Agrégateur de flux

Élections professionnelles

Instruction - Peines

Ryanair / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule, pour insuffisance de motivation, la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide d’État de l’Allemagne en faveur de la compagnie aérienne Condor Flugdienst

Dansk Erhverv / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission constatant que l’absence de perception d’une consigne sur certains emballages de boissons vendues par des commerces frontaliers allemands à des clients domiciliés au Danemark ne constitue pas une aide d’État

Yanukovych / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal annule les actes du Conseil de 2019 sur la prorogation du gel de fonds infligé à M. Viktor Yanukovych, ancien président de l’Ukraine, et à son fils, M. Oleksandr Yanukovych

Mary Keyes (Griffith University) has posted Women in Private International Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

There has been almost no consideration of the position of women in private international law. There is very little published research applying a feminist analysis to, or even considering the position of women in, private international law. This field gives almost no attention to the particular interests, positions and experiences of women as subjects of the law, or the contribution of women as makers of the law. In the common law, private international law was largely developed in the 19th century, by male judges who were strongly influenced by commentary written exclusively by men. This chapter establishes that the apparently gender-neutral nature of private international law conceals profoundly ingrained assumptions about gender, in which the masculine is represented as a rational and sophisticated businessman, and the feminine is represented as a legally incapable wife. It then considers the gendered dimension of private international law in international family law, referring in particular to the regulation of international child abduction, international family property agreements, and international commercial surrogacy. Each of these examples demonstrates the differential impact of the law on women, indicating the need for greater awareness of and attention to gender. It concludes that while there have been some advances recently, particularly in terms of increased representation of women in making and commenting on private international law, there remains a great need for further research into the position of women as legal subjects and law-makers in this field.

 

Election or political party disputes often feature before Nigerian courts. In Nigeria jurisdiction in matters of conflict of laws (called “territorial jurisdiction” by many Nigerian judges) also applies to matters of disputes between members of a political party in the inter-state context.[1]

In Oshiomhole v Salihu (No. 1)[2] (reported on June 7, 2021), one of the issues for determination was whether the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja possessed territorial jurisdiction to handle a dispute between members of Nigeria’s ruling political party. The 1st defendant/appellant was at the time the National Chairman of the 2nd defendant/appellant (the ruling party in Nigeria). It was alleged by some Members of the party that he had been suspended at the ward level in Edo State and he was thus disqualified from holding the position of National Chairman. The 1st defendant/appellant, inter alia, filed a preliminary objection to the suit and argued that the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory did not possess territorial jurisdiction because the cause of action arose in Edo State where he was alleged to have been suspended as the National Chairman. The Court of Appeal (per Onyemenam JCA in his leading judgment) dismissed the preliminary objection and held as follows:

 

“The issue herein is straightforward. Order 3 rule 4 of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018 provides that:

“All other suits shall where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action arose in the Federal Capital Territory, be commenced and determined in the High court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”

By this Rule, apart from the matters that fall under Order 3 Rules 1 & 2 of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018, the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have territorial jurisdiction where:

1. The defendant resides within the Federal Capital Territory or
2. The defendant carries on business within the Federal Capital Territory or
3. The cause of action arose within the Federal Capital Territory or

In either of the three circumstances stated above, the High Court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have territorial jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. The appellants’ contention herein is that the cause of action arose in Edo State and not in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and as such the High court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja lacks the jurisdiction to hear the suit. This argument is one third percent correct for the simple fact that, where cause of action arose is not the sole source of territorial jurisdiction of the High court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. In the instant case, the office of the 1st appellant as National Chairman of the 2nd appellant; as well as the Registered office and Secretariat of the 2nd appellant are both within the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. This makes the High court of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, have territorial jurisdiction over the suit filed by the respondents under Order 3 rule 4(1) of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory(Civil Procedure) Rules, 2018…

I therefore hold that the trial court has the territorial jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s suit and resolve the issue in favour of the 1st – 6th respondents.”[3]

 

The above rationale for the Court of Appeal’s decision of Onyemenam JCA in his leading judgment is clearly wrong. Order 3 rule 4 of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018 is a choice of venue rule for allocating jurisdiction as between the judicial division of the Federal Capital Territory for the purpose of geographical and administrative convenience. It cannot and should not be used to resolve inter-state matters of conflict of laws. It is submitted that the better view is stated by the Court of Appeal in Ogunsola v All Nigeria Peoples Party,[4] where Oduyemi JCA in his leading judgment at the Court of Appeal, rightly held that:

