Agrégateur de flux

Comune di Copertino
Libre circulation des personnes
Avocate générale Ćapeta : les États membres peuvent limiter la monétisation des jours de congé annuel payé non pris à la fin de la relation de travail

UFC - Que choisir et CLCV
Rapprochement des législations
Voyages à forfait et pandémie de Covid-19 : une réglementation nationale libérant temporairement les organisateurs de leur obligation de remboursement intégral en cas de résiliation n’est pas compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Austrian Airlines (Vol de rapatriement)
Transport
Pandémie de Covid-19 : un vol de rapatriement organisé dans le contexte d’une mesure d’assistance consulaire ne constitue pas un vol de réacheminement que le transporteur aérien effectif doit offrir aux passagers dont le vol a été annulé

Prestige and Limousine
Liberté d'établissement
La limitation du nombre de licences de services de véhicule de tourisme avec chauffeur dans l’agglomération de Barcelone est contraire au droit de l’Union

This post was written by Ugljesa Grusic, Associate Professor at University College London. It offers a preview of the upcoming developments relating to Zubaydah v Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a case pending before the UK Supreme Court.

While private international law is no longer regarded as an apolitical field, it is rare for it to become directly entangled in clandestine intelligence operations, secret state deals, and egregious human rights violations. However, the UK Supreme Court is set to hear precisely such a case on 14 and 15 June 2023 in Zubaydah v Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This case is important not only because of its context, but also because it raises a crucial question of private international law. Can reasonable/legitimate expectations, justice, convenience, fairness, and appropriateness, as fundamental principles underlying the application of foreign law, be of practical relevance for determining the applicable law in difficult cases?

Facts

Abu Zubaydah, the first detainee in a CIA black site and the first subject of what the CIA euphemistically refers to as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, but what should rightfully be recognised as torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, is currently a ‘forever prisoner’ in Guantánamo. He is suing the UK government for its alleged complicity in the CIA’s wrongful conduct, which itself was part of the US ‘war on terror’.

Claims

Zubaydah is suing the UK government for misfeasance in public office, conspiracy, trespass to the person, false imprisonment, and negligence. The crux of the claims is that the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service (better known as, respectively, the MI5 and the MI6) were aware that Zubaydah was being arbitrarily detained at CIA black sites, where he was being subjected to torture and maltreatment during interrogations conducted by the CIA, but nevertheless sent questions with a view to the CIA eliciting information from him, expecting and/or intending (or at the very least not caring) that he would be subjected to such torture and maltreatment. The defendants are neither confirming nor denying these allegations.

Central Issue

The claim is brought in tort. The Rome II Regulation does not apply due to the acta iure imperii exception. Section 15(1) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 states that the choice-of-law rules for torts in the Act apply ‘in relation to claims by or against the Crown as [they apply] in relation to claims to which the Crown is not a party’. The lex loci delicti applies pursuant to section 11 of the 1995 Act. However, section 12 provides an escape clause.

In this case, the claimant (respondent in the appeal) aims to plead and establish his claim by reference to English law. On the other hand, the defendants (appellants in the appeal) argue that the laws of Thailand, Poland, Cuba (Guantánamo Bay), Morocco, Lithuania, and Afghanistan (the ‘Six Countries’, where he was allegedly detained, tortured, and mistreated) should govern.

Private international law thus becomes the focal point of the power dynamics at play in this case. Of course, the defendants are not asserting that the MI5 and MI6 officers who sent questions to their CIA counterparts had the specific laws of the Six Countries in mind as governing their actions. Rather, they are arguing that the laws of the Six Countries apply because this would make the claimant’s claim more uncertain and resource intensive and, consequently, more challenging to establish. Lane J accepted the defendants’ argument, but Dame Sharp P, Thirlwall and Males LJJ unanimously allowed the appeal.

Importance of the Case

This case holds importance for private international law for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the role of private international law in holding the executive accountable and vindicating fundamental rights, particularly in cases involving alleged wrongs arising out of the external exercise of British executive authority. I will not discuss this aspect of the case here, except to say that I have written a whole book on the topic, Torts in UK Foreign Relations, which will be published by Oxford University Press in their Private International Law series on 13 June 2023.

The focus here is on the second important aspect of the case, which involves the reliance by the parties and the courts on reasonable/legitimate expectations, justice, convenience, fairness, and appropriateness, as fundamental principles underlying the application of foreign law, as important factors in the choice-of-law process.

As elucidated by the editors of Dicey, Morris and Collins in paragraph 1-006, ‘The main justification for the conflict of laws is that it implements the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties to a transaction or an occurrence.’ In the following paragraphs, the editors further assert that failing to apply foreign law in ‘appropriate cases’ would lead to ‘grave injustice and inconvenience’. As private international lawyers, we recognise these and similar principles as the truths of our field. However, courts rarely delve into the reasons for applying foreign law and the practical relevance of these fundamental principles. It is in the most difficult cases, such as Zubaydah, that courts may have to go back to the drawing board.

