The European Commission has released today its Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood. However, it is not currently available in the official languages of the European Union, only in English at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/com_2022_695_1_en_act_part1.pdf
The Court of Justice delivered today its judgement in case C‑358/21 (Tilman SA v Unilever Supply Chain Company AG), which is about consent to a jurisdiction clause contained in the general terms and conditions to which the contract concluded in writing refers by the inclusion of a hypertext link to a website:
“Article 23(1) and (2) of [Lugano II] must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause is validly concluded where it is contained in the general terms and conditions to which the contract concluded in writing refers by the inclusion of a hypertext link to a website, access to which allows those general terms and conditions to be viewed, downloaded and printed prior to that contract being signed, without the party against whom that clause operates having been formally asked to accept those general terms and conditions by ticking a box on that website”.
Today, the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation enters into force in Kazakhstan, the 10th State party to the Convention. Whilst not yet ratified by any European country, it is being considered by several
Source: https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/international_settlement_agreements/status
“From 9 to 11 November 2022, the First Meeting of the Special Commission (SC) on the Practical Operation of the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention was held in The Hague. […] The meeting resulted in the adoption of over 70 Conclusions & Recommendations […] Among other things, the SC confirmed that, in general, the Convention is operating smoothly and is fit for purpose. It also stressed the importance of seeing more States join the Convention. The SC also approved, in principle, the draft Practical Handbook, Implementation Checklist, and Country Profile under the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention, subject to their amendment in light of the latest comments by HCCH Members, the discussions that took place at the SC and their outcome, to be submitted for endorsement by the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP). Delegates also discussed habitual residence, ex lege representation, instructions given and wishes made by an adult in anticipation of a future impairment, issues of recognition and enforcement, Central Authority co-operation, the use of existing recommended Model Forms, direct judicial communications, and possible amendments to the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention. The Conclusions & Recommendations adopted by the SC are available” at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/06db03d0-812c-42fb-b76d-4e6e05a91b3b.pdf.
Extract: “The SC recalled that the change of habitual residence is a question of fact which will be assessed by the competent authorities called upon to make a decision on this matter. The competent authority seised is the only one that has to determine the habitual residence of the adult and whether it has jurisdiction under the 2000 Convention. In this regard, the competent authority seised could consult, if necessary, the competent authorities of the former State of habitual residence, to obtain relevant information. For example, the competent authority seised can request information relevant to assess whether the habitual residence has changed, in order to determine if it can take jurisdiction under Article 5(2), or whether the former competent authority would continue to exercise jurisdiction under other grounds (e.g., Art. 7) or if it would be appropriate to request a transfer of jurisdiction under Article 8. Recalling Articles 32 and 34, the SC noted that cooperation can take place with a view to sharing information regarding the adult’s change of habitual residence. The SC further noted that this process should be conducted diligently and without delay. The SC reminded Contracting Parties that Article 29 generally provides Central Authorities with an opportunity to exchange information, including such information as may be relevant for the purposes of Article 5(2).
11 The SC noted that, where the habitual residence of the adult changes to another Contracting Party, the competent authorities of the new habitual residence will have primary jurisdiction. Through the
exchange of information under Articles 29 and 34, a competent authority may be alerted to the change of residence of an adult, in order for this authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to take measures of protection”
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=884
The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑646/20 (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, Standesamtsaufsicht v TB, intervening parties: Standesamt Mitte von Berlin, RD), which is about Article 2(4) and Article 21 Brussels II bis and the concept of ‘judgment’: “Article 2(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted, in particular for the purpose of the application of Article 21(1) of that regulation, as meaning that a divorce decree drawn up by a civil registrar of the Member State of origin, containing a divorce agreement concluded by the spouses and confirmed by them before that registrar in accordance with the conditions laid down by the legislation of that Member State, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Article 2(4)”.
Yesterday (14 November 2022), Botswana acceded to the Hague Child Abduction, Adoption and Child Support Conventions, i.e. respectively: the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, and the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. The Child Abduction Convention will enter into force for Botswana on 1 February 2023, the Adoption Convention on 1 March 2023 and the Child Support Convention on 16 November 2023.
