Agrégateur de flux

Irrecevabilité

Non lieu à renvoi

Liquidation judiciaire - Banque

The series of seminars are organised by the Ambrosio L. Gioja Research Institute of the University of Buenos Aires, the Center for Legal and Social Research of the National University of Córdoba (Argentina) and the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). The seminars will take place each Friday from 16 July to 27 August 2021 at 17:00 (Buenos Aires time) / 22:00 CEST time (Central European Summer Time).

The topics that will be discussed are very diverse, ranging from vaccination contracts to migration and Private International Law. The series of seminars will end on 27 August 2021 with a summary of the findings, coordinated by Candela Villegas and Luciana Scotti.

I am proud to announce that several AMEDIP members will be speaking at these seminars.

The seminars are free of charge but registration is required. Please click here to register.

Certificates of participation will be issued and certifications of approval will also be issued but only to those who prepare a final paper.

For more information, click here (Facebook page). The platform that will be used is Zoom. Any questions may be directed to seminario.gioja.cijs@gmail.com.

In Emerald Pasture Designated Activity Company & Ors v Cassini SAS & Anor [2021] EWHC 2010 (Ch) there is an interesting split between pre and post Brexit applicable EU rules, with BIa not engaged yet the EU insolvency rules firmly in the picture.

Claimants Emerald are lenders, and first defendant Cassini is the borrower, under a senior facilities agreement dated 28 March 2019 (the SFA). The SFA is governed by English law and has an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts. Cassini is subject a French ‘Sauvegarde’) opened on 22 September 2020. This is a form of debtor-in-possession safeguard proceeding for a company in financial difficulties that wishes to propose a restructuring plan to its creditors. Sauvegarde is included in the proceedings that are subject to the Recast European Insolvency Regulation 2015/848. Parties are seemingly in agreement that the EIR 2015 continues to apply in the UK in respect of the Sauvegarde, because it was commenced prior to 31 December 2020, Brexit date.

Cassini contest jurisdiction, arguing that the claim derives from and is closely linked to the Sauvegarde and thus falls within A6(1) EIR, the so-called vis attractiva concursus which reads

“The courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened in accordance with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked with them, such as avoidance actions.”

This Article is the result of CJEU case-law such as Gourdain , Seagon , German Graphics , F -Tex.

Zacaroli J unfortunately repeats the suggested dovetail between BIa and the EIR, referring to CJEU Nickel & Goeldner.

As the judge notes [24] the application of A6(1) has not been made easier by the CJEU blurring the distinction between the conditions – with reference to Bobek AG in NK v BNP Paribas Fortis NV (on the Peeters /Gatzen suit).

Emerald argue that the question is whether the action itself derives from the insolvency proceeding. They contend that since the action is for declaratory relief in respect of a contract, its source is the common rules of civil and commercial law. Cassini focus on the issue raised by the action. They contend that since the only matter in issue in the action is whether the rights to information under the SFA are overridden by the Sauvegarde – and the principles of French insolvency law that govern the Sauvegarde – the real matter in issue concerns the effects of the insolvency proceedings so that the action falls within A6(1).

The judge [45] after discussion and assessment of the authorities (incl   ING Bank NV v Banco Santander SA ) discussed by both parties, decides against vis attractiva concursus. He holds that the legal basis for the declarations sought remains the SFA, and thus the rules of civil and commercial law, notwithstanding that the only issue which the court would be required to determine is the impact of French insolvency law on the obligations under the SFA. The question which the declarations are designed to answer, it is held, is the enforceability of the contractual rights.

On that basis, the exclusive choice of court clause grants E&W courts jurisdiction, under English common law (as it would have done under BIa, given the judge’s finding on vis attractiva).

If the claim goes ahead (one images appeal may be sought), the French insolvency proceedings will not have lost their relevance. Cassini argue on that issue [12 ff] that since the characteristic performance of the SFA is the loan of funds, which has already occurred, the SFA is not a “current contract” and as a result of French law, is no longer enforceable. Only the underlying debt subsists, they argue, which must be paid by way of dividends in the French insolvency proceedings. That argument, one assumes, will bump into further obstacles.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed, 2021, para 5.76 ff.

Interesting judgment where Brussels Ia due to claim date doesn't apply, EU EIR does: earlier opening of French #insolvency
CJEU Gourdain, related actions
Held E&W courts have jurisdiction per choice of court
Emerald Pasture v Cassini [2021] EWHC 2010 (Ch)https://t.co/RBcRzbVn98

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 17, 2021

On 16 July 2021, the EU Commission has issued a Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession by the European Union to the Hague Convention of 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.