Consider a scenario where a person negligently injures a Ruritanian victim while driving in Ruritania. It is well-established that Ruritanian law would govern the tort in such a case. The application of Ruritanian law can be justified based on the reasonable/legitimate expectations of the parties involved. By driving to Ruritania, the tortfeasor submits to Ruritanian law, and the Ruritanian victim naturally expects the application of its own country’s law. Additionally, the application of foreign law can be explained by notions of justice, either as the attainment of individual private justice or the systemic justice derived from the appropriate allocation of regulatory authority among states.

However, do these ideas still hold weight where the victim was forcibly and unlawfully ‘extraordinarily rendered’ from one country to another, where their senses of sight and hearing were deprived during transportation using goggles and earmuffs, and where they were kept unaware of their location by their captors and torturers? What if the defendant accomplice was oblivious and indifferent to the victim’s whereabouts? And what if the objective of the claims is to hold a government accountable and vindicate fundamental rights that are part of the forum state’s bill of rights?

Parties’ Arguments

These are big questions, and I address them all in my new book. Here, I want to limit myself to summarising the parties’ arguments, based on the arguments advanced in the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

The claimant is relying on three arguments. First, the focus should be on the defendants’ alleged tortious conduct of sending questions to the CIA, rather than the conduct of the CIA. Second, the factors connecting the tort to the Six Countries are weak because the claimant had no control or knowledge of his location, the defendants were unaware or indifferent to the claimant’s whereabouts, and the claimant was effectively held in ‘legal black holes’ in the Six Countries, outside any legal system. Third, the factors connecting the tort to England are strong because the relevant conduct occurred in England, it was undertaken for the perceived benefit of the UK, the defendants acted in their official capacity under UK law, and they were subjected to UK criminal and public law.

The defendants are relying on four arguments. The first and second arguments (the relevant conduct; the strength of the relevant factors) present a mirror-image of the claimant’s first two arguments. Third, the escape clause in section 12 of the 1995 Act should be strictly interpreted. Fourth, tortious claims arising out of the external exercise of British executive authority do not require the disapplication of the lex loci delicti and the application of the escape clause, as shown by a string of cases involving the wars in Afghanistan (Mohammed v MoD) and Iraq (R (Al-Jedda) v SoS for Defence; Rahmatullah v MoD), as well as the UK’s participation in the extraordinary rendition, arbitrary arrest, torture, and maltreatment by foreign states (Belhaj v Straw), where English courts refused to apply English law.

While the High Court aligned with the defendants’ arguments, adopting a broad view of the relevant conduct and a narrow interpretation of the escape clause, the Court of Appeal was sympathetic to the claimant’s arguments. The Court of Appeal relied in its decision on reasonable/legitimate expectations, justice, convenience, fairness, and appropriateness, as is clear from these paragraphs:

41. These are strong connections connecting the tortious conduct with England and Wales. They reflect also the parties’ reasonable expectations. While it is true that the claimant himself had no connection with this country, he could reasonably have expected, if he had thought about it during the 20 years in which he has been detained, that the conduct of any country’s security services having to do with him would be governed by the law of the country concerned. As for the Services, they would reasonably have expected that their conduct here would be subject to English law …

42. … This conclusion gives effect to the principles on which the 1995 Act is founded, including the reasonable expectations of the parties, and to the general principle of private international law identified by the Law Commission “that justice is done to a person if his own law is applied”… the Services can hardly say that it would be unfair (or to use the statutory term, inappropriate) for their conduct to be judged by the standards of English law, as distinct from (for example) Lithuanian or Moroccan law.

Conclusion

Zubaydah is now awaiting a decision from the UK Supreme Court, which will determine whether or not English applies. Regardless of the outcome, this case is likely to become a prominent authority on the reasons for applying foreign law and the practical relevance of fundamental principles underlying the application of foreign law.

The hearing at the UK Supreme Court will be streamed live for those interested, scheduled for Wednesday and Thursday, 14 and 15 June 2023. The live stream can be accessed by following the link ‘watch live court sittings’ on the court’s home page.

Written by Christina Shin, University of Sydney Law School

On 1 June 2023, International Children’s Day, the University of Sydney’s Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS) hosted an online webinar discussing the issue of children’s welfare and voices in private international law (PIL). In the first part of the webinar, five experts were invited to share their views on the status quo, challenges, and potential solutions to protect the welfare of children in the international and transnational context. The second part of the webinar involved a roundtable discussion among the experts. This event was moderated by Dr. Jeanne Huang, Associate Professor at the Sydney Law School and CAPLUS co-director. The guest speakers were as follows:

• Philippe Lortie, co-head of the International Family and Child Protection Law Division at the Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau. Mr. Lortie has more than 30 years of experience in the field of child protection.
• Professor Lukas Rademacher, Professor of Private Law, Private International Law, and Comparative Law at Kiel University, Germany. Professor Rademacher read law in Düsseldorf and Oxford and obtained a PhD in Münster. He is currently habilitating in Cologne, Germany.
• Miranda Kaye, Senior Lecturer at the University of Technology Sydney. Ms. Kaye is a member of Hague Mothers, a project aiming to end the injustices created by the Hague Child Abduction Convention. She also has experience in public service (Law Commission of England and Wales) and as a practicing solicitor (family law in the UK).
• Anna Mary Coburn, former attorney for the US Government (USG) involving the Hague Children’s Conventions and a Regional Legal Advisor and Foreign Service Officer for USAID. Ms. Coburn now has her own legal practice in private international family law, focusing on children’s rights.
• Haitao Ye, lawyer at the Shanghai office of the Beijing Dacheng Law LLP specialising in marriage and family dispute resolution, as well as wealth inheritance and management. She is a former experienced judge in civil and commercial trials at the Shanghai Pudong New District People’s Court.