Last month, on 4 October 2022, Cabo Verde acceded to the Hague Child Abduction and Child Protection Conventions, i.e. respectively the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. The Child Abduction Convention will enter into force for Cabo Verde on 1 January 2023 and the Child Protection Convention on 1 August 2023.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=883 et https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=877
Advocate General Szpunar delivered today his opinion in Case C‑651/21 (М. Ya. M.), which is about the Succession Regulation and a declaration of waiver of succession made by an heir in the Member State of his habitual residence, with a subsequent registration of that declaration, at the request of another heir, with the court of another Member State.
Suggested decision: “1) Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] does not preclude, after an heir has had registered with a court of the Member State in which he or she is habitually resident his or her acceptance or waiver of the succession of a deceased person who was habitually resident in another Member State at the time of death, another heir from subsequently requesting registration of that declaration in the latter Member State.
(2) Article 13 of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as not precluding a co-heir other than the person who made the declaration of waiver in the Member State of his or her habitual residence from informing the court dealing with the succession of the existence of that declaration”.
The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑873/19 (Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, joined party: Volkswagen AG), which is about the Aarhus Convention and access to justice in environmental matters:
“1. Article 9(3) of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, signed in Aarhus on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding a situation where an environmental association, authorised to bring legal proceedings in accordance with national law, is unable to challenge before a national court an administrative decision granting or amending EC type-approval which may be contrary to Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information.
2. Article 5(2)(a) of Regulation No 715/2007 must be interpreted as meaning that a defeat device can be justified under that provision only where it is established that that device strictly meets the need to avoid immediate risks of damage or accident to the engine, caused by a malfunction of a component of the exhaust gas recirculation system, of such a serious nature as to give rise to a specific hazard when a vehicle fitted with that device is driven. Furthermore, the ‘need’ for a defeat device, within the meaning of that provision, exists only where, at the time of the EC type-approval of that device or of the vehicle equipped with it, no other technical solution makes it possible to avoid immediate risks of damage or accident to the engine, which give rise to a specific hazard when driving the vehicle”.
AG Pikamae delivered on 20 October 2022 his opinion in case C‑393/21 (Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey GmbH), which is about the European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
Suggested decision : “L’article 23 du règlement (CE) no 805/2004 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que : l’expression « circonstances exceptionnelles », visée à cette disposition, couvre le préjudice grave et irréparable pouvant être causé au débiteur par l’exécution immédiate de la décision certifiée en tant que titre exécutoire européen, caractérisant une situation d’urgence qu’il revient au débiteur d’établir. Dans l’affirmative, il appartient à la juridiction ou à l’autorité compétente de l’État membre d’exécution de procéder à une mise en balance des intérêts en présence au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances pertinentes du cas d’espèce.
Seules les mesures de limitation de la procédure d’exécution visées à l’article 23, sous a) et b), de ce règlement peuvent faire l’objet d’une application combinée.
2) Les articles 6 et 11 du règlement no 805/2004 doivent être interprétés en ce sens que :
lorsque le caractère exécutoire de la décision certifiée en tant que titre exécutoire européen a été suspendu dans l’État membre d’origine et que le certificat prévu à l’article 6, paragraphe 2, de ce règlement a été transmis à l’instance compétente dans l’État membre d’exécution, cette dernière est tenue, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des règles nationales applicables, d’assurer le plein effet de l’article 11 dudit règlement en suspendant la procédure d’exécution”.
AG Szpunar delivered on 20 October 2022 his opinion in case C‑291/21 (Starkinvest SRL), which is about the European Account Preservation Order. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
Context: “1. Le présent renvoi préjudiciel trouve son origine dans une procédure dans le cadre de laquelle la société de droit belge Starkinvest SRL demande l’autorisation de procéder à une saisie-arrêt conservatoire européenne de compte bancaire sur les sommes se trouvant potentiellement sur le compte bancaire français d’une société de droit irlandais.
2. Par cette procédure, la requérante au principal cherche à garantir une créance sur des astreintes qui seraient dues par cette société de droit irlandais sur la base d’une décision judiciaire rendue en Belgique l’obligeant, sous peine d’une astreinte de 2 500 euros par infraction, à cesser certains comportements.
