European Civil Justice

AG Szpunar delivered today his opinion in case C‑354/21 (R.J.R., Registrų centras), which is about the delimitation of the lex successionis and the lex registrii, with suggested decision in favour of the first one. The opinion is currently available in the vast majority of EU official languages, albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

Context : « Une femme vit en Allemagne, de même que son fils. Elle décède, laissant celui-ci pour seul héritier. Elle possédait des biens immobiliers en Allemagne et en Lituanie. Son fils obtient un certificat successoral européen des autorités allemandes, spécifiant qu’il est l’unique héritier de l’intégralité du patrimoine de la défunte. Il présente ce certificat aux autorités lituaniennes en demandant l’inscription au registre foncier d’un bien immobilier. Celles-ci refusent d’accéder à cette demande au motif que ledit certificat est incomplet.

2. La présente demande de décision préjudicielle soulève donc la question délicate de la délimitation des domaines d’application respectifs de la lex successionis  et de la lex registrii et, plus concrètement, de la répartition des compétences entre l’autorité émettrice d’un certificat successoral européen et l’autorité en charge du registre foncier, située dans un autre État membre ».

Suggested decision : « L’article 1er, paragraphe 2, sous l), l’article 68, sous l), et l’article 69, paragraphe 5, du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] s’opposent à l’application de dispositions de droit national en vertu desquelles un bien immobilier acquis par un héritier unique en vertu d’un droit successoral régi par le principe de la succession universelle, ne peut être inscrit au registre foncier de l’État membre sur le territoire duquel ce bien est situé sur le fondement d’un certificat successoral européen qu’à la condition que toutes les données d’identification du bien immeuble requises par le droit national de cet État membre soient indiquées dans ce certificat ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=262971&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1845309

“From 4 to 8 July 2022, the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1993 Adoption Convention was held […] The Special Commission reviewed the draft Toolkit on Preventing and Addressing Illicit Practices in Intercountry Adoption, developed by the Working Group on Preventing and Addressing Illicit Practices in Intercountry Adoption, as well as the draft Recommended Model Forms for use under the 1993 Adoption Convention, and approved them, in principle, subject to certain amendments. Both will be submitted to the Council on General Affairs and Policy in 2023 for final approval and publication. Post-adoption matters featured prominently in the discussions, resulting in several recommendations to Contracting Parties aimed at developing specialised and quality post-adoption services, including in the search for origins. Intrafamily adoptions and alternatives to full adoption, such as simple and open adoptions, were also discussed.

[…] The Special Commission adopted over 50 Conclusions & Recommendations, available” at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d56b7ba3-6695-4862-b49c-75c730e9d599.pdf

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=866

On 8 July 2022, Pakistan acceded to the Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, which will enter into force for Pakistan on 9 March 2023.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=865

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (7 July 2022) its judgment in case C‑7/21 (LKW WALTER Internationale Transportorganisation AG), which is about the rights of the defence in the Service bis Regulation:

« Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 […], read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of the Member State of the authority which issued a document to be served, pursuant to which the starting point of the one-week period referred to in Article 8(1) of that regulation, within which the addressee of such a document may refuse to accept it on one of the grounds set out in that provision, is the same as the starting point for the period within which a remedy is to be sought against that document in that Member State”.

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=262423&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=252837

On 1 July 2022, the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance and the Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations entered into force for the Republic of Ecuador.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=864

On 22 June 2022, the Republic of the Philippines ratified the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for the Philippines on 1 October 2022.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=862

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑652/20 (Allianz Elementar Versicherungs AG), which is about Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 11, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012, concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, doit être interprété en ce sens que, lorsque cette disposition est applicable, elle détermine tant la compétence internationale que la compétence territoriale de la juridiction d’un État membre dans le ressort de laquelle se situe le domicile du demandeur ».

Reminder : Article 11: « 1. An insurer domiciled in a Member State may be sued:

a) in the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled;

b) in another Member State, in the case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled; or

c) if he is a co-insurer, in the courts of a Member State in which proceedings are brought against the leading insurer”.

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=261922&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=FR&cid=8348163

The Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered today its judgment in case C‑700/20 (London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain), which is about Article 34 Brussels I:

“1. Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment entered by a court of a Member State in the terms of an arbitral award does not constitute a ‘judgment’, within the meaning of that provision, where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of that Member State without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that regulation, in particular as regards the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in the insurance contract in question and the rules on lis pendens contained in Article 27 of that regulation, and that, in that situation, the judgment in question cannot prevent, in that Member State, the recognition of a judgment given by a court in another Member State.

2. Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that Article 34(3) of that regulation does not apply to a judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award, the recognition or enforcement of a judgment from another Member State cannot be refused as being contrary to public policy on the ground that it would disregard the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=261144&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=4584727

AG Szpunar delivered last week (16 June 2022) his opinion in case C‑265/21 (AB, AB-CD v Z EF), which is about Article 5 Brussels I. The opinion is available in the vast majority of EU official languages (save notably German), albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

« 1) L’article 5, point 1, du règlement (CE) nº 44/2001 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que son application présuppose la détermination d’une obligation juridique librement consentie par une personne à l’égard d’une autre et sur laquelle se fonde l’action du demandeur, même lorsque cette obligation ne lie pas directement les parties au litige. Dans le cadre de l’interprétation de cette disposition, la juridiction nationale doit veiller au respect de l’équilibre entre l’objectif de prévisibilité et de sécurité juridique et celui de proximité et de bonne administration de la justice.

2) Aux fins d’apprécier le fondement d’une action en vue de déterminer si elle relève de la « matière contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001, la juridiction saisie n’est pas tenue d’examiner, au stade de la vérification de la compétence, l’obligation contractuelle ou, le cas échéant, le contenu du ou des contrats en cause. Afin de vérifier si les conditions essentielles de sa compétence sont remplies, cette juridiction identifie uniquement les points de rattachement avec l’État du for justifiant sa compétence en vertu de cette disposition et apprécie tous les éléments dont elle dispose, notamment les allégations pertinentes du demandeur quant à la nature des obligations sur lesquelles se fonde son action et, le cas échéant, les contestations émises par le défendeur. La circonstance que l’action en cause au principal est une action en reconnaissance d’un droit de propriété est sans incidence sur le fait que cette action relève de la « matière contractuelle » et, partant, sur l’application de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001.

3) L’action en reconnaissance d’un droit de propriété portant sur un bien meuble, lorsqu’elle est fondée sur deux contrats qui ne lient pas directement les parties au litige, relève de la « matière contractuelle », au sens de l’article 5, point 1, du règlement nº 44/2001. Le contrat à prendre en compte pour déterminer le lieu de l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande est le contrat original faisant l’objet du litige ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=261006&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4632834

The Court of Justice delivered last week (2 June 2022) its judgment in Case C‑196/21 (SR and alii), which is about the Service bis Regulation:

« Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court orders the transmission of judicial documents to third parties that apply for leave to intervene in the proceedings, that court cannot be regarded as being the ‘applicant’ within the meaning of that provision”.

Note : Article 5 Service bis Regulation states :

“1. The applicant shall be advised by the transmitting agency to which he forwards the document for transmission that the addressee may refuse to accept it if it is not in one of the languages provided for in Article 8.

2. The applicant shall bear any costs of translation prior to the transmission of the document, without prejudice to any possible subsequent decision by the court or competent authority on liability for such costs”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=D6263372CF35902864FE65D23613F425?text=&docid=260188&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4507548

The Court of Justice delivered last week (2 June 2022) its judgment in Case C‑617/20 (T.N. and alii), which is about the Succession Regulation:

“Articles 13 and 28 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a declaration concerning the waiver of succession made by an heir before a court of the Member State of his or her habitual residence is regarded as valid as to form in the case where the formal requirements applicable before that court have been complied with, without it being necessary, for the purposes of that validity, for that declaration to meet the formal requirements of the law applicable to the succession”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=D6263372CF35902864FE65D23613F425?text=&docid=260184&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4507548

Regulation (EU) 2022/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on a computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (e-CODEX system), and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726, has been published at the OJEU, L 150, 1.6.2022, p. 1.

Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.150.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A150%3ATOC

The Hague Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 2007 Child Support Convention and 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol was held from 17 to 19 May 2022. The meeting resulted in the adoption of over 80 Conclusions & Recommendations, released this week.