Under the Proposal, the EU would make two declarations.

The European Union declares, in accordance with Article 27(1) of the Convention, that it exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention. Its Member States will not sign, ratify, accept or approve the Convention, but shall be bound by the Convention by virtue of its conclusion by the European Union. 

For the purpose of this declaration, the term “European Union” does not include the Kingdom of Denmark by virtue of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The European Union hereby declares under Article 18 of the Convention that it will not apply the Convention to commercial leases (tenancies) of immovable property situated in the European Union.

The declaration is explained as follows:

a declaration is needed in order to ensure that the achievement of the policy objectives of the Brussels Ia Regulation is not affected by the accession to the Convention. More specifically, in cases involving commercial tenancies, the Brussels Ia Regulation affords exclusive jurisdiction to courts in a Member State where the immovable property is located. The Judgments Convention does not include such exclusive jurisdictional rules for commercial tenancies. Therefore, under the Convention, Member States would be obliged to recognise and enforce third-country judgments on commercial leases of immovable property that is situated on their territory. This would be in contradiction to the policy objective behind the Brussels Ia Regulation to attribute exclusive jurisdiction to courts in the EU for disputes related to immovable property situated in the EU.

The Commission will not make declarations pursuant to Articles 18 and 19 of the Convention.

On the possibility to make declarations, Member States opposed a declaration based on Article 19 of the Convention and did not express clear views on declarations under Article 18. Only a small number of stakeholders favoured accession with a declaration under Article 19 while there was no clear tendency detected for Article 18 declarations.

Summer has come! The blog will remain open, but blogging will be lighter in the coming weeks.

We will resume our usual 5-post-a-week pace at the end of August.

We wish our readers and all EAPIL Members all the best for their holidays.

Stay safe, and enjoy the break!

Le Conseil d’État juge que la situation en Afghanistan ne se caractérisait pas, à la date où la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA) a statué, par un niveau de violence susceptible de s’étendre à des personnes sans considération de leur situation personnelle de nature à permettre l’octroi de la protection subsidiaire.

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Aldricus – Apakah anak Anda kerap bolak-balik ke kamar mandi untuk kencing? Kemungkinan ada keadaan tertentu yang menjadi pemicunya. Untuk ketahui langkah menangani kerap buang air kecil pada anak, Anda perlu pahami dahulu pemicu anak kerap kencing. Dengan begitu, pengatasan terbaik bisa dicari.

Bila anak kerap kencing sesudah dia minum banyak air, ini tentu saja dipandang normal. Tetapi, jika Sang Kecil kerap buang air kecil saat sedikit minum air, kemungkinan ada keadaan tertentu yang menjadi pemicunya.Berikut beragam pemicu anak kerap buang air kecil dan langkah menanganinya yang dapat Anda kerjakan.

Jika anak terburu-buru saat buang air kecil, kemungkinan masih tetap ada urine yang masih ada dalam kandungan kemihnya. Keadaan ini dikenali sebagai voiding dysfunction.Voiding dysfunction umumnya terjadi saat anak sedang main dengan beberapa temannya hingga dia tergesa-gesa saat buang air kecil. Hasilnya, urine yang sisa dalam kandungan kemihnya akan membuat Sang Kecil kembali lagi ke kamar mandi untuk kencing.Bila ini kasusnya, langkah menangani kerap buang air kecil pada anak yang dapat Anda kerjakan ialah minta anak tidak untuk terburu-buru saat kencing hingga urine di kandungan kemih dapat dikeluarkan seutuhnya.

Peradangan pada organ intim dapat menjadi pemicu anak kerap buang air kecil. Bila terjadi pada anak wanita, keadaan ini dikatakan sebagai vulvovaginitis. Saat itu, permasalahan ini dikenali sebagai balanitis bila terjadi pada anak lelaki.Ke-2 keadaan ini umumnya terjadi bila anak-anak tidak bersihkan organ intimnya dengan baik. Disamping itu, mandi dalam bak yang penuh busa bisa juga jadi pemicunya.Vulvovaginitis ialah permasalahan yang umum terjadi pada anak wanita.

