Agrégateur de flux

In 1971, the American Law Institute published the epochal Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second). Now, a new version is in the making.

An overview of the work will be given by Kermit Roosevelt III (University of Pennsylvania) on 10 May 2022, at 5 PM CET, in the context of the Max Planck Institute (MPI) Hamburg series on “Current Research in Private International Law”.

This promises to be very interesting as the speaker is deeply involved in the drafting process.

The registration link can be found here. Participation is free of charge.

La France préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne pour six mois. À cette occasion, la Délégation des barreaux de France et Lefebvre Dalloz s’associent pour vous proposer ce podcast dont la vocation est de sensibiliser sur les travaux et les actions conduites dans le domaine de la justice au plan européen.

en lire plus

Just this week, the Supreme Court decided an important conflict of laws question in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (S. Ct. 2022).

We have discussed this case on this site before, but the facts deserve restating. Paul Cassirer was a German Jew who owned an art gallery who owned Pissarro’s Rue Saint-Honoré in the Afternoon, Effect of Rain . Paul’s heir, Lilly Cassirer, inherited the painting and hung it in her Berlin home. In 1939, she gave the paintings to the Nazis in return for an exit visa. She later came to the United States with her grandson, Claude, the plaintiff in this case.

The Cassirer family initially brought proceedings in the United States Court of Restitution Appeals under the assumption that the painting had been lost or destroyed—but it wasn’t destroyed. The Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC)—a public foundation and an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain—purchased it in 1993. After TBC refused to return it to the Cassirer’s, Claude filed suit against Spain and TBC in 2005. Spain was voluntarily dismissed as a party in 2011, and after his death, Claude’s heir’s continued the case.

The Courts determined in 2011 that TBC was not immune from suit because the painting had been taken in violation of international law. The case then proceeded to trial on the merits. The plaintiffs argued that California law should govern, while TBC argued that Spanish law should govern. The judge, citing Ninth Circuit precedent, decided that federal common law provided the conflict of laws rule that should be used to decide what law substantively governed the claim, and that under federal common law conflicts principles, Spanish law governed. TBC prevailed at trial, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review only on the question whether federal common law should govern the conflicts analysis, or whether the court should instead have applied California’s conflict of laws rules.

Many commentators wrote—and I agree—that the case is pretty straightforward. The FSIA (28 U.S.C. § 1606) provides that in any case where the foreign sovereign defendant is not immune from jurisdiction, “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” So, if TBC had not been an instrumentality of the Spanish state, California conflict of laws rules would have governed (because the case is pending in a federal court in California and does not arise under federal law). Justice Kagan’s unanimous opinion agreed. In light of § 1606, the courts could not apply a rule to the foreign sovereign defendant different from the rule it would have applied to a private defendant. Once a plaintiff overcomes the jurisdictional hurdles of foreign sovereign immunity, the foreign sovereign has to be treated like any other litigant.

As a result of the decision, the judgment will be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. The lower courts, applying California’s conflict of laws rules, could again conclude that Spanish law should govern, or it could decide that California law should govern, in which case maybe a new trial will be necessary. Lots a litigation left, in the end.

IG Metall et ver.di
Liberté d'établissement
Avocat général Richard de la Tour : la transformation d’une société anonyme allemande en société européenne ne permet pas de porter atteinte au scrutin spécifique pour élire les représentants des syndicats au sein du conseil de surveillance

Meta Platforms Ireland
Principes du droit communautaire
Les associations de défense des consommateurs peuvent exercer des actions représentatives contre des atteintes à la protection des données à caractère personnel

In JJH Enterprises Ltd (Trading As ValueLicensing) v Microsoft Corporation & Ors [2022] EWHC 929 (Comm) Picken J makes a debatable point in his discussion of a forum non conveniens application by defendants, Microsoft.