3. [] le règlement (UE) nº 655/2014 prévoit des conditions différentes pour la délivrance d’une ordonnance européenne de saisie conservatoire des comptes bancaires (ci-après l’« OESC ») selon que le créancier a déjà obtenu ou non un titre exigeant du débiteur le paiement de sa créance dans l’État membre d’origine. Dans le premier cas, le créancier ne doit démontrer que le caractère urgent de la mesure du fait de l’existence d’un danger imminent, tandis que, dans le second cas, il doit également convaincre la juridiction du fumus boni iuris.
4. Dans la présente affaire se pose la question de savoir si le créancier, qui a obtenu une décision judiciaire condamnant le débiteur au paiement d’une astreinte en cas de violation d’un ordre de cessation imposé par cette décision, dispose d’un titre remplissant les conditions requises par le règlement nº 655/2014 et s’il est, dès lors, dispensé de l’obligation qui est exigée dans ce second cas de figure”.
Suggested decision : « L’article 7, paragraphe 2, du règlement (UE) no 655/2014 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que : une décision judiciaire signifiée condamnant le débiteur au paiement d’une astreinte en cas de violation d’un ordre de cessation ne constitue pas une « décision exigeant du débiteur le paiement de [la] créance » au sens de cette disposition, de sorte que la juridiction saisie d’une demande d’ordonnance européenne de saisie conservatoire des comptes bancaires par laquelle le créancier cherche à garantir le paiement de la créance relative à cette astreinte doit examiner l’existence et le montant de cette créance ».
The Court of Justice delivered on 20 October 2022 its judgment in case C‑604/20 (ROI Land Investments Ltd), which is about employment law and Brussels I bis and Rome I. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
« 1) L’article 21, paragraphe 1, sous b), i), et paragraphe 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012, concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, doit être interprété en ce sens que : un travailleur peut attraire devant la juridiction du dernier lieu où, ou à partir duquel, il a accompli habituellement son travail une personne, domiciliée ou non sur le territoire d’un État membre, avec laquelle il n’est pas lié par un contrat de travail formel, mais qui est, en vertu d’un accord de garantie dont dépendait la conclusion du contrat de travail avec un tiers, directement responsable envers ce travailleur de l’exécution des obligations de ce tiers, à condition qu’il existe un lien de subordination entre cette personne et le travailleur.
2) L’article 6, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que : la réserve relative à l’application de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, de ce règlement exclut qu’une juridiction d’un État membre puisse se fonder sur les règles de cet État en matière de compétence judiciaire lorsque les conditions d’application de cet article 21, paragraphe 2, sont réunies, quand bien même ces règles seraient plus favorables au travailleur. En revanche, lorsque les conditions d’application ni dudit article 21, paragraphe 2, ni d’aucune des autres dispositions énumérées à l’article 6, paragraphe 1, dudit règlement ne sont réunies, une telle juridiction est libre, conformément à cette dernière disposition, d’appliquer lesdites règles pour déterminer la compétence judiciaire.
3) L’article 17, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 et l’article 6, paragraphe 1, du règlement [] (Rome I), doivent être interprétés en ce sens que : la notion d’« activité professionnelle » recouvre non seulement une activité indépendante, mais également une activité salariée. En outre, un accord conclu entre le travailleur et une personne tierce à l’employeur mentionné dans le contrat de travail, en vertu duquel celle-ci est directement responsable envers le travailleur des obligations de cet employeur découlant du contrat de travail, ne constitue pas un contrat conclu en dehors et indépendamment de toute activité ou finalité d’ordre professionnel pour l’application de ces dispositions ».
The Court of Justice delivered last month (15 September 2022) its judgment in case C‑18/21 (Uniqa Versicherungen AG v VU), which is about the EOP and COVID-19:
“Articles 16, 20 and 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 […] must be interpreted as not precluding the application of national legislation, which was adopted when the COVID‑19 pandemic arose and which interrupted the procedural periods in civil matters for approximately five weeks, to the 30-day time limit laid down by Article 16(2) of that regulation for the defendant to lodge a statement of opposition to a European order for payment”.
The Court of Justice delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑399/21 (IRnova AB v FLIR Systems AB), which is about the scope of application of Article 24 Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version)
“L’article 24, point 4, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012, concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, doit être interprété en ce sens que : il ne s’applique pas à un litige tendant à déterminer, dans le cadre d’un recours fondé sur la qualité alléguée d’inventeur ou de co-inventeur, si une personne est titulaire du droit sur des inventions visées par des demandes de brevet déposées et par des brevets délivrés dans des pays tiers”.