Walau jarang ada, diabetes type 1 bisa menjadi pemicu anak kerap buang air kecil. Dokter biasanya akan lakukan analisis lebih dulu untuk pastikan apa diabetes type 1 sebagai pemicu anak kerap kencing.Bila memang keadaan anak kerap kencing disebabkan penyakit ini, umumnya urine yang dikeluarkan bisa banyak. Sang Kecil akan berasa haus terlalu berlebih (polidipsia) hingga dia bisa banyak minum.

Diabetes insipidus ialah pemicu sangat jarang dari anak kerap buang air kecil. Tipe diabetes ini terjadi karena ada permasalahan pada hormon antidiuretik (hormon yang membuat ginjal mempernyerap air).Keadaan ini membuat ginjal tidak dapat simpan air hingga badan akan kehilangan cairan. Hasilnya, anak akan berasa haus terlalu berlebih dan kerap bolak-bolak ke kamar mandi untuk kencing.

Penyembuhan diabetes insipidus akan dilandasi oleh macamnya. Misalkan, dokter akan mereferensikan pasien diabetes insipidus sentra untuk minum air semakin banyak dan konsumsi obat desmopressin untuk gantikan hormon antidiuretik yang lenyap.Sedang, untuk pasien diabetes insipidus nefrogenik, dokter akan mereferensikan skema makan rendah garam untuk kurangi jumlah urine yang dibuat ginjal. Dokter akan menyarakankan untuk minum cukup air buat menghindar dehidrasi.

Infeksi aliran kemih bisa juga mengakibatkan anak kerap kencing. Tanda-tanda infeksi aliran kemih yang perlu dicurigai berbentuk merasa sakit saat kencing, urine berdarah atau kotor, demam, ngilu punggung, sampai mual.Langkah menangani kerap buang air kecil pada anak yang disebabkan karena infeksi aliran kemih akan berbeda. Dokter akan lakukan analisis lebih dulu untuk cari tahu apa pemicunya.Bila pemicunya ialah bakteri, karena itu dokter bisa mereferensikan obat antibiotik. Tetapi, bila virus atau jamur yang menjadi pemicunya, karena itu dokter akan memberi resep obat antivirus dan antijamur.

The post Cara Mengatasi Sering Buang Air Kecil pada Anak appeared first on Aldri Blog.

Since 2016, the European General Data Protection Regulation has been one of the most popular topics of discussion, academic and otherwise. While the PIL discussion has mostly focused on the unilateral conflicts rule in Article 3 of the Regulation, which defines its “external” scope of application, some scholars – like Martina Mantovani on this blog – have pointed out that despite providing a unified regime that applies across the Union, the Regulation’s repeated deference of specific questions to the laws of the Member States still requires a certain degree of “internal” coordination. On this aspect of the Regulation, Merlin Gömann has just published an impressive volume of over 800 pages (in German), offering what easily constitutes the most comprehensive treatment of the problem to date.

In essence, Gömann tries to work out how (and by whom) this coordination can (and must) be achieved according to primary EU law. He comes to the conclusion that the respective scopes of the national laws implementing the Regulation cannot be determined by unilateral conflict rules of the Member States but need to be derived from the Regulation itself. Accordingly, the conflict rules contained in many national laws implementing the Regulation are in violation of primary EU law (also explained in some more detail here).

According to the author, the necessary coordination between national laws must instead be achieved by applying Art. 3 GDPR by analogy. Gömann carefully explains the consequences of his proposition on more than 200 pages – including the somewhat surprising fact that national data-protection authorities might be required to apply the substantive data-protection laws of another Member State. And if this weren’t enough of an academic achievement already, Gömann concludes his book by also developing specific propositions on how the GDPR could be reformed in order to provide a proper system of coordination between the residual national laws.

Advocate General Pikamäe delivered on 14 July 2021 his opinion in case C‑262/21 PPU (A v B), which is about the impact of a transfer decision under Regulation no 604/2013 on the term “wrongful removal or retention” under Article 2 Brussels II bis. The opinion is currently available only in Finn and French. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« Le règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que la situation, telle que celle au principal, dans laquelle un enfant et sa mère se sont rendus et maintenus dans un État membre en exécution d’une décision de transfert prise par l’autorité compétente de l’État membre d’origine conformément au règlement (UE) no 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des États membres par un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride ne saurait être considérée comme un déplacement ou un non-retour illicites, au sens de l’article 2, point 11, du règlement no 2201/2003, sauf s’il est établi que, sous le couvert d’une demande de protection internationale formée pour l’enfant, la mère a commis une voie de fait afin de contourner les règles de compétence judiciaire prévues par le règlement no 2201/2003, ce qu’il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier au regard de l’ensemble des circonstances particulières du cas d’espèce ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244107&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) an important decision in case C‑791/19 on the Rule of Law in Poland:

