The Yong Pung How Professorship Lecture 2024 will be held on Thursday 23 May 2024 5:00 to 6:30pm Singapore time. Professor Yeo Tiong Min, SC (Hon), who holds the Yong Pung How Chair Professor of Law at Singapore Management University, will be speaking on ‘Past, Present, and Future Tensions: Jurisdiction over Absent Defendants’.
The synopsis is as follows: ‘This lecture considers the historical backdrop to the current law in Singapore on when overseas defendants may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court, with a view to understanding the old and new issues arising from the overhaul of the rules for service out of jurisdiction in 2021 and the amendments in 2023 to accommodate the Hague Service Convention. The future-readiness of these rules will also be considered.’
The event will be in hybrid format. Further details may be found here.
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme s’est imposée comme précurseur d’une évolution certaine en matière de respect des droits et libertés des personnes détenues. Les juges européens confirment, par l’arrêt commenté, le mouvement de défense des droits dans un contexte de grève du personnel pénitentiaire.
Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit de l’exécution des peines 2023/2024 Voir la boutique DallozIl résulte de l’article 25 du règlement Bruxelles I bis que l’opposabilité d’une clause attributive de juridiction au tiers porteur du connaissement est déterminée d’après le droit applicable au fond du litige, et non d’après le droit de la juridiction désignée par la clause. En outre, lorsqu’il est admis que le tiers porteur a succédé aux droits et obligations du chargeur en vertu du droit applicable au contrat, toute appréciation relative à son acceptation à la clause doit être écartée.
Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit des transports 2023/2024 Voir la boutique DallozThe Dispute Resolution Interest Group of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) is pleased to announce the third edition of the DRIG Prize for Best Article in International Dispute Resolution. The Prize will be awarded to the author(s) of the article published in 2023 that the Selection Committee considers to be outstanding in the field of international dispute resolution. DRIG is currently accepting submissions for the Prize.
Please find below the details on the Prize and the members of the Selection Committee:
o Eligibility: The Selection Committee will consider publications on inter-State dispute settlement, investor-State dispute settlement, international commercial arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution. Any article, or book chapter from an edited volume, in the English language published during 2023 may be nominated. Sole and jointly authored papers are eligible. Membership in the American Society of International Law is not required. Submissions from outside the United States are welcome and encouraged.
o Criteria: In assessing submissions, the Selection Committee will take into account factors such as: a) depth of research; b) sophistication of analysis; c) originality; d) quality of writing; and e) potential impact on the field of international dispute resolution.
o Submission: The Dispute Resolution Interest Group is currently accepting submissions, which must be received by November 1, 2024. Electronic submission is required in portable document format (.pdf). All submissions must include contact information (name, e-mail, phone, address). Electronic submissions should be sent to the following email address: drig@asil.org. Please indicate “Submission for the DRIG Prize” in the subject line.
o Prize: The Selection Committee will select one publication for the award of the Prize. The Prize consists of a certificate of recognition, a complimentary registration for the 2025 ASIL Annual Meeting, a complimentary one-year membership in the Society, and a complimentary one-year subscription to the Jus Mundi international law and arbitration search engine. The winner of the Prize will be announced at the ASIL Annual Meeting in April 2025. The Prize is sponsored by Covington & Burling LLP, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, and Jus Mundi.
o Selection Committee: The Selection Committee consists of individuals drawn from private practice, academia, and/or government who possess expertise in the fields covered by the Prize, and also includes the DRIG co-chairs. The Selection Committee for the 2025 Prize will be presided by Esmé Shirlow (Australian National University) and will include Julian Arato (The University of Michigan), Tom Ginsburg (The University of Chicago), Sebastián Green Martínez (Uría Menéndez), Natalie Morris-Sharma (Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore), Sabina Sacco (Independent Arbitrator), Priyanka Shetty (AZB & PARTNERS), Amer Tabbara (University of Birmingham), and Philippa Web (King’s College London).
La Cour de justice apporte d’utiles précisions au domaine d’application de la loi d’ouverture d’une procédure d’insolvabilité secondaire, à la détermination de la masse des actifs dépendant de cette procédure et, enfin, aux pouvoirs reconnus aux praticiens des procédures principale et secondaire.
