Agrégateur de flux

20-84.472
FS-P+I

The Hague Court of Appeal on January 29, 2021 held that Shell’s parent and subsidiary company in Nigeria were liable for oil spillage in Bayelsa State – an oil producing area in Nigeria. The Court held that Shell had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the oil spillage was caused by sabotage by a third party.

The full details on the above important case can be found here

February starts with a hearing on 4 February in a PPU case. C-603/20 PPU MCP is a preliminary reference from the High Court of Justice, Family Division (United Kingdom), filed on November 2020 (that much for Brexit…), on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003. The facts concern two Indian citizens habitually resident in the United Kingdom who share the parental responsibility for P, a British citizen aged three, born in the UK. P has been living in India since October 2018, when the mother took him there fleeing from (alleged) domestic violence. There has been no contact between the father and P since 2018.

The mother did not seise the English courts before removing P to India, nor did she obtain the consent of the father. On 26 November 2019, she seised the Family Court at Chelmsford for ‘permission to change jurisdiction of the child’. On 26 August 2020, the father filed an application in the High Court requesting in essence the return of the child to the UK. On 6 November 2020, the High Court (Family Division) addressed the issue of jurisdiction and determined that the English courts could not base jurisdiction neither on Article 8 on Article 12(3) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Having doubts as to whether Article 10 of the Regulation applies where a child is wrongfully removed to or retained in a third country, it referred the following question for a preliminary ruling:

Does Article 10 of Brussels 2 retain jurisdiction, without limit of time, in a member state if a child habitually resident in that member state was wrongfully removed to (or retained in) a non-member state where she, following such removal (or retention), in due course became habitually resident?

The case is allocated to a chamber of five judges, with E. Regan as reporting judge. A. Rantos is the advocate general in charge.

The Opinion of AG Bobek in case C-800/19, reported in this blog some days ago, will be delivered on 23 February.

Finally, the judgment in C-804/19 Markt24 will be published on 24 February. The blog had informed about the questions referred here. The Opinion by AG Oe, of October 29, 2020, is not available in English. My tentative translation would be:

1. A claim for payment of the remuneration agreed in an employment contract, filed by a worker domiciled in a Member State against an employer domiciled in another Member State, falls within the scope of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (…) and, more specifically, section 5 of its chapter II, even when the worker has not, in practice, performed any work in compliance with the contract in question.
2. Regulation No. 1215/2012 precludes the application of the rules on jurisdiction established by the national law of the court seised, enabling an employee to bring an action in the place where his domicile or habitual residence is located during the employment relationship, or before the court in the place where the remuneration is to be paid.
3. When a employee and an employer have entered into an employment contract and, for whatever reason, no performance has been made in practice in compliance with that contract, ‘the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work’, within the meaning of Article 21, paragraph 1, letter b), subparagraph i), of Regulation No. 1215/2012, will coincide, in principle, with the workplace agreed in the aforementioned contract.

Although not directly related to PIL, I would like to draw the readers’ attention also to case C-490/20 Stolichna obshtina, Rayon “Pancharevo”. Hearing is taking place on 9 February. The questions referred by Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaria) are:

Must Article 20 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the Bulgarian administrative authorities to which an application for a document certifying the birth of a child of Bulgarian nationality in another Member State of the EU was submitted, which had been certified by way of a Spanish birth certificate in which two persons of the female sex are registered as mothers without specifying whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological mother, are not permitted to refuse to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate on the grounds that the applicant refuses to state which of them is the child’s biological mother?

Must Article 4(2) TEU and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that respect for the national identity and constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union means that those Member States have a broad discretion as regards the rules for establishing parentage? Specifically:

–    Must Art. 4(2) TEU be interpreted as allowing Member State to request information on the biological parentage of the child?

–    Must Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that it is essential to strike a balance of interests between, on the one hand, the national identity and constitutional identity of a Member State and, on the other hand, the best interests of the child, having regard to the fact that, at the present time, there is neither a consensus as regards values nor, in legal terms, a consensus about the possibility of registering as parents on a birth certificate persons of the same sex without providing further details of whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological parent? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how could that balance of interests be achieved in concrete terms?

