Agrégateur de flux

The third issue of 2021 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Cristina Campiglio, Professor at the University of Pavia, Conflitti positivi e negativi di giurisdizione in materia matrimoniale (Positive and Negative Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters)

Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II-bis) provides for a range of alternative grounds for jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and is strongly marked by the favor actoris principle. The system sets the scene not only for forum shopping but also for a rush to the court. However, spouses who have the nationality of different Member States and reside in a Third State remain deprived of the right to an effective remedy before an EU court. Taking a cue from a case currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union, this article examines the possible avenues to address these cases of denial of justice, also in light of Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This analysis is conducted, in particular, with the overarching goal of launching, at a political level, a general reflection on the question of conflicts of jurisdiction and on the opportunity to create a coherent, unified “European system” in which general and special regulations operate in a coordinated manner. 

Fabrizio Marrella, Professor at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Forza maggiore e vendita internazionale di beni mobili in un contesto di pandemia: alcune riflessioni (Force Majeure and International Sales of Goods in the Context of a Pandemic: Some Remarks)

For centuries, national legal systems have recognised both the principle pacta sunt servanda and its exceptions, i.e. the rebus sic stantibus and ad impossibilia nemo tenetur principles. However, the manner in which these basic rules operate varies in the landscape of comparative law. The unforeseeable change of circumstances is among the most relevant issues for international contracts. For this reason, international commercial practice has provided some standard solutions. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 11 April 1980 is among the instruments that provide some uniform law solutions: however, these are not satisfactory when compared to modern commercial practice and the potential litigation arising from the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this context, legal doctrine on the private international law aspects of force majeure also seems scarce. This article explores some of the most pressing private international law issues arising from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on cross-border B2B contracts. Notably, it analyses the choice of the lex contractus and its scope in relation to force majeure, addressing issues of causation, penalty clauses, evidence (with particular reference to “force majeure certificates” imposed by some governments), payment, and overriding mandatory rules.

The following comments are also featured:

Marco Argentini, PhD Candidate at the University of Bologna, I criteri di radicamento della giurisdizione italiana nei contratti di trasporto aereo transnazionale (The Criteria for Establishing Italian Jurisdiction in Contracts for International Carriage by Air)

This article analyses the rules to identify the competent courts, in the field of international air carriage contracts, for passenger claims aimed at obtaining the flat-rate and standardised rights provided for in Regulation No 261/2004 and the compensation for further damage under the Montreal Convention. In particular, the jurisdiction over the former is governed by the Brussels I-bis Regulation, whereas the one over the latter is governed by the Convention itself. Since passengers are the weaker contractual party, the article also addresses some remedies to avoid fragmentation of legal actions between courts of different States, as well as the particular case, tackled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, of a flight forming part of a broader package tour.

Claudia Cantone, PhD Candidate at the University “Luigi Vanvitelli” of Campania, Estradizione e limiti all’esercizio della giurisdizione penale extraterritoriale nel diritto internazionale: riflessioni a margine della sentenza della Corte di cassazione n. 30642/2020 (Extradition and Limits to the Exercise of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in International Law: Reflections on the Court of Cassation’s Judgment No 30642/2020)

This article builds upon the judgment of the Court of Cassation 22 October 2020 No 30642, delivered in an extradition case towards the United States of America. The decision of the Supreme Court is noteworthy since, for the first time, the Court examines the restrictions imposed by public international law on States in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction outside their territory. Notably, it states that the existence of a “reasonable connection” could justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law. In this regard, the Author also analyses the emerging principle of jurisdictional reasonableness in the theory of jurisdiction under international law. Finally, the paper focuses on whether, in extradition proceedings, the judicial authority of the requested State might ascertain the basis of jurisdiction upon which the request is based, taking into consideration the absence of any provision in extradition treaties allowing such assessment.

Curzio Fossati, PhD Candidate at the University of Insubria, Le azioni di private enforcement tra le parti di un contratto: giurisdizione e legge applicabile (Private Enforcement Actions between Parties to a Contract: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law)

This article deals with the main private international law issues of antitrust damage claims between contracting parties, according to the latest rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, these issues concern (a) the validity and the scope of jurisdictions clauses, (b) the determination of jurisdiction under the Brussels I-bis Regulation, and (c) the applicable law under the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations. The article aims at demonstrating that the analysis of these aspects should be preceded by the proper characterization of the damage action for breach of competition law between contracting parties. The conclusion reached is that the adoption of a univocal method to characterize these actions as contractual or non-contractual fosters coherent solutions.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Matthias HAENTJENS, Financial Collateral: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020, pp. XXXIX-388.

SpaceNet,Telecom Deutschland,Commissioner of the Garda Síochána
Rapprochement des législations
L’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona rappelle que la conservation généralisée et indifférenciée des données relatives au trafic et des données de localisation afférentes aux communications électroniques n’est autorisée qu’en cas de menace grave pour la sécurité nationale

O’Loan and Scott v MIB and AIG (Fintan O’Loan and Elisabeth Scott v Motor Insurance Bureau and AI Europe SA) involves the same Loi Badinter that was also the subject of Marshall v MIB. I was alerted to the case buy Ian Denham’s post. Judgment is as yet unreported and I am grateful to Ian for having sent me copy.

The contested claim is the one of Ms Scott v AIG. She was the front seat passenger of the hire car, insured by AIG and driven by Mr O’Loan, her partner, when the car was driven into by an uninsured, French registered car. Ms Scott therefore turns to the driver, her partner (in reality, the insurer of the hire car), to have her damage covered under the strict liability (no need to show fault) rule of the French Loi Badinter.

To get to French law however she needs to overcome Article 4(2) Rome II’s provision that in case victim and party claimed to be liable are habitually resident in the same country at the time the damage occurs, the laws of that country apply. A4(3) is the portal to that escape route:

(3) Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.

It was conceded by both parties [12] that the district judge cut quite a few corners on the A4(3) analysis and Platts J therefore started afresh. Winrow v Hemphill of course was referred to, as was Owen v Galgey (the conclusions of which I disagreed with).

The judge notes (as does the Handbook: para 4.39) that it is important to identify what is meant by “the tort/delict’ in A4(3) before considering whether that tort/delict is more closely connected with a country other than England. A4(3) holds that ‘the tort’ (not individual elements of the tort, such as the event and/or the damage and /or anything singular at all) needs to be ‘more closely connected’.

I disagree with the judge [23] that ‘the tort’ or ‘delict’ clearly refers to the event which caused the damage, or ‘the incident’ [24]. In the case of a tortious obligation ‘the tort’ arguably refers to the classic 3 elements of event, damage, and causal link between the two (all three here clearly referring to France). I do agree it does not refer to the cause of action which arises from the incident [24]. While linguistically speaking that may be caught be ‘the tort’ for it would be one of its consequences, it would also mean that remedies available, or not, for instance would play a role in determining lex causae. Where Rome II envisages such assessment, it says so explicitly: such as in Article 7’s environmental damage rule.