“Among other things, HCCH Members and Contracting Parties:

Confirmed that the Convention and Protocol are fit for purpose and reaffirmed their global scope;

Discussed effective access to legal assistance for children, including children studying abroad, for the recovery of maintenance obligations arising from a parent-child relationship;

Emphasised that the right of the child to child support takes precedence over the right of the debtor to privacy in financial matters;

Discussed the enforcement of child support against the debtor’s assets located in another State;

Discussed that child support can be established without necessarily establishing parentage;

Discussed the non-disclosure of personal information when the health, safety or liberty of a person involved in child support recovery could be jeopardised;

Discussed the use of secure means of communication for the recovery of child support, including the iSupport electronic case management and secure communication system for the recovery of cross-border maintenance under the EU 2009 Maintenance Regulation and the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention;

Reaffirmed their commitment towards the abolition of cheques in their international transfer of maintenance funds;

Took note of the Report of the International Transfer of Maintenance Funds Experts’ Group which highlighted the potential benefits of the Universal Postal Union’s Postal Payment Services Agreement of 6 October 2016 as a cost-effective way to transfer maintenance funds internationally”.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=859

The conclusions and recommendations may be found at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/ee328db7-1d7a-4e8a-b765-2e35e937a466.pdf.

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (19 May 2022) its judgment in case C‑33/21 (Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Ryanair DAC):

“Article 14(2)(a)(i) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 [on social security] must be interpreted as meaning that the social security legislation applicable to the flight and cabin crew of an airline, established in a Member State, which crew is not covered by E101 certificates and which work for 45 minutes per day in premises intended to be used by staff, known as the ‘crew room’, which that airline has in the territory of another Member State in which that flight and cabin crew reside and, which for the remaining working time, are on board that airline’s aircraft is the legislation of the latter Member State”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259607&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=1267764

The European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), C/2022/2428, has been published this week at the OJEU (L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30).

Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.138.01.0030.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A138%3ATOC

The Grand Chamber delivered on 17 May 2022 its judgment in case C‑869/19 (L v Unicaja Banco SA, formerly Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria SAU), which is about Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair terms in consumer contracts and national rules of procedure:

“Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding the application of principles of national judicial procedure, under which a national court, hearing an appeal against a judgment temporally limiting the repayment of sums wrongly paid by the consumer under a term declared to be unfair, cannot raise of its own motion a ground relating to the infringement of that provision and order the repayment of those sums in full, where the failure of the consumer concerned to challenge that temporal limitation cannot be attributed to his or her complete inaction”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259430&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=922860

The Court of Justice delivered on 12 May 2022 its judgment in case C‑644/20, which is about not the Maintenance Regulation itself but the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3 du protocole de La Haye, du 23 novembre 2007, sur la loi applicable aux obligations alimentaires […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, aux fins de la détermination de la loi applicable à la créance alimentaire d’un enfant mineur déplacé par l’un de ses parents sur le territoire d’un État membre, la circonstance qu’une juridiction de cet État membre a ordonné, dans le cadre d’une procédure distincte, le retour de cet enfant dans l’État où il résidait habituellement avec ses parents immédiatement avant son déplacement, ne suffit pas à empêcher que ledit enfant puisse acquérir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire de cet État membre ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=259145&text=&dir=&doclang=FR&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=209782

AG Collins delivered on 5 May 2022 his opinion in case C‑700/20 (The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v Kingdom of Spain), which is about Brussels I (recognition of a judgment given in another Member State, a judgment irreconcilable with a judgment incorporating an arbitral award given between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought).

Background: “Slightly under two decades ago, in November 2002, the M/T Prestige (‘the vessel’), a single-hull oil tanker registered in the Bahamas, broke into two sections and sank off the coast of Galicia (Spain). At the time the vessel was carrying 70 000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil and the resulting oil spill caused significant damage to beaches, towns and villages along the northern coastline of Spain and the western coastline of France. […] the sinking of the vessel generated a lengthy dispute between its insurers and the Spanish State pursued by way of two different procedures in two Member States. It resulted in two judgments: one delivered by the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña, Spain), the other handed down by the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (United Kingdom). The Spanish State ultimately sought to have the judgment of the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) recognised by the courts of England & Wales. In the last days of the transitional period after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) made a reference for preliminary ruling seeking an interpretation by the Court of Justice of Article 1(2)(d) and Article 34(1) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters”.

