Agrégateur de flux

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑595/20 (UE v ShareWood Switzerland AG, VF), which is about Rome I :

« Article 6(4)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) must be interpreted as meaning that a contract of sale, including a lease agreement and a service agreement, relating to trees planted on leased land for the sole purpose of being harvested for profit, does not constitute a ‘contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253728&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334998

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑522/20 (OE v VY), which is about Article 18 TFEU and Brussels II bis :

« The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of [Brussels II bis] is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253726&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334783

The Internationaal Juridisch Instituut in The Hague, an institute providing legal opinions on private international law and foreign law,  is recruiting a senior legal counsel. The candidate will work in the fields of international family law and international succession law. They must be fluent in Dutch and English, and have a good working knowledge of German; additional language skills appreciated).

On 2 and 3 March 2022, the INSOL Europe Academic Forum’s (IEAF) annual conference takes place in Dublin (Ireland). The IEAF is looking forward to meet again in person for the first time in two years. The overall theme of the academic conference will be: “The Emerging New Landscape of European Restructuring and Insolvency”.

The legal development have not stopped with the pandemic, in fact it has set in motion many new developments. The programme will touch upon this by discussing among others:

1. Current developments in corporate preventive restructuring,
2. Fresh start and other topics related to individual debtors,
3. Design issues in restructuring and insolvency law, and
4. Cross-border and EU law restructuring and insolvency.

Programme and registration details

For an overview of the speakers and further details on the programme, please find the conference brochure here.

To conference will be in person in Dublin on 2 and 3 March 2022. To register for this academic conference, please click here: https://www.insol-europe.org/academic-forum-events

Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg) and Sara Migliorini (University of Macau) have published a commentary in French on Regulation 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO).

The book offers a comprehensive article per article commentary of the EAPO Regulation with a focus on its implementation and operation in the three French speaking Members States of the EU, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Some aspects of the implementation of the Regulation are addressed by implementing legislation, which the book reproduces and discusses.

On certain issues, the implementation of the Regulation has varied a great deal in these three countries (and more widely in the EU).

An interesting example is the information gathering remedy which Article 14 of the EAPO Regulation requires all Member States to establish. Each Member State is meant to offer a procedure for finding information on bank accounts that the debtor might hold in the relevant Member State. France already had such procedure that it simply made applicable in the context of the EAPO Regulation. In contrast, no such procedure existed in Luxembourg and Belgium. Luxembourg established one for the purpose of the Regulation. So did Belgium, but it did not limit the scope of the said procedure to request made under Article 14 and has introduced a new remedy in Belgian law available outside the scope of the EAPO Regulation.

More information on the book can be found here. The table of contents is available here.

The EU Commission’s Proposal of 1 December 2021 outlines, in its introductory Recitals:

“Efficient cross-border judicial cooperation requires secure, reliable and time-efficient communication between courts and competent authorities. Moreover, this cooperation should be carried out in a way that does not create a disproportionate administrative burden and is resilient to force majeure circumstances. These considerations are equally important for individuals and legal entities, as getting effective access to justice in a reasonable time is a crucial aspect of the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).

To protect their rights, both individuals and legal entities should be able to rely on effective remedies. Mere access to judicial authorities does not automatically constitute effective access to justice. For this reason, it is important to find ways to facilitate the conduct of procedures and reduce practical difficulties as much as possible. Individuals and legal entities should be able to exercise their rights and comply with their obligations in a swift, cost-efficient and transparent way.

At EU level, there exists a comprehensive set of instruments designed to enhance judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases. Many of these govern the communication between authorities, including in certain cases with the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, and between authorities and individuals or legal entities. However, most instruments do not provide for engaging in such communication through digital means. Even where they do, other gaps may exist, such as a lack of secure and reliable digital communication channels or non?recognition of electronic documents, signatures and seals. This deprives judicial cooperation and access to justice of using the most efficient, secure and reliable channels of communication available.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that force majeure events may severely affect the normal functioning of Member States’ justice systems. During the crisis, in many cases national courts have been unable to maintain normal operations due to the spread of the virus. Member States were forced to take a number of measures ranging from full lockdowns to treating certain priority cases only. At the same time, the use of digital technologies (e.g. email, videoconference, etc.) helped to limit disruption. However, many of the technical solutions employed were developed in an ad hoc manner, and did not necessarily satisfy security and fundamental rights standards to the full. Judicial cooperation and access to justice in EU cross-border cases have been similarly affected, and the COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the need to ensure the resilience of communication.

Against this background, the rules on digitalisation set out in this proposal aim at improving access to justice and the efficiency and resilience of the communication flows inherent to the cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities in EU cross-border cases.”

The Commission further summarises its important Proposal as follows (copied from here):

“1. Digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation

What are the main elements of the proposal?