The judge’s reasons for opting for displacement are [30]

I therefore consider the connection with France to be manifestly closer than the connection with England: the collision was in France; it was between two vehicles registered in France; the damage was caused in France in that the initial injury was suffered in France. Further, the circumstances were such that the claim of first claimant is to be dealt with under French law.

That last element is in slight contradiction I find to the judge’s consideration signalled above, that an advance on (remedies available or not under the) lex causae, must not play a role. If that is the case for claimant seeking to overturn A4(2)’s presumption, arguably there must not be a role either for the lex causae of other claims involved in the case.

Of note is the judge’s emphasis on the vehicles both being registered in France. If that is an element, travellers of countries without strict liability rules, might have a strong incentive indeed to hire cars rather than drive their own when driving in EU Member States with strict liability rules such as the Loi Badinter.

Appeal dismissed, for the result is the same (French law applies) even if the route to it was quite different from the first judge.

I do not think the analysis on ‘the tort’ is quite there yet.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 4.5.2 (para 4.39 ff).

Of much note and my review shall be on the blog soon. (There is a queue, plus the posts inevitably are playing snakes and ladders with my day jobs). https://t.co/JxrMg02Sxh

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 15, 2021

 

Yesterday (17 November 2021) the Russian Federation signed the HCCH Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention). The HCCH news item is available here.

No declarations were filed. Click here (Depositary’s website).

It should be noted that in order to consent to be bound by the treaty, the Russian Federation would need to deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval (art. 24(2) of the  HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention). In the meantime, a signatory State has the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (art. 18 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

***

The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention is not yet in force. In accordance with its article 28: “This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.”

There are currently five signatory States: Costa Rica, Israel, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uruguay. The act of signing a treaty does not count towards the timeline specified in article 28 of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention as it is not an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

 

The fourth issue of the Journal du droit international for 2021 has just been released. It contains two articles and several case notes relating to private international law issues, including the 2020 annual case-law review of EU private international law supervised by Louis d’Avout (University of Paris II).

In the first article, the International Law Association (ILA) pays tribute to the memory of Philippe Kahn (Hommage à Philippe Kahn, by Catherine Kessedjian, Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Éric Loquin, Jean-Michel Jacquet, Marie Cornu, Ali Bencheneb & Franck Latty).

The English abstract reads:

Philippe Kahn was above all a researcher, an inventive person, an explorer. The French Branch of the International Law Association paid tribute to him on April 8, 2021. The tribute, in its entirety, is available on Youtube. The texts reproduced here concern only his scientific contributions highlighted by the authors in the various fields that his insatiable curiosity led him to tackle: international contracts, the financing of international trade, cultural heritage and the art market, outer space, to mention just a few aspects of his work.

In the second article, Gwendoline Lardeux (Aix-Marseille University) analyses some difficult private international law issues in real property matters (De certaines hypothèses délicates du droit international privé des immeubles).

The English abstract reads:

The autonomous concepts of European conflict of laws are progressively shaped, litigation after litigation, through Court of justice, as European substantive law as such is lacking. This jurisdiction is therefore referring to International private law goals to choose or reject any qualification. This is clearly the case for the immovable suit. The different regulations on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters provide indeed an exclusive jurisdictional competence to the courts of the situs rei « in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property » (see Reg. Brussels I bis, art. 24, 1°, al. 1er). Those both hypotheses are raising difficult legal qualification issues regarding numerous intricate contracts or institutions.

A full table of contents can be downloaded here.

Lorsqu’un recours formé contre une décision de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA) ne présente aucun élément sérieux susceptible de remettre en cause sa décision, la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA) peut le rejeter sans attendre la production d’observations complémentaires annoncées par le requérant.

en lire plus

?Chen Zhi?Wangjing & GH Law Firm, PhD Candidate at University of Macau)

Finality of tribunal’s decision without any challenging system on merits issues has been well established and viewed as one of the most cited benefits of arbitration, which can be found in most influential legal documents such as 1958 New York Convention and UNCIITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (issued in 1985, as revised in 2006).

Nevertheless, among all salient features of arbitration, finality of award is probably the most controversial one. In the investment arbitration, the question has been canvassed at length and has been serving as one of the central concerns in the ongoing reform of investment arbitration.[i] While in commercial arbitration, some practitioners and commentators are also making effort to advocate an appeal system. For example, a report by Singapore Academy of Law Reform Committee in February of 2020 strongly recommended introduction of appeals on question of law into international arbitration seated in Singapore,[ii] and has ignited a debate in this regard.

In legal practice, there are some legislations or arbitration institutions provide approaches allowing for the parties to apply for reconsideration of the award, which can be summarized into 3 categories: 1. The appellate mechanism conducted by state courts; 2. Appellate mechanism within the arbitration proceedings and; 3. Alternative to appellate mechanism by arbitration society.

This article will start by giving a brief introduction about the forgoing systems, and comment on the legitimacy and necessity of appellate mechanism in commercial arbitration.

• Appealing mechanism before the court

1.1 Appellate Mechanism in England

When it comes to appellate mechanism conducted by state courts, the appeal mechanism for question of law as set out in section 69 of 1996 English Arbitration Act(EAA) is one of the most cited exceptions. It is undeniable that Section 69 of EAA constitutes an appellate mechanism in respect of arbitration conducted by judicial institutions. Nevertheless, some clarifications shall be made in this regard:

(1) The appellate mechanism serves as a default rule rather than a mandatory one, which allows parties to contract out of it. Apart from an agreement which explicitly excludes the appellate system, such consensus can be reached by other means. One of the methods is the parties’ agreement on dispensing with reasons for the arbitral award, which is overall a rare practice in the field of international commercial arbitration while frequently used within some jurisdictions and sectors. Another way is the designation of arbitration rules containing provisions eliminating any appeal system, such as arbitration rules of most world renowned arbitration institutions. For instance, Article 26.8 of London Court of International Arbitration Rules(The LCIA Rules) explicitly stipulates that parties waive “irrevocably” their right to appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority in any form.[iii] Therefore, parties may easily dispense with the right to appeal by reference of arbitration before The LCIA Rules or under its rules.

(2) Albeit parties fail to opt out of such appeals, the court is still afforded with discretion on rejection of a leave to commence such appeal. As provided by Section 69 (3) of EAA, such leave shall be granted only certain standards are satisfied, inter alia, the manifest error in the disputed award or raise of general public importance regarding the debating question.

(3) The competence of the appealing court is confined to review the question of laws and shall not impugned on the factual issue. In other words, any alleged errors in fact finding by tribunal is out of the court’s remit. English courts are tended to reject efforts dressing up factual findings as questions of law, and have set up a high threshold regarding mixed questions of law and fact.[iv]

The abovementioned three factors have enormously narrowed down the scope of appellate system under Section 69 of EAA. Statistics in recent years also reveal the extreme low success rate in both granting of leave and overturning of the outcome. From 2015 to March 2018, more than 160 claims had been filed, while only 30 claims were permitted and 4 claims succeeded.[v] Hence, the finality of arbitration award is overall enshrined in England. Parties can hardly count on the appeal proceedings set forth in Section 69.

