Kumlin & Anor v Jonsson & Ors [2022] EWHC 1095 (QB) disciplines forum shopping, in this case libel tourism, in a claim that is considered a SLAPP: a Strategic Lawsuit against public participation.
First Claimant is an entrepreneur, businessman and investor in sustainable and ethical business ventures, resident in Monaco, with business interests in the UK including in the Second Claimant, of which he is the founder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He is a Swedish citizen. Second Claimant is a public limited company registered in England and Wales. Claimants’ case is that between 29 September 2020 and 2 November 2020 the Defendants, or some of them, all of whom are Swedish, published or caused to be published on the Website eight articles concerning the Claimants. There was further publication via Facebook, Twitter, etc, where links to the Articles were posted.
The Articles are in Swedish. Knowles J [30] advances the reasoning, proposed by defendants, that jurisdiction under any of the gateways as a result of A4 BIa, locus damni or locus delicti commissi (A7(2) BIa per CJEU Bier and Shevill), or centre of interests (A7(2) BIa, per CJEU eDate and Bolagsupplysningen) only exist to the degree the case is actually actionable in those cases which, he submits, requires reference to the domestic laws of those Member States (e.g. a minimum ‘publication’ threshold). I believe this is incorrect: jurisdiction and actionability are not the same. While lex fori on threshold issues will have an immediate impact on the practical reality of a claim, it does not stand in the way of principled jurisdiction under BIa, which exists without reference to national laws.
The judge refers to much CJEU and E&W authority, all of it discussed on this blog, most recently the Court of Appeal in Mincione.
Knowles J’s discussion eg [69] ff of the intensity of publication etc required, under residual double actionability rules, in my view is a threshold question and not, as it is presented, a jurisdictional, gateway question, albeit the analysis in this section is mixed with justifiable discussion of direct v indirect damage under the CJEU Marinari rule. The judgment is much more extensive on this point than it could have been in my opinion.
[224] it is concluded that on the centre of interest issue, which is relevant for the natural person claimant only, his centre of interests is Monaco, where he is habitually resident. That is a factual assessment which is unlikely to be material for an appeal.
Geert.
EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.439 ff.
#slapp, CJEU Bolagsupplysningen claxon. I have not yet seen the actual judgment. Should be an interesting jurisdictional read. https://t.co/yibMYgKcgz
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 11, 2022
I give background to Collins AG’s Opinion in C-700/20 The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain here. The Court of Appeal nota bene in the meantime has held that the High Court should have never referred, as I report here.
Does an English ‘Section 66’ (Arbitration Act) judgment, which confirms an arbitral award is enforceable in the same way as a judgment in ordinary, qualify as a judgment under the recognition and enforcement Title of Brussels Ia? If it does, the Spanish judgment contradicting the award is unlikely to be recognised.
The case at issue in essence enquires how far the arbitration exception of Brussels Ia stretches. Does the arbitration DNA of the case once and for all means any subsequent involvement of the courts is likewise not covered by Brussels Ia (meaning for instance that it must not have an impact on the decision to recognise and enforce an incompatible judgment issued by another Member State in the case); or should the involvement of the courts in ordinary be judged independently against the Regulation’s definition of ‘judgment’.
The case therefore echoes the High Court’s later intervention in the infamous West Tankers case, and the recent CJEU judgment in C-568/20 J v H Limited (on third country judgments).
(44) the 1958 New York Convention does not come into play in the proceedings for the reason that those proceedings do not involve, as Article I(1) of that convention requires, the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award in a State other than that in which that award was made: the award was made in the UK.
The AG suggests a broad scope of the exclusion, seeking support in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports. He also confirms the exclusion of arbitration has the effect, in particular, of making it impossible to use that regulation to enforce an arbitral award in another Member State by first turning it into a judgment and then asking the courts of the other Member State to enforce that judgment under Chapter III.
However, in the case at issue he suggests the proceedings are not caught by the arbitration exception, for 3 reasons:
(53) the notion of ‘judgment’ needs to be interpreted broadly;
(54) CJEU Solo Kleinmotoren instructs that for a finding to be a ‘judgment’, ‘the decision must emanate from a judicial body of a Contracting State deciding on its own authority on the issues between the parties’; that is the case here for (55) the S66 court does not rubberstamp; it discusses and settles a range of substantive issues between the parties;
(57) there is no requirement that a court must determine all of the substantive elements of a dispute in order to deliver a judgment that satisfies the purposes of that provision; reference here is made to CJEU C-394/07 Gambazzi (see the Handbook 2.576).
In the view of the AG (62) A1(2) is not determinative as to whether a judgment under the recognition and enforcement Title comes within the scope of the Regulation. Those provisions, he suggest, were enacted for different purposes and pursue different objectives: they aim to protect the integrity of a Member State’s internal legal order and to ensure that its rule of law is not disturbed by being required to recognise a foreign judgment that is incompatible with a decision of its own courts. A1(2) on the other hand is firmly part of the free movement of judgments rationale of the Regulation (and limitations thereto).