“1.  Declares that:

– by failing to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), which is responsible for reviewing decisions issued in disciplinary proceedings against judges […];

– by allowing the content of judicial decisions to be classified as a disciplinary offence involving judges of the ordinary courts […];

– by conferring on the President of the Izba Dyscyplinarna (Disciplinary Chamber) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) the discretionary power to designate the disciplinary tribunal with jurisdiction at first instance in cases concerning judges of the ordinary courts […] and, therefore, by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases are examined by a tribunal ‘established by law’; and

– by failing to guarantee that disciplinary cases against judges of the ordinary courts are examined within a reasonable time (second sentence of Article 112b § 5 of the Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts), and by providing that actions relating to the appointment of defence counsel and the taking up of the defence by that counsel do not have a suspensory effect on the course of the disciplinary proceedings (Article 113a of that law) and that the disciplinary tribunal is to conduct the proceedings despite the justified absence of the notified accused judge or his or her defence counsel (Article 115a § 3 of the same law) and, therefore, by failing to guarantee respect for the rights of defence of accused judges of the ordinary courts,

the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU;

2.      Declares that, by allowing the right of courts and tribunals to submit requests for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union to be restricted by the possibility of triggering disciplinary proceedings, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU”

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244185&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The European Commission adopted today a proposal for the EU’s accession to the Hague 2019 Judgement Convention. The proposal is available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/proposal_eu_accession_judgments_convention_and_annex_en.pdf

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in case C‑30/20 (RH v AB Volvo, and alii), which is about Article 7(2) Brussels I bis and the private enforcement of competition law

“Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, within the market affected by collusive arrangements on the fixing and increase in the prices of goods, either the court within whose jurisdiction the undertaking claiming to be harmed purchased the goods affected by those arrangements or, in the case of purchases made by that undertaking in several places, the court within whose jurisdiction that undertaking’s registered office is situated, has international and territorial jurisdiction, in terms of the place where the damage occurred, over an action for compensation for the damage caused by those arrangements contrary to Article 101 TFEU”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244190&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in joined Cases C‑152/20 and C‑218/20 (DG, EH v SC Gruber Logistics SRL (C‑152/20), and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, DT v SC Samidani Trans SRL (C‑218/20)), which is about the law applicable to employment contracts:

“1. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 […]  must be interpreted as meaning that, where the law governing the individual employment contract has been chosen by the parties to that contract, and that law differs from the law applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of that article, the application of the latter law must be excluded with the exception of ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ under that law within the meaning of Article 8(1) of that regulation, provisions that can, in principle, include rules on the minimum wage.

2. Article 8 of Regulation No 593/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that:

–  first, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law pursuant to a national provision, provided that the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to the contract, and

– secondly, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer, with the employee merely accepting it”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244192&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

Non lieu à renvoi

The CJEU held yesterday in C-30/20 Volvo Trucks. I reviewed Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion here.

After having noted the limitation of the questions referred to locus damni [30]  (excluding therefore the as yet unsettled locus delicti commissi issues) the CJEU confirms first of all [33] that Article 7(2) clearly assigns both international and territorial jurisdiction. The latter of course subject to the judicial organisation of the Member State concerned. If locus damni x has no court then clearly the Regulation simply assigns jurisdiction to the legal district of which x is part. However the Court does not rule out [36] per CJEU Sanders and Huber that a specialised court may be established nationally for competition law cases.

The Court then [39] applies C‑343/19 Volkswagen (where goods are purchased which, following manipulation by their producer, are of lower value, the court having jurisdiction over an action for compensation for damage corresponding to the additional costs paid by the purchaser is that of the place where the goods are purchased) pro inspiratio: place of purchase of the goods at artificially inflated prices will be locus damni, irrespective of whether the goods it issue were purchased directly or indirectly from the defendants, with immediate transfer of ownership or at the end of a leasing contract [40].

The Court then somewhat puzzlingly adds [40] that ‘that approach implies that the purchaser that has been harmed exclusively purchased goods affected by the collusive arrangements in question within the jurisdiction of a single court. Otherwise, it would not be possible to identify a single place of occurrence of damage with regard to the purchaser harmed.’