1.2 Appellate Mechanism Outside England

Some other jurisdictions have embedded similar appellate system, Canada and Australia employed an opt-out model like Section 69 of EAA.[vi] Other jurisdictions have adopted stringent limits on such appeal. in Singapore, appeal on merits of award is only provided by Arbitration Act governing domestic arbitration and not available in arbitration proceedings under International Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Ordinance of Hong Kong SAR of China provides an opt-in framework which further narrows down the use of appellate mechanism.

Appeal in the court is somehow incompatible with the minimal intervene principle as set out in legislations like UNCITRAL Model Law. Further, it will not only enormously undermine efficiency of arbitration but also make the already-clogged state courts more burdensome. The important consideration about the appeal against question of law in the court is the development of law through cases,[vii] while it is not suitable for all jurisdictions.

• Internal appellate of arbitration institution

Apart from state courts, some arbitration institutions may have the authority to act as appellate bodies under their institutional rules, which can be summarized as “institutional appellate mechanism”. While such system can be observed in the arbitration concerning certain sectors such as the appeal board of The Grain and Feed Trade Association, it is rarely used by institutions open for all kinds of commercial disputes, with exceptions such as The Institute of Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) and Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc (JAMS).[viii]

Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) is the first arbitration institution in Mainland China who introduced optional appellate arbitration procedure into its arbitration rules published in December of 2018 (having come into effective since February 2019), enclosed with a guideline for such optional appellate arbitration procedure.

SCIA’s Optional Appellate Arbitration Procedure provides an opt-in appellate system against the merits issue of an award where the below prerequisites are all satisfied: (1) pre-existing agreement on appeal by parties; (2) such appeal mechanism is not prohibited by the law of the seat; (3) the award is not rendered under expedited procedure set out in SCIA Arbitration Rules.[ix]

If all the above conditions are satisfied and one of the dispute parties intend to appeal, the application of appeal shall be filed the appeal within 15 days upon receipt of the disputing award and an appealing body composed of 3 members will be constituted through the appointment of SCIA’s chief. The appealing body is afforded with broad direction to revise or affirm the original award, of whom the decision will supersede the original award.[x]

The SCIA appellate mechanism is a bold initiative, while some uncertainties may arise under the current legal system in Mainland China:

First is the legitimacy of an internal appellate system under current legislation system. Though the current statutes do not contain any provision specifying the institutional legitimacy of an appellate mechanism, while legal risk may arise by breach of finality principle set out in the Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law, which expressly stipulates that both state court and arbitration institution shall reject any dispute which has been decided by previous award. In this respect, any decision by an appealing system, regardless of whether it is conducted by state court, is likely to be annulled or held unenforceable subsequently. Apparently, SCIA was well aware of such risk and set forth the first prerequisite for the system such that parties may circumvent the risk through designation of arbitral seat.

The second is the risk brought by designation of arbitration seat other than Mainland China while no foreign-related factor is involved. Current law in PRC is silent on the term of arbitration seat, even though the loophole may be well resolved by the new draft of revised Arbitration Law which has been published for public consultation since late July 2021,[xi] it is still unclear whether parties to arbitration without foreign-related factors have the right to designate a jurisdiction other than Mainland China. As per previous cases, courts across the jurisdiction has been for a long time rejecting parties’ right to agree on submission of case to off-shore arbitration institutions provided that no foreign-related factor can be observed in the underlying dispute.[xii]If the same stance keep unchanged in respect of parties’ consent on arbitration seat, parties’ agreement on designating an off-shore seat to avoid the scrutiny will be invalidated and the SCIA appellate mechanism will thereby not be available.

Third is the possibility of contradictory results. In Mainland China, a domestic award is final upon parties and hence enforceable without any subsequent proceedings. With this regard, SCIA’s appellate mechanism may create two contradictory outcomes in one dispute resolution proceeding under the current legal system. If the successful party seeks for enforcement of award by concealing the existence of appeal proceedings, the court will enforce it basing on its text. Even though the court is aware of the appeal proceedings in the course of enforcement, it is not obliged to stay the enforcement in absence of any legal basis. In other words, the appeal mechanism will be meaningless for all parties in case of the launch of enforcement proceedings .

• Alternatives to appealing mechanism

As mentioned above, in Mainland China there is no room for a review on merits system in commercial arbitration under Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law. This article has been verbatim transplanted into the most recent draft of revised Arbitration Law which has been published for public consultation since late July 2021. Therefore, the much-cited bill brings no assistance in this regard.

With all that said, a few institutions have set up a special system called “pre-decision notification”??????as an alternative to mirror the function of appeal mechanism, which is said to be credited to Deyang Arbitration Commission of Sichuan Province dated back to 2004, according to a piece of news in August 2005 reported by Legal Daily, a nationwide legal professional newspaper run by the Supreme People’s Court.[xiii] Pre-decision notification allows for tribunal to notice parties their preliminary opinions about the case before rendering the final decision, and ask for parties’ comments within fixed duration. Tribunal’s preliminary opinions can be revised by the final award based on comments by parties, occurrence of new fact after deliberation, or merely on the tribunal’s own initiative.

One notable case about the pre-decision notification mechanism is decided by Xi’an Intermediate Court of Shanxi Province dated 18 April of 2018.[xiv] The case concerns an arbitration proceeding administered by Shangluo Branch of Xi’an Arbitration Commission where the tribunal dispatched preliminary opinion to parties at the outset, whilst ruled on the contrary in the final decision. The plaintiff (respondent of the arbitration proceeding) subsequently commenced an annulment proceeding against the award on the basis that the final decision is contradictory with the one set out in pre-decision notice (together with other reasons which were not relevant to the topic of this article), whilst the court refused to set aside the award by simply indicated that the reasons replied upon by plaintiff had no merits, without giving any further comment on such system.

In another noteworthy case which concerns the fact that tribunal ruled adversely after considering parties’ comments on opinion set out in pre-decision notice, in the annulment proceeding, the Guiyang Intermediate Court of Guizhou Province explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of pre-decision notification, by stating that even though it is not regulated in any current legislation, pre-decision notice can be viewed as an investigation method by means of tribunal’s query to the parties, instead of a decision by tribunal. Therefore, the discrepancy between pre-decision opinion and final award does not amount to annulment of the award.[xv]

The abovementioned court decisions are somehow problematic: the pre-decision notification is by no means a mere investigating tool for the tribunal. While the preliminary opinion is made and dispatched, it shall be deemed that the tribunal has taken the stance, which shall be distinguished from tribunal’s query about facts or laws in a neutral and open minded manner which is widely accepted in commercial arbitration.[xvi] Therefore, subsequent comments by parties would constitute a de facto appealing mechanism before the same decision-making body, which will give rise to problems such as postponing the arbitral proceedings and the question of conflict of interest. Moreover, it probably produces unfairness for parties dissatisfying with the preliminary opinion may spare no effort to change the tribunal’s mind by intervening tribunal’s autonomy (even by taking irregular or illegal measures).