This initiative aims to modernise EU cross-border judicial cooperation:

• It proposes digitalising communication between judicial and other authorities in cross-border judicial cooperation procedures in civil (including family), commercial and criminal matters.
• In addition, it gives individuals and businesses the option to communicate with judicial and other authorities through electronic means in cross-border cases.
• It will ensure electronic communication from individuals, businesses and legal practitioners are accepted, and have legal certainty – namely through the compulsory recognition of electronic signatures and seals and the legal admissibility of electronic documents.
• In cross-border cases, the proposal will make it possible to conduct oral hearings in civil and criminal procedures through videoconferencing.
• Parties to civil and commercial cases with cross-border implications will be able to pay court fees electronically.

How will this initiative improve the way in which authorities communicate?

The proposal establishes a dedicated and secure decentralised IT system. This system will be composed of the IT systems of the Member States and of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, which will be interconnected through interoperable access points (based on the e-CODEX system). Where Member States do not have existing national IT systems, they will have the choice to use, free of charge, a Commission-developed reference implementation solution.

Alternative means of communication between authorities will be allowed only in case of disruption of the system, or in other specific circumstances where the use of the decentralised IT system is not appropriate.

How will the proposal benefit individuals and businesses involved in EU cross-border judicial procedures?

To ensure smooth access to courts or other judicial authorities, individuals, businesses and legal practitioners will be able to use electronic means of communication to file claims and otherwise communicate with the authorities in EU cross-border civil law cases (for instance, under the European Small Claims procedure).

Where national IT portals for electronic communication in EU civil law matters exist, they can continue to be used. In parallel, the Commission will develop a European access point hosted on the European e-justice Portal. Each person will be able to log in, create an account and file all types of submissions, claims, requests, and standardised forms, both to national judicial authorities and to those of other Member States. The use of the European access point will be free of charge.

Individuals, businesses and legal practitioners will not be obliged to use electronic means of communication with courts and authorities, and may continue to use paper or other types of traditional communication.

What will the cost for Member States for implementing the IT systems be?

Member States will have to bear the cost related to the decentralised IT system. The Commission will provide funding opportunities to support Member States in setting up the necessary infrastructure, if needed.

The Commission expects that the “access points” of the decentralised IT system will be based on e-CODEX that can be used free of charge. However, national IT systems need to be developed so that they may be connected through e-CODEX.

The Commission will finance creation, maintenance and future development of a software, which Member States may decide to use instead of developing national IT systems.

How will personal data be protected?

The digitalisation of existing data exchanges will not introduce any new personal data categories compared to what is already exchanged today, nor will it affect the existing data processing arrangements.

The security of personal data processing is essential to protect data subjects. e-CODEX was designed specifically for the justice area, and uses encryption to ensure security. Using e-CODEX for cross-border exchanges will increase security and thereby mitigate the risk of security breaches. e-CODEX is therefore clearly an improvement compared to present exchanges using paper or unsecure e-mails.

2. Digital information in cross-border terrorism cases

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris 2015, the necessity to identify links between and coordinate cross-border terrorist investigations and prosecutions early on became evident. Learning from this experience, Eurojust established the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register to reinforce the judicial response in Member States to terrorist threats and to improve security for citizens.

However, the data processing environment at Eurojust is outdated and exchange of information with national competent authorities is not structurally digitalised. This makes information exchange cumbersome, leading to suboptimal results in the exchange of information.

What are the main elements of the proposal?

• It will modernise Eurojust‘s information system. It will integrate in it the European Judicial Counter Terrorism Register and its functionalities, in order to improve the capacities of link identification.
• It will set-up secure digital communication channels between national authorities and Eurojust.
• It will introduce a digital communication tool to facilitate digital exchange of structured data and to automate processes.
• It will introduce a clear legal basis in the Eurojust Regulation for cooperation with non-EU liaison prosecutors.

What exactly is the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register?

The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register is a unique EU-wide database for judicial proceedings relating to terrorist offences. The authorities of the Member States provide information on these cases to Eurojust where it is cross-checked with information on other cases relating to terrorism, but also relating to other cases of serious crime.

Once a potential link – such as the same or similar name of a suspect – is established, the National Members at Eurojust follow up to see if this potential link can be validated. Once it is clear that a link exists, Eurojust informs the national authorities involved in the case. Eurojust also provides further support to such investigations.

How will the proposal improve the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register?

Digitalising data exchange will enable national authorities to send more information to Eurojust. It will be quick and secure. At Eurojust, the new information management system will identify many links automatically and require much less manual intervention to identify links.

Thereby Eurojust will be able to give faster and better feedback to national authorities and support them in the follow-up. This will enable the national authorities to have a better understanding of the full extent of the criminal activities, to prosecute terrorist offences and serious cross-border crimes more efficiently and not stop the investigations at their own Member State’s borders.

How will the proposal benefit the general public?

The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register and the follow-up through judicial cooperation in criminal matters is essential to effectively combat terrorism and thus ensure security of citizens across the EU. The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register may also contribute to respecting fundamental rights; the communication and cooperation of national judicial authorities may reveal links between cases and therefore prevent multiple prosecutions and convictions of transnational crimes. Thus, it will ensure the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence (Article 50 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).

3. Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) collaboration platform

Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) are set up by two or more States for specific criminal investigations with a cross border impact and for a limited period of time. This framework allows the competent judicial and law enforcement authorities involved to organise and coordinate their actions jointly and investigate efficiently even in very complex cases such as organised crime activities not bound by any borders.

Although JITs have proven to be one of the most successful tools for cross-border investigations and prosecutions in the EU, practice shows they have been facing several technical difficulties preventing them from gaining the highest possible efficiency. The main difficulties concern secure electronic exchange of information and evidence (including large files), secure electronic communication with other JIT members and JIT participants, such as Eurojust, Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), as well as a joint daily management of a JIT.

The JIT collaboration platform will solve these problems and deliver the technical support that has been missing so far.

What are the main elements of the proposal?

• Establish a Joint Investigation Teams collaboration platform – The platform will be a highly secure online collaboration tool aiming to facilitate exchanges and cooperation within JITs throughout their duration.
• Provide technological support to those involved in JITs to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border investigations and prosecutions conducted by them.
• Ensure that those involved in JITs can more easily share information and evidence collected in the course of the JIT activities, by enabling them to more easily and more safely communicate with each other, and by facilitating the joint daily management of a JIT.

What will the key functionalities of the platform be?

• Allow secure non-traceable communication to be stored locally on the devices of the users, including a communication tool offering an instant messaging system, a chat feature, audio/video-conferencing and a functionality replacing regular emails.
• Allow the exchange of operational information and evidence, including large files, through an upload/download system designed to store the data centrally only for a limited period of time necessary for a technical transfer of the data. As soon as all addresses downloaded the data, the data will be automatically deleted from the platform.
• Allow evidence traceability – an advanced logging mechanism allowing to keep a trace of who did what and when regarding all evidence exchanged through the platform, and, consequently, supporting the need to ensure admissibility of evidence in front of a court.

What will the cost of the platform be?

The Regulation establishing the platform is envisaged to incur the following costs:

• Development of the platform – the one-off cost incurred for eu-LISA – around €10 million.
• Technical maintenance and operation of the platform – the recurring cost incurred for eu-LISA – around €3 million per year.

For Member States, no technical costs are considered because the centralised component of the platform is web-based. It will not require any adaptions of the national technical infrastructure. The same pertains to the communication software, which will simply need to be downloaded on each device of the JIT platform’s users. Access to the platform for the competent Union bodies, offices and agencies, such as Eurojust, Europol the EPPO and OLAF, will be driven by the same principles and will not incur any costs.

How will personal data be protected?

The platform itself will not change nor will the underlying legal frameworks for conducting a JIT and as such the already existing obligation of Member States to comply with data protection rules for the exchange of personal data. The platform is a secure and reliable technical addition to allow for a better, swifter and safer way of conducting these communications and exchanges. Additionally, the JIT collaboration platform will fully comply with the EU data legislation.”

Under the title IPR für eine bessere Welt: Vision – Realität – Irrweg?, the volume published by Mohr Siebeck contains the contributions to the Third German-Speaking Conference for Young Scholars in PIL, which took place virtually on 18 and 19 March 2021 at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg.

Angelika Nussberger’s keynote paper on the role of the European Convention on Human Rights vis-à-vis Private International Law is followed by up by nine contributions (one of which in English) by younger scholars engaging with different aspects of the conference theme, such as the extraterritoriality of data protection law, corporate liability for human-rights violations, the potential of uniform law fo further sustainability or the unilateralist approach of EU PIL to cases involving non-EU member states. The volume also includes the papers from, and a transcript of, the (English) panel discussion between Ralf Michaels, Roxana Banu, and Hans van Loon.

The table of contents is available on the publisher’s website.

Today, in the case of OE ./. VY, C-522/20 (no Opinion was delivered in these proceedings), the ECJ decided on a fundamental point: whether nationality as a (supplemental) connecting factor for jurisdiction according to Article 3 lit. a indent 6 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2201/2003) concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility is in conformity with the principal prohibition of discrimination against nationality in the primary law of the European Union (Art. 18 TFEU).

Article 18 TFEU reads: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. …”.

Art. 3 lit. a Brussels IIbis Regulation reads: “In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction shall lie with with the courts of the Member State:”; indent 5 reads: “in whose territory the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made, or”, according to indent 6: “the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State in question …”.