 

Mr. Lortie opened the webinar by introducing the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), an intergovernmental organisation with a mandate to develop conventions to progressively unify the rules of PIL in all areas, including children’s rights. Mr. Lortie’s presentation covered three matters: the future of parent surrogacy, the 1996 Convention on Parental Responsibility and Protection of Children, and the 2007 Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support. After 10 years of working on its Parentage/Surrogacy Project, the HCCH has implemented a working group of state representatives to voice their views on the laws and policies of their respective states. According to Mr. Lortie, the HCCH’s immediate mandate is to develop a single or two-instrument solution that applies to all children. Mr. Lortie explained that the recent US Supreme Court decision of Golan v. Saada emphasises the benefits of being a party to the 1996 Convention, as it allows judges to order protective measures in urgent circumstances under Art. 11 (such as returning a child post-abduction). The US is currently not a party to the 1996 Convention. Moreover, Mr. Lortie pointed out that Australia is not yet a party to the 2007 Convention, despite NZ, the US, EU, and UK being parties (and Canada having signed). This Convention allows applications for child support and communications to occur securely over the Internet and aims to keep procedural costs low for the benefit of member states.

 

Professor Rademacher’s presentation explored whether well-intentioned protective measures could cause more harm than good, by examining the German Constitutional Court’s (FCC) highly controversial recent decision declaring the unconstitutionality of Germany’s “Act to Combat Child Marriage”. Under that Act, passed in 2017 partly as a response to the large number of refugees seeking asylum in Germany, marriages made under foreign law were voidable if one spouse was under 18 at the time of marriage and null and void if they were under 16. It also prevented courts from applying the public policy doctrine of ordre public. The FCC found that the Act violated the German Constitution’s Article 6 on the basis that it disproportionately curtailed the freedom of marriage. Professor Rademacher explained that the FCC’s ruling has been subject to misinterpretation – rather than endorsing child marriage, it highlights the nuanced balancing act required when considering a child’s best interests. For example, the legislation did not regulate the consequences of a voided marriage – such as the minor spouse losing the legal protections of marriage, as well as rights arising from dissolution of the marriage (including financial claims). The FCC reasoned that these consequences ran counter to the purpose of protecting minors, as well as the protection of free choice. Professor Rademacher concluded that this FCC decision demonstrates that whilst legislatures may pass laws that delimit and regulate marriage, the most rigid laws may not necessarily be in best interests of protecting children.

 

Ms. Kaye presented on Australia’s recent amendment to the Family Law Act with respect to the Hague Abduction Convention (HAC), focusing on the potential unintended consequences of these changes on mothers fleeing the country due to domestic violence (DV). Under the HAC, children are generally returned to the left-behind parent with limited exceptions. Ms. Kaye focused on one exception, HAC Article 13(1)(b), which gives courts discretion not to order a child’s return where there is a ‘grave risk’ that it would ‘expose the child to physical or psychological harm’. Whilst there is no explicit reference to DV, Ms. Kaye explained that Article 13(1)(b) is most widely used in such cases. She went on to examine the new Reg 16 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 which implements HAC Article 13(1)(b), expressing concern towards its wording that courts ‘may’ (not ‘must’) consider whether returning a child may expose them to family violence, giving courts a potentially detrimental discretion. Ms. Kaye also raised the issue of inequality of arms – in Australia, a HAC application is brought by a central authority, not the left-behind parent. With no means-testing, left-behind parents often have a considerable jurisdictional advantage with better legal advice at their disposal than taking parents, who rarely receive Legal Aid in HAC cases. Optimistically, the government recently allocated $18.4M of its Federal Budget to investing in children’s protection, with $7.4M dedicated to balancing legal representation. Finally, Ms. Kaye discussed the voice of the child, nothing that Reg 16(c)(3) imposes more onerous wording than the HAC, and additional evidential requirements. Ms. Kaye considered this in the context of a child’s right to culture and connection to land, which, whilst of paramount importance in matters involving First Nations children, has proved difficult to translate in Hague cases.

 

Fourthly, Ms. Coburn shared her views on child participation in PIL proceedings. She began with an overview of the public international legal framework for children, for which the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and its Optional Protocols provide guiding principles. These three optional protocols concern children in armed conflict (OPAC), the sale of children, child prostitution and pornography (OPSC) and a communications procedure allowing direct child participation in individual cases (OPIC). Ms. Coburn noted that although the US has not ratified the UNCRC, its laws provide for child participation in proceedings involving parties from states that have ratified it. Child participation in Hague matters is relevant in two areas: 1) where a child has agency to express their views in proceedings that affect them, and 2) children’s direct involvement in the formation and implementation of instruments designed to protect their welfare. Ms Coburn noted that whilst the US is not party to the UNCRC nor OPIC, the Supreme Court in Golan v Saada appeared to apply a best interest standard in considering whether to return a child to their place of habitual residence under the HAC due to grave risk of harm. Ms. Coburn concluded that continued efforts amongst IGOs demonstrate a trend towards more forceful support for children’s rights and participation, such as the WHO–UNICEF–Lancet Commission which advocates for improving child participation in all countries.