Overall, pre-decision notification is a highly controversial practice which received lots of criticisms, and hence does not constitute a mainstream system in China. None of the first-class arbitration institutions (including CIETAC, Beijing Arbitration Commission, Guangzhou Arbitration Commission, etc.) had ever embraced such system in the field of commercial arbitration. Some institutions are seeking to repeal or limit the use of such system. For example, Zunyi Arbitration Commission abolished such system in its rules released in 2018, while other arbitration commissions who are consistently strong champions of this system also opined that it is only used in rare cases with higher controversy and complexity.

Despite of these pitfalls and controversies, the courts’ decisions clearly reveal that pre-decision notification system per se is not necessarily a breach of finality principle set out in arbitration legislation and hence feasible for parties if it is explicitly set out in applicable arbitration rules.

Pre-decision notification has been introduced into investment arbitration in recent years, Beijing Arbitration Commission has incorporated such system into its investment arbitration which was finalized and published in September 2019, which provides that the tribunal shall provide parties with the draft of award and seek for their comments, and may give proper consideration to the parties’ feedback.[xvii] By the language, pre-decision notification will act as a mandatory rule while any investor-state case is being administered by this institution.

4.Comments

Several pertinent issues have been raised with regard to appellate mechanism in arbitration, which can be boiled down to several sub-issues including legitimacy, efficiency and fairness, as well as preference of parties.

4.1 Legitimacy Perspective

According to leading legislations across the world, the competence of state court confined to procedural issues in respect of judicial review over arbitration award, with rare and narrow exceptions such as the public policy set out in UNCITRAL Model Law and New York Convention. With this respect, even though some commentators argue that an appeal on merits is not necessarily a breach of finality and minimal intervene principles set out in UNCITRAL Model Law,[xviii] a mandatory and all-catching appealing system encompassing both factual and legal issues conducted by state court is undeniably incompatible with modern arbitration legislation.

In this respect, an internal appealing mechanism conducted by arbitration institution seems to be less controversial in respect of legitimacy at first glance. While it may also be viewed as a breach of finality of award in the context of some specific legislations such as Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law.

4.2 Efficiency and Fairness

Finality principle in commercial perceivably enhances the efficiency of dispute resolution by relieving both parties and states from endless and burdensome appealing and reconsidering proceedings, while efficiency is not free from problem while the fairness issue is concerned, giving rise to pertinent considerations about correction of error, enhancement of consistency and the increase of transparency.

Nevertheless, the fairness argument is less convincing in the context of international commercial arbitration in which parties are seeking for a neutral forum in avoidance of local protectionism.[xix] Further, consistency and transparency is less concerned in the context of arbitration which is viewed to be tailored for individual cases while less public concerns are involved, comparing with litigation.

4.3 Preference of Parties

It can be drawn from above analysis that there is no one-standard-fitting all approach for the appeal mechanism in commercial arbitration, in that scenario, parties’ preference shall be taken into account by virtue of the autonomy nature of commercial.

An worldwide survey conducted by Queen Mary University in 2015 provides that 23% of the respondents were in favor of an appeal mechanism in commercial arbitration (compared to 36% approval rate in the same question about investment arbitration),[xx] which reveals a boost about 150% while compared with the rate in 2006 survey (around 9%).In 2018 survey, 14% of the respondents had selected “lack of appeal mechanism on the meritss” as one of the three worst characteristics of arbitration.[xxi]

In a nutshell, statics reveals the increasing demand for appeal system, while it is premature to say that preference for appeal mechanism has been the mainstream in commercial arbitration, it has given rise to concerns by arbitration practitioners and proper response shall be made accordingly.

[i]See Elsa Sardinha, The Impetus for the Creation of an Appellate Mechanism, in Meg Kinnear and Campbell McLachlan (eds), ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Oxford University Press 2017, Volume 32 Issue(3) pp. 503 – 527S https://www.sal.org.sg/sites/default/files/PDF%20Files/Law%20Reform/2020%20Report%20on%20the%20Right%20of%20Appeal%20against%20International%20Arbitration%20Awards%20on%20Questions%20of%20Law.pdf

[ii] See Singapore Academy of Law Reform Committee, Report on the Right of Appeal against International Arbitration Awards on Questions of Law February 2020, available at

[iii] Article 26.8 of LCIA Arbitration Rules?coming into effective since October 2020?,available at https://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2020.aspx

[iv] See Teresa Cheng, The Search for Order Within Chaos in the Evolution of ISDS, CIArb’s 45th annual Alexander Lecture on 16 January 2020, available at https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/speeches/20200116_sj1.html

[v] Ben Sanderson et al.,Appeals under the English Arbitration Act 1996?available at https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2018/05/appeals-under-the-english-arbitration-act-1996/#:~:text=Section%2069%2C%20meanwhile%2C%20is%20a%20non-mandatory%20provision%20of,the%20English%20courts%20on%20a%20point%20of%20law.

[vi]T. Dedezade, Are You In or Are You Out? An Analysis of Section, 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996: Appeals on a Question of Law, 2 Intl. Arb. L.J. 56 (2006) available at http://corbett.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Taner-s-69-article.pdf

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] See Rowan Platt, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over Finality?, Journal of International Arbitration , Volume 30 Issue 5 p. 548?2013?

[ix] See Article 68 of SCIA Arbitration Rules(coming into effective since 2019),available at http://scia.com.cn/upload/20201027/5f97bf7833c8c.pdf

[x] See SCIA Guidelines for the Optional Appellate Arbitration Procedure, available at http://www.scia.com.cn/files/fckFile/file/SCIA%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20Optional%20Appellate%20Arbitration%20Procedure.pdf

[xi] See Anton Ware et al., Proposed Amendments to the PRC Arbitration Law: A Panacea?, available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/09/09/proposed-amendments-to-the-prc-arbitration-law-a-panacea/

[xii] See a seminal case (2013)??????10670? by Beijing 2nd Intermediate Court in January of 2014, which concerns an award rendered in proceedings governed by KCAB, the court rejected enforcement of KCAB award by the reason that the underlying dispute did not have any foreign-related factor, despite of the fact that one party to the proceedings is an enterprise wholly subsidized by Korean citizens.

[xiii] See Li Yongli et al., Enhancing Arbitration Legislation through Pre-Decision Notification. Legal Daily, 16 August 2005, p,12???????????“????”???????????????????2005?8?16??12???

[xiv] 2018 Shan 01 Min Te No. 99?2018??01??99?

[xv] 2016 Qian 01 Min Te No. 48?2016??01??48?