Is the answer to Question 1 affected by the legal consequences of Brexit in that one of the mothers listed on the birth certificate issued in another Member State is a UK national whereas the other mother is a national of an EU Member State, having regard in particular to the fact that the refusal to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate for the child constitutes an obstacle to the issue of an identity document for the child by an EU Member State and, as a result, may impede the unlimited exercise of her rights as an EU citizen?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, oblige the competent national authorities to derogate from the model birth certificate which forms part of the applicable national law?

This will be (not surprisingly) a Grand Chamber decision.

Le président Robert Spano a tenu, le 28 janvier 2021, une conférence de presse. À cette occasion, le président de la Cour a présenté le bilan des activités de la Cour et les statistiques pour l’année 2020.

en lire plus

From 15 to 20 February 2021, Università degli Studi di Milano and the European Court of Arbitration, in cooperation with the Law Firms BonelliErede and DLA Piper Italy, organize the first edition of the “Milan Investment Arbitration Week” (MIAW), a series of different events (conferences, round-table debates, legal competitions), held in streaming and related to international investment law and arbitration. Renowned Italian and foreign experts from academia, legal profession and arbitral institutions will address from different angles some of the most relevant topics related to the field. In addition, MIAW will include two legal competitions: the second edition of the Milan Investment Arbitration Pre-Moot and the first edition of the Construction Arbitration Moot, with the participation of several Universities from all around the world. Detailed information available here.

Michiel Posen appropriated a currently popular meme and went (almost) viral. Is his observation right? Comments very welcome.

by Jingru Wang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

1. Background

A blocking statute is adopted by a country to hinder the extraterritorial application of foreign legislation.[1] For example, the EU adopted Council Regulation No 2271/96 (hereinafter “EU Blocking Statute”) in 1996 to protest the US’s extraterritorial sanctions legislation concerning Cuba, Iran and Libya.[2] Since Donald Trump became the US president, the US government officially defined China as its competitor.[3] Consequently, China has been increasingly targeted by US sanctions. For example, in 2018, the US imposed broad sanctions on China’s Equipment Development Department (EDD), the branch of the military responsible for weapons procurement and its director for violating the US law on sanctions against Russia.[4] In 2020, the US announced new sanctions on Chinese firms for aiding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.[5] A number of “Belt and Road” countries are targeted by US primary sanctions, which means that Chinese entities may face a high risk of secondary sanctions for trading with these countries. In these contexts, Chinese scholars and policy makers explore the feasibility to enact blocking law to counter foreign sanctions.[6] On 9 January 2021, China’s Ministry of Commerce (hereinafter “MOFCOM”) issued “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures” (hereinafter “Chinese Blocking Rules”), which entered into force on the date of the promulgation.[7]

2. Analysis of the Main Content

Competent Authority: Chinese government will establish a “Working Mechanism” led by the MOFCOM and composed of relevant central departments, such as the National Development and Reform Commission. The Working Mechanism will take charge of counteracting unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and other measures (Art. 4).

Targeted extraterritorial measures: The Chinese Blocking Rules target foreign legislation and other measures unjustifiably prohibit or restrict Chinese parties from engaging in normal economic, trade and related activities with third state’s parties (Art. 2), which is the so-called “secondary sanction”. Namely, if China considers sanctions unilaterally imposed by the US against a third country unjustified and violating international law, it may nullify such sanctions and allow Chinese companies to continue to transact with the third country. These Rules do not impact restrictions on business activities between China and the sanctioning country.