I think the CJEU judgment could go either way and if I were a betting man (which I am not) I suspect the Court will not follow and instead will take the same holistic approach towards protecting the application of Brussels Ia by the courts in ordinary, as it did in CJEU West Tankers. By the very nature of s66 (and similar actions in other Member States), the ‘issues between the parties’ are different in actions taking place entirely in courts in ordinary, and those in arbitration awards which are subsequently sanctioned (in the sense of ‘approved’) by a court. The latter proceedings do not discuss ‘the issues’ between the parties. They only engage a narrow set of checks and balances to ensure the soundness of the arbitration process.
Neither do I follow the logic (63) that if the UK were not allowed to take account of the s66 judgment in its decision to recognise, it would mean that Member States would have to ignore all internal judgments with res judicata in an excluded area, including insolvency, social security etc., in favour of other Member States judgments ‘adjudicating upon the same issue’ (63): if they truly adjudicate upon ‘the same issue’, the judgment of the other Member State will be exempt from Brussels Ia. This is unlike the case at hand which clearly did involve a Spanish judgment on a subject matter covered by the Regulation. The arbitration exemption is the only exemption that relates to a modus operandi of conflict resolution: all the others relate to substantive issues in conflict resolution.
Commercial arbitration enjoys a peculiar privilege in the CJEU’s view on ADR (see CJEU Komstroy). I do not think however the Court will give it a forum shopping boost in the context of Brussels Ia.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, ia 2.120.
Aldricus – Warna rambut yang cocok dan sesuai dengan warna kulit dapat membantu wajah menjadi lebih berseri dan segar. Untuk kulit wanita Indonesia, memilih warna-warna lembut seperti coklat adalah salah satu pilihan yang paling banyak diminati. Diantara sekian banyak variasi warna coklat untuk pewarna rambut, ada variasi cat rambut coklat yang paling glamor dan membuat tampilan lebih trendy.
Cokelat Gelap Untuk Kesan NaturalWarna rambut paling aman bagi mereka yang pertama kali mewarnai rambut adalah coklat tua. Selain lebih mudah diaplikasikan karena tidak membutuhkan bleaching sebelum diwarnai, dark brown juga cocok untuk semua warna kulit.
Anda dapat mencoba pilihan warna Dark Brown (3) dan Pearly Brown (4.2) dari L`oréal Paris Excellence Crème untuk mendapatkan warna cokelat tua yang cantik. Pilihan warna ini juga cocok untuk Anda yang ingin menutupi uban dan membuatnya terlihat lebih berkilau dan alami.
Cokelat Kemerahan Untuk Tampilan MenawanMemilih cat rambut coklat kemerahan dapat membantu menambah nuansa pada wajah Anda. Warna ini akan menambah kesan mewah bagi pemilik kulit putih. Warna Light Auburn lebih disukai karena tidak berwarna tetapi memberikan cahaya merah yang mengejutkan saat terkena sinar matahari.
Pilihan warna L`oreal Paris Excellence Crème’s Chocolate Brown (5.35) dan Light Auburn (6.45) bisa menjadi pilihan Anda saat ingin mencoba tampilan berbeda dengan warna coklat kemerahan yang cantik.
Cokelat Terang Untuk Rambut BergelombangJika Anda memiliki rambut bergelombang, warna coklat muda bisa menjadi pilihan warna rambut yang tepat. Warna rambut coklat muda yang dipadukan dengan tekstur rambut bergelombang menciptakan kesan wajah yang lebih hidup.
Pilihan warna ini cocok untuk Anda yang memiliki kulit putih atau cokelat karena akan memberikan kesan segar dan cerah pada wajah. Coba L`oréal Paris Excellence Crème Light Brown (5) untuk tampilan awet muda.
Cokelat Keunguan Untuk Tampilan AnggunCat rambut coklat coklat keunguan ini bisa menjadi pilihan jika Anda memiliki warna kulit cerah atau gelap dan ingin tampil lebih gaya namun dengan kesan yang berbeda. Pilihan warna ini sangat cocok untuk wanita dewasa yang tetap ingin terlihat sedikit playful tanpa menghilangkan tampilan dewasanya. Anda bisa mencoba pilihan L’Oreal Paris Excellence Crème’s Purple Brown (4.26) untuk mendapatkan warna rambut yang tepat.
The post Warna Cat Rambut Coklat yang Sedang Tren appeared first on Aldri Blog.
The CJEU a little while back held in C‑498/20 ZK v BMA on the applicable law for the Dutch ‘Peeters Gatzen’ suit, for which I reviewed the AG Opinion here. The suit is a tortious suit brought by a liquidator. In Nk v BNP Paribas the CJEU held at the jurisdictional level it is covered by Brussels Ia, not by the Insolvency Regulation.