[xvi] Per the common practice and well established principle, tribunals are free to delivery query to parties in respect of both factual finding and ascertaining law (Jura Novit Curia), while it shall be conducted in a manner that being prepared to consider legal positions advanced by the parties, irrespective of questions well known to the tribunal. See: Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem, International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration Report for the Biennial Conference in Rio de Janeiro, August 2008,

[xvii] Article 42.4 of Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center Rules for International Investment Arbitration?available at https://www.bjac.org.cn/page/data_dl/touzi_en.pdf

[xviii] See Singapore Academy on Law Reform Committee: Report of Appeal Against International Arbitration Awards on Questions of Law, February 2020, available at https://www.sal.org.sg/sites/default/files/PDF%20Files/Law%20Reform/2020%20Report%20on%20the%20Right%20of%20Appeal%20against%20International%20Arbitration%20Awards%20on%20Questions%20of%20Law.pdf

[xix] Noam Zamir ,Peretz Segal, Appeal in International Arbitration—an efficient and affordable arbitral appeal mechanism‘, in William W. Park (ed), Arbitration International, Oxford University Press 2019, Volume 35 Issue 1) p. 84.

[xx] See Queen Mary, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, p,8 available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2015_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf

[xxi] See Queen Mary & White Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, p,8 available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey—The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF

Facts

An Austrian national (A) was born in 1975 as a woman. In 2010, at A’s request, the Austrian authorities changed A’ first name, and in 2016 A’s gender to “male”. A married a German male national in July 2019 in Berlin. On the same day, A gave birth to their common child there. The German authorities were unsure about how to enter A into the birth register.

Ruling

On 21 January 2021, the Court of Appeal Berlin (Kammergericht) rendered a Solomonic judgment (docket number 1 W 1290/20, published in NJW-RR 2021, p. 387, paywall access here). It ruled that A was to be registered as the child’s mother, but that A’s gender was to be recorded as “male”. This solution was reached through applying a combination of the formal rules governing the birth register, conflict-of-laws rules, and an interpretation of substantive law.

Formal Rules on Civil Status

The Court justified the registration of A as a “mother” by the formal procedural rules governing the German civil status (Personenstandsgesetz) as the lex fori. According to these rules, the person giving birth to the child is to be registered as the mother, independently of their gender. A’s status as a mother would follow from the fact that A had given birth to the child.

Conflict of Laws

The Court also tried to justify this rather formalistic solution by the law applicable to the substantive legal relationship between A and the child. In order to do so, it had to identify the law applicable to kinship.

The Court highlighted that since the child has its habitual residence in Germany, German law applied to the relation of kinship (Article 19(1) 1 of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code – EGBGB). Yet in addition to habitual residence, German international family law provides further connecting factors with the goal of establishing, as far as possible, a parent-child relationship. In particular, the relationship of descent from a parent can also be derived from the law of the state of this parent’s nationality (see Art 19(1) 2 EGBGB). In the present case, given A’s Austrian nationality, this would lead to Austrian law. Finally, kinship could also be established under the law governing the general effects of the marriage (Art 19(1) 3 EGBGB). Under German conflicts law, the general effects of same-sex marriages are, in the absence of a choice of law by the spouses, submitted to the law where the same-sex marriage is registered (Art 17b(4) EGBGB).  In the present case, this again led to German law. Hence, German and Austrian law apply to questions of kinship, with a preference for the law that is more likely to establish a parent-child-relationship.

Substantive Kinship Law

A substantive problem is that the German Civil Code defines the mother of a child as the “woman who gave birth to the child” (sec. 1591 German Civil Code – BGB). A very similar provision exists under Austrian law (sec. 143 Austrian Civil Code – ABGB). Seemingly, these provisions do not allow a man to be registered as a mother.

However, the German Federal Court had previously held that the role of the mother and the female gender must always be attributed to the person giving birth to the child (Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 6 September 2017 – XII ZB 660/14). It is true that the Act on Transsexuals, on which the Federal Supreme Court had relied, was not applicable given that A had changed its name and gender abroad, i.e., under Austrian law. Nevertheless, the Berlin Court of Appeal followed the precedent set by the Federal Supreme Court. It argued that the notions “mother” and “woman” in sec. 1591 BGB would refer to a specific role in the procreation of the child, and were to be understood in a biological and not in a legal sense. Since A had given birth to the child, A would have to be considered as the mother and consequently also as a “woman” for the purposes of this provision.

The Berlin Court of Appeal also pointed out that A could not be registered as a father, despite being male. A did not meet the necessary requirements to be registered as the child’s father, as he was neither married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, nor has his paternity been acknowledged or established by the court (sec. 1592 German Civil Code – BGB). Moreover, under German law, every child can only have one father and one mother. As A’s husband had been registered as the father, this role was precluded for A. The Court also pointed out that gender-neutral registration is not foreseen under German law.

In Austria, no special rules exist for transsexual persons as mothers. Yet the Court of Appeal pointed to the Austrian practice under which a woman who had changed her gender before giving birth to a child could be entered into the central civil status register as the mother. The result would be basically the same as under German law.

Substantive Gender Law

With regard to the recording of A’s gender in the birth register, the Berlin Court of Appeal referred to Art 7 EGBGB, which submits questions concerning the legal personality and legal capacity of natural persons to the law of their nationality. This provision would apply, by analogy, also to gender identity. Hence, Austrian law was applicable. The Court remarked that the Austrian authorities had issued a birth certificate for A with the gender “male”. Similar documents had been submitted for purposes of the wedding. The Austrian authorities had also recorded A’s gender as male when registering the child’s birth in the general civil status register. There could therefore be no serious doubt about A’s gender. The Austrian acts and documents would have to be respected in Germany. As a result, a man was registered as a mother.

Assessment

The case illustrates the need for reform to German and Austrian family law. Both still are based on the assumption that the mother of a child is always a woman, which is no longer universally true, as illustrated by the present case. The Berlin Court of Appeal’s distinction between the sex in a biological sense and gender a legal sense can hardly convince when applied in a purely legal context. Where someone is recognised as having a certain gender, this must apply in all legal circumstances. The proper solution therefore would be to define the mother purely functionally as the person giving birth to remove the reference to a “woman” in both sec. 1591 German BGB and sec. 143 Austrian ABGB. This could be best done by a change of the law; in the absence of such reform, an adaptive interpretation is indispensable.

With regard to A’s gender, the Berlin Court of Appeal could have shortened its ruling. It should simply have accepted the Austrian documents on the basis of the CJEU case law that demands the recognition of civil status acts rendered in other Member States (see for the registration of names e.g. CJEU, C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn). A conflicts analysis was therefore unnecessary in this context.

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne poursuit la construction de sa jurisprudence sur le temps de travail des sapeurs-pompiers non professionnels.

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On 15 November 2021, the JURI committee of the European Parliament held a hearing on EU Private International Law. The focus was on issues that would need to be addressed in a review of the current rules, including as regards Corporate Due Diligence and SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation).

Giesela Rühl (Humboldt University of Berlin, and Secretary General of EAPIL), Geert Van Calster (Leuven University), and Olivera Boskovic (Université Paris Déscartes) took part in the hearing.

The video recording of the hearing can be found here.