Unlike the EU Blocking Statute, the Chinese Blocking Rules do not provide an annex listing the legislation subject to the blocking but grant the Working Mechanism discretion. To determine whether foreign legislation or other measures fall within the application scope of the Chinese Blocking Rules, the Working Mechanism shall consider (1) the international law and fundamental principle of international relations; (2) potential impact on China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests; (3) potential impact on the legitimate interest of the Chinese party and (4) all other factors (Art. 6). On the one hand, the non-exhaustive list grants the Working Mechanism broad flexibility to analyse on a case-by-case basis. China has repeatedly become the target of US secondary sanctions. An exhaustive list of foreign legislation and other measures is insufficient to deal with the changing situations. On the other hand, China is prudent in confrontation with other countries. In a press conference, the MOFCOM spokesman stated that “the working mechanism will closely follow the inappropriate extraterritorial application of relevant national laws and measures.”[8] Therefore, the response of other countries will influence the enforcement of the Chinese Blocking Rules.

It is noteworthy the Chinese Blocking Rules will not affect China’s performance of its international obligations. These Rules shall not apply to such extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and measures as provided for in treaties or international agreements to which China is a party (Art. 15).

Information reporting system: A Chinese party prohibited or restricted by foreign legislation and other measures from engaging in normal economic, trade and related activities with a third state’s party shall report such matters to the MOFCOM within 30 days (Art. 5). Otherwise, the Chinese party may be warned, ordered to rectify or fined (Art. 13). To encourage the information report, Art. 5 of the Chinese Blocking Rules also provides that the competent authority shall keep such report confidential at the request of the Chinese party. The staff of the competent authority may undertake administrative penalties if they fail with such obligation (Art. 14).

Concerning the Information reporting system, when the report obligation is triggered is unclear. Should the Chinese party report within 30 days after the foreign legislation is published or other measures are taken or after its actual operation is restricted? Moreover, since the Chinese Blocking Rules do not list targeted foreign legislation and other measures, the Chinese party should rely on their judgment to report. Finally, who should report on behalf of the legal person remains to be answered.

Prohibition order: Once the unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and other measures is confirmed, the Working Mechanism may decide that the MOFCOM shall issue a prohibition order to ban the effect of relevant foreign legislation and other measures (Art. 7). A Chinese party that fails to observe the prohibition order will be punished (Art. 13). Therefore, Chinese parties are forced to comply with either Chinese or foreign laws. In other words, they will be punished by one or the other. To free the party from the dilemma, a Chinese party may apply for exemption from compliance with a prohibition order (Art. 8). China-based subsidiaries of foreign companies are formed under Chinese law. They are considered to be Chinese entities. Therefore, unless otherwise provided by law, they are subject to the prohibition order issued under the Chinese Blocking Rules and can apply for the exemption.

One major uncertainty is whether third state’s parties are subject to the prohibition order. These Rules do not stipulate that foreign entities will be punished by violating the prohibition order or can apply for the exemption. However, it is suggested that the prohibition order may bind the third state’s party for two reasons. Firstly, the US may issue secondary sanctions to prohibit Chinese parties from trading with third state’s parties (Iran as an example), or to prohibit third state’s parties (EU as an example) from trading with Chinese parties. According to Art. 2 of the Chinese Blocking Rules, both situations may obstruct the normal economic, trade and related activities between the Chinese party and the third state’s party. If the prohibition order merely applies to the Chinese party, it cannot protect Chinese businesses from being prejudiced by the US secondary sanctions in the latter situation. Secondly, a Chinese party can bring a lawsuit before the People’s Court against the party who infringes the legitimate interest of such Chinese party by complying with the foreign legislation and other measures covered by the prohibition order (Art. 9). This article does not limit the defendant to “a Chinese party.” Thus it shall include the third state’s party. If the prohibition order does not bind the third state’s party, it is doubtful that such third state’s party is liable for not complying with the prohibition order.

The prohibition order refrains relevant parties from complying with specific foreign legislation and other measures. A question is how should the prohibition order be observed. According to the European Commission’s Guidance Note, the purpose of the EU Blocking Statute is to ensure that business decisions on trading with third States remain free. It does not oblige EU operators to do business with Iran or Cuba. Also, the Chinese Blocking Rules cannot and should not oblige the Chinese party and the third state’s party to engage with each other. Therefore, it raises the worry that these Rules may apply better for breach of existing contract but be more difficult to “force” someone to enter into a contract or in terms of the pre-contractual obligation.