 

Finally, Ms. Haitao Ye discussed the emerging issue of protecting children’s civil rights in cross-border surrogacy. Ms. Ye framed this issue in the context of rapid technological developments in the reproductive space, as well as the emotional stakes involved for interested parties. She began by discussing China’s first (ongoing) custody dispute, where a Chinese same-sex couple shared surrogate children who were born in the US but taken to China by one parent when the relationship deteriorated. Ms. Ye also discussed Balaz (2008) involving a German couple and an Indian surrogate mother, where neither country’s domestic laws allowed the surrogate twins to obtain citizenship of either country. These disputes raise concerns about the lack of uniformity amongst surrogacy legislation, conflicting PIL principles of children’s best interests and other domestic public interests and demonstrate the lag between current legislation and practical reality. Balaz illustrates the potential risk of surrogate children facing statelessness, which denies their access to certain rights such as welfare. Ms. Ye concluded by sharing her opinion that the current body of PIL is not ready to meet the challenges of transnational surrogacy, which poses the risk of commercial exploitation. Nonetheless, she suggested that joint efforts of the international community, such as establishing international and national central agencies to record, review and regulate transnational surrogacy should continue to further protect surrogate children.

 

In part two of the webinar, a roundtable discussion took place between the expert speakers on the core question: “How can we define the ‘best interest’ of a child?”

• Ye referred to a custody dispute case in the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, involving a German father and Chinese mother. Ms. Ye demonstrated that Chinese courts place paramount importance on a child’s interests; in that case, the court considered factors such as the children’s living and educational environment, parental income, nationality, and the best care that could be received from either party.
• Coburn opined that the US’ failure to ratify UNCRC will become problematic as the PIL sector moves towards increasing child participation and their best interests. At a federal level, US courts are less likely to refer to children’s best interests and right to participate. Moreover, although state courts interpret child protection principles that are similar to the UNCRC, they will not necessarily order protections that are not entrenched in statute.
• Kaye emphasized the significant difference between Australian Family Court matters (where a child’s best interests are paramount) and Hague matters, where best interests are considered not in Australia, but in the country of habitual residence. She reiterated her concern that systematically, ‘best interests’ in Hague matters are not met in DV matters.
• Professor Rademacher drew attention to intersectional issues at play, noting that German court cases often implicate refugees and disproportionately impact young women. This is a Europe-wide issue that has resulted in stricter child marriage laws in countries like France and the Netherlands – however, he observed that these jurisdictions tend to have more flexible public policy approaches than Germany with respect to underage marriage.
• Lortie concluded the roundtable by agreeing with Ms. Kaye that DV adds difficulties to putting in practice the principles and protections under the HAC and UNCRC, resulting in wrongful removal and retention of children. He emphasised the importance of education and states’ responsibilities to implement solutions to combat DV on a domestic level.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme donne des indications précises et claires à l’administration et au juge national lorsqu’il s’agit d’établir et de contrôler la validité d’une décision de retrait de titre de séjour et d’interdiction de retour sur le territoire. Ces critères détaillés font une place réelle à la santé mentale de l’étranger que le juge doit prendre en compte. À défaut, le contrôle européen pourra se substituer à son analyse.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile 2023, annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Les conditions d’exercice du droit exclusif d’une marque détenue en copropriété notamment s’agissant de l’octroi ou de la résiliation d’un accord de licence sont régies par le droit de l’État membre déterminé par les règles du droit de l’Union européenne.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de la propriété intellectuelle 2023, Annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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On 6 June 2023, the Mexican National Code of Civil and Family Procedure has been passed by decree issued by the Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Indeed, after many years of stagnation, the National Code has finally been published today in the Mexican Federal Official Gazette. See here. It will enter into force tomorrow (see article 1 of the transitory articles).

This development is ground-breaking because it will gradually replace the states codes of civil and family procedure in Mexico, harmonising procedural law in all 32 Mexican states. A specific procedure has been foreseen for the way in which it will be adopted in the Mexican states (see article 2 of the transitory articles).

There are many interesting provisions for Private International Law lawyers, we will be preparing a brief summary, which will be published here. By way of example, see the provisions on international child abduction: articles 1150-1161.