Sur la boutique Dalloz Code des procédures collectives 2024, annoté & commenté Voir la boutique DallozEkaterina Aristova (Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, University of Oxford) is the author of the ‘Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations: The Challenge of Jurisdiction in English Courts’ (OUP 2024), which has just been published in the Oxford Private International Law series. She has kindly shared the following summary with us:
The book examines the approach of the English courts to the question of jurisdiction in civil liability claims brought against English-based parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries as co-defendants (e.g., Lubbe v Cape, Lungowe v Vedanta, Okpabi v Shell, etc.). While the book is written from the perspective of English law, the book also draws on examples of similar cases in Australia, Canada, EU Member States, and the US to broaden the discussion.
The assertion of jurisdiction in parent company liability claims based on a nexus with the forum state presents a challenge to the courts. The territorial focus of the adjudicative jurisdiction is often contrary to the transnational nature of cross-border business activities. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have the flexibility to spread operations over multiple jurisdictions and create a legal separation between the subsidiary’s activities and the home state of the parent company. Courts rely on various private international law rules and doctrines to resolve the question of jurisdiction in parent company liability claims, including forum non conveniens doctrine in common law legal systems, the mandatory rule of domicile under EU law, and the presumption against extraterritoriality in US jurisprudence. The broad disparities in the issues of civil jurisdiction among domestic legal regimes and the considerable controversy surrounding the exercise of extraterritorial regulation over corporate operations often lead to the creation of a ‘jurisdictional veil’ for the parent company and a significant degree of autonomy, largely free from the control of any national jurisdiction.
To address this puzzle, this book seeks to answer three questions: 1) To what extent can English courts, under existing rules, exercise jurisdiction over English parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries as co-defendants? 2) Is England a suitable forum for deciding parent company liability claims? 3) Should the jurisdictional competence of the English courts be broadened through a new connecting factor derived from the ‘economic enterprise’ theory?
The book aims to offer a new angle to the discourse by placing the discussion of parent company liability claims in the context of the topical debate about the changing role of private international law in a globalised world. The transnational adjudication of disputes, cross-border activities of non-state actors and expansion of private law-making challenge several conventional assumptions of the discipline of private international law, including its focus on territoriality and geographical connecting factors and its capacity to interact with public mechanisms. Home state courts have become the fora for struggles between TNCs and vulnerable communities from the host states, raising complex questions about (il)legitimate forum shopping, the appropriate forum, and the limits of judicial discretion. Parent company liability claims impact how we think about private international law and its function, and the reader is invited to explore these challenging dynamics.
The Bonavero Institute of Human Rights in Oxford will celebrate the publication of the book by hosting a (hybrid) book launch and wine reception on 5 June 2024.
Registration for the 2025 programme of The Hague Academy of International Law’s renowned Winter Courses on International Law (6-24 January 2025) is now open. In contrast to the summer courses, this program combines aspects of both Public and Private International Law and therefore provides for a particularly valuable academic experience.
Following the Inauguaral Lecture by Bhupinder Singh Chimni (O.P. Jindal Global University), this year’s General Course in Private International Law will focus on “International Law in the Times of Globalization: Contexts, Networks, Practices” and will be delivered by Mónica Pinto (University of Buenos Aires). Furthermore, Special Courses will be offered in English by Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab (Cairo University), Payam Akhavan (University of Toronto), Enrico Milano (University of Verona) and Catherine Rogers (Bocconi University), while Niki Aloupi and Sébastien Touzé (Paris-Panthéon-Assas) will deliver their presentations in French. As always, all lectures will be simultaneously interpreted into English or French and vice versa. If you are interested in alternative dispute resolution, the lecture on “The Concept of Arbitrator Impartiality” seems particularly interesting.
Advanced Students, especially those who are ambitious to sit for the prestigious Diploma Exam, are highly encouraged to apply for the Academy’s Directed Studies as well. The French edition of these interactive afternoon seminars will be directed by Emanuel Castellarin (University of Strasbourg), while English-speaking candidates are taught by María Carmelina Londoño Lázaro (University of La Sabana).