Governor of Cloverhill Prison e.a.
Relations extérieures
Les dispositions concernant le régime du mandat d’arrêt européen à l’égard du Royaume-Uni prévues dans l’accord de retrait et concernant le nouveau mécanisme de remise dans l’accord de commerce et de coopération entre l’Union européenne et cet État tiers sont contraignantes pour l’Irlande

Commission / Hongrie
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
En sanctionnant pénalement l’activité d’organisation visant à permettre l’ouverture d’une procédure de protection internationale par des personnes ne remplissant pas les critères nationaux d’octroi de cette protection, la Hongrie a violé le droit de l’Union

Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le droit de l’Union fait obstacle au régime en vigueur en Pologne permettant au ministre de la Justice de déléguer des juges dans des juridictions pénales supérieures, délégation à laquelle ce ministre, qui est en même temps le procureur général, peut à tout moment mettre fin sans motivation

On 1 December 2021, at 3 pm CET, the University of Catania will host a webinar, in French, titled Différences culturelles et droit international privé de la famille (Cultural differences and Private International Law in Family Matters), organised by Pasquale Pirrone.

The main speakers are Jean-Yves Carlier (Catholic University of Louvain) and Léna Gannagé (Saint Joseph University, Beirut). Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (University of Macerata) and Roberto Baratta (Roma Tre University), among others, will also intervene.

Attendance is free, via Teams. Further details here.

On 11 November 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Bank Sepah v. Overseas Financial Limited (case C‑340/20).

The judgment clarifies the effect of the freezing of assets pursuant to European (and U.N.) sanctions on the right of creditors to attach the said assets.

In this case, the sanctions were the restrictive measures against Iran  implemented by Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 April 2007 and several subsequent regulations replacing it (‘the Regulations’). Regulation 423/2007 froze the assets and resources of certain listed entities. One of them was Iranian bank Sepah.

Article 1 (h) and (j) of Regulation 423/2007 provided:

‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any moving, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;

‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

The issue was whether attaching preventively assets subject to such sanctions fell within these definitions and was thus forbidden. In this case, U.S. creditors were seeking to enforce a French judgment against bank Sepah and had sought enforcement and conservative measures. In a judgment of July 10th, 2020, the French supreme court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) considered that the situation was clear enough for enforcement measures, but asked the CJUE whether the Regulations prevented granting conservative measures as well.

Background

The US creditors were Delaware companies Overseas Financial Limited and Oaktree Finance Limited. They were seeking to enfore a French judgment against Bank Sepah, a company established in Iran.

After obtaining partial payments made between 2007 and 2011, Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance on 2 December 2007 requested that the French Minister for the Economy authorise the release of the outstanding amount pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 423/2007. Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance brought an action for annulment against the implicit rejection of their request before the Administrative Court of Paris, which dismissed that action by judgment of 21 October 2013.

On 17 May 2016, Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance issued formal notices of attachment and sale against Bank Sepah before attaching, on 5 July 2016, receivables, shareholder rights and transferable securities held by a French bank. By judgment of 9 January 2017, the enforcement court of Paris confirmed those attachments and their amount, including the interest provided for by the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 26 April 2007. While Bank Sepah accepted that it was required to pay the principal amounts ordered against it, it argued that it was not liable for the interest and it therefore contested the enforcement measures before that enforcement court. It inter alia argued that it could not be held liable for interest, taking the view that it had been prevented from paying its debt by a case of force majeure arising from the freezing of its assets by Regulation No 423/2007, which had the effect of suspending the running of that interest.

Questions Referred to the Court

The French Cour de cassation referred two questions to the CJEU.

The first was concerned with the meaning of the concept of changing the ‘destination’ of the frozen funds under Article 1(h). The referring Court wondered whether a subsequent freeze of the assets by a national conservative measure amounted to such a change.

More specifically, the Cour de cassation ruled that, while it thought it likely that an enforcement measure transferring the ownership of the frozen asset would change its destination, it was less clear for conservative measures, which would not result in such a transfer to the benefit of the creditor.

The Cour de cassation insisted on particular feature of French conservative measures: they not only freeze assets, but they also grant an in rem right to the creditor, and thus a right to paid in priority over the relevant funds.

The second question was whether the origin of the claim that the creditor sought to enforce was relevant. In the case at hand, the claims of the U.S. creditors were unconnected to the Nuclear Programme of Iran, or any other activity which justified the sanctions.

Judgment

As to the first question, the CJEU responded that the freezing of assets under the Regulations do prevent further attachement, even if such attachements are not enforcement measures.

46 In terms of measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which establish a right to be paid on a priority basis over other creditors in favour of the creditor concerned, it must be stated, as the Advocate General observed in points 55 to 61 of his Opinion, that such measures have the effect of changing the destination of frozen funds and are liable to permit the use of frozen economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services.

47 It follows that such measures fall within the concepts of ‘freezing of funds’ and ‘freezing of economic resources’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) and (j) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 423/2007.

48 The fact that such measures do not have the effect of removing assets from the debtor’s estate cannot call that conclusion into question.

49 (…) the concept of ‘freezing of funds’ encompasses any use of funds which results, inter alia, in a change in the destination of those funds, even if such use of the funds does not have the effect of removing assets from the debtor’s estate.

As to the second question, the CJEU noted that the Regulations made no such distinction, and held that it should not be relevant for determining the scope, and effect, of the freezing of funds and resources.

Assessment

The judgment is essentially an exercise of construction of the relevant regulations. Given the very broad language used by the European lawmaker, such exercise was bound to result in an inclusion of the relevant measures in the forbidden uses of the funds. The court does not conduct any purposive interpretation.

While conservative measures grant in rem rights under French, they do not under the law of other Member States. The CJEU responded to the question as framed, but it insisted that the issue was the change of ‘destination’. It seems, therefore, that conservative measures should be considered as falling within the scope of the freezing of funds irrespective of whether they grant in rem rights or not.

Lorsqu’un incident de procédure n’a pas été joint au fond, la personne réclamée doit avoir la parole en dernier à l’issue des débats sur les demandes d’extradition et de renvoi.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de procédure pénale 2022, annoté Procédure pénale Procédure pénale Droit pénal. Procédure pénale 2022 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Par un arrêt du 21 octobre 2021, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise sa jurisprudence relative à l’article 13, § 2, du règlement Bruxelles I bis, dans l’hypothèse où un assureur est assigné par une société à laquelle la victime d’un accident de la circulation a cédé sa créance d’indemnisation.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de procédure civile 2022, annoté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Ni l’autorisation de la loi ni le commandement de l’autorité légitime ne peuvent justifier l’usage d’une arme par un policier sur une personne en fuite non armée et dont il n’apparait pas qu’elle ait été impliquée dans les infractions ayant motivé la consigne d’interpeller les individus troublant l’ordre public.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code pénal 2022, annoté Droit pénal général Droit pénal. Procédure pénale 2022 Droit pénal général 2022 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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By Zheng Sophia Tang, Wuhan University (China) and Newcastle University (UK)

Mr Ting Liao, PhD candidate at the Wuhan University Institute of International Law, published a note on the Chinese Smart Court, which attracted a lot of interests and attention. We have responded a few enquires and comments, some relating to the procedure and feasibility of virtual/remote hearing. Based on the questions we have received, this note provides more details on how the virtual hearing is conducted in China.