Judicial Remedy: A Chinese party can bring a lawsuit before the People’s Court of PRC against the party who infringes its legitimate interest by complying with the foreign legislation or measures covered by the prohibition order. A Chinese party may also suit the party who benefits from the judgment or ruling made under such foreign legislation or other measures before the People’s Court (Art. 9). Problems may arise if the losing party has no asset in China seized for enforcement by the Chinese court. Other countries may be reluctant to recognize and enforce such judgment.

Government support: Members of the Working Mechanism shall provide guidance and service to Chinese parties to deal with unjustified extraterritorial application of foreign legislation and other measures (Art. 10). Suppose a Chinese party that observes the prohibition suffers significant losses resulting from non-compliance with the relevant foreign legislation and measures. In that case, relevant government departments may provide necessary support based on specific circumstances (Art. 11). Which government department is responsible for these matters? Does “Necessary support” include financial compensation or support on litigation in the sanctioning country? These questions remain to be answered.

3. Impact of the Blocking Statute

Considering that China has long suffered from secondary sanctions issued by the US government, promulgating the Chinese Blocking Rules is not a surprise. Overall, the Chinese Blocking Rules attempt to establish three core institutions anticipated by Chinese scholars: (1) blocking the effect and enforcement of specific foreign legislation in China; (2) prohibiting relevant parties from complying with specific foreign legislation and other measures; (3) enabling relevant parties to recover the damage from the party who complies with the foreign legislation and measures covered by the prohibition order. Therefore, a blocking statute serves as both shield and sword to fight against foreign sanctions.

But the function of blocking statute shall not be overemphasized. The same as the EU Blocking Statute, the Chinese Blocking Rules create a quandary for relevant parties.

For Chinese parties, if they comply with the Chinese prohibition order, they have to deal with US penalties. Chinese parties may invoke “foreign sovereign compulsion”[9] as a defence to insulate themselves from certain US sanctions penalties. In determining whether to buy such argument, US courts often consider whether foreign states actively enforce them.[10] The Chinese Blocking Rules can provide a legal basis for Chinese parties to exempt from the US sanctions by strategic enforcement actions. If so, Chinese parties will be relieved to transact with third state’s parties. But the Chinese government may not be willing to provide the same exemption. Out of self-interest, Chinese parties may be more likely to comply with the Chinese Blocking Rules.

These Rules have not yet stipulated the legal result if third states’ parties violate the Chinese prohibition order. In principle, prescriptive jurisdiction can be extraterritorial, but enforcement jurisdiction must be territorial. Therefore, China cannot always extend the effect of Blocking Rules to a third state’s party even if it has the will. However, it is reasonable to assume that third state’s parties may be added to the “unreliable entities list”[11] for disregarding the Chinese prohibition order. It may prompt third state’s parties to observe the Chinese prohibition order voluntarily to preserve their assets and reputation in China. But even if third state’s parties value the Chinese market, it is uneasy for them to choose China over the US.

China has become more active in exploring countermeasures against the US. On 19 September 2020, MOFCOM released provisions on establishing “unreliable entity list.”[12] Promulgation of the Chinese Blocking Rules is another proactive attempt. However, both are departmental rules, which are at a relatively low-level in the Chinese legal system. Predictably, higher-level legislation concerning the extraterritorial effect of foreign legislation and other measures will be enacted in the future. It may prompt China and the US back to the negotiating table.

[1] Menno T. Kamminga, “Extraterritoriality”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, November 2012, para. 26.

[2] COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2271/96, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01996R2271-20140220.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017.

[4] CAATSA – Russia-related Designations, available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180920_33. aspx.

[5] North Korea Designations, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20201208.