A first issue of note, which I discuss at some length in my earlier post, is whether the liability is carved-out from Rome II as a result of the lex societatis provision. The CJEU confirms the AG’s contextual analysis, without repeating his general criterion, emphasises the need for restrictive interpretation, and specifically for the duty of care holds that liability resulting from a duty of care of a corporation’s bodies and the outside world, is covered by Rome II. This is important for business and human rights litigation, too: [55]
Pour ce qui concerne spécifiquement le manquement au devoir de diligence en cause au principal, il convient de distinguer selon qu’il s’agit du devoir spécifique de diligence découlant de la relation entre l’organe et la société, qui ne relève pas du champ d’application matériel du règlement Rome II, ou du devoir général de diligence erga omnes, qui en relève. Il appartient à la seule juridiction de renvoi de l’apprécier.
The referring judge will have to decide whether the case engages the duty of care vis-a-vis the wider community (including the collectivity of creditors) however it would seem most likely that it does. If it does, locus damni is held, confirming the AG view, to be The Netherlands if the referring judge finds that the insolvent corporation’s seat is based there. The financial damage with the creditors is indirect only and does not establish jurisdiction.
[44] Should a judge decide that they do not have jurisdiction over the main claim, they also and necessarily have to relinquish jurisdiction over the warranty /guarantee claim against a third party under A8(2) BIa. CJEU Sovag is referred to in support.
Geert.
#CJEU this morning in ZK v BMA on jurisdiction and applicable law for the Peeters Gatzen #insolvency suit.
See my review of the Opinion AG here https://t.co/9eVzlPMQPX
Judgment herehttps://t.co/jtJJXerEld
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 10, 2022
Pal v Damen & Anor [2022] EWHC 4697 (QB) is another application (compare Clarke v Kalecinski) of Brussels Ia’s consumer section to cosmetic surgery contracts. Respectfully, the analysis is a botched job.
Claims are both in contract and in tort, as is usual in this type of litigation. Jurisdiction on the basis of the consumer title against the Belgium-based surgeon is undisputed, as is the lack of jurisdiction under Article 7(2)’s tort gateway against the clinic where the surgery was performed, locus damni (direct damage, CJEU Marinari) and locus delicti commissi both being in Belgium. The core question is whether there is a contract between surgeon and /or the clinic and the patient, and whether this is a consumer contract.
The second question needs to be determined first. The clinic essentially provides the hardware for the surgeon, but also ensures patient flow via its website http://www.wellnesskliniek.com which without a doubt meets with the CJEU Pammer /Alpenhof criteria and therefore ‘directs its activities’ towards the UK. Its general terms and conditions, of which it is somewhat disputed that claimant ticked the relevant box, state ia that the clinic ‘is not party to the treatment agreement between the physician and the patient.’
The expert evidence [25] ff centres around Belgian law. Expert for one of the defendants is their Belgian counsel, and Cook M dismisses his report [55] as not meeting relevant CPR requirements on expert evidence. On the basis of the remaining evidence, the judge finds [59]
the Claimant has established a good arguable case for the existence of a contract for medical treatment and /or medical services between her and the Surgeon and accordingly this Court has jurisdiction over that claim. The Claimant has failed to establish a good arguable case for the existence of a contract for medical treatment and /or medical services against the Clinic and accordingly the Court does not have jurisdiction over that claim.
With respect, the direction of analysis is entirely wrong. The first line of enquiry should have been whether there is a consumer contract with either or both of the Belgian parties, and if there is with one, whether the other party could have been caught in its jurisdictional slipstream. Á la Bonnie Lackey but then in the opposite direction: in Bonnie Lackey the question was whether persons in the immediate orbit of the undisputed ‘consumer’-claimant, may also sue under the consumer title. In current case, the question would be whether those in the immediate vicinity of the business-defendant, may be sued under the consumer title. The existence of a consumer contract is entirely an EU law question, not a Belgian law one.
Next, if the decision were taken that at least one of the parties is not caught by the consumer title, the existence of a ‘contract’ (for the provision of ‘services’) under Article 7(1) would be triggered, as would the forum contractus under Article 7(1)a, with an analysis of where the services were or should have been provided. This, too, is an analysis that requires EU law and EU law alone. [There is no trace in the judgment of a choice of court and /or law which for the former per A25 Brussels Ia may require Belgian law, with renvoi, a lex fori prorogati but even then only for the material ‘consent’ issue].
Belgian law does not come into this analysis at all, unless, potentially and most unlikely, one argues that the A7(1) analysis requires the conflicts method, should a contract for medical services not be caught by Article 7(1)’s ‘provision of services’: in that case, Rome I’s decision tree would be required to determine lex contractus and place of performance. Even then however it is not at all certain that Belgian law would be the outcome of Rome I’s matrix.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.222 ff, 2.385 ff.
Consumer contract re plastic surgery, jurisdiction
Whether contract exists with BE surgeon alone or also his clinic
Odd descent into BE substantive law
'Expert' reports largely held inadmissible
On the blog soon
Pal v Damen & Anor [2022] EWHC 4697 (QB) https://t.co/GgFEsYZrYP
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 5, 2022
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