Registration is open from 1 May 2024 to 1 October 2024 via the institution’s own Online Registration Form . Students who whish to apply for the Academy’s scholarship opportunities need to submit their application by 31 July 2024. For further information on the HAIL 2024 Winter courses and the Academy in general, please consult the HAIL Homepage or refer to the attached PDF Programme.
The Rhenish Friedrich Wilhelm University of Bonn is an international research university with a wide education and research profile. With a 200-year history, approximately 33,000 students, more than 6,000 staff, and an excellent reputation at home and abroad, the University of Bonn is one of the most important universities in Germany and is recognized as a university of excellence.
The Institute for German and International Civil Procedure is looking for a highly skilled and motivated PhD candidate and fellow (Wissenschaftliche/r Mitarbeiter/in) to work in the fields of International Civil Procedural Law and/or International Commercial Arbitration on a part-time basis (50%) to start as soon as possible.
Responsibilities:
Your Profile:
We offer:
The University of Bonn is committed to diversity and equal opportunity. It is certified as a family-friendly university. Its goal is to increase the proportion of women in areas where they are underrepresented and to particularly promote their careers. It therefore strongly encourages applications from relevantly qualified women. Applications are handled in accordance with the State Equal Opportunity Act. Applications from suitable persons with proven severe disabilities and persons treated as such are particularly welcome
If you are interested in this position, please send your application (cover letter in German; CV; and relevant documents and certificates, notably university transcripts and a copy of the German State Examination Law Degree) to Prof Dr Matthias Weller (weller@jura.uni-bonn.de).
For additional information, please refer to the attached pdf document (in German) or visit the Institute’s homepage.
• PILIG newsletter editors recruiting
American Society of International Law Private International Law Interest Group publishes a newsletter and commentaries covering private international law development in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America.
The editor team is working on the 2024 issue and invites scholars, practitioners, and students to contact us to become a PILIG newsletter editor.
ASIL Private International Law Interest Group Co-Chairs
Jeanne Huang <jeanne.huang@sydney.edu.au>
George Tian <YiJun.Tian@uts.edu.au>
With the publication of the Elgar Companion to UNIDROIT, edited by Ben Köhler, Rishi Gulati, and Thomas John, the trilogy of books on the three key international institutions mandated to work on private international law and uniform private law is now complete. The volumes on the HCCH and UNCITRAL have been published in 2020 and 2023 respectively.
The editors have kindly shared the following description with us:
The comprehensive Companion provides a unique overview of UNIDROIT, the primary independent organisation coordinating the unification of private law across its 65 member states. As the third in the suite of titles covering the ‘three sisters’ of uniform private law and private international law, it considers UNIDROIT’s role in the creation of existing uniform law, as well as posing questions about its future in the sector.
The Companion offers a broad range of diverse perspectives on UNIDROIT, providing a rich reference resource that considers the history, present and future of the organisation. The team of authors explore the evolving scope and role of UNIDROIT, with a particular focus on its Principles of International Commercial Contracts, as well as its contributions to secured transaction processes, capital markets and cultural properties. Through its assessment of case studies, the Companion delineates the current priorities of UNIDROIT, as well as examining the future of the organisation, and outlining how the organisation can address challenges such as sustainable development and disruptive technologies, and further advance its own impact in underrepresented regions.
Covering a broad range of perspectives from scholars and practitioners alike, this Companion will be a crucial reference point for academics and students in the fields of private international law, and international commercial law, especially those interested in how international organisations contend with critical legal issues.
Way out west, where the rain don’t fall
There’s a treaty for the sale of goods that’s good news for all
But you might not know it’s here
Unless you’re livin’ and a workin’ on the land …
In 2009, Associate Professor Lisa Spagnolo observed – based upon her census of Australia’s CISG case law at that time – that the Convention was effectively ‘in the Australian legal outback’. For those unfamiliar with Australia’s geography, most of its population is concentrated on the continent’s eastern coast. Australia’s outback extends, amongst other places, across much of Western Australia. With that geographic imagery in mind, one might not be surprised to hear that a recent decision of the County Court of Victoria – in Australia’s east – overlooked the Vienna Sales Convention’s application.