The case emerged from a request in proceedings between OE and his wife, VY, concerning an application for dissolution of their marriage brought before the Austrian courts (paras. 9 et seq.):

“On 9 November 2011, OE, an Italian national, and VY, a German national, were married in Dublin (Ireland). According to the information provided by the referring court, OE left the habitual residence the couple shared in Ireland in May 2018 and has lived in Austria since August 2019. On 28 February 2020, that is, after residing in Austria for more than six months, OE applied to the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling, Austria) for the dissolution of his marriage with VY. OE submits that a national of a Member State other than the State of the forum is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of that latter State under the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003, on the basis of observance of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, after having resided in the territory of that latter State for only six months immediately before making the application for divorce, which is tantamount to disregarding the application of the fifth indent of that provision, which requires a period of residence of at least a year immediately before the application for divorce is made. By order of 20 April 2020, the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling) dismissed OE’s application, taking the view that it lacked jurisdiction to hear it. According to that court, the distinction made on the basis of nationality in the fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 is intended to prevent the applicant from forum shopping. By order of 29 June 2020, the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna, Austria), hearing the case on appeal, upheld the order of the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling). OE brought an appeal on a point of law against that order before the referring court, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria).”

The Court reiterated, inter alia, that (paras. 18 et seq.) the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment require that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way, “unless such treatment is objectively justified”, further that the comparability of different situations must be assessed having regard to all the elements which characterise them, and thirdly that the (EU) legislature has a broad discretion in this respect. “Thus, only if a measure adopted in this field is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objectives which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue can the lawfulness of such a measure be affected”.

Against this background the Court held (paras 25 et seq.) that, first, Article 3 meets “the need for rules that address the specific requirements of conflicts relating to the dissolution of matrimonial ties”, secondly that while the first to fourth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation expressly refer to the habitual residence of the spouses and of the respondent as criteria, the fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) permit the application of the jurisdiction rules of the forum actoris, and thirdly that “it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the rules on jurisdiction laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 2201/2003, including those laid down in the fifth and sixth indents of paragraph 1(a) of that article, seek to ensure a balance between, on the one hand, the mobility of individuals within the European Union, in particular by protecting the rights of the spouse who, after the marriage has broken down, has left the Member State where the couple had their shared residence and, on the other hand, legal certainty, in particular that of the other spouse, by ensuring that there is a real link between the applicant and the Member State whose courts have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the dissolution of the matrimonial ties concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2016, Mikolajczyk, C-294/15, EU:C:2016:772, paragraphs 33, 49 and 50, and of 25 November 2021, IB (Habitual residence of a spouse – Divorce), C-289/20, EU:C:2021:955, paragraphs 35, 44 and 56).“ And the fact that typically there is such a real link if there is nationality sufficed to justify distinguishing between indent 5 and indent 6, all the more as this cannot be a surprise to the other spouse.

Therefore the Court came to the conclusion:

“The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State.”

The most important take away seems to be that PIL legislation using nationality as a supplemental connnecting factor is still in conformity with Article 18 TFEU as long as it appears “not manifestly inappropriate” (para. 36). Therefore, and reconnecting to older case law (para. 39), legislation is still valid “with regard to a criterion based on the nationality of the person concerned, … although in borderline cases occasional problems must arise from the introduction of any general and abstract system of rules” so that “there are no grounds for taking exception to the fact that the EU legislature has resorted to categorisation, provided that it is not in essence discriminatory having regard to the objective which it pursues (see, by analogy, judgments of 16 October 1980, Hochstrass v Court of Justice, 147/79, EU:C:1980:238, paragraph 14, and of 15 April 2010, Gualtieri v Commission, C-485/08 P, EU:C:2010:188, paragraph 81).”

 

OE (Résidence habituelle d’un époux - Critère de nationalité)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La durée de résidence requise pour que les juridictions d’un État membre exercent leur compétence pour statuer sur une demande en divorce peut valablement dépendre de la nationalité du demandeur

HR Rail
SOPO
Un travailleur handicapé, y compris celui qui accomplit un stage dans le cadre de son recrutement, et déclaré inapte à exercer les fonctions essentielles du poste qu’il occupe peut bénéficier d’une affectation à un autre poste pour lequel il dispose des compétences, des capacités et des disponibilités requises

by José Antonio Briceño Laborí, Professor of Private International Law at the Universidad Central de Venezuela and Universidad Católica Andrés Bello

To celebrate the 25th anniversary of its launching, the Master’s Program in Private International Law and Comparative Law is inviting all authors that would like to publish a paper in the fourth edition of its Yearbook.

The central topic of this edition is “Private International Law in Action” (“Derecho Internacional Privado en Acción”). Therefore, all papers should focus on the analysis or commentary of the practice of Private International Law, both in judicial and arbitral venues.

All those interested must send their papers to the following email address: cmadridmartinez@yahoo.es. The deadline for receiving the papers is March 30, 2022. All papers must comply with our editorial and publishing guidelines, which are available on our website: https://bit.ly/30cqnvl.

Finally, we invite all those interested in the developments of Private International Law in Venezuela to follow us on our social networks: Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and Linkedin, as well as to visit our YouTube channel where we have available more than 20 conferences from our “Master Classes” and “Jurisprudential Dialogue” cycles.