On 1st September 2023, the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will enter in force between the European Union (save Denmark) and Ukraine, following their ratification on 29 August 2022.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=870
On 29 August 2022, Ukraine ratified the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, which will enter in force for this country on 1 December 2022.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=870
The Court of Justice delivered on 1 August 2022 its judgment in case C‑501/20 (MPA v LCDNMT), which is about Brussels II bis and the Maintenance Regulation:
“1. Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted as meaning that the status of the spouses concerned as members of the contract staff of the European Union, working in the latter’s delegation to a third country and in respect of whom it is claimed that they enjoy diplomatic status in that third State, is not capable of constituting a decisive factor for the purposes of determining habitual residence, within the meaning of those provisions.
2. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of determining a child’s habitual residence, the connecting factor of the mother’s nationality and her residence, prior to the marriage, in the Member State of the court seised of an application relating to parental responsibility is irrelevant, whereas the fact that the minor children were born in that Member State and hold the nationality of that Member State is insufficient.
3. Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction to rule on an application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties pursuant to Articles 3 to 5 of Regulation No 2201/2003, Article 7 of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 6 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that the respondent in the main proceedings is a national of a Member State other than that of the court seised prevents the application of the clause relating to residual jurisdiction laid down in Article 7 to establish the jurisdiction of that court without, however, preventing the courts of the Member State of which the respondent is a national from having jurisdiction to hear such an application pursuant to the latter Member State’s national rules on jurisdiction.
Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to parental responsibility pursuant to Articles 8 to 13 of Regulation No 2201/2003, Article 14 of that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that the respondent in the main proceedings is a national of a Member State other than that of the court seised does not preclude the application of the clause relating to residual jurisdiction laid down in Article 14 of that regulation.
4. Article 7 of Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that:
– where the habitual residence of all the parties to the dispute in matters relating to maintenance obligations is not in a Member State, jurisdiction founded, on an exceptional basis, on the forum necessitatis referred to in Article 7 may be established if no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under Articles 3 to 6 of that regulation, if the proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted in the third State with which the dispute is closely connected, or proves to be impossible, and there is a sufficient connection between the dispute and the court seised;
– in order to find, on an exceptional basis, that proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted in a third State, it is important that, following an analysis of the evidence put forward in each individual case, access to justice in that third State is, in law or in fact, hindered, in particular by the application of procedural conditions that are discriminatory or contrary to the fundamental guarantees of a fair trial, without there being any requirement that the party relying on Article 7 demonstrate that he or she has been unsuccessful in bringing or has attempted to bring the proceedings in question before the courts of the third State concerned; and
– in order to consider that a dispute must have a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised, it is possible to rely on the nationality of one of the parties”.
On 28 July 2022, the Hellenic Republic ratified the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, which will enter into force for Greece on 1 November 2022.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=869
Earlier this month (13 July 2022), Senegal acceded to the Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, which will enter into force for Senegal on 23 March 2023.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=868
Council Decision (EU) 2022/1206 of 12 July 2022 concerning the accession of the European Union to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was published at the OJEU today (JOEU, L 187, 14.7.2022, p. 1).
Its Article 1 states: “The accession of the European Union to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters is hereby approved on behalf of the Union”.
The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑572/21 (CC v VO), which is about Brussels II bis and the transfer, during court proceedings, of the habitual residence of a child from a Member State to a third State party to the 1996 Hague Convention. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
« L’article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 du Conseil, du 27 novembre 2003 […] lu en combinaison avec l’article 61, sous a), de ce règlement, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une juridiction d’un État membre, saisie d’un litige en matière de responsabilité parentale, ne conserve pas la compétence pour statuer sur ce litige au titre de cet article 8, paragraphe 1, lorsque la résidence habituelle de l’enfant en cause a été transférée légalement, en cours d’instance, sur le territoire d’un État tiers qui est partie à la convention concernant la compétence, la loi applicable, la reconnaissance, l’exécution et la coopération en matière de responsabilité parentale et de mesures de protection des enfants, conclue à La Haye le 19 octobre 1996 ».
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