The circumstances in which this omission occurred are interesting, and provide a useful opportunity for Australian practitioners to learn more about the CISG’s application in Australia.
The case at issue is last year’s C P Aquaculture (India) Pvt Ltd v Aqua Star Pty Ltd [2023] VCC 2134. That case involved a sale of goods dispute (concerning prawn and shrimp) between Australian and Indian parties. Whilst the CISG has been part of Australian law since 1989, it is a well-known fact that India is not a CISG Contracting State. It is perhaps this well-known fact – taken at face value – that led the County Court of Victoria to overlook the CISG’s application.
The C P Aquaculture judgment indicates that ‘[t]he parties are agreed that the proper law of the contracts between CP (India) and Aqua Star for the sale of shrimp or prawns is Victorian law’. As recorded in the judgment, this followed from the plaintiff’s view that ‘India has not adopted the convention on contracts for the international sale of goods’, and from the defendant’s view that there was a ‘failure on the part of either part[y] to allege and prove the terms of any other law as a proper law’.
On either view, however, there is actually a very good basis for applying the CISG, rather than non-harmonised Victorian law. This case therefore represents an excellent opportunity for Australian lawyers to better understand how and why the CISG applies in Australia.
Taking the plaintiff’s position first, the fact that India has not adopted the CISG is actually not fatal to the Convention’s application. In fact, the Convention specifically provides for its application in those exact circumstances. This follows from Art. 1(1) CISG, the treaty’s key application provision:
This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.
Where – as in C P Aquaculture – it is not the case that both parties are from Contracting States, the CISG cannot apply by virtue of Art. 1(1)(a) CISG. But it can still apply pursuant to Art. 1(1)(b) CISG. The key here is whether ‘the rules of private international law’ call for the application of a Contracting State’s law.
In an informal discussion I once had with a leading Australian barrister, I was asked ‘what does “the rules of private international law” here actually mean?’ It may be that uncertainty over the meaning of this phrase contributes to the CISG’s application being overlooked in cases like C P Aquaculture. In short, private international law rules include choice of law rules (where a sales contract is governed by a CISG State’s law because of a choice of law clause) and conflict of laws rules (where, absent party choice of law, the forum’s rules indicate that a CISG State’s law is to apply). In a way, Art. 1(1)(b) CISG might have been more easily understood by non-specialists if it read ‘when a Contracting State’s law is the governing law’. Although it doesn’t read this way, that is essentially the provision’s effect, and understanding Art. 1(1)(b) CISG accordingly may better help Australian practitioners identify cases requiring the treaty’s application.
Taking the defendant’s position second, where the law of an Australian jurisdiction governs, it is actually not necessary to ‘allege and prove’ the CISG’s terms because the CISG – despite its abstract existence as a treaty – is not foreign law. Roder Zelt-Und Hallenkonstruktionen GmbH v Rosedown Park Pty Ltd – Australia’s first ever case applying the CISG – confirmed this by explaining that the CISG is ‘part of’ Australian law and is thus ‘not to be treated as a foreign law which requires proof as a fact’.
Indeed, the Goods Act 1958 (Vic) – a statute that the defendant itself sought to rely upon in C P Aquaculture – is the very vehicle giving effect to the CISG in Victoria, via its pt IV.
All this being said, C P Aquaculture provides Australian practitioners (and lawyers representing Australian traders’ counterparts) with some useful lessons in understanding how and why the CISG applies. If the CISG really is still in the Australian legal outback, then perhaps what Australian practitioners need is a good understanding of the lay of the land. And to that end, private international law can be their map.