*** Sección Tercera De la Cooperación, cuando intervengan Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes Artículo 1150. El ejercicio del derecho de visita y custodia de niñas, niños o adolescentes cuyos padres radiquen en países diferentes de manera habitual, se regirá conforme a los instrumentos internacionales y se observarán las siguientes reglas: I.           Las autoridades nacionales ejecutarán las medidas necesarias a fin de lograr la plena convivencia de las niñas, niños o adolescentes con sus padres, incluyendo la utilización de medios telemáticos; II.          El derecho de visita de una niña, niño o adolescente a otro país diferente al del lugar de su residencia, implicará que el progenitor que lo reciba en visita en el Extranjero o en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, asegure la restitución de la niña, niño o adolescente, y III.          La autoridad jurisdiccional fijará a cargo de qué persona correrán los gastos de desplazamiento, si es que no hubiese acuerdo entre los interesados. Artículo 1151. Las solicitudes de restitución internacional de niñas, niños o adolescentes se regirán de acuerdo con los tratados internacionales y en su defecto, por las siguientes disposiciones: I.           La autoridad jurisdiccional tendrá la facultad de ordenar las medidas precautorias y de aseguramiento, con el fin de asegurar el bienestar de las niñas, niños y adolescentes y prevenir que sean nuevamente trasladados indebidamente o retenidos. II.          Los procedimientos de restitución no podrán pronunciarse y decidir sobre el fondo de la guarda y custodia. III.          En los casos de retención o traslado ilícito de una niña, niño o adolescente, deberá procederse de inmediato y sin dilaciones a la restitución del mismo. IV.         Cuando la niña, niño o adolescente reclamado, no se encuentre en territorio mexicano, el órgano competente autorizado responderá a la solicitud informando el resultado de la búsqueda. Ninguna autoridad jurisdiccional de lugar diferente al de la residencia habitual de la niña, niño o adolescente, podrá declarar a favor de la persona que retiene o efectúe el traslado, algún derecho de custodia, salvo que el derecho convencional internacional lo permita. Si se encuentran en trámite procedimientos jurisdiccionales que resuelvan la custodia, éstos deberán suspenderse. Artículo 1152. La autoridad jurisdiccional nacional podrá rechazar una solicitud de restitución de una niña, niño o adolescente, cuando la persona que se oponga a la restitución compruebe que: I.           La persona, institución u organismo titulares de la solicitud de restitución, no ejercía de modo efectivo el derecho de custodia en el momento en que fue trasladado o retenido, o había consentido o posteriormente aceptado, dicho traslado o retención. II.          Existe un riesgo grave de que la restitución del menor lo exponga a un peligro físico o psicológico, o que de cualquier otra manera ponga al menor en una situación intolerable. III.          La niña, niño o adolescente, se oponga a la restitución, si ya alcanzó una edad y un grado demadurez suficiente en que resulte apropiado tener en cuenta su opinión. IV.         La restitución podría violentar los derechos humanos reconocidos en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y las garantías que para ellos se otorguen. V.          Cuando la solicitud de restitución se hubiere presentado un año después de ocurrido el trasladoo la retención y se comprueba que la niña, niño o adolescente, ha quedado integrado a su nuevo medio ambiente. Artículo 1153. Los procedimientos de restitución deberán ser iniciados dentro del plazo máximo de un año contado a partir de la fecha en que la niña, niño o adolescente hubiere sido trasladado o retenido ilícitamente,por lo que corresponderá a la autoridad competente ordenar la restitución inmediata del menor. Respecto de menores cuyo paradero se desconozca, el plazo se computará a partir del momento en que fueren precisa y efectivamente localizados. Artículo 1154. Toda solicitud de restitución de una niña, niño o adolescente, proveniente del extranjero, se presentará, por conducto de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, la cual lo remitirá a la o las autoridades jurisdiccionales competentes. Si en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos se encuentra la niña, niño o el adolescente, deberán adoptarse todas las medidas adecuadas tendientes a obtener la restitución voluntaria de la niña, niño o adolescente. Las autoridades nacionales podrán propiciar una solución amigable, a través de la mediación. De no lograrse ésta en una única sesión, deberán iniciar procedimiento jurisdiccional o administrativo con el objeto de conseguir la restitución, o en su caso, permitir la regulación o ejercicio efectivo del derecho de visita. Artículo 1155. La solicitud de restitución deberá contener al menos lo siguiente: I.           Nombre y datos generales de la niña, niño o adolescente; II.          Nombre y datos del solicitante y el carácter con el que promueve respecto a la niña, niño o adolescente; III.          Antecedentes y los hechos relativos al traslado o sustracción; IV.         El nombre de la persona que se presume retuvo o traslado ilícitamente y el domicilio o ubicación donde se presume que se encuentra la niña, niño o adolescente, y V.          Cualquier información que sea necesaria o pertinente para su localización. Artículo 1156. La solicitud de restitución deberá estar acompañada de: I.           Copia documento que acredite la custodia de la niña, niño o adolescente solicitado; II.          Constancia de la residencia habitual de la niña, niño o adolescente solicitado; III.          Cualquier otro documento con el que se pueda probar el medio en el que se desarrolla habitualmente la niña, niño o adolescente; IV.         Fotografías y demás datos o elementos precisos de identificación de la niña, niño o adolescente en su caso, y V.          La traducción de los documentos que se presenten en un idioma distinto al del país al que se solicite la restitución. La autoridad competente podrá prescindir de algunos de estos requisitos si a su juicio se justifica la restitución. Artículo 1157. Toda petición de restitución será preferente y, salvo consideración especial de la autoridad jurisdiccional, deberá concluir dentro del plazo de seis semanas a partir de su presentación. Artículo 1158. Ningún procedimiento de custodia tramitado en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos suspenderála restitución ordenada. Artículo 1159. Presentada la solicitud de restitución, la autoridad jurisdiccional dispondrá de un plazo de veinticuatro horas para pronunciarse sobre su admisión. En caso de ser admitida, ordenará correr traslado a la parte de la que se presume ha retenido o trasladado ilícitamente a la niña, niño o adolescente para que, con los apercibimientos legales correspondientes, acuda ante la autoridad jurisdiccional dentro del término de tres días hábiles siguientes en compañía de la niña, niño o adolescente, así como todas las pruebas que considere necesarias para apoyar su objeción a la restitución, si fuera el caso. El auto que admita la solicitud deberá disponer las medidas cautelares necesarias, y en su caso, ordenará la entrevista con la niña, niño o adolescente solicitado, en términos de este Código Nacional. Artículo 1160. En la audiencia única la autoridad jurisdiccional intentará conciliar a las partes para su restitución voluntaria y la parte requerida deberá manifestar si acepta restituir voluntariamente a la niña, niño o adolescente; en caso de que así sea, se levantará el acta correspondiente con las condiciones que las partes concedan, debiendo ser dicho acuerdo sancionado por la autoridad jurisdiccional. En caso de que haya objeción en la restitución, quien se oponga deberá hacer valer las excepciones aplicables y ofrecer las pruebas correspondientes que las acrediten. En esa audiencia, la autoridad jurisdiccional realizará la entrevista a la niña, niño o adolescente. Hecho lo anterior, admitirá o no las pruebas ofrecidas y enseguida procederá a su desahogo, en términos de este Código Nacional. Artículo 1161. Concluido el desahogo, la autoridad jurisdiccional deberá resolver sobre la restitución,dentro de la misma audiencia. En caso de que se otorgue la restitución, la autoridad jurisdiccional dictará las medidas adecuadas y eficaces para garantizar el retorno seguro de la niña, niño o adolescente. La autoridad jurisdiccional deberá informar de dicha decisión a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.