In the proceedings ValueLicensing claim damages arising from alleged breaches of competition law by Microsoft. The claim is a ‘stand alone’ one, not a ‘follow-on’ one. There is no underlying infringement decision of the European Commission (or any domestic competition regulator) on which ValueLicensing can rely to establish that an infringement of competition law has been committed.

Some of the Microsoft entities firstly seek summary dismissal of the case against them, arguing they cannot be held liable for an alleged infringement of either Article 101 or 102 TFEU as a result of an overall Microsoft ‘campaign’ in which they did not demonstrably take part. Here [31] ff there is interesting discussion ia of Provimi (Roche Products Ltd. & Ors v Provimi Ltd [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm)), which held that an entity that implements an agreement in breach of A101 to which a member of the same undertaking is a party can be held liable for the infringement even though the implementer itself does not know of the infringement. Specifically, whether Provimi was wrongly decided following from Cooper Tire Europe Ltd v Bayer Public Co Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864  – this is an issue for which CJEU referral is not possible post Brexit.

The judge however refers to the broader concept of ‘undertaking’ in the A101-102 sense following eg CJEU C-882/19 Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Trucks Espana SL. Sumal, Picken J holds [44], is relevant authority both pre and post Brexit.

Quite how parties see a difference in the lex causae for the competition law infringement pre and post Brexit is not clear to me. Post Brexit it is said to be ‘English law’ (held to include 101-102 TFEU prior to Brexit), full stop, while post Brexit that law is said to be determined by (retained) Article 6 Rome II, which for same of the claim will be English law as being one of the ‘affected markets’ per A6 Rome II.

It is in the forum non application that the judge posits [78] that an important consideration of England as the more appropriate forum, is

it is clear that Microsoft UK’s position at trial will be that in certain material respects English law has taken a divergent path from EU law. In such circumstances, it would be wholly inappropriate, and certainly undesirable, for a court in Ireland to be determining whether Microsoft UK is right about this. On the other hand, there would be no difficulty with the Court here applying EU competition law, either as part of English law (in respect of the pre-Brexit period and, if that is what the Court determines is the case, also in respect of the post-Brexit period) or as part of the laws of other EU/EEA member states, since the Court here is very experienced in doing just that.

If it is true that under forum non, only English courts can be held properly to determine the direction of English law post Brexit, the hand of many a claimant in forum non applications will surely be strengthened.

Geert.

Forum non conveniens
Interesting point [75] that E&W are the most appropriate forum, given that it must be EN courts determining whether EN law differs substantially from EU law post #Brexit

JJH Enterprises (ValueLicensing) v #Microsoft [2022] EWHC 929https://t.co/XP3z4nX8KV

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2022

Vinařství U Kapličky
Une attestation émanant des autorités d’un État tiers sur la conformité d’un lot de vin aux pratiques œnologiques de l’Union ne constitue pas, à elle seule, une preuve du respect de ces pratiques pour sa commercialisation dans l’Union

Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging
SOPO
Faillite d’entreprise et droit des travailleurs : en cas de transfert d’actifs dans le cadre d’une procédure de pre-pack, le cessionnaire a le droit de déroger au maintien des droits des travailleurs si cette procédure est encadrée par des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires

C et CD (Obstacles juridiques à l’exécution d’une décision de remise)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La notion de « force majeure » rendant impossible l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne s’étend pas aux obstacles juridiques résultant d’actions légales introduites par la personne recherchée

Within the activities of the Jean Monnet Module “CoRiMaR” (Consumer’s Rights and Market Regulation in the European Union), the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Udine (Italy), together with a consortium of European universities including the University of Essex, De Montfort University, Universitatea de Vest din Timisoara, East Anglia University, University of Belgrade and University of Rijeka, organises the 15th edition of the Summer school Consumer’s Rights and Market Regulation in the European Union, to be held 13-22 July 2022 in Udine (Italy), at the Campus of Legal and Economic Sciences.