Dr Benjamin Hayward
Associate Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash Business School
X (Twitter): @LawGuyPI
International Trade and International Commercial Law research group: @MonashITICL
I. Introduction
Recent developments in the field of family law in the UAE, in particular the adoption of the so-called “Civil Marriage Laws”, have aroused interest, admiration, curiosity, and even doubt and critics among scholars and practitioners of family law, comparative law and private international law around the world.[1] First introduced in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,[2] and later implemented at the federal level,[3] these “non-religious” family laws, at least as originally enacted in Abu Dhabi, primarily intend to apply to foreign non-Muslims.[4] The main stated objective of these laws is to provide foreign expatriates with a modern and flexible family law based on “principles that are in line with the best international practices” and “close to them in terms of culture, customs and language”.[5] One of the peculiar feature of these laws is that their departure from the traditional family law regulations and practices in the region, particularly in terms of gender equality in pertinent matters such as testimony, succession, no-fault divorce and joint custody.[6]
Aside from the (critical) judgment that can be made about these laws, their application raises several questions. These include, inter alia, the question as to whether these laws would apply to “foreign Muslims”, and if yes, under which conditions. The decision of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Court (hereafter “ADSC”) reported here (Ruling No. 245/2024 of 29 April 2024) shed some light on this ambiguity.
II. The Facts:
The case concerns a unilateral divorce action initiated by the husband (a French-Lebanese dual national, hereafter “X”) against his wife (a Mexican-Egyptian dual national, hereafter “Y”). Both are Muslim.
According to the facts reported in the decision, X and Y got married in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi on 11 September 2023, apparently in accordance with the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law[7] although some aspects of the Islamic tradition regarding marriage appear to have been observed.[8] On 6 November 2023, X filed an action for no-fault divorce with the Abu Dhabi Civil Family Court (hereafter ADCFC) pursuant to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law using the prescribed form.[9] Y contested the divorce petition by challenging the jurisdiction of the court. However, the ADCFC admitted the action and declared the dissolution of the marriage. The decision was confirmed on appeal.
Y then appealed to the ADSC primarily arguing that the Court of Appeal had erred in applying the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law to declare the dissolution of the marriage because both parties were Muslim. Y’s main arguments as summarized by the ADSC are as follows:
III. The Ruling
The ADSC accepted the appeal and ruled that the ADCFC was not competent to hear the dispute, stating as follows:
“Pursuant to Article 87 of the [2022 Federal Act on Civil Procedure, hereafter “FACP”], challenges to the court’s judicial jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the courts sua sponte and may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings. On appeal, Y argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she was Muslim […] and a dual national of Mexico and Egypt, while X was also a Muslim […] and holder of French and Lebanese nationalities.
[However,] the Court of Appeal rejected Y’s arguments and confirmed its jurisdiction based on Articles 3 and 4 of [the Procedural Regulation]; [although] the opening of Article 3 relied on [by the court] states that “the court is competent to hear civil family matters for non-Muslim foreigners regarding civil marriage, divorce and their effects”. In addition, Article 1(1) of Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 states that “The provisions of the present Legislative Decree shall apply to non-Muslim citizens of the UAE and to foreign non-Muslims residing in the UAE, unless they invoke the application of their own law in matters of marriage, divorce, succession, wills and establishment of filiation.”
[Given that] it was judicially established by the parties’ acknowledgement that they were Muslim, the Court of Appeal violated the Law No. 14/2021, as amended by Law No. 15/2021, and its Procedural Regulation [No. 8/2022], as well as Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 by upholding the appealed decision without ascertaining the religion of the parties and ruling as it did, [therefore its decision] must be reversed”.
IV. Comments
The main legal question referred to the ADSC concerned the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation to foreign Muslims. The ADSC answered the question in the negative, stating that the ADCFC was not competent to declare the dissolution a marriage between foreign Muslims. Although the case raises some interesting issues regarding the international jurisdiction of the ADCFC, for the sake of brevity, only the question of the applicability of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law will be addressed here.