 

Written by Professor Eric Clive

The Secretary of State for Scotland, a Minister of the United Kingdom government, has made an order under section 35 of the Scotland Act 1998 blocking Royal Assent to the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill 2022, a Bill passed by the Scottish Parliament by a large majority. The Scottish government has challenged the order by means of a petition for judicial review. The case is constitutionally important and may well go to the United Kingdom Supreme court. It also raises interesting questions of private international law.

At present the rules on obtaining a gender recognition certificate, which has the effect of changing the applicant’s legal gender, are more or less the same in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Scottish Bill would replace the rules for Scotland by less restrictive, de-medicalised rules. An unfortunate side effect is that Scottish certificates would no longer have automatic effect by statute in other parts of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom government could remedy this by legislation but there is no indication that it intends to do so. Its position is that it does not like the Scottish Bill.

One of the reasons given by the Secretary of State for making the order is that having two different systems for issuing gender recognition certificates within the United Kingdom would cause serious problems. A person, he assumes, might be legally of one gender in England and another in Scotland. There would therefore be difficulties for some organisations operating at United Kingdom level – for example, in the fields of tax, benefits and pensions. This immediately strikes a private lawyer as odd. Scotland and England have had different systems in the law of persons for centuries – in the laws on marriage, divorce, legitimacy, incapacity and other matters of personal status – and they have not given rise to serious problems. This is because the rules of private international law, even in the absence of statutory provision, did not allow them to.

In a paper on Recognition in England of change of gender in Scotland: a note on private international law aspects[1] I suggest that gender is a personal status, that there is authority for a general rule that a personal status validly acquired in one country will, subject to a few qualifications, be recognised in others and that there is no reason why this rule should not apply to a change of gender under the new Scottish rules.

The general rule is referred to at international level. In article 10 of its Resolution of September 2021 on Human Rights and Private International Law, the Institute of International Law says that:

Respect for the rights to family and private life requires the recognition of personal status established in a foreign State, provided that the person concerned has had a sufficient connection with the State of origin … as well as with the State whose law has been applied, and that there is no manifest violation of the international public policy of the requested State ….

So far as the laws of England and Scotland are concerned, there are authoritative decisions and dicta which clearly support such a general rule. Cases can be found in relation to marriage, divorce, nullity of marriage, legitimacy and legitimation. A significant feature is that the judges have often reasoned from status to particular rules. It cannot be said that there are just isolated rules for particular life events. And the rules were developed at common law, before there were any statutory provisions on the subject.

Possible exceptions to the general rule – public policy, no sufficient connection, contrary statutory provision, impediment going to a matter of substance rather than procedure – are likely to be of little if any practical importance in relation to the recognition in England of changes of gender established under the proposed new Scottish rules.

If the above arguments are sound then a major part of the Secretary of State’s reasons for blocking the Scottish Bill falls away. There would be no significant problem of people being legally male in Scotland but legally female in England, just as there is no significant problem of people being legally married in Scotland but unmarried in England. Private international law would handle the dual system, as it has handled other dual systems in the past. Whether the Supreme Court will get an opportunity to consider the private international law aspects of the case remains to be seen: both sides have other arguments. It would be extremely interesting if it did.