The Summer school on Consumer’s Rights and Market Regulation is an intensive course (40 hours of lectures, a workshop and a moot court), held in English by internationally renowned academics. It addresses theoretical and practical issues related to the legal protection of consumers and the market regulation in the European Union.

The call for application and the brochure is available here and here.

The application deadline is 15 June 2022.

For further info, please write an email to ip.europeanlaw.uniud@gmail.com.

Is a foreign arbitral award granting damages in bitcoin compatible with substantive public policy? The Western Continental Greece Court of Appeal was recently confronted with this question. Within the framework of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, it ruled that the recognition of a US award runs contrary to Greek public order. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, favors tax evasion and facilitates economic crime, causing insecurity in commercial transactions to the detriment of the national economy.

FACTS

The applicant, a German national, was a member of a website, governed by a US company. The website was a platform through which members could conclude credit contracts in cryptocurrency (bitcoin). The applicant agreed with a resident of Greece to finance his enterprise by providing a credit of 1.13662301 bitcoin. The Greek debtor failed to fulfill his obligations, and he refused to return the bitcoin received. On the grounds of an arbitration agreement, an award was issued by an online arbitration court, located in the USA. The debtor appeared in the proceedings and was given the right to challenge the claim of the applicant. The court of first instance decided that the arbitral award may not be recognized in Greece for reasons of substantive public policy (CFI Agrinio 23.10.2018, unreported). The applicant lodged an appeal.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT APPEAL

The appellate court began with a short description on the nature of bitcoin. It then mentioned the position of the European Central Bank with respect to the same matter. It concluded that the use of bitcoins endangers transactions both for the parties involved and the state. This comes from the fact that any income resulting from the use of cryptocurrency is tax-free, given that this kind of transactions are not regulated in Greece. Hence, importing capital in bitcoins and generally any kind of cryptocurrency, irrespective of the type of legal matter, infringes the domestic legal order, because it favors tax evasion and facilitates economic crime, causing insecurity in commercial transactions to the detriment of the national economy.

As a result of the above, the recognition of an award which recognizes bitcoin as a decentralized currency unit (peer to peer), and orders the payment of a certain debt in bitcoins, runs contrary to public policy, i.e., to fundamental rules and principles of Greek legal order in present times, reflecting predominant social, financial, and political values.

Finally, by enhancing transactions in bitcoin and promoting its equalization to legal currency, the recognition of such an award in Greece would essentially disturb prevailing standards of the country, given bitcoin’s sudden and unpredictable fluctuations [Western Continental Greece Court of Appeal 27.09.2021, unreported].

 COMMENT

Unlike the profound analysis of the first instance court, the appellate court confirmed the judgment mechanically, with zero references to legal scholarship and case law. The developments in the subject matter between 2018 (publication of the first court’s ruling) and 2021 (publication of the appellate court’s judgment) were not taken into account. The Hellenic Republic has transposed crucial directives related to cryptocurrency (see DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/713 of 17 April 2019 on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA). New income tax rules and regulations focusing on cryptocurrency are prepared by state authorities. Even now, i.e., without a special law on cryptocurrencies, bitcoin profits must be declared for taxation purposes. Bitcoin exchange offices are active in the country. To conclude, the judgment seems to be alienated from contemporary times.

Referring to the judgment of the CJEU in the case Skatteverket / David Hedqvist (C-264/14), the first instance ruling underlined that the decision focused on the Swedish economic environment, which may not be compared to the situation in Greece. Therefore, and in light of recent developments in the country, we may hope that the courts will soon shift course towards a more pragmatic approach.