1. Unlike the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status, which explicitly states that its provisions “apply to non-Muslim UAE citizens, and to non-Muslim foreigners residing in the UAE” (article 1, emphasis added), the law in Abu Dhabi is rather ambiguous on this issue.
i. It should be indicated in this respect that, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, which was originally enacted as “The Personal Status for Non-Muslim Foreigners in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” (Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021, emphasis added) clearly limited its scope of application to foreign non-Muslims. This is also evident from the definition of the term “foreigner” contained in the former article 1 of the Law, according to which, the term (foreigner) was defined as “[a]ny male or female non-Muslim foreigner, having a domicile, residence or place of work in the Emirate.” Former article 3 of the Law also defined the scope of application of the Law and limited only to “foreigners” in the meaning of article 1 (i.e. non-Muslim foreigners). Therefore, it was clear that the Law, in its original form, did not apply to “foreign Muslims” in general.[10]
ii. However, only one month after its enactment (and even before its entry into force), the Law was amended and renamed “The Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi” by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021. The amendments concerned, inter alia the scope of application rationae personae of the Law. Indeed, the Law No. 15/2021 deleted the all references to “foreigners” in the Law No. 14/2021 and replaced the term with a more neutral one: “persons covered by the provisions of this Law [al-mukhatabun bi hadha al-qanun]”. This notion is broadly defined to include both “foreigners” (without any particular reference to their religious affiliation) and “non-Muslim citizens of the UAE” (New Article 1).
Article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides further details. It defines the terms “persons covered by the provisions of this Law” as follows:
The wording of article 5(2) is somewhat confusing, as it can be interpreted in two manners:
(i) if read a contrario, the provision would mean that foreigners, irrespective to their religion (including non-Muslims), would not be subject to the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if they hold the nationality of a country that does “primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, family relationships of Christian Algerian or Moroccan, for example, would not be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation. However, this interpretation seems to be in opposition with the very purpose of adopting the Law, which, in its own terms, applies to non-Muslim UAE citizens.
(ii) Alternatively, the word “foreigner” here could be understood to mean “Muslim foreigners”, but only those who hold the “the nationality of a country that does not primarily apply the rules of Islamic Sharia in matters of personal status”. As a result, the family relationships of Muslim Canadian, French, German or Turkish (whether Tunisian would be included here is unclear) would be governed by the Law.
The latter interpretation seems to be prevalent.[11] In addition, the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department (ADJD)’s official website (under section “Marriage”) presents even a broader scope since it explains that “civil marriage” is open to “anyone, regardless of their religion” including “Muslims” “as long as they are not UAE citizens”.
iii. The situation becomes more complicated when the parties have multiple nationalities especially when, as in the reported decision, one is from of a predominantly Muslim country and the other from a non-Muslim country. Here, article 5 of the Procedural Regulation provides useful clarifications. According to paragraph 2 in fine, the nationality to be taken into account in such situation is the one used by the parties according to their [status] of residence in the UAE. If interpreted literally, family law relationships of foreign Muslims who, in addition to their nationality of a non-Muslim country, also hold a nationality of a country whose family law is primarily based on Islamic Sharia (as in the reported decision) would be governed by the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation if, according to their status of residence, they use the nationality of their non-Muslim country nationality.
iv. In the case commented here, the parties have dual nationality (French/Lebanese, Mexican/Egyptian). Although the parties are identified as “Muslim”, they appear to have used the nationality of their non-Muslim countries.[12] Accordingly, contrary to the ADSC’s decision, it can be said that the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation were applicable in this case.
2. In addition to the religion of the parties, the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation determine other situations in which the Law applies.
i. These include, with respect to the effect of the marriage and its dissolution, the case where “the marriage is concluded is accordance with” the Law and its provisions (Article 3 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law;[13] Article 5(4) of the Procedural Regulation).[14] The application of this rule does not seem to be dependent on the religion of the parties concerned. Consequently, since the marriage in casu was concluded pursuant to the provisions of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law,[15] its dissolution should logically be governed by the provisions of the same Law.
ii. However, it must be acknowledged that such a conclusion is not entirely self-evident. The confusion stems from the ADJD’s official website (under section “Divorce”) which states as a matter of principle that, normally, “anyone who obtained a Civil Marriage through the ADCFC” is entitled to apply for divorce in application of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law. However, the same website indicates that “[f]or applicants holding citizenship of a country member of the Arab League countries [sic], an official document proving the religion of the party may be required” when they apply for divorce” (emphasis added).[16] Although the ADSC made no reference to the Arab citizenship of the parties in its decision, it appears that it adheres to the idea of dissociation between the conclusion and the dissolution of marriage in dispute involving Muslims. In any case, one can regret that the ASDC missed the opportunity to examine the rule on dual nationality under article 5(2).
