui subordonne le bénéfice de financements issus du budget de l’Union au respect par les États membres des principes de l’État de droit

Catégories: Flux européens

No Harry, don’t look at the light! The CJEU in Sharewood on Rome I’s rei sitae exception to consumer protection.

GAVC - mar, 02/15/2022 - 15:03

In C-595/20 Sharewood, the CJEU last week held on the extent of Rome I’s rei sitae exception to consumer contracts. In essence, as a result of Article 6 Rome I, for consumer contracts, choice of law is free (in the case at issue this lex voluntatis was Swiss law) except the consumer may always fall back on the mandatory laws of his habitual residence (here, Austrian law).

For a limited selection of contracts, including (A6(4)c) ‘a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property other than a contract relating to (timeshares)’, party  autonomy is restored in full under the terms of Articles 3 and 4 Rome I, hence the consumer loses his protection.

The contract at issue is a tree purchase, lease and service agreement. The trees at issue are grown in Brasil. The ground rent for the lease agreement, which granted the right to grow the trees in question, was included in the purchase price of those trees. The service agreement provided that ShareWood would manage, administer, harvest and sell the trees and would remit the net return on the timber to UE, the (anonymised) consumer. The difference compared to the gross return, expressed as a percentage of the return, was retained by ShareWood as its fee for the provision of those services.

The question in the case at issue is essentially how intensive the link to (foreign) soil needs to be for it to fall under the rei sitae carve-out for consumer contracts. The CJEU does refer to some of its Brussels Ia case-law, including Klein and Kerr, for the ‘tenancy’ element of the question, but not for the ‘rights in rem’ part of the discussion, where it more straightforwardly concludes on the basis of the contractual arrangements that the trees [28]

must be regarded as being the proceeds of the use of the land on which they are planted. Although such proceeds will, as a general rule, share the same legal status as the land on which the trees concerned are planted, the proceeds may nevertheless, by agreement, be the subject of personal rights of which the owner or occupier of that land may dispose separately without affecting the right of ownership or other rights in rem appertaining to that land. A contract which relates to the disposal of the proceeds of the use of land cannot be treated in the same way as a contract which relates to a ‘right in rem in immovable property’, within the meaning of Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation

and [37]

the main purpose of the contract at issue in the main proceedings is not the use, in the context of a lease, of the land on which the trees concerned are planted, but… to generate income from the sale of the timber obtained following the harvest of those trees. As is apparent from the order for reference, the lease provided for in that agreement, which includes only the right to allow those trees to grow and has no purpose other than the acquisition of those trees, is intended merely to enable the sales and services elements provided for in the contract to be carried out.

Not caught therefore by the rei sitae exception.

I often refer my students to Harry, in A Bug’s Life, to make the point that both for jurisdictional and for applicable law purposes, the mere presence of real estate does not lead to the rei sitae jurisdictional and governing law implications being triggered. CJEU Sharewood is a good illustration of same.

Geert.

 

CJEU last week In Share Wood on lex rei sitae, applicable law A6 Rome I.
Contract of sale, including lease and service agreement, re trees planted on leased land for sole purpose of being harvested for profit, is not a contract relating to a right in remhttps://t.co/tlKVHl2xYX

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 14, 2022

CJEU on Article 6(4) Rome I

European Civil Justice - sam, 02/12/2022 - 00:12

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑595/20 (UE v ShareWood Switzerland AG, VF), which is about Rome I :

« Article 6(4)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) must be interpreted as meaning that a contract of sale, including a lease agreement and a service agreement, relating to trees planted on leased land for the sole purpose of being harvested for profit, does not constitute a ‘contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253728&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334998

CJEU on Article 18 TFEU and Brussels II bis

European Civil Justice - sam, 02/12/2022 - 00:09

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑522/20 (OE v VY), which is about Article 18 TFEU and Brussels II bis :

« The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of [Brussels II bis] is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253726&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334783