From the point of view of private international law, it would be a pity if the Secretary of State’s blocking order were allowed to stand. The rules in the Scottish Bill are more principled than those in the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which contains the existing law. The Scottish Bill has rational rules on sufficient connection (essentially birth registered in Scotland or ordinary residence in Scotland). The 2004 Act has none. The Scottish Bill has a provision on the recognition of changes of gender under the laws of other parts of the United Kingdom which is drafted in readily understandable form. The corresponding provisions in the 2004 Act are over-specific and opaque. The Scottish Bill has a rule on the recognition of overseas changes of gender which is in accordance with internationally recognised principles.

The 2004 Act has the reverse. It provides in section 21 that: A person’s gender is not to be regarded as having changed by reason only that it has changed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom. This is alleviated by provisions which allow those who have changed gender under the law of an approved overseas country to use a simpler procedure for obtaining a certificate under the Act but still seems, quite apart from any human rights aspects, to be unfriendly, insular and likely to produce avoidable difficulties for individuals.

 

[1] Clive, Eric, Recognition in England of change of gender in Scotland: A note on private international law aspects (May 30, 2023). Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2023/06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4463935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4463935

Aprile et Commerciale Italiana / EUIPO - DC Comics (Représentation d’une chauve-souris dans un cadre ovale)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Logo de Batman : les preuves présentées au Tribunal ne suffisent pas à démontrer que la marque de l’Union européenne représentant une chauve-souris dans un cadre ovale était dépourvue de caractère distinctif à la date du dépôt de la demande d’enregistrement

Shakutin / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Mesures restrictives à l’encontre de la Biélorussie : le Tribunal rejette le recours introduit par M. Aleksandr Vasilevich Shakutin contre les mesures restrictives qui lui ont été imposées

Luís de Lima Pinheiro (University of Lisbon) has posted Laws Applicable to International Smart Contracts and Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOS) on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

International contracts, legal persons and other external organizations raise choice-of-law problems. Should smart contracts and DAOs in general be considered international? Are the choice-of-law rules in force for State courts and for arbitral tribunals appropriate for the determination of the applicable laws? To provide replies to these questions the present essay starts by general introductions to smart contracts and DAOs and also outlines the Private International Law framework of these realities. Solutions for difficulties on the application of the choice-of-law rules in force and more flexible approaches to address them are proposed.

On September 1st, 2023, the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention will enter into force for the Member States of the EU and Ukraine. According to the HCCH, the Convention is “a true gamechanger in international dispute resolution”, which will “reduce transactional and litigation costs, facilitate rule-based multilateral trade and investment, increase certainty and predictability” and “promote effective justice for all”. The international conference taking place in Bonn later this week will likely strike an equally celebratory tone.

This sentiment is not shared universally, though. In a scathing article just published in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) entitled ‘Judgments Convention: No Thanks!‘, Haimo Schack (University of Kiel) labels the Convention as “evidently worthless”.

Schack comes to this damning conclusion in three steps. First, he argues that the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, the first outcome of the decades-long HCCH Jurisdiction Project, has been of minimal use for the EU and only benefited Singapore and London. Second, he points out the limited scope of the 2019 Convention, which is not only (inherently) unable to limit the exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction or avoid, let alone coordinate parallel proceedings, but also contains a long list of excluded areas of law in its Art. 2 (including, most significantly, the entire field of intellectual property: Art. 2(1)(m)). Schack argues that combined with the equally long list of bases for recognition and enforcement in Art. 5, the Convention will make recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments significantly more complicated. This effect is exacerbated, third, by a range of options for contracting states to further reduce the scope of application of the Convention, of which Art. 29 is particularly “deadly”, according to Schack. The provision allows contracting states to opt out of the effect of the Convention vis-à-vis specific other contracting states, which Schack fears will lead to a ‘bilateralisation’ similar to what prevented the 1971 Convention from ever getting off the ground, which will reduce the 2019 Convention to a mere model law. All in all, Schack considers the Convention to do more harm than good for the EU, which he fears to also lose an important bargaining chip in view of a potential bilateral agreement with the US.

Leaving his additional criticism of the HCCH’s ongoing efforts to address the problem of parallel proceedings aside, Schack certainly has a point in that the 2019 Convention will not be easy to apply for the national courts. Whether it will be more complicated than a myriad of rarely applied bilateral conventions may be subject to debate, though. It also seems worth pointing out that the 1971 Convention contained a significantly more cumbersome mechanism of bilateralisation that required all contracting states to conclude additional (!) bilateral agreements to enter into force between any given pair of them, which is quite different from the opt-out mechanism of Art. 29. In fact, it seems at least arguable that the different ways in which contracting states can tailor their accession to the Convention to their specific needs and concerns, up to the exclusion of any treaty relations with a specific other contracting state, may not be the proverbial nail in the coffin as much as it might be a key to the Convention’s success. While it is true that these mechanisms appear to undermine the internationally binding nature of the Convention, bringing it closer to a model law than a binding treaty, they also make it possible to accommodate different degrees of mutual trust within a single legal framework. The fact that the 2005 Convention has preserved some degree of judicial cooperation between the EU Member States and the UK in an area now otherwise devoid of it may be testimony to the important purpose still served by international conventions in the area of international civil procedure despite – but maybe also as a result of – their increasingly limited, tailor-made scope(s).