[…]

13. At the time the vessel sank, its owners (‘the owners’) had Protection & Indemnity (‘P&I’) insurance with The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited (‘the Club’), (7) pursuant to an insurance contract concluded by a certificate of entry dated 20 February 2002 (‘the insurance contract’). By that contract, the Club agreed to provide P&I cover for the owners in respect of, inter alia, any one occurrence of liability for pollution up to a maximum aggregate amount of 1 billion United States dollars (USD). The insurance contract was subject to the Club’s Rules, that is, the standard terms and conditions of the insurance policy incorporated into the certificate of entry. Rule 3, entitled ‘Right to recover’, provided for a ‘pay to be paid’ clause (8) in the terms following:

‘3.1 If any member shall incur liabilities, costs or expenses for which he is insured he shall be entitled to recovery from the Association out of the funds of this Class, PROVIDED that:

3.1.1 actual payment (out of monies belonging to him absolutely and not by way of loan or otherwise) by the Member of the full amount of such liabilities, costs and expenses shall be a condition precedent to his right of recovery;…’

14. Rule 43 of the Club’s Rules, entitled ‘Jurisdiction and law’, contained an arbitration clause whereby ‘if any difference or dispute shall arise between a Member and the Association’, ‘such difference or dispute’ was to be referred to arbitration in London (United Kingdom) before a sole legal arbitrator subject to English law and the Arbitration Act 1996.

15. In late 2002, criminal proceedings were initiated in Spain against, inter alia, the vessel’s master, chief officer and chief engineer.

16. In or about June 2010, at the conclusion of the investigatory stage of the criminal proceedings, several legal entities, including the Spanish State, brought civil claims against a number of defendants, including the Club as the owners’ liability insurer under the insurance contract pursuant to a right of direct action under Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code. The Club did not take part in the Spanish proceedings.

17. On 16 January 2012, the Club initiated arbitration proceedings in London, whereby it sought declarations to the effect that, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the insurance contract, the Spanish State was bound to pursue its claims under Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code in London and that the Club was not liable to the Spanish State in respect of such claims as a matter of English law and/or under that contract. The Spanish State did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. (9)

18. By an award delivered on 13 February 2013 (‘the Award’), the arbitral tribunal held that, since the claims in question were of a contractual nature under English conflict of law rules, English law applied to the contract. The Spanish State could not thus benefit from the owners’ contractual rights without complying with both the arbitration clause and the ‘pay to be paid’ clause. Moreover the Spanish State ought to have initiated arbitration proceedings in London to recover payment from the Club. The Award also declared that, in the absence of prior payment of the insured liability by the owners, the Club was not liable to the Spanish State in respect of the claims. In any event, the Club’s liability did not exceed USD 1 billion.

19. In March 2013, the Club applied to the referring court under section 66(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 for leave to enforce the Award in the jurisdiction in the same manner as a judgment or order and for a judgment to be entered in the terms of the Award. The Spanish State opposed that application. It sought orders to set aside the Award and/or to declare the Award of no effect, pursuant to sections 67 and/or 72 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Those sections provide that an English arbitral award may be challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction and that the relevant dispute could not properly be submitted to arbitration. The Spanish State also argued that the referring court should decline to exercise its discretion to enter judgment.

20. Following a seven-day trial in the course of which factual evidence together with expert evidence of Spanish law was heard, on 22 October 2013 the referring court delivered judgment. It ordered that the Spanish State’s applications be dismissed, granted the Club, pursuant to section 66(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996, leave to enforce the Award and declared that, pursuant to section 66(2) of that act, judgment was to be entered against the Spanish State in the terms of the Award. On the same date it delivered a separate formal judgment which stated that ‘pursuant to section 66(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, judgment is entered against the [Spanish State] in the terms of the Award’. (10)

21. The Spanish State appealed against the section 66 judgment to the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom). By judgment of 1 April 2015, that court dismissed the appeal.

22. On 13 November 2013, the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) gave judgment in the Spanish proceedings. It made no finding as to the civil liability of the owners or of the Club. Various parties appealed against that judgment to the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain). By judgment of 14 January 2016, that court held, inter alia, that the master and the owners were liable in respect of the civil claims and that the Club was directly liable pursuant to Article 117 of the Spanish Criminal Code, subject to the global limit of liability of USD 1 billion. It remitted the matter to the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) to determine the quantum of the respective liabilities of the defendants to the Spanish proceedings. By judgment of 15 November 2017 (rectified on 11 January 2018), that court held that, as a result of the accident, the master, the owners and the Club were liable to over 200 separate parties (including the Spanish State) in sums in excess of EUR 1.6 billion, subject, in the case of the Club, to the global limit of liability of USD 1 billion. Various parties appealed against that judgment before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), which, by judgment of 19 December 2018 (amended on 21 January 2019), upheld it, subject to a limited number of variations.

