European Civil Justice

The opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a computerised system for communication in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings (e-CODEX system), and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726’ (COM(2020) 712 final — 2020/0345 (COD)) (EESC 2020/05898) has been published at the OJEU, C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 82, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2021.286.01.0082.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2021%3A286%3ATOC

The opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Ensuring justice in the EU — A European judicial training strategy for 2021-2024”’ (COM(2020) 713 final) (EESC 2021/00976) has been published at the OJEU, C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 141, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2021.286.01.0141.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2021%3A286%3ATOC

Advocate General Pikamäe delivered on 14 July 2021 his opinion in case C‑262/21 PPU (A v B), which is about the impact of a transfer decision under Regulation no 604/2013 on the term “wrongful removal or retention” under Article 2 Brussels II bis. The opinion is currently available only in Finn and French. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« Le règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que la situation, telle que celle au principal, dans laquelle un enfant et sa mère se sont rendus et maintenus dans un État membre en exécution d’une décision de transfert prise par l’autorité compétente de l’État membre d’origine conformément au règlement (UE) no 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des États membres par un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride ne saurait être considérée comme un déplacement ou un non-retour illicites, au sens de l’article 2, point 11, du règlement no 2201/2003, sauf s’il est établi que, sous le couvert d’une demande de protection internationale formée pour l’enfant, la mère a commis une voie de fait afin de contourner les règles de compétence judiciaire prévues par le règlement no 2201/2003, ce qu’il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances particulières du cas d’espèce ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244107&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) an important decision in case C‑791/19 on the Rule of Law in Poland:

“1.  Declares that:

– by failing to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), which is responsible for reviewing decisions issued in disciplinary proceedings against judges […];

– by allowing the content of judicial decisions to be classified as a disciplinary offence involving judges of the ordinary courts […];

– by conferring on the President of the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) the discretionary power to designate the disciplinary tribunal with jurisdiction at first instance in cases concerning judges of the ordinary courts […] and, therefore, by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases are examined by a tribunal ‘established by law’; and

– by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases against judges of the ordinary courts are examined within a reasonable time (second sentence of Article 112b § 5 of the Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts), and by providing that actions relating to the appointment of defence counsel and the taking up of the defence by that counsel do not have a suspensory effect on the course of the disciplinary proceedings (Article 113a of that law) and that the disciplinary tribunal is to conduct the proceedings despite the justified absence of the notified accused judge or his or her defence counsel (Article 115a § 3 of the same law) and, therefore, by failing to guarantee respect for the rights of defence of accused judges of the ordinary courts,

the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU;

2.      Declares that, by allowing the right of courts and tribunals to submit requests for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union to be restricted by the possibility of triggering disciplinary proceedings, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU”

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244185&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The European Commission adopted today a proposal for the EU’s accession to the Hague 2019 Judgement Convention. The proposal is available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/proposal_eu_accession_judgments_convention_and_annex_en.pdf

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in case C‑30/20 (RH v AB Volvo, and alii), which is about Article 7(2) Brussels I bis and the private enforcement of competition law

“Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, within the market affected by collusive arrangements on the fixing and increase in the prices of goods, either the court within whose jurisdiction the undertaking claiming to be harmed purchased the goods affected by those arrangements or, in the case of purchases made by that undertaking in several places, the court within whose jurisdiction that undertaking’s registered office is situated, has international and territorial jurisdiction, in terms of the place where the damage occurred, over an action for compensation for the damage caused by those arrangements contrary to Article 101 TFEU”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244190&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in joined Cases C‑152/20 and C‑218/20 (DG, EH v SC Gruber Logistics SRL (C‑152/20), and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, DT v SC Samidani Trans SRL (C‑218/20)), which is about the law applicable to employment contracts:

“1. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 […]  must be interpreted as meaning that, where the law governing the individual employment contract has been chosen by the parties to that contract, and that law differs from the law applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of that article, the application of the latter law must be excluded with the exception of ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ under that law within the meaning of Article 8(1) of that regulation, provisions that can, in principle, include rules on the minimum wage.

2. Article 8 of Regulation No 593/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that:

–  first, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law pursuant to a national provision, provided that the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to the contract, and

– secondly, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer, with the employee merely accepting it”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244192&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

Advocate General M Szpunar delivered today his opinion in case C‑422/20 (RK v CR), which is about the Succession Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 6, sous a), et l’article 7, sous a), du règlement (UE) nº 650/2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la juridiction de l’État membre dont la compétence est censée résulter d’un déclinatoire de compétence de la juridiction préalablement saisie n’est pas habilitée à vérifier, premièrement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que la loi de cet État membre a été choisie ou est réputée avoir été choisie pour régir la succession, deuxièmement, si l’une des parties à la procédure a présenté une demande au titre de l’article 6, sous a), de ce règlement devant la juridiction préalablement saisie et, troisièmement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que les juridictions dudit État membre sont mieux placées pour statuer sur la succession, lorsque ces trois conditions ont été vérifiées par la juridiction préalablement saisie ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243877&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=499554

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑289/20 (IB v FA), which is about Brussels II bis.  The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, aux fins de l’attribution de compétence, chaque conjoint ne peut se voir reconnaître qu’une résidence habituelle.