27/2022 : 10 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-522/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/10/2022 - 09:43
OE (Résidence habituelle d’un époux - Critère de nationalité)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La durée de résidence requise pour que les juridictions d’un État membre exercent leur compétence pour statuer sur une demande en divorce peut valablement dépendre de la nationalité du demandeur

Catégories: Flux européens

26/2022 : 10 février 2022 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-485/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/10/2022 - 09:42
HR Rail
SOPO
Un travailleur handicapé, y compris celui qui accomplit un stage dans le cadre de son recrutement, et déclaré inapte à exercer les fonctions essentielles du poste qu’il occupe peut bénéficier d’une affectation à un autre poste pour lequel il dispose des compétences, des capacités et des disponibilités requises

Catégories: Flux européens

25/2022 : 9 février 2022 - Arrêt du Tribunal dans l'affaire T-791/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 02/09/2022 - 11:31
Sped-Pro / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission rejetant une plainte à l’encontre de PKP Cargo, société contrôlée par l’État polonais, pour un prétendu abus de sa position dominante sur le marché des services de transport ferroviaire de marchandises en Pologne

Catégories: Flux européens

Bayer at the CJEU on neonicotinoids. (Belatedly) of bees, ponies, sophistry and precaution.

GAVC - mar, 02/08/2022 - 13:01

The CJEU held (first Chamber, which includes the  CJEU President Koen Lenaerts) in C‑499/18 P Bayer Crop Science v European Commission a few months back. Here at GAVCLaw the judgment was firmly on our minds – but my analysis not yet put to paper.

The case centres around the legality of the conditions imposed by the EU for the approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid (these are neonicotinoids), and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active substances. The act challenged by Bayer is Commission Implementing Regulation 485/2013 and the justification for the measures are the documented losses of honeybee colonies as a result of the use of the substances.

The application follows a tried and tested path of applicants in the chemical and related sectors. Firstly and preferably, find some holes in the (often extensive) documentary trail of preparatory and advisory paperwork relied upon by the Institutions in their measure, and claim these devastate the legality of the eventual measure. A typical example would be ‘the studies relied upon reported testing of the substances on small ponies while the eventual regulation cites concerns for both small and medium-sized ponies’. Secondly, try and tempt the CJEU into finding fault with the application of core principles of EU law (such as subsidiarity, proportionality, ultra vires, attributed powers etc) and /or EU sectoral policy (such as in particular the precautionary principle), or confuse the Court with at best esoteric but usually sophistic discussions on eg ‘new and scientific knowledge’.

The General Court had found against Bayer. Much of the appeal before the CJEU discusses the first type of arguments and, like the General Court, dismisses them.

On the suggested infringement of the precautionary principle, the Court first of all rejects that precaution cannot be relied upon until an ‘exhaustive’ scientific assessment is made: [81]: ‘an exhaustive risk assessment cannot be required in a situation where the precautionary principle is applied, which equates to a situation in which there is scientific uncertainty.’ The point is NOT that precaution does not engage with science. It does. That is also where its weakness may lie: it desperately speaks the language of data, science and numbers yet as the saying goes, “Data is like a spy – if you torture it long enough, it will tell you anything you want to know.” The point is rather (see eg [78]) that for one to have to wait for every single new potential sub-study into a sub-issue, would hand industry the golden ticket for delay tactics; [82] that studies are underway which may call into question the available scientific and technical data, is not an obstacle to application of the precautionary principle.

Bayer put essentially the same argument to the CJEU with slightly differing angles (eg suggesting that for already approved active substances, precaution must be applied to a higher threshold than for new to be approved substances) and the Court rejected them at each turn.

A good judgment.

Geert.

EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018, p.28 ff.