23. On 1 March 2019, the Audiencia Provincial de La Coruña (Provincial Court, A Coruña) issued an execution order setting out the amounts that each of the claimants, including the Spanish State, were entitled to enforce against the respective defendants, including the Club (‘the Spanish judgment’).

24. On 25 March 2019, the Spanish State applied to the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) to have the Spanish judgment recognised under Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001. That court acceded to that application by order of 28 May 2019 (‘the registration order’). (11)

25. On 26 June 2019, the Club lodged an appeal against the registration order under Article 43 of Regulation No 44/2001. It relied on two grounds. First, it argued that, pursuant to Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, the Spanish judgment was irreconcilable with the section 66 judgment which the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) had upheld on 1 April 2015. Second, by reference to Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, it submitted that recognition or enforcement of the Spanish judgment was manifestly contrary to English public policy. The Spanish State contested the Club’s appeal. It asked the referring court to refer six questions for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001.

26. In those circumstances, on 22 December 2020, the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Given the nature of the issues which the national court is required to determine in deciding whether to enter judgment in the terms of an award under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment granted pursuant to that provision capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of [Regulation No 44/2001]?

(2) Given that a judgment entered in the terms of an award, such as a judgment under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment falling outside the material scope of Regulation No 44/2001 by reason of the Article l(2)(d) arbitration exception, is such a judgment capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of the regulation?

(3) On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition or enforcement or [does] Article 34(3) and (4) of the regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?’”

Suggested decision: “A judgment entered in the terms of an arbitral award pursuant to section 66(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 is capable of constituting a relevant ‘judgment’ of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 […], notwithstanding that such a judgment falls outside the scope of that regulation by reason of Article 1(2)(d) thereof”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=258882&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212120

AG Collins delivered on 5 May 2022 his opinion in case C‑646/20 (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, Standesamtsaufsicht v TB, joined parties: Standesamt Mitte von Berlin, RD), which is about Brussels II bis:

“The dissolution of a marriage by a legally ordained procedure whereby spouses each make a personal declaration that they wish to divorce before a civil registrar, who confirms that agreement in their presence not less than 30 days later after having verified that the conditions required by law for the dissolution of the marriage have been met, namely that the spouses do not have minor children or adult children who are incapacitated or severely disabled or economically dependent and the agreement between them does not contain terms concerning the transfer of assets, is a divorce judgment for the purposes of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=258881&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=217509

The Court of Justice delivered on 28 April 2022 its judgment in case C‑44/21 (Phoenix Contact GmbH & Co. KG v HARTING Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, Harting Electric GmbH & Co. KG), which is about Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property:

“Article 9(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as precluding national case-law under which applications for interim relief for patent infringement must, in principle, be dismissed where the validity of the patent in question has not been confirmed, at the very least, by a decision given at first instance in opposition or invalidity proceedings”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=258493&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=218534

AG De La Tour delivered on 28 April 2022 his opinion in C‑604/20 (ROI Land Investments Ltd. v FD), which is about Brussels I bis and Rome I. The opinion is currently available in selected EU official languages only (and therefore not in English). Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version)

« À titre principal :

1) L’article 21, paragraphes 1 et 2, du [Brussels I bis] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une personne physique ou morale, domiciliée ou non sur le territoire d’un État membre, avec laquelle le travailleur a conclu non pas son contrat de travail, mais un accord faisant partie intégrante de ce contrat, en vertu duquel cette personne est responsable de l’exécution des obligations de l’employeur envers ce travailleur, peut être considérée comme un « employeur », si celle-ci a un intérêt direct à la bonne exécution dudit contrat. L’existence d’un tel intérêt direct doit être appréciée par la juridiction de renvoi de manière globale, en prenant en considération l’ensemble des circonstances de l’espèce.

2) L’article 6, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que l’application des règles de compétence du droit national est exclue lorsque les conditions d’application de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, de ce règlement sont réunies.

À titre subsidiaire, dans l’hypothèse où la Cour considérerait que le litige ne relève pas du champ d’application de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 :

3) L’article 17, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 et l’article 6, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 593/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 17 juin 2008, sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Rome I) doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la notion d’« activité professionnelle » recouvre une activité salariée dans le cadre d’une relation de travail.

4) L’article 17, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 et l’article 6, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 593/2008 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’un accord de garantie, faisant partie intégrante d’un contrat de travail en vertu duquel une personne est responsable de l’exécution des obligations de l’employeur envers le travailleur, relève de la notion d’« activité professionnelle » ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=258504&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=218534