O. G. (Mandat d’arrêt européen à l’encontre d’un ressortissant d’un État tiers)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La possibilité d’un refus d’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen pour que la peine soit exécutée dans l’État membre de résidence doit également s’appliquer aux ressortissants de pays tiers

In Athenian Brewery and Heineken v Macedonian Thrace Brewery ECLI:NL:HR:2023:660, the Dutch Supreme Court is likely to refer to the CJEU on the approach to ‘relatedness’ in competition law cases, required to substantiate anchor jurisdiction. It is the Greek authorities that have held that  Heineken’s Greek daughter, in which it held close to 99% of shares, had infringed competition law.

Competition law works with an assumption of attributability of daughter undertakings’ infringements to their mother corporation: see CJEU ENI and recently C-377/20 SEN /AGCM. The SC now should like to ask the CJEU how that assumption relates to Article 8(1) Brussels Ia’s anchor defendant mechanism, which requires claims to be ‘closely related’, whether the case needs to be distinguished from CJEU CDC seeing as it is the Greek, not the EU competition authorities which held the infringement, and what impact the issue has on the assessment required per CJEU Universal Music and Kolassa.

An impending reference of note.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.13.1.

Competition law, jurisdiction
Dutch SC minded to refer to #CJEU on role of EU competition law's presumption of mother corp involvement in daughter's abuse of dominant position, for purposes of A8(1) BIa's anchor defendant mechanism, 'closely connected'https://t.co/Mum1uuMWzT

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 28, 2023

In ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2023:887 (parties names anonymised given the nature of the case; husband and wife have been divorced under civil law since 2018; the ex-husband is domiciled and lives in France; the ex-wife is also domiciled in France yet is habitually resident in Israel) the courts at Amsterdam held upon appeal that the mere rabbinical (Conference of European Rabbis) instruction for a husband to appear before the Amsterdam Beth Din so as to grant get to his wife, does not suffice to make Amsterdam either locus delicti commissi or locus damni.

The French courts have already granted damages to the wife on the basis of the husband’s continued refusal to engage with the Beth Din. Authority referred to viz A7(2) BIa includes CJEU Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, and leads the court to conclude that Amsterdam is not a new locus delicti commissi viz the husband’s continued refusal to engage with the religious courts, but rather a continuation of the same delicti commissi which led to the French allocation of damages [3.11]. [3.12] the wife’s Mozaik reference to CJEU Shevill is not accepted with reference to the possibility under Jewish law of other Beth Dins to have jurisdiction in the case.

On locus damni and per CJEU Universal Music, I understand the reluctance to identify Amsterdam as locus damni given the lack of links between the case and the parties, to The Netherlands. Per CJEU Ofab I would suggest however that a different outcome on locus delicti commissi could have been possible.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.432 ff.

Interesting judgment Amsterdam
A7(2) Brussels Ia

Rabbinical instruction for husband to appear before Amsterdam Beth Din to grant Get to his wife, does not suffice to make A'dam locus delicti commissi
No locus damni in A'dam, eitherhttps://t.co/hClfbCYVwe #lawandreligion

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 28, 2023

Commission / Pologne (Indépendance et vie privée des juges)
Principes du droit communautaire
État de droit : la réforme de la justice polonaise de décembre 2019 enfreint le droit de l’Union

Prise de fonctions de M. Vittorio Di Bucci, nouveau greffier du Tribunal

A late post on the Amsterdam courts’ injunction, in interlocutory proceedings, ordering Hammy Media to remove secretly filmed amateur adult content. The judgment will be of interest to both privacy lawyers and jurisdictional aficionados.

The court is not too bothered with a neat and exhaustive analysis of the jurisdictional issue. This could have brought it to a discussion of CJEU e-Date, Bolagsupplysningen, etc,  removal orders as also applied in the context of the right to be forgotten, and of course the complex relationship between Brussels Ia and the GDPR when it comes to jurisdiction.

Instead, it identifies The Netherlands as a Member State with full jurisdiction as locus delicti commissi (ldc),  seemingly arguing [4.2] (it reasons are a bit muddled) that the use of a specific internet domain name to target Dutch customers, and the use of (whether not automatically translated) Dutch on that site, makes The Netherlands the (or perhaps: ‘a’?) ldc, which in one breath it mentions as meeting with the foreseeability requirement that is part of the general DNA of Brussels Ia. It supports its jurisdiction with a refernece to A79 GDPR’s ‘habitual residence’ of the data subject’s gateway as I discuss here.

Except for that material for which Hammy Media can show consent of all persons involved, the court then bans distribution of the material, worldwide as far as those resident in The Netherlands is concerned, and in The Nethelrands as far as the data subjects not resident in The Netherlands is concerned.

It does not specify why it introduces that distinction, although it is clearly linked to jurisdictional limitations it feels itself limited to.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.256.

Adult website ordered to remove secretly filmed and amateur nude content, unless it can show consent of all involved

Worldwide removal viz NL domiciled, NL removal viz non-NL doms

Jurisdiction based on A7(2) Brussels IA and A79 #GDPR

SEOK v Hammy Mediahttps://t.co/67YHgvCt5L

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2023