[Many thanks to Professor Euripides Rizos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, for his valuable insight into the field of cryptocurrencies]

T-710/21 Roos e.a./Parlement, T-722/21 D'Amato e.a./Parlement , T-723/21 Rooken e.a./Parlement
SANT
Certificat Covid et accès aux bâtiments du Parlement européen : le Tribunal rejette les recours de certains députés européens

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 28 April 2022 at 3:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 10:00 pm (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is International co-operation in child abduction and the rights of the child and will be presented by judge mag. Óscar Gregorio Cervera Rivero, professor Nuria González Martín and Luz Elena López Rodea (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88059270915?pwd=QnFGVnBWQ2xiSGFhSjJja2lUOThSUT09

Meeting ID: 880 5927 0915

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

 

Airbnb Ireland
Liberté d'établissement
Une législation régionale belge obligeant les prestataires de services d’intermédiation immobilière et, notamment, les responsables d´une plate-forme électronique d´hébergement à transmettre à l’administration fiscale certaines données relatives aux transactions d’hébergement touristique n’est pas contraire au droit de l’Union

At its conference of Thursday, 19 May 2022, the Association pour le droit des étranger (ADDE) and its partners (Agentschap Integratie en Inburgering and University of Liege) will address the reform of the civil status in Belgian law and its international issues. The Conference will be held in Brussels in French.

Speakers will address, among others, the reform of the civil status and the civil registry;  actors of the civil registry; rectification, modification and cancellation of civil status documents; receipt of a foreign civil status document; cases where civil status is unclear or uncertain.

See the program and practical information and the registration form.

The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law is organising two video conferences on Family status, Identities and Private International Law. A Critical Assessment in the Light of Fundamental Rights on 5 and 12 May 2022.

See the programme.

For further information and registration: news.isdc@unil.ch.

On 23 February 2022, the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence was released.

In recent years, many experts have expressed their views on the Union’s ambition to regulate corporate due diligence comprehensively and in a binding manner at the EU level. The private international law (PIL) aspects have received particular attention (e.g. here and more globally here), including on our blog (e.g. here, here and here) and others (here and here).

Indeed, a first central issue is the spatial applicability of the (forthcoming) EU instrument so that it effectively covers transnational (harmful) conduct of multinational companies, incorporated in the Union or active in the EU market (see Article 2, §1 and §2). Another major issue concerns remedies for the damage caused by companies through their supply chain, to victims and to the environment. The Directive proposal provides for rules on liability for violation of the due diligence requirements laid down by the text.

In this context, what are the main solutions of the Directive proposal on the PIL aspects? Here are some brief elements of the response that experts on the matter will analyse in more detail during the negotiations of the text (see already Geert Van Calster thoughts)

Private Enforcement Scheme

One of the main objectives of the Directive proposal is to “improve access to remedies for those affected by adverse human rights and environmental impacts of corporate behaviour” (p. 3). Remedies and more globally enforcement rules are indeed a key-factor for normative effectiveness. Private parties should be empowered to report concerning behaviours of multinational companies or misconducts (see Articles 9 and 19 of the Directive proposal). As a crucial step, victims should be able to sue the company liable for any damage caused within the Union’s territory or, most frequently, outside the Union through its value chain. The Directive proposal provides for a common civil liability regime (although incomplete). This is a great improvement, in particular for foreign victims who could seek remedies within the EU (Article 22).

Against this background, the private enforcement regime remains dependent on the jurisdiction of a “European forum” (i.e. among national courts of EU Member States) and, then, on the application of EU law.

No Specific Provision on Jurisdiction in the Union

The Directive proposal provides for a private enforcement scheme but without mentioning any specific rules on jurisdiction. Hence, Brussels I bis Regulation will remain the applicable legal framework within the EU judicial area.

EU-based Companies

The jurisdictional rules of the Regulation are, in principle, applicable once the defendant is domiciled in the Union, regardless of whether there is any other connection with the EU legal order (Article 4). When the defendant is a legal person, it lays down a flexible concept of domicile; it may be the statutory seat of the company, its central administration or its principal place of business (Article 63). In the present case, it means that the mother or ordering company located in the Union may be sued by any victims before a “European forum” for compensation of losses suffered in a third country. In that respect, the solution follows the rationale of the home country control.