 

Impartiality is key to any kind of production of justice and probably one of the very few principles of “justice” recognized universally, see e.g. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Chapter 5: “Impartiality and Objectivity”, pp. 114 et seq. with references also to non-Western traditions, see also e.g. Leviticus 19:15 (New International Version): “Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly.”; see also e.g. IBA Rules of Ethics, rule 1: “Arbitrators shall … remain free from bias”. Thus, there cannot be put enough emphasis and thought on how to implement this command, for acting arbitrators as well as parties and reviewing state courts, when they ask themselves in countless greyish constellations how to behave or judge in order to avoid even the slightest perception of bias but also to abstain from unproductive “due process paranoia”. The PhD thesis by Angoura, supervised by Burkhard Hess and published in the Luxembourg Max Planck Institute’s series “Successful Dispute Resolution”, offers solid information and thorough analysis on a comparative basis – highly recommended.

Francesco Parisi (Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, Law School and a Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna), Daniel Pi (Assistant Professor at University of Maine School of Law) and Alice Guerra (Assistant Professor at the University of Bologna) wrote an interesting article using a law and economics approach to compare access to evidence in the US and EU. The article, entitled Access to Evidence in Private International Law, is forthcoming in 2022 in volume 23 of Theoretical Inquiries in Law.

The authors focus their analysis on how a misalignment of the burden of proof and evidentiary rules can frustrate the production of evidence and undermine care incentives when these are applied cross-border tort cases.

The abstract reads as follows:

This Article analyzes the interaction between the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery rules. Both sets of rules can affect incentives for prospective injurers to invest in evidence technology (i.e., ex ante investments that increase the quantity and quality of evidence in case an accident occurs). This interaction becomes acutely important in the private international law setting, where jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be treated as a substantive or procedural matter. When a tort occurs in Europe, but the case is litigated in American courts, treating the burden of proof as a procedural matter preserves the complementarity of incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules. Conversely, treating the burden of proof as a substantive matter creates a mismatch in incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules.

The article is structured in three parts. The first part of the article provides a theoretical insight into the interaction of presumptions and discovery rules using an economic approach. The second part offers a short overview of the way American and European law deal with the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery. In the third part the authors discuss how dissonant incentives can arise when tort cases are adjudicated in American courts using European legal rules. The various case law of American jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be regarded as substantive or procedural. The authors ultimately suggest that the US should treat presumption of negligence as a procedural rule to promote efficient incentives. They conclude that such a rule counterintuitively results in better outcomes in cases of private international law tort cases where, with a proper alignment of presumptions and discoverability rules, defendants would face incentives to invest in evidence technology even when knowing that the evidence could be used against them.

La France préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne pour six mois. À cette occasion, la Délégation des barreaux de France et Lefebvre Dalloz s’associent pour vous proposer ce podcast dont la vocation est de sensibiliser sur les travaux et les actions conduites dans le domaine de la justice au plan européen.

en lire plus

Sped-Pro / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission rejetant une plainte à l’encontre de PKP Cargo, société contrôlée par l’État polonais, pour un prétendu abus de sa position dominante sur le marché des services de transport ferroviaire de marchandises en Pologne

Jean-Sylvestre Bergé who is a law professor at Université Côte d’Azur (CNRS GREDEG) and a former member of the Institut Universitaire de France has recently published a new open access essay titled Rethinking Flow Beyond Control – An Outreach Legal Essay (ed. DICE, coll. Confluence des droits collection, 2021, 154 p., already announced here).

This work is the continuum of his previous legal essay titled “Situations in Motion and The Law – A Pragmatic Epistemology” (Les situations en mouvement et le droit – Essai d’une épistémologie pragmatique, Dalloz, 2021, announced here) which examines a number of legal constructs in national, international or European contexts and the way they respond each time they are faced with “situations in motion”. As explained by the author, “it was an attempt at deconstruction and reconstruction with the aim of offering a series of tools that could improve our understanding of both ordinary and complex circulation phenomena”.

Since the very inspiring work of Jean-Sylvestre Bergé is about circulation across territories, following a global approach, I have interviewed Jean-Sylvestre to know more about his new essay from a private international law perspective.

 — Can you share with us the central idea of your work? 

First of all, I would like to make it clear that this book is written for a wide audience, not just lawyers, and writing it in English allows me to capture all the exchanges I had during its preparation and now to share them as widely as possible.

The book is divided in two parts.

The first part is an epistemological analysis of circulation and law through the lens of circulation. The approach is therefore different from the one traditionally chosen, particularly by private international law scholars, who study the “law of circulation” (e.g. legal aspects of movement of goods or persons). I reverse the perspective: how does the phenomenon of circulation question the constructions of law and in particular those of private international law?

For example, when we study the cross-border circulation of judgments or civil status documents, there is a disciplinary pre-understanding. The analysis is made under the rules and methods of the subject. The book proposes to “decompartmentalize” knowledge and analysis, by taking various examples in several disciplinary fields.