Surely it must mean that if purchases occurred in several places, Mozaik jurisdiction will ensue rather than just one locus damni (as opposed to the alternative reading that locus damni jurisdiction in such case will not apply at all). However the Court then also confirms [41 ff] its maverick CDC approach of the buyer’s registered office as the locus damni in the case of purchases made in several places.

Here I am now lost and the simply use of vocabulary such as ‘solely’, ‘additionally’ or ‘among others’ would have helped me here. Are we now to assume that the place of purchase of the goods is locus damni only if there is only one place of purchase, not if there are several such places (leaving a lot of room for Article 7(2) engineering both by cartelists and buyers); and that, conversely, place of registered office as locus damni only applies in the event of several places of purchase, therefore cancelling out the classic (much derided) Article 7(2) Mozaik per Shevill and Bier – but only in the event of competition law infringement? This, too, would lead to possibility of forum engineering via qualification in the claim formulation.

I fear we are not yet at the end of this particular road.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.12.2.8.

Just out #CJEU Volvo Trucks https://t.co/fkCqdk015C
Location of damage in competition law follow-on damages suits: locus damni A7(2) BIa.
Seems to confirm AGs opinion which I reviewed here https://t.co/CvpU5bFR2U More analysis soon.

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 15, 2021

According to a press release, the EU Commission has proposed for the EU to join the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention. So far, the Convention has been signed, but not yet ratified, by three states (Israel, Ukraine, Uruguay).

The full statement reads as follows:

International Justice: The Commission proposes for the EU to join the Hague Judgments Convention

Today, the Commission has adopted a proposal for the EU’s accession to the Hague Judgement Convention, an international treaty that facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters in foreign jurisdictions. Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice, said: “Having one’s rights enforced in a country outside of the EU can be very cumbersome, both for private persons and for businesses. The EU joining the Hague Judgments Convention would improve legal certainty and save citizens and companies time and money. The average length of proceedings would decrease considerably.” Currently, EU citizens and businesses that want to have a judgment given in the EU to be recognised and enforced in a non-EU country face numerous legal issues due to the absence of an international framework. This legal uncertainty as well as the associated costs may cause businesses and citizens to give up on pursuing their claims or decide not to engage in international dealings altogether. The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, adopted in July 2019, offers a comprehensive legal framework with clear rules as to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Commission’s proposal will now have to be adopted by the Council, with the European Parliament’s consent, for the EU to join the Convention. More information on the International Cooperation on Civil Justice is available here. (For more information: Christian Wigand – Tel.: +32 229 62253; Katarzyna Kolanko – Tel.: +32 229 63444; Jördis Ferroli – Tel.: +32 229 92729)

According to Frank Woud (e-CODEX Community and External Relations Manager, Ministry of Justice and Security, The Netherlands):

The full potential of the European e-commerce market has not yet been reached. While consumers feel safer buying from online stores within the borders of their own country rather than from other European countries, European traders experience a range of challenges of their own, such as the lack of a level playing field and the overwhelming complexity of the legal and judicial system. Justice is the sine qua non for trade, and e-commerce will only be able to reach its full potential in Europe when justice permeates the digital realm. e-CODEX, the digital platform for cross-border legal data exchange within the European Union (EU), plays an important role in this regard. The mission of e-CODEX is to make cross-border justice accessible for all citizens and businesses within the EU.

To further this pursuit, e-CODEX hosted on 25 November 2020 an online roundtable discussion about e-justice as an enabler for cross-border e-commerce in Europe. The webcast of the roundtable discussion can be viewed here.

The e-Commerce Meets Justice White Paper is a representation of the facts and opinions expressed by the panel members. The panel was composed of Margarita Touch (Information Officer at DG JUST), Luca Cassetti (Secretary General of Ecommerce Europe), Marco Velicogna (Researcher at Institute of Legal Informatics and Judicial Systems of the National Research Council of Italy), and Hans van Grieken (Senior Technology Researcher at Capgemini, Gartner and Deloitte).

Their contributions to the White Paper discuss: e-commerce and developments triggered by the pandemic, the SMEs heavy reliance on platforms for cross-border e-commerce, the legal aspects of inter-European e-commerce, alternative dispute resolution means, and the role of e-justice in supporting cross-border e-commerce and building consumers’ trust.

More information on e-CODEX can be found here.

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne se penche sur une action engagée par un ressortissant polonais alléguant que le contenu d’un article diffusé sur un site internet d’un journal allemand porte atteinte à son identité de citoyen polonais et à sa dignité, bien qu’il ne soit pas nommément visé par l’article.

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