 

 

 

 

 

UK Consultation on the Singapore Convention on Mediation

European Civil Justice - sam, 02/05/2022 - 23:33

The UK Ministry of Justice opened this week (2 February 2022) a consultation on whether the UK should sign and ratify the Singapore Convention on Mediation 2018. The consultation closes at 23:59 on 1 April 2022. A Consultation document (with questions to the public) is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-singapore-convention-on-mediation

CJEU on Article 7(1)(b) Brussels I bis

European Civil Justice - sam, 02/05/2022 - 16:27

The Court of Justice delivered two days ago (3 February 2022) its judgment in Case C‑20/21 (JW, HD, XS v LOT Polish Airlines), which is about Article 7(1)(b) Brussels I bis :

« The second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs on which transport is performed by separate air carriers, where a claim for compensation, brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 […] arises exclusively from a delay of the first leg of the journey caused by a late departure and is brought against the air carrier operating that first leg, the place of arrival for that first leg may not be classified as a ‘place of performance’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=253283&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=1413659

LOT. Place of performance under Article 7(1)a in case of multicarrier flights. The CJEU dismisses landing place of first leg of multileg flight as forum contractus.

GAVC - ven, 02/04/2022 - 12:12

The CJEU held yesterday in C-20/21 LOT Polish Airlines, on the place of performance (hence creation of jurisdiction in an application for flightdelay compensation) of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking and performed in several legs by two separate air carriers. That the claim came within Article 7(1)’s gateway for contracts is a result of CJEU flightright. The Court also held in that case that both the place of departure of the first leg of the journey and the place of arrival of the last leg of the journey were forum contractus.

In the case at issue, jurisdiction is sought for the place of landing of the first leg of the journey. In CJEU Zurich Insurance, on multimodal transport, place of dispatch was added as forum contractus, with the CJEU refraining from holding explicitly whether other legs of the journey could count as such forum (Tanchev AG had opined they should not). In current case, the CJEU would seem to confirm my feeling that in Zurich Insurance it implicitly sided with a limitation of fora. Indeed it holds that the place of arrival of the first leg is not forum contractus under A7(1), however, there is a caveat: [24]:

the referring court does not indicate the elements of the contract which could justify, with a view to the efficacious conduct of proceedings, the existence of a sufficiently close link between the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and its jurisdiction.

The CJEU’s dictum is formulated in more absolute terms:

The second indent of [A7(1) BIa] must be interpreted as meaning that, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs on which transport is performed by separate air carriers, where a claim for compensation, brought [under the flightdelay Regulation 261/2004] arises exclusively from a delay of the first leg of the journey caused by a late departure and is brought against the air carrier operating that first leg, the place of arrival for that first leg may not be classified as a ‘place of performance’ within the meaning of that provision

However given the caveat [24] it is not to be excluded that contractual terms could distinguish the finding of lack of forum contractus.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.399 ff.

#flightdelay Regulation, place of arrival of first flight is no 'place of performance' granting jurisdiction under A7(1) Brussels Ia #CJEU C‑20/21 LOT Polish Airlineshttps://t.co/5R4YKF3ShL

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 3, 2022

23/2022 : 3 février 2022 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-121/21

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/03/2022 - 16:52
République tchèque / Pologne (Mine de Turów)
Environnement et consommateurs
Avocat général Pikamäe : en prolongeant de six ans l’autorisation d’extraction de lignite dans la mine de Turów sans procéder à une évaluation des incidences sur l’environnement, la Pologne a enfreint le droit de l’Union

Catégories: Flux européens

24/2022 : 3 février 2022 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-500/20

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/03/2022 - 10:02
ÖBB-Infrastruktur Aktiengesellschaft
Transport
Selon l’avocate générale Tamara Ćapeta, la Cour de justice devrait se déclarer compétente s’agissant d’interpréter les règles uniformes CUI, dès lors que l’Union a exercé ses compétences partagées en adhérant à la COTIF

Catégories: Flux européens

23/2022 : 3 février 2022 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-121/21

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/03/2022 - 09:52
République tchèque / Pologne (Mine de Turów)
Environnement et consommateurs
Avocat général Pikamäe : en prolongeant de six ans l’autorisation d’extraction de lignite dans la mine de Turów sans procéder à une évaluation des incidences sur l’environnement, la Pologne a enfreint le droit de l’Union

Catégories: Flux européens

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