1. Background

The fast development of virtual hearing and its wide use in practice in China is attributed to the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic causes serious disruption to litigation. China is a country that has adopted the toughest prevention and controlling measures. Entrance restriction, lockdown, quarantine and social distancing challenge the court process and case management. In the meantime, it offers the Chinese courts a chance to reform and modernize their judicial systems by utilizing modern technology. Since suspending limitation period may lead to backlog and delay, more Chinese courts favour the virtual proceedings. This strategy improves judicial efficiency and helps parties’ access to justice in the unusual circumstances.

Before the pandemic, Chinese courts have already started their exploration of online proceedings. In 2015, the Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Registration and Filling of Cases provides the People’s courts should provide litigation services including online filing.[1] In the same year, the SPC published the Civil Procedural Law Interpretation, which states that the parties can make agreement on the form of hearing, including virtual hearing utilizing visual and audio transfer technology. The parties can make application and the court can decide whether to approve.[2] Although online trial from filing to hearing is permitted by law, but it was rarely used in practice due to the tradition and social psychology. The adoption of virtual proceedings for cases with large value is even rarer. The relevant procedure and technology are also taking time to progress and maturase.

Because the pandemic and the controlling measures make serious disruption to traditional form of litigation, online trial becomes more frequently used and develops to a more advanced stage. The SPC provids macro policy instructions that Chinese courts should actively utilize online litigation platform, such as China Movable Micro Court, which allows the parties to conduct litigation through mobile, and Litigation Service Website to carry out comprehensive online litigation activities, including filing, mediation, evidence exchange, hearing, judgment, and service of procedure.[3] While more administrative and technological efforts have been put in, and the pandemic made no better alternatives, more trials were done online. For example, between Feb and Nov 2020, 959 hearings (16.42%) and 5020 mediations were carried out online in the Qianhai Court. Between Feb and July 2020, courts in Beijing conducted average 1,300-1,500 virtual hearings per day.

Some important cases were also tried online. For example, Boa Barges As v Nanjing Yichun Shipbuilding concerned a dispute worth nearly $50,000,000.[4] The contract originally included a clause to resolve disputes in London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and to apply English law. However, the pandemic outbroke in the UK in March 2020. The parties entered into a supplementary agreement in May 2020 to submit the dispute to Nanjing Maritime Court and apply Chinese law. Chinese commentators believe the change of chosen forum and governing law demonstrates the parties’ trust on Chinese international judicial system and courts’ capacity. Nanjing Maritime Court followed the SPC instruction by allowing the foreign party to postpone submitting authorization notarization and authentication, and conducted online mediation. In China, mediation is part of the formal litigation procedure. The parties settled by mediation within 27 days.

In 2021, the SPC published the Online Litigation Regulations for the People’s Courts, including detailed rules for how online litigation should be conducted.[5] It provides five principles for online litigation, including fairness and efficiency, freedom of choice, protection of rights, convenience and security.[6] This Regulations provides further clarification of certain key procedural issues and provide unified micro-guidance which helps the local courts to operate in the same standards and according to the same rule.

2. Initiation of virtual hearing

Virtual proceedings may lead to several controversies. Firstly, how are the virtual proceedings initiated? Could the court propose by its own motive, or should the parties reach agreement? What if a physical trial is not possible due to the pandemic control, both the court and the claimant want a virtual trial, but the defendant refuse to consent? In such a case, would a virtual trial in the absence of the defendant an infringement of the defendant’s due process right and should not be enforced abroad? What if the defendant and the court agree to go ahead with a virtual trial, but the claimant refuses? Would a default judgment in the absence of the claimant infringe the claimant’s due process right?

The Online Litigation Regulations provides clear guidance. Online litigation should follow the principle of freedom of choice. In other words, parties should consent the online procedure and cannot be forced by the court.[7] If a party voluntarily chooses online litigation, the court can conduct litigation procedure online. If all the parties agree on online litigation, the relevant procedure can be conducted online. If some parties agree on online litigation while others not, the court can conduct the procedure half online for parties who give consent and half offline for other parties.[8] However, what if a party cannot physically participate in the offline litigation because of the pandemic, and this party also refuses online litigation? This party certainly can apply for suspension or postponement of procedure. However, if this party has no legitimate reason to refuse online litigation like technical problems or the lack of computer literacy, would not the court consider such a refusal unreasonable? Does it mean a person may use the refusal rights to delay otherwise legitimate procedure to the detriment of the other party? Would the refusal turn to be a torpedo action? Does this strict autonomy approach meet the purpose of good faith and judicial efficiency? Although the freedom of choice is important, would it necessary to provide some flexibility by allowing the court to assess special circumstances of a case? It seems that this strict consent condition is based on the traditional attitude against online litigation. This attitude makes offline litigation a priority and online litigation an exception, which will only be used by parties’ choice. This approach does not provide online litigation true equal footing as offline litigation, and still reflect the social psychological concern over the use of modern technology in the court room. Although the pandemic speed the development of online litigation in China, it is treated as an exceptional emergency measure and the emphasis on it may fade away gradually after the pandemic is ending, unless the social psychology is also changed after a longer period of successful use of online litigation.

3. Public hearing

Would virtual hearing satisfy the standard of public hearing? Certainly, there is no legal restriction preventing public access to the hearing.[9] Furthermore, the Online Litigation Regulations provides that online litigation must be made public pursuant to law and judicial interpretation, unless the case concerns national security, state secrets, individual privacy, or the case concerns a minor, commercial secrets and divorce where the parties apply for the hearing not be made public.[10] However, how to make online hearing public is a technical question. If the virtual hearing is organised online, without a openly published “link”, no public will be able to access the virtual court room and the trial is “secret” as a matter of fact. This may practically evade the public hearing requirement.

Chinese online litigation has taken into account the public hearing requirement. Both SPC litigation service website and the Movable Micro Court make open hearing an integral part of the platform. The public can register an account for free and log in the website. After log in, the public can find all available services in the page, including Hearing Livestream. After click in, the pubic can find the case that they want to watch by searching the court or browse the Live Courtroom Today. There are also recorded hearing for the public to watch. In contrast to traditional hearing, the only extra requirement for the public to access to the court is registration, which requires the verification of ID through triple security check: uploading the scan/photo of ID card, verifying mobile numbers via security code and facial recognition.

It shows that Chinese virtual hearing has been developed to a mature stage, which meets the requirement of due process protection and public hearing. Chinese virtue hearing has been systematically updated with the quick equipment of modern technologies and well-established online platform. This platform is made available to the local courts to use through the institutional power of the centre. Virtual hearing in China, thus, will not cause challenge in terms of public hearing.