However, the situation would be less effective if the victims also decide to sue, as co-defendant, other companies of the value chain of the European undertaking (e.g. subsidiaries or business partners), when the former are not established in the Union. In such a case, the Brussels I bis Regulation is not applicable pursuant to its Article 8,(1). It will be for the national laws of Member States to determine the jurisdiction of their courts. This is regrettable; the discrepancies between national rules may weaken the EU provisions on remedies. Some courts will be competent, others not, in equivalent disputes.

Nonetheless, the lack of legal approximation here is not inconsistent with the European enforcement regime, since the latter is limited for now – under Article 22 of the Directive proposal – to civil liability claims against the company in charge of the due diligence requirements pursuant to Article 7 and 8 of the text. Hence, national law remains applicable to the civil liability of “subsidiaries or of any direct and indirect business partners in the value chain” (Article 22, §3 of the directive proposal). The lack of a uniform substantive liability regime in the forthcoming EU instrument, directly applicable to these potential co-defendants, mitigates or, at least, may explain, the absence of a ground jurisdiction based on EU law in such circumstances.

Non-EU-based Companies

A much more problematic situation concerns foreign companies – i.e. domiciled outside the Union – that are economically active in the internal market and, in that respect, covered by an EU due diligence obligation. The jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation are in principle not applicable, even if the losses were suffered on the Union’s territory. Private enforcement will depend on the national laws of EU Member States on the jurisdiction issue. European remedies are therefore likely to remain totally ineffective before certain domestic courts of the Union where no specific ground for jurisdiction, such as a forum necessitatis, exists. Victims will be treated differently in the European judicial area; some of them will not be able to benefit from remedies. It also creates a severe discrepancy between European and foreign companies. The latter may avoid private enforcement as a result of this lacuna in the European legal system.

A solution may be found in the obligation of foreign companies to have a representative in the Union pursuant to Article 16 of the Directive proposal. It could be argued that the European domicile of this representative, set up for the public enforcement of the EU due diligence regime should also apply for private enforcement, based on the civil liability regime of Article 22 (see Article 16, §4 on public enforcement, mentioning the cooperation with supervisory authorities). In that regard, the preliminary explanation of the Directive proposal describes quite broadly the role of those mandated authorised representatives; they may be addressed by a competent authority of a Member State on all issues necessary inter alia for “[the] enforcement of legal acts issued in relation to this Directive” (page 25).

In a more effective way, a specific ground of jurisdiction could be introduced. It could be the forum of the Member States “in which the company generated most of its net turnover in the Union in the financial year preceding the last financial year” (Article 16, §3). This is the criterion laid down by the Directive proposal for the designation of the authorised representative in the Union. Therefore, it could be easily transposed to international competence, linking public and private enforcement schemes, as already suggested above.

No Specific Choice of Law Rules (either)

The extraterritoriality of the forthcoming EU substantive rules on due diligence is not enough (legally speaking) to guarantee their application before “European fora” when damage was suffered in third countries. In that respect, the Directive proposal opts for the mandatory nature of the civil liability regime laid down in Article 22: it is “of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State” (Article 22, 5).

From a PIL perspective, this formulation may be seen as ambiguous. First, the mandatory nature under EU law of all the text on corporate due diligence should be made explicit (even if it may be seen as obvious). Second, regarding the civil liability regime it is about its overriding mandatory dimension, whatever law is applicable, since this technique applies ex ante, before any conflict-of-laws reasoning. At the same time, it will still be necessary for the national courts (in EU Member States) to determine the law applicable to the case. Indeed, the Directive proposal does not lay down a complete and fully uniform regime of liability. More protective regimes under national law could prevail (recital 59) and some questions are referred to national law (for instance, the burden of proof of the absence of misconduct of the company, see recital 58).