The second part of the book aims at characterising circulation and pushing it to a point of paroxysm: this is the figure of “rupture” that I call the “total loss of control in circulation”. I think about flows produced by all of us in the everyday life and the loss of control of the stakeholders, such as a family, a company or even the whole world. This figure of loss of control is interesting because it is a “clash of the titans” with the law. Law is dominated by the control of situations and, for my part, I work on the loss of control of flows. This is not an unknown object of study, but lawyers find it difficult to accept! Think of the nuclear risk and its legal treatment. Control is certainly not total…

 — If we take the example of cross-border circulation of civil status documents, when do we reach a situation of “loss of control”? Can private international law regulate the situation “beyond control”?

Let’s take the specific case of children born of surrogate motherhood abroad (where it is legal), and then the request for transcription of the child’s birth certificate in the country where the parents live and which prohibits this method of procreation, such as France. In this context, the core issue could be the circulation of the child. There are mechanisms that allow for the circulation of the child; consequently, this infers all subsequent constructions, including those of private international law, which deal with and regulate the circulation of civil status records of these children born of surrogate motherhood.

In France, this circulation was liberated by the “Taubira” circular concerning travel documents allowing the child to leave his/her State of birth for France, even though surrogate motherhood is prohibited in France. If we want to fight surrogate motherhood (from the point of view of its opponents), we must attack the circulation, block it, prohibit it… Can we ban these children from circulation and how can we do it? There is a “reading template” to respect, starting with the respect of the fundamental rights of the child with regard to circulation or non-circulation.

This is another way of considering this topic, renewing the usual debate on the prohibition (or not) of this mode of procreation and the cross-border “recognition” of the parent-child relationship; it is the prism of circulation beyond control, following an epistemological approach of private international law.

 — What is the main contribution of your work to private international law theory and practice?

The book invites us to revisit the legal acquis (including private international law acquis) by using the language of an epistemology of circulation and of a total loss of control, such as internationality, extraneity, mobility or relocation (see the index of the book). There are well-known concepts in private international law that could allow the issue of circulation to be brought back to the center of the proposed analysis. For example, in France, the “Matter doctrine” according to which a contract is international if it involves the interests of international trade through the ebb and flow of financial values across borders.  In my opinion, this doctrine is not sufficient to consider that the issue of the international dimension of a situation is settled. It has not provided for a conceptual framework for circulation phenomena under private international law. It can usefully be rethought through the concept of flow in the context of situations in motion.

To this end, I propose new notions, such as a distinction between cases in which the law tackles situations in motion from a “consequential perspective” (i.e. looking at its causes and effects) or “in and of itself” (i.e. from end to end). This distinction is very interesting because it allows to study mechanisms of private international law to see whether they deal with mobility from beginning to end or, on the contrary, whether they only deal with its causes or effects. It is often the latter answer that prevails because it is the easiest way for the law in general. Let us think of the expulsion of an individual from a territory: it is a question of apprehending an incoming flow. There is a legal apparatus that deals with the issue only by its causes or effects in this case.

In contrast, the law can grasp the movement in its entirety, from start to finish: this is the case in extradition conventions, in the mechanism of the European arrest warrant, or in private international law of the legal regime for the return of illegally displaced children, in the Hague Convention on international child abduction. This text puts in place a very sophisticated mechanism based on a very high level of cooperation between public authorities, which makes it possible to apprehend the circulation and return of the child with immediate effect.

In this contrasting context, the question is which path the law chooses to take in its legal treatment of circulation? This is a legal policy choice with varying levels of construction. End-to-end mechanisms are fragile, often held in check and more complex to set up and implement because they require an understanding across territories of the complete mechanisms. The treatment of the subject by its causes or effects is easier, the law knows how to “receive” or “send” a situation in motion. It is a much more unilateral rationale and, whatever one may say, unilateralism is a key-component of private international law…

 — The book also develops a “modal analysis of circulations”, distinguishing between the forms of circulations that lead to different legal regimes.

Yes, this approach is well-known in transport law: depending on the type of transport by air, sea or road, there are adapted legal regimes. We can use this rationale to analyse some mechanisms of private international law.

For example, circulation in law is consubstantial with its subject. In private international law, is the person consubstantial with its object? People should be allowed to circulate without losing their status. This question has already been examined but the analysis can be renewed. We know that we cannot let everyone circulate freely. So as soon as we deal with movement, it is because we have the right to control it; if we deal with controlling movement, it is because movement is not free. In law, we do not talk about movement when it is free; if the law talks about it, it is because it controls it. Hence my counterpoint: loss of control!

 — The book proposes another concept, which could be very useful for international lawyers, that of the “normative space of flows”. Can you tell us more about it?

I start from the idea that it is the flow that designates the perimeter of actors in a field with cross-border implications, and brings them into contact (e.g. a buyer and a seller in an international contract). This flow is composed of a set of factual and legal data. Sometimes, this can give rise to collateral damage that is difficult to grasp and that draws new, global perspectives. In this context, my theoretical proposal is to say that the flow creates its own space and that this space is capable of producing its own law.