4. Evidence

Although blockchain technology can prove the authenticity of digital evidence, many original evidence exists offline. The parties need to upload an electronic copy of those evidence through the “Exchange evidence and cross-examination” session of the smart court platform, and other parties can raise queries and challenges. During trial, the litigation parties display the original evidence to the court and other parties through the video camera. If the court and other parties raise no challenge during the pre-trial online cross-examination stage and in the hearing, the evidence may be admitted. It, of course, raises issues of credibility, because electronic copy may be tempered with and the image displayed by video may not be clear and cannot be touched, smelled and felt for a proper evaluation. Courts may adopt other measures to tackle this problem. For example, some courts may require original evidence to be posted to the court if the court and other parties are not satisfied of the distance examination of evidence. Other courts may organise offline cross-examination of the evidence by convening a pre-trial meeting. However, in doing so, the value of the online trial will be reduced, making the trial process lengthier and more inefficient.

The practical difficulty also exists in witness sequestration. Article 74 of the “Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Litigations” provides witnesses in civil proceedings shall not be in court during other witnesses’ testimony, so they cannot hear what other witnesses say.[11] This is a measure to prevent fabrication, collusion, contamination and inaccuracy. However, in virtual hearings, it is difficult for judges to completely avoid witnesses from listening to other witnesses’ testimony online.

 

 

[1] Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Registration and Filling of Cases, Fa Shi [2015] No8, Art 14.

[2] The SPC Interpretation of the Application of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, Art 295.

[3] Notice of the SPC about Strengthening and Regulating Online Litigation during the Prevention and Controlling of the Covid-19 Pandemic, Fa [2020] 49, Art 1.

[4] The Supreme People’s Court issued the sixth of ten typical cases of national maritime trials in 2020: BOABARGESAS v Nanjing Yichun Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Ship.

[5] SPC, Online Litigation Regulations for the People’s Court, Fa Shi [2021] No 12.

[6] Art 2.

[7] Art 2(2).

[8] Art 4.

[10] Art 27.

[11] Fa Shi [2019] 19.

In Silverman v Ryanair DAC (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB), claimant was injured whilst going down stairs at an airport terminal in England. The claim is subject to EU private international law. Jurisdiction for the English courts in this personal injury claim is not disputed.

Under A5 Rome I, contracts for carriage of goods are subject to the ordinary lex voluntatis rule, while for carriage of passengers, parties can only choose from a limited selection of leges contractus. The standard approach is for  general terms and conditions to select the law of the carrier’s habitual residence or his place of central administration, which is entirely kosher under Rome I. Unless the booking qualifies as package travel, it essentially means that passengers are generally less protected than ordinary consumers under A6 Rome I.

In the case of Ryanair, the default choice inevitably leads to Irish law, except in this case (because Irish law would lead to higher damages), the airline unusually seeks to divert from its default choice of law.  The airline’s relevant clause, reads

8.2.4: Governing Law: “Except as otherwise provided by the Convention or applicable law, your contract of carriage with us, these Terms and Conditions of Carriage and our Regulations shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Ireland and any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Irish Courts.”

The Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air 1999 is unaffected by Rome I as a result of the Regulation’s A25, which gives clear priority to multilateral Conventions at least if the Convention concerned also includes non-EU Member States. The Convention also operates to make the choice of court provision invalid, as discussed ia in CJEU  C-213/18 Adriano Guaitoli et al v Easyjet.

Claimant however argues that assessment of quantum of damages is not regulated by Montreal and therefore remains subject to the lex voluntatis. This is where the second line of Ryanair’s defence comes in, namely an attempt to qualify the claim as one in tort, subject to Rome II’s lex loci damni rule, rather than Rome I’s lex voluntatis.

In essence therefore the question is a matter of Treaty interpretation viz the Montreal Convention (what does it mean to regulate in its provisions on liability and damages), subsequently secondary EU law interpretation viz Rome I and II (qualification: is it a claim in contract or tort, and once that held, does the lex casuae indicated by the relevant Regulation, cover quantum of damages).

Master McCloud turns to international comparison not by way of binding authority but pro inspiratio seeing as the case concerns an international Convention [52]. Scalia J’s ‘Pass-through’ approach to the lex fori’s choice-of-law rules in Zicherman (1996) is the approach also followed in this judgment. The judge uses the formulation by Bader Ginsburg J in El Al Israel: that Warsaw drafters intended to resolve whether there is liability, but to leave to domestic law (the local law identified by the forum under its choice-of-law rules or approaches) determination of the compensatory damages available to the suitor.”

Comparative case-law analysis makes sense. However one would have thought a starting point should have been analysis of the Convention and its travaux itself. Master McCloud does get to that when considering the rather awkward , counsel-inspired idea that there needs to be a discussion of the law that applies to the interpretation of the Convention. Determining the ‘Applicable law to matters of interpretation of the Convention’ might perhaps make sense in a dualist jurisdiction like the UK?

At [59] the judge holds the lex causae for interpretation of the Convention is the lex fori, English law therefore. At [61] he calls this

Convention law as understood by this court, ie the lex fori in that rather special international sense.’

Here I am lost.

The judge then employs the ‘natural language’ approach to determine what parts of the Montreal liability scheme parties can and cannot contractually be negotiated away.

Only the liability issues that have ‘passed through’ to the lex fori are then considered with a view to determining the qualification exercise: is the claim one in contract or one on tort. The judge raises the possibility that the claimant could have construed the claim as being a ‘Convention claim incorporated in the contract’ [64] however he holds that claim is not brought on that footing:

‘the Claim and Particulars are clear: they plead a claim for damages for breach of the Convention, they do not plead a claim in the law of contract’ [64].

That, I would submit, is wrong. The claim is subject to European conflict of laws rules. These require the judge to qualify the claim subject to the autonomous interpretation of ‘contract’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’ as most recently discussed by the CJEU in Wikingerhof. While I am the first to acknowledge claim formulation is a powerful tool to manage qualification (indeed Wikingerhof confirms as much), I do not think deference to claimant may be as large as suggested here.

The judge proceeds with the non-contractual nature (causing injury to the claimant through negligence [65]), points out that the Convention covers both contractual and non-contractual claims [66] and seeks support in his analysis on tort and contract in Prof. Thomas Kadner Graziano’s 2016 paper in the Yearbook of Private International Law. With respect, I do not think Thomas’ paper supports the conclusions in this case.

At [72][73] the judge then rather summarily and using A4(3) Rome II displaces the lex loci damni for the ‘passed through’ claim, in favour of Irish law, the lex contractus to the contract of carriage. Once the Rome II path chosen (of which, per above, I am not convinced), I do not think the lex loci damni may be pushed aside quite as concisely as this.

The relationship between international Conventions and European conflicts rules is not always straightforward. Yet here I think it has been presented a touch too convolutedly.

Geert.

Silverman v #Ryanair (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB)
Aviation law, whether airline can disapply its own choice of law & how #Montreal Convention interacts with the choice of law rules of the Forum, here: Rome I and II (and A4(3) escape clause for the latter https://t.co/EWJ7njH5ED

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 12, 2021