Concluding Remarks
1. To deny the jurisdiction of the ADCFC, the ASDC relied on article 3 of the Procedural Regulation, which the Court quoted as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreign non-Muslims in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” The problem, however, is that the ADSC conveniently omitted key words that significantly altered the meaning of the provision.
The provision, properly quoted, reads as follows: “The [ADCFC] is competent to hear civil family matters for foreigners or non-Muslim citizens in relation to civil marriage, divorce and its effects (emphasis added).” In other words, article 3 does not limit the scope of application of the Law and its Regulation exclusively to “foreign non-Muslims” as outlined above.
2. Moreover, it is quite surprising that the ADSC also referred to Article 1 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status in support of its conclusions, i.e. that the taking of jurisdiction by the ADFCF “violated the law”. This is because it is accepted that the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status does not apply to Abu Dhabi.[17] In addition, some important differences exist between the two laws such as age of marriage which fixed at 18 in the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law (article 4(1)), but raised to 21 in the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status (article 5(1)).[18] The combined (mis)application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status appears opportunistic and reveals the ADSC’s intention to exclude contra legem foreign Muslims (or at least those who are binational of both a Muslim and Non-Muslim countries) from the scope of application of 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law and its Procedural Regulation.
[1] see on this blog, Lena-Maria Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners, Shakes up Domestic and International Family Law”. See Also, idem, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates: A Preliminary Assessment”, 37 Arab Law Quarterly (2023) 1 ff. For a particularly critical view, see Sami Bostanji, “Le droit de statut personnel au service de l’économie de marché! Reflexoins autour de la Loi n°14 en date de 7 novembre 2021 relative au statut personnel des étrangers non-musulmans dans l’Emirat d’Abou Dhabi” in Mélanges offerts en l’honneur du Professeur Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine (CPU, 2023) 905 ff.
[2] Law No. 14/2021 of 7 November 2021 on the “Personal Status for Non-Muslims” as modified by the Law No. 15/2021 of 8 December 2021 which changed the Law’s title to “Law on Civil Marriage and its Effects” (hereafter “2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law”) and its Procedural Regulation issued by the Resolution of the Chairman of the Judicial Department No. 8/2022 of 1 February 2022, hereafter the “2022 Procedural Regulation”
[3] Federal Legislative Decree No. 41/2022 of 3 October 2022 on “Civil Personal Status” (hereafter “2022 Federal Civil Personal Status”) and its Implementing Regulation issued by the Order of the Council of Ministers No. 1222 of 27 November 2023.
[4] See below IV(1)(i). On the difference between the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status on this particular point, see below IV(1).
[5] Article 2 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law.
[6] Article 16 of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Law Civil Marriage Law; article 4 of the 2022 Federal Civil Personal Status.
[7] The text of the decision is not clear on this point. Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded pursuant to 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[8] The text of the decision particularly mentions the presence and consent of Y’s matrimonial guardian (wali), which is a necessary requirement for the validity of marriage between Muslims, but not a requirement under the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law.
[9] The ADCFC, which was established specifically to deal with family law matters falling under the purview of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Civil Marriage Law, holds subject-matter jurisdiction in this regard.
[10] cf. Möller, “Abu Dhabi Introduces Personal Status for non-Muslim Foreigners” op. cit.
[11] For an affirmative view, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[12] Some comments online explain that the marriage was concluded using foreign passports with no-Arabic names and no indication of the parties’ religion.
[13] On the problems of interpretation of this provision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 7.
[14] The Procedural Regulation further expands the scope of application of the Civil Marriage Law to cover cases where “the marriage was concluded abroad in a country whose family law is not primarily based on Islamic Sharia as determined by Abu Dhabi authorities” (Article 5(3)) and in any other case determined by the Chairman of the Judicial Department and about which an order is issued (Article 5(5)).
[15] See supra n (7).
[16] However, this rule appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
[17] Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 2.
[18] For a comparision, see Möller, “One Year of Civil Family Law in the United Arab Emirates”, op. cit., 13-15.
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