Against this background, the Rome II Regulation will remain applicable for cross-border disputes concerning non-contractual obligations. The Regulation lays down a provision on overriding mandatory provisions (Article 16). It could therefore provide for the unilateral application of the national law of the competent court (its lex fori), which contains the EU due diligence duty and its attached civil liability regime (as already proposed by Giesela Rühl). However, it remains to be expressly clarified in the proposal whether the European provisions concerned – including (where appropriate) their implementation in the national laws of the Member States – have such an international mandatory nature.

In any case, PIL issues are crucial and condition the effectiveness (and therefore the success) of EU law (including EU values) beyond the Union’s borders in this area.

Ldricus – Charcoal merupakan salah satu bahan utama yang sering digunakan pada masker wajah. Manfaat masker charcoal sangat cocok sebagai masker untuk kulit kusam akibat minyak dan kotoran berlebih, karena mampu membersihkan secara mendalam, membuat wajah bersih dan cerah seketika.

Berbagai Manfaat Masker Charcoal

Selain membuat masker untuk kulit kusam akibat minyak dan kotoran berlebih pada wajah, charcoal memiliki banyak manfaat lain untuk kulit wajah Anda:

1. Merawat kulit berminyak.

Masker charcoal memiliki kemampuan untuk menyeimbangkan kadar minyak di kulit dengan menyerap minyak berlebih, sehingga sangat bagus jika Anda memiliki kulit berminyak.

2. Mengurangi jerawat

Jerawat diakibatkan karena adanya akumulasi kotoran, sel kulit mati, dan minyak berlebih hingga bakteri yang ada di pori-pori kulit. Sifat antibakteri charcoal dapat membantu menghilangkan bakteri dari pori-pori sehingga juga membantu mengurangi jerawat.

3. Membuat pori-pori tampak lebih halus

Manfaat masker charcoal sebagai bahan utamanya dapat membantu menarik dan menyerap semua kotoran yang ada di pori-pori. Ketika pori-pori bebas dari kotoran, pori-pori akan mengecil dan tersamarkan kembali agar terlihat mulus.

Masker untuk Mengatasi Kulit yang Kusam

Campuran charcoal dan beras hitam bisa Anda dapatkan sebagai masker untuk kulit kusam akibat minyak dan kotoran berlebih di Garnier Black Serum Mask Pure Charcoal Black Rice. Masker serum tisu ini membantu membersihkan wajah secara mendalam, melembabkan dan menutrisi kulit secara optimal.

Kandungan charcoal murni, ekstrak beras hitam dan LHA, serta asam hialuronat membuat wajah bersih sempurna dan tampak cerah berseri hanya dalam 15 menit pemakaian. Karena kandungan nutrisinya yang melimpah, penggunaan masker untuk kulit kusam ini memiliki manfaat yang sama seperti menggunakan serum selama seminggu.

Anda juga akan mendapatkan manfaat ini saat menggunakan Garnier Black Serum Mask Pure Charcoal Black Algae untuk membersihkan dan mencerahkan wajah secara mendalam, mengencangkan pori-pori dan menghaluskan kulit.

Apalagi untuk kulit berminyak yang sering terpapar lingkungan tercemar. Manfaat masker charcoal akan didapatkan jika menggunakannya secara rutin dan juga sesuai dengan ketentuan penggunaan yang tertera pada kemasan.

The post Manfaat Masker Charcoal Untuk Kulit Wajah yang Sehat appeared first on Aldri Blog.

Pologne / Parlement et Conseil
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’obligation, pour les fournisseurs de services de partage de contenus en ligne, de contrôler les contenus que des utilisateurs souhaitent téléverser sur leurs plates-formes préalablement à leur diffusion au public est accompagnée des garanties nécessaires pour assurer sa compatibilité avec la liberté d’expression et d’information

Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark , Bezirkshauptmannschaft Leibnitz (Durée maximale du contrôle aux frontières intérieures)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
En cas de menace grave pour son ordre public ou sa sécurité intérieure, un État membre peut réintroduire un contrôle à ses frontières avec d’autres États membres mais sans dépasser une durée totale maximale de six mois