“Where the dispute as to venue is not one between one division or another of the same State High Court or between one division or the other of the F.C.T. Abuja High Court, but as between one division or the other of the F.C.T Abuja High Court, but as between the High Court of one State in the Federation and the High Court of the F.C.T. then the issue of the appropriate or more convenient forum is one to be determined under the rules of Private International Law formulated by courts within the Federation.”[5]

In Oshiomhole (supra) the opportunity was missed to apply and develop jurisdictional conflict of law rules for disputes between members of a political party in Nigeria. The  result of the decision reached in Oshiomhole (supra) in applying choice of venue rules through Order 3 rule 4 of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018 will conflate with the principles of Nigerian private international as the defendants were resident in the State they were sued. So the Court of Appeal in Oshiomhole (supra) incorrectly reasoned its way to the right conclusion – the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory had jurisdiction in this case.

Unfortunately, in recent times the Supreme Court of Nigeria has held that the High Court of a State cannot establish jurisdiction over a cause of action that occurs in another State – the strict territorial jurisdiction approach.[6] This approach has also been applied to disputes between members of a political party.[7] This approach is also wrong as it ignores the principles of traditional Nigerian common law conflict of laws. It also leads to injustice and unduly circumscribes the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court, which ultimately makes Nigerian courts inaccessible and unattractive for litigation. Nigerian courts should have jurisdiction as of right once a defendant is resident or submits to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court. In Oshiomhole (supra), if the strict territorial jurisdiction approach was applied, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja would not have had jurisdiction because the cause of action arose in Edo State.

In summation, applying the right principle of private international law, the Court of Appeal in Oshiomhole (supra) reached the right decision (residence of the defendant) through an incorrect reasoning of relying on Order 3 rule 4 of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules 2018, which is choice of venue rule for judicial divisions within a State. If the recent Supreme Court cases, which apply the strict territorial jurisdiction approach was applied in this case, Oshiomhole (supra) would be per incuriam and, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja would not have had jurisdiction because the cause of action arose in Edo State.

 

[1]Ogunsola v All Nigeria Peoples Party (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) 462, 480.

[2] (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 237.

[3]Oshiomhole v Salihu (No. 1) (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1778) 237, 275-6.

[4](2003 ) 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) 462, 480 .

[5] Ogunsola v All Nigeria Peoples Party (2003 ) 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) 462, 480 .

[6] Capital Bancorp Ltd v Shelter Savings and Loans Ltd (2007) 3 NWLR 148; Dairo v Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt 1059) 99,

[7]Mailantarki v Tongo & Ors (2017) LPELR-42467; Audu v. APC & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48134.

 

Le 31 mai dernier, l’exécutif a promulgué un décret venant préciser les contours de la procédure de signalement aux procureurs européens délégués, les modalités d’exercice par le procureur européen délégué de sa compétence ainsi que le déroulement des procédures qu’il suit.

en lire plus

In C-280/20, ZN v Generalno konsulstvo na Republika Bulgaria v grad Valensia, Kralstvo Ispania [the Bulgarian consulate], the CJEU last week essentially confirmed CJEU C-154/11 Mahamdia. ZN is a Bulgarian national residing in Sofia who holds a permit to reside in Spain, where she provided services relating to the activity of the Consulate General. ZN brought an action in Bulgaria against the Consulate General seeking, first, recognition of her employment relationship and, second, payment of compensation in lieu of paid annual leave not taken during a period in which she provided services concerning the receipt of documents. The Consulate General contests the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian courts and invokes the jurisdiction of the Spanish courts as the courts of ZN’s place of employment. The referring court has doubts as to the existence of cross-border implications in so far as the dispute at issue in the main proceedings concerns a Bulgarian employee and a Bulgarian employer, and the fact that their legal relationship is closely connected with the Republic of Bulgaria.  It also notes that Bulgarian law expressly provides that, in the case of contracts concluded between a Bulgarian employer established abroad and a Bulgarian national working abroad, any disputes may be examined only by the Bulgarian courts.