For example, a transatlantic air flight is a normative space of flow; it should be possible to study it as the ephemeral constitution of a legal order that federates around its object the movement of the plane from Paris to Toronto, a set of rules of private law, public law, soft law, hard law, requirements on corporate social responsibility, etc… All these rules have the flow as their object. If I put the flow back at the center of the legal order, I redraw the relationships between the legal norms at the start of the flow.

There are a large number of possible examples.

To return to the example of surrogate motherhood in an international context, the circulation of the child is a normative space of flows that disrupts the classic legal framework for understanding this phenomenon.

 — In this normative space of flows, where does control lie? Is the circulation always “beyond control”?

It depends! Circulation can be under control or beyond control for the law in a normative space of flows. In the hypothesis of a plane accident, its legal treatment can be analysed through the normative space of flows but the law will have difficulty in regaining control of the situation, given the complexity of the cross-border legal treatment of the situation (i.e. compensation for material and physical damage, search for the responsibilities of the parties involved, etc.).

The problem is that there is no “meta rule” of private international law to seize one single court with a unique applicable law at the global level. In the example of an air crash, there is inevitably a scattering of the procedure with victims who are culturally different, the evidence is spread over several territories, the area of the accident may even be a-national (on the high seas), etc.

Finally, we may wonder if the law – including private international law – is capable of dealing with the phenomenon of circulation. The answer is difficult. When it circulates, the answer is positive, but when the circulation is difficult or when there is no circulation at all, we wonder. This brings us to the limits of the legal treatment of situations in motion. Why is this so? Because the flow cannot produce its own normative space.

 — What about EU private international law? In what way does the unification of PIL rules in the European area contribute to the discourse on situations in motion and its legal treatment?

The European system of private international law is a normative space of flows. This may seem obvious, but it is no small thing to say! It is a legal system that modifies the reference system of private international law. This is huge! It was originally the (national) forum and sometimes we looked a little at the lex causae, but that remained rare. And now we have a supranational construction that anchors a space that is not a territory as a point of reference. This changes everything: it is a normative space of flows like a national forum.

In this context, the book proposes that lawyers and lawmakers take the flow as the object of normative construction. This could perhaps make it possible to overcome certain failures of the law to embrace situations in motion. But there is strong resistance because each legal order wants to keep its perimeter, its control and deal with the situation alone, even if it goes beyond its borders…

 

In conclusion, I would like to thank Jean-Sylvestre for this fascinating analysis of situations in motion, based on the concept of flow, and this invitation for lawyers, including experts in private international law, to rethink the “applicable law” (i.e. from its conception to its implementation).

The CJEU held (first Chamber, which includes the  CJEU President Koen Lenaerts) in C‑499/18 P Bayer Crop Science v European Commission a few months back. Here at GAVCLaw the judgment was firmly on our minds – but my analysis not yet put to paper.

The case centres around the legality of the conditions imposed by the EU for the approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid (these are neonicotinoids), and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active substances. The act challenged by Bayer is Commission Implementing Regulation 485/2013 and the justification for the measures are the documented losses of honeybee colonies as a result of the use of the substances.

The application follows a tried and tested path of applicants in the chemical and related sectors. Firstly and preferably, find some holes in the (often extensive) documentary trail of preparatory and advisory paperwork relied upon by the Institutions in their measure, and claim these devastate the legality of the eventual measure. A typical example would be ‘the studies relied upon reported testing of the substances on small ponies while the eventual regulation cites concerns for both small and medium-sized ponies’. Secondly, try and tempt the CJEU into finding fault with the application of core principles of EU law (such as subsidiarity, proportionality, ultra vires, attributed powers etc) and /or EU sectoral policy (such as in particular the precautionary principle), or confuse the Court with at best esoteric but usually sophistic discussions on eg ‘new and scientific knowledge’.

The General Court had found against Bayer. Much of the appeal before the CJEU discusses the first type of arguments and, like the General Court, dismisses them.

On the suggested infringement of the precautionary principle, the Court first of all rejects that precaution cannot be relied upon until an ‘exhaustive’ scientific assessment is made: [81]: ‘an exhaustive risk assessment cannot be required in a situation where the precautionary principle is applied, which equates to a situation in which there is scientific uncertainty.’ The point is NOT that precaution does not engage with science. It does. That is also where its weakness may lie: it desperately speaks the language of data, science and numbers yet as the saying goes, “Data is like a spy – if you torture it long enough, it will tell you anything you want to know.” The point is rather (see eg [78]) that for one to have to wait for every single new potential sub-study into a sub-issue, would hand industry the golden ticket for delay tactics; [82] that studies are underway which may call into question the available scientific and technical data, is not an obstacle to application of the precautionary principle.

Bayer put essentially the same argument to the CJEU with slightly differing angles (eg suggesting that for already approved active substances, precaution must be applied to a higher threshold than for new to be approved substances) and the Court rejected them at each turn.

A good judgment.

Geert.

EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018, p.28 ff.

 

 

 

 

 

In a judgment of 23 November 2021, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the French provisions implementing the 1986 Agency Directive are not overriding mandatory provisions, and thus do not define French public policy.

It is hard to reconcile this judgment with the Ingmar case of the European Court of Justice.

Background

Swiss company Guess Europe entered into an agency contract with a French company to market its products in France. The agency contract provided for the application of Swiss law and, it seems, arbitration in Switzerland.

After the French agent did not meet its target, Guess terminated the contract without paying any indemnity for termination. It then initiated arbitration proceedings seeking, inter alia, that it did not owe anything under the agency contract. Guess partly prevailed: the arbitrator ordered Guess to pay certain commissions, but ruled that it did not owe anything else.

In parallel, the French agent initiated proceedings before French courts against the French subsidiary of Guess seeking payment of commissions and production of certain documents for the purpose of determining the amount of its indemnity after termination. The action was dismissed on an unknown ground. The parties debated whether Guess France could be characterised as principal before both fora, so it is possible that the agent lost on the ground that Guess France was not concerned with these claims.

Guess Europe obtained a declaration of enforceability of the arbitral award in France. The French agent appealed and argued that the award was contrary to French public policy.

Ingmar

The main argument of the French agent was obviously that the European Court of Justice held in Ingmar v. Eaton (C-381/98) that

Articles 17 and 18 of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, which guarantee certain rights to commercial agents after termination of agency contracts, must be applied where the commercial agent carried on his activity in a Member State although the principal is established in a non-member country and a clause of the contract stipulates that the contract is to be governed by the law of that country.

This strongly suggested that these provisions of the Agency Directive should be considered as overriding mandatory provisions by the Member States.

If so, it would also seem that these provisions should define the public policy of the Member States.

The Judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal

The Paris Court of Appeal, however, ruled that the French provisions implementing the Agency Directive (articles L. 134-1 et seq. of the French Commercial Code) do not define French international public policy. It held:

an internal mandatory rule, even if it is the result of the transposition of a European directive, the imperative nature of which has been recalled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, is only likely to come under the French concept of international public policy if, after having verified its applicability to the dispute, its disregard violates this concept, that is to say the set of rules and values whose disregard cannot be tolerated by the French legal order, even in international matters (§29).

The Court found, however, that the dispute fell within the scope of the Directive. But it then ruled that the purpose of the Directive is not to define the most essential values and principles which should trigger the public policy exception.

The Court ruled that the provisions of European Union law

even if they are described as mandatory, do not all pursue objectives aimed at guaranteeing essential principles or values whose disregard by the Member States cannot be tolerated in an international context (§ 39)

and that this was not the purpose of the aforementioned directive and its transposition, the objective of which

is essentially to harmonize and approximate the laws of the Member States with regard to the defence of the private interests of commercial agents without the protection of vital interests of those same Member States being at stake, or even if it is clear from such provisions that they are necessary for the implementation of a compelling policy of defending freedom of establishment or undistorted competition (§40).

Precedent

The Court of Appeal relied on two judgments of the Cour de cassation in support of its position. One is pretty unclear, but the other one had indeed ruled that the French implementing provision was a domestic mandatory rule and thus not an overriding mandatory provision.

The debate in this case, however, was not whether French law should be applied to displace the application of the law of a third State, but whether it should be applied to displace the application of German law.

Assessment

The Paris Court of Appeal certainly has a point. The reasons given by the ECJ to justify its decision show that its goal was not to assess whether the Directive serves the crucial interests of the Member States. Rather, the Court wanted to advance its own agenda of creating a single market, and used strategically private international law to that end.

This being said, there is a precedent, and it is binding on the Member States.

La Cour de cassation se prononce pour la première fois sur la possibilité ouverte aux époux par le règlement du 20 décembre 2010 de choisir, avant même que la décision de divorcer ne soit prise, la loi applicable à leur divorce et en particulier la loi du for.

en lire plus

In December 2021, the European Commission launched a public consultation on the cross-border protection of vulnerable adults. Feedback obtained will be used to assess the need for a legislative initiative in the area, as well as to inform possible EU measures.

As a result of the combined effects of an ageing population and the mobility of citizens, more and more vulnerable adults find themselves in cross-border situations. The existence of different rules between EU Member States, as well as judicial, administrative and language barriers may affect the continuity and effectiveness of their legal protection.

All interested parties (citizens, judges, court staff, legal practitioners, academic, officials, medical staff, social workers, etc.) are invited to submit responses by 29 March 2022 (midnight Brussels time). The short questionnaire is available in all EU languages at the following link: Civil judicial cooperation – EU-wide protection for vulnerable adults (europa.eu).

A call for evidence to share relevant experience in the area of cross-border protection of vulnerable adults is also open, with the same deadline of 29 March 2022 (midnight Brussels time). The call for evidence is available here: Civil judicial cooperation – EU-wide protection for vulnerable adults (europa.eu).