Quand un conjoint partage sa vie entre deux ou plusieurs États membres de telle sorte qu’il n’est aucunement possible de considérer l’un de ces États comme étant celui de sa résidence habituelle au sens de l’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement no 2201/2003, la compétence judiciaire internationale doit être déterminée conformément à d’autres critères prévus par ce règlement et, le cas échéant, conformément aux critères résiduels en vigueur dans les États membres.

Dans ce même cas de figure, la compétence peut être exceptionnellement attribuée aux juridictions des États membres d’une résidence non habituelle d’un conjoint, lorsque l’application du règlement no 2201/2003 et des fors résiduels ne fait ressortir la compétence internationale d’aucun État membre ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243875&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=499554

In a note verbale of 22 June 2021, recently transmitted to the Swiss Federal Council as Depository of the Lugano II Convention, the European Commission has notified that “the European Union is not in a position to give its consent to invite the United Kingdom to accede to the Lugano Convention”.

The note verbale may be found on the website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA in German), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/fr/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/autres-conventions/Lugano2/20210701-LUG-ann-EU.pdf

AG De La Tour delivered today his opinion in case C‑277/20 (UM), which is about the Successions Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que relèvent de la notion de « pacte successoral » les actes de donation entre vifs en vertu desquels le transfert, au profit du donataire, de la propriété d’un bien ou des biens qui constituent même partiellement le patrimoine successoral du donateur n’intervient qu’à son décès ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243669&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=23944552

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑301/20 (UE, HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG, intervening parties: Estate of VJ), which is about the Successions Regulation:

“1. Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a certified copy of the European Certificate of Succession, bearing the words ‘unlimited duration’, is valid for a period of six months from the date of issue and produces its effects, within the meaning of Article 69 of that regulation, if it was valid when it was presented to the competent authority;

2. Article 65(1) of Regulation No 650/2012, read in conjunction with Article 69(3) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that the effects of the European Certificate of Succession are produced with respect to all persons who are named therein, even if they have not themselves requested that it be issued”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=4EB7F36D35D24BF4E135A4654D292A60?text=&docid=243642&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=23943665

Georgia acceded on 31 May 2021 to the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. The first one will enter into force for Georgia on 1 January 2022, subject to the Article 28 procedure. The second one will enter into force for Georgia on 30 July 2021.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=803

The Court of Justice delivered last Thursday (17 June) its judgment in case C-800/19 (Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v SM), which is about Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 7, point 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243103&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1427608

AG Bobek delivered today his opinion in case C‑55/20 (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości joined parties: Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego, Prokurator Krajowy, Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie), which is about the Rule of Law in Poland.

Context: “  In July 2017, the Prokurator Krajowy – Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego […] (‘the National Prosecutor’) requested the Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Agent of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […] to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer of the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In the view of the National Prosecutor, the statements made by that lawyer when publicly commenting on the possibility of his client being charged with a criminal offence amounted to unlawful threats and disciplinary misconduct. Twice, the Disciplinary Agent either refused to initiate such proceedings or decided to discontinue them. Twice, the Sąd Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […], following an appeal lodged by the National Prosecutor or the Minister of Justice, overturned those decisions and remitted the case back to the Disciplinary Agent.

2. The present request for a preliminary ruling has been made in a third ‘round’ of those proceedings, within which the Disciplinary Court is examining the decision of the Disciplinary Agent to discontinue once more the disciplinary inquiry against that lawyer, following an appeal lodged again by the National Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice. The referring court seeks to know whether Directive 2006/123/EC (‘the Services Directive’) (2) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) are applicable to disciplinary proceedings pending before it. However, it appears that the crux of the matter before the referring court lies elsewhere: what concrete consequences, in procedural terms, is the referring court to draw from the Court’s judgment in A. K. and Others, (3) in view of the fact that its ruling might be subsequently appealed before the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, Poland)? How can that court, in specific and practical terms, ensure compliance with EU law?”

The suggested decision (Extract): “On the basis of the primacy of EU law:

–  A national court is required to set aside the provisions of national law which reserve jurisdiction to rule on cases to a court which is not an independent and impartial tribunal, so that those cases may be examined by a court which meets the requirements of independence and impartiality and which, were it not for those provisions, would have jurisdiction.

– A national court must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of a higher court if it considers that they are incompatible with EU law, including situations in which incompatibility derives from the lack of independence and impartiality of that higher court”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=243109&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=14807561

The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) delivered today its decision in case C‑645/19 (Facebook Ireland Ltd, Facebook Inc., Facebook Belgium BVBA, v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit), which is about the cross-border processing of personal data:

“1. Article 55(1), Articles 56 to 58 and Articles 60 to 66 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 […] on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data […] read together with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a supervisory authority of a Member State which […] has the power to bring any alleged infringement of that regulation to the attention of a court of that Member State and, where necessary, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, may exercise that power in relation to an instance of cross‑border data processing even though it is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’, within the meaning of Article 56(1) of that regulation, with respect to that data processing, provided that that power is exercised in one of the situations where Regulation 2016/679 confers on that supervisory authority a competence to adopt a decision finding that such processing is in breach of the rules contained in that regulation and that the cooperation and consistency procedures laid down by that regulation are respected.

2. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of cross-border data processing, it is not a prerequisite for the exercise of the power of a supervisory authority of a Member State, other than the lead supervisory authority, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, within the meaning of that provision, that the controller with respect to the cross-border processing of personal data against whom such proceedings are brought has a main establishment or another establishment on the territory of that Member State.

3. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that the power of a supervisory authority of a Member State, other than the lead supervisory authority, to bring any alleged infringement of that regulation to the attention of a court of that Member State and, where appropriate, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, within the meaning of that provision, may be exercised both with respect to the main establishment of the controller which is located in that authority’s own Member State and with respect to another establishment of that controller, provided that the object of the legal proceedings is a processing of data carried out in the context of the activities of that establishment and that that authority is competent to exercise that power, in accordance with the terms of the answer to the first question referred.

4. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a supervisory authority of a Member State which is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’ […] has brought a legal action, the object of which is an instance of cross-border processing of personal data, before 25 May 2018, that is, before the date when that regulation became applicable, that action may, from the perspective of EU law, be continued on the basis of the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC […] on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which remains applicable in relation to infringements of the rules laid down in that directive committed up to the date when that directive was repealed. That action may, in addition, be brought by that authority with respect to infringements committed after that date, on the basis of Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679, provided that that action is brought in one of the situations where, exceptionally, that regulation confers on a supervisory authority of a Member State which is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’ a competence to adopt a decision finding that the processing of data in question is in breach of the rules contained in that regulation with respect to the protection of the rights of natural persons as regards the processing of personal data, and that the cooperation and consistency procedures laid down by that regulation are respected, which it is for the referring court to determine.

5. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that that provision has direct effect, with the result that a national supervisory authority may rely on that provision in order to bring or continue a legal action against private parties, even where that provision has not been specifically implemented in the legislation of the Member State concerned”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=242821&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14254177

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in Case C‑280/20 (ZN v Generalno konsulstvo na Republika Bulgaria v grad Valensia, Kralstvo Ispania), which is about Brussels I bis and an employment contract concluded with a consular representation of the Member State of the employee in another Member State:

“Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, read in conjunction with recital 3 of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that it applies for the purposes of determining the international jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State to hear and rule on a dispute between an employee from a Member State who does not carry out duties involving the exercise of public powers and a consular authority of that Member State situated in the territory of another Member State”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=242028&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9748919

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑914/19 (Ministero della Giustizia v GN). The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 21 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et l’article 6, paragraphe 1, de la directive 2000/78/CE du Conseil, du 27 novembre 2000, portant création d’un cadre général en faveur de l’égalité de traitement en matière d’emploi et de travail, doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à une réglementation nationale qui fixe une limite d’âge de 50 ans pour pouvoir participer au concours d’accès à la profession de notaire, dans la mesure où une telle réglementation ne paraît pas poursuivre les objectifs d’assurer la stabilité de l’exercice de cette profession pendant une durée significative avant la retraite, de protéger le bon fonctionnement des prérogatives notariales et de faciliter le renouvellement générationnel ainsi que le rajeunissement de ladite profession et, en tout état de cause, dépasse ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre ces objectifs, ce qu’il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier ».

The International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris (France) delivered on 25 May 2021 a judgment on International jurisdiction under Brussels I bis (ICCP-CA RG 20/12522).

Here is the official translation of the résumé of the decision: “The CCIP-CA had to rule on an appeal on the jurisdiction of an action for damages brought by a French company against a German certifying company (and its German insurer), based on an alleged tort from the latter producing certificates of conformity in the context of a contract with the manufacturer of the boxes necessary for the operation of photovoltaic panels.

The Court upheld the decision of the Court of first instance which ruled for the international jurisdiction of the French courts under Article 7 § 2 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) , which allows a person domiciled in a Member State to be sued “in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur “, and ruled out the question for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU.

The Court found, relying on the case law of the CJEU (§ 43 to 53) that the boxes of the photovoltaic panels had been installed on proprieties located in France and that the repair work resulting from the defect noticed had also been done on these facilities located in France. It considered that the installer company and its subrogated insurer were therefore “direct victims due to the normal use of panels” and that the place of occurrence of the initial damage was located in France (§ 55 to 60). However, considering that Article 7 point 2 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) was intended to directly designate the competent court without referring to the internal rules of the Member States, which are therefore not practical, the Court held that each judicial court in the jurisdiction in which the contentious facility was located must have authority to hear this action (§ 61 et seq.)”.

The decision is not yet available. However, it is likely it will be in a few days (check the following link).

Source: https://www.cours-appel.justice.fr/paris/25052021-ccip-ca-rg-2012522-competence-juridictionnelle-internationale-international

On Monday 24 May 2021, Niger acceded to the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, which will enter into force for this country on 1 September 2021.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=801