In Mahamdia the Court first of all applied the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and held that an embassy often acts iure gestionis, not iure imperii, and that under the Vienna rules, the EU is perfectly entitled to apply the Regulation given that it applies to ‘civil and commercial’ matters. In that vein, an embassy may very well have to be regarded as an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of Article 20(2) (on employment contracts). In ZN, the Court [28-29] suggests that services in connection with the receipt of documents in files opened at the consulate by Bulgarian nationals and the management of those files, do not fall within the exercise of public powers and do not risk interfering with the security interests of the Republic of Bulgaria. Hence it strongly suggests the issue is a ‘civil and commercial one’, leaving final determination of same to the referring court. I would intuitively have thought that processing documents at a country’s consulate quite au contraire, does engage closely with diplomatic functions that must be qualified as iure imperii, particularly seeing as before said processing one is likely not to have knowledge of the documents’ content.

On the issue of ‘international element’ required to trigger Brussels Ia, the Court per Mahamdia considers a consulate to be an ‘establishment’ of one Member State in another Member State. Hence one of the parties to the dispute must be considered to be domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than that of the court seised [37]: the cross-border element is clearly present, which will not surprise many of us. One also assumes that the  aforementioned Bulgarian rule on exclusive jurisdiction for employment disputes between Bulgarians even with an international element present, does not meet with EU law requirements.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.35, para 2.128.

 

Non lieu à renvoi

Secret professionnel

Fichiers et libertés publiques

Discrimination

This post was drafted by Paul Eichmüller and Matthias Lehmann.

Almost six years after the Volkswagen Dieselgate scandal became public, the issue of international jurisdiction for damage claims arising from the fraud is still creating headaches. In a recent decision from 24 March 2021, the Austrian Supreme Court decided a case that was in many respects similar to the one giving rise to the much discussed ECJ judgment of C-343/19, VKI/VW – yet, there was one important difference: the car was transported to another country after its purchase.

Facts

Like in previous cases, the Austrian Supreme Court had to decide on a damage claim resulting from the sale of a car produced by a member of the VW group. The claimant was resident in Austria but had acquired the car directly from the manufacturer in Germany, where the vehicle was also handed over to the buyer. He then paid the price from his Austrian bank account and imported the car to Austria, where he continued to use it. The manufacturer’s representative had been aware of this intention at the time when the contract was concluded. After the discovery of the emission fraud scandal, the buyer brought a claim for damages against the manufacturer in Austrian courts, claiming compensation for the decreased value of the car due to the fraud.

The courts of first and second instance both declined international jurisdiction since the car had been bought and handed over in Germany. They argued that for the sale of movable goods, the place where the damage occurs in the sense of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation should always be located where a good is handed over, and not in the country of (intended) habitual use.

The Decision by the Austrian Supreme Court

The Austrian Supreme Court agreed with the legal opinion of the lower courts. It cited the CJEU ruling in C-343/19, VKI/VW, according to which the damage occurs at the place of purchase (see para 37). As in its view the damage had already occurred in the moment of the purchase in Germany, the Austrian Supreme Court concluded that the subsequent transport to Austria – be it with the previous knowledge or even the consent of the seller – could not change the competent court.

Neither did the fact that the payment was effected from an Austrian bank account establish jurisdiction of Austrian courts change the analysis in the eyes of the Austrian Supreme Court. It distinguished the CJEU judgment in C-304/17, Löber, on the ground that the damage materialised in a tangible object and not in a bank account.

The buyer’s final argument was based on the fact that the seller had allegedly directed his activity to Austria and thus, the applicable law to the contract would be Austrian law pursuant to Art 6(1)(b) Rome I Regulation. However, this argument was rejected on purely procedural grounds.

Austrian courts thus lacked jurisdiction and the claim was rejected. The Supreme Court did not deem a request for a preliminary ruling necessary, as it considered it a case of the acte éclairé doctrine.

Assessment

The judgment by the Austrian Supreme Court is a logical next step from the CJEU ruling in VKI/VW. The latter gave precedence to the place of purchase, citing the interest of legal certainty, the need for the court to determine the market conditions at this place and the competitive relations or collective consumer interests that may be affected there as the main reasons. These considerations force the conclusion that the damage occurs at the place of purchase irrespective of where the car is subsequently used. This new ruling results from the CJEU using a single connecting factor in VKI/VW instead of weighing a number of different factors. Assigning jurisdiction to the courts of Germany may pose a disadvantage for some customers, but they must be aware that a purchase in a foreign country may also have legal side-effects.