[6] Ye Yan, “On the EU Blocking Statute”, Pacific Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3, Mar. 2020, pp. 50-66; Huo Zhengxin, “Extraterritoriality of Domestic Law: American Model, Jurisprudential Deconstruction and Chinese Approach”, Tribune of Political Science and Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, Mar. 2020, pp. 173-191.

[7] Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, available at: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/e/202101/20210103032421.shtml.

[8] The Head of the Department of Treaty of Law of Ministry of Commerce answers press on “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures”, available at:  http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/news/202101/20210103029779.shtml.

[9] “Foreign Sovereign Compulsion” means that if a party is obliged to do or not to do an act by a state, it may constitute a defence for not complying with the obligation specified by the US law before the US court. See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, 1990, p. 341.

[10] M. J. Hoda, “The Aerospatiale Dilemma: Why U.S. Courts Ignore Blocking Statutes and What Foreign States Can Do About It”, California Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 1, 2018.

[11] The entity added to the list will be restricted on China-related trade, investment in China and travel or work permits. See “MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020 on Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List”, available at:

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/fwzl/202009/20200903002593.shtml.

[12] Ibid.

On 19 January 2021, Namibia deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute, becoming the 87th Member of the HCCH. More information is available here. 

On 1 January 2021, the HCCH 2000 Protection of Adults Convention entered into force for Belgium. The Convention currently has 13 Contracting Parties. More information is available here. 

On 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom’s new instrument of accession to the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention and new instrument of ratification to the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention entered into force. The United Kingdom has already been bound by the Choice of Court Convention since 2015 and by the Child Support Convention since 2014, by virtue of the European Union’s approval. To ensure continuity in their application following its withdrawal from the EU, the United Kingdom deposited these new instruments of accession and ratification on 28 September 2020. More information is available here. 

On 18 January 2020, Singapore deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention. With the accession of Singapore, the Apostille Convention now has 120 Contracting Parties. Singapore is the third ASEAN Member State to join the Apostille Convention. It will enter into force for Singapore on 16 September 2021. More information is available here. 

From 22 to 27 January, the Applicable Law Working Group on the HCCH 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol met via videoconference. The Group provided guidance in relation to issues of applicable law arising from certain family relationships, the law applicable to preliminary / incidental questions, as well as the interpretation and scope of certain articles of the Protocol. More information is available here. 

On 29 January, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of translations, in all European Union languages, of the Practical Handbook for Competent Authorities on the 2007 Child Support Convention, the 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol, and the 2009 EU Maintenance Regulation. The translations were made possible with the support of the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission. The Handbook, originally published in English, French, and Romanian, was jointly developed by the HCCH, the Ministry of Justice of Romania, and the French National School for the Judiciary (ENM). More information is available here. 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website. 

The Private International Law Interest Group of the Italian Society of International Law and EU Law has organised a series of webinar, most of which will be conducted in English, under the title Private International Law in Europe: Current Developments in Jurisprudence.

The programme is as follows:

29 January 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET): Limiting European Integration through Constitutional Law? Recent Decisions of the German Bundesvarfassungsgericht and their Impact on Private International Law – Speaker: Christian Kohler (Univ. Saarbrücken); Discussant: Giulia Rossolillo (Univ. Pavia).

19 February 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET): State Immunity and Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters in Recent Court of Justice Rulings – Speaker: Alexander Layton (King’s College London); Discussant: Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe (Univ. Genova).

12 March 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET): La trascrizione dell’atto di nascita nella recente giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale italiana – Speaker: Sara Tonolo (Univ. Trieste); Discussant: Elena Rodriguez Pineau (Univ. Autonóma Madrid).

9 April 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET): Law Governing Arbitration Agreements in a Recent Judgment of the UK Supreme Court – Speaker: Adrian Briggs (Univ. Oxford); Discussant: Pietro Franzina (Catholic Univ. of the Sacred Heart, Milan).

23 April 2021, 4 to 6 PM (CET) (TBC): Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Cross-Border Torts according to the Recent Volkswagen Judgment of the Court of Justice – Speaker: Giesela Rühl (Humboldt Univ. Berlin); Discussant: Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (Univ. Macerata).

More information available here.

Trower J confirmed mid-December (judgment was not published until earlier this week) jurisdiction for England and Wales courts over continental corporations using ‘Restructuring Plans’, in an echo of his earlier findings in Virgin Atlantic.  The plan has in the meantime also been sanctioned. Mother holding is a Dutch BV. Plan companies are all UK incorporated. Creditors in part UK based, largely non-UK based. However the presence of a sizeable number of them in E&W is held (36-38) to be sufficient to serve as anchor using A8(1) BIa.

As I flagged in my review of Virgin Atlantic, pre-Brexit and of course even more so post Brexit, jurisdiction for these Plans let alone their recognition and enforcement in the EU, involves additional challenges to Schemes of Arrangements. I have a paper on the issues forthcoming.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, paras 5.35 ff

Convening order is now here https://t.co/ADUj1QubUO
(and sanctioning order https://t.co/8BtUzj8KMM)
Brussels Ia jurisdiction re Deep Ocean #restructuring 'Plan' addressed in two paras simply confirming indeed arguendo approach as under Schemes of Arrangement, anchor defendants. https://t.co/Qb4nH1cPQO

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 28, 2021

On 4 November 2020, the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) ruled on the applicability of the consumer jurisdiction under Article 18 Brussels I bis Regulation to transactions related to Bitcoin.

The facts of this case were quite peculiar. An Austrian resident offered investment opportunities on a cross-border basis, which could only be paid for in Bitcoin. After being contacted by a German resident who expressed interest in the investment opportunities, the Austrian offeror sent three agents to the German customer.

The three agents brought with them a so-called Bitcoin ATM to carry out the transaction. Since the Bitcoin ATM did not function, they used the smartphone of the Austrian offeror, which they had also brought “just in case”, to transfer six Bitcoin belonging to the Austrian offeror to an investment account in the name of the German customer. It was agreed that the German customer would reimburse six Bitcoin within a month to the Austrian offeror.

When he failed to do so, he was sued by the Austrian offeror at the latter’s domicile in Austria.

In the proceedings, the German investor contested the jurisdiction of the Austrian courts.

The Austrian courts at first and second instance dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. They characterised the contract as a contract for the exchange of Bitcoin for the participation in the investment. This led them to apply Article 7(1)(a) Brussels I bis Regulation, with the consequence that (i) the place of performance for each obligation must be determined according to the governing national law and (ii) the governing national law must be identified through the use of the rules of private international law of the forum (see the now classic CJEU judgments in Tessili and De Bloos). The courts took the view that under both Austrian and German law, the place of performance of contracts of exchange is the place of domicile of the debtor of the respective obligation. Since the result was the same under both laws, it did not matter which of the two was applicable to the obligation to return the Bitcoin.

According to the same courts, it was of no relevance in this case if the contract were to be characterized not as a contract for exchange, but as a loan. In the latter case, the place of performance would still be the place of domicile of the debtor under Austrian and German law. This view, however, ignores that loan contracts are governed by the uniform jurisdiction rule of Article 7(1)(b) Brussels I bis Regulation (see CJEU C-249/16, Kareda). The place of performance for a Bitcoin loan would therefore be determined uniformly and in an autonomous way. The CJEU has also previously ruled that the place of performance for long-term contracts is uniformly located at the domicile of the lender (see again Kareda).

The Supreme Court of Austria cut short the legal debate. It ruled that the German investor acted for a purpose that could not be attributed to her professional or commercial activity, and that she was therefore a consumer in the sense of Article 17 Brussels Ibis Regulation. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Austrian offeror was to be assumed to have acted in a professional capacity and therefore as an entrepreneur. The Austrian offeror had also directed his activities to the consumer’s country of residence, as evidenced by the fact that he had marketed the investments in Germany and had recruited numerous investors there. Therefore, the consumer jurisdiction rules of Article 18 Brussels Ibis Regulation applied. As a result, the German investor could only be sued at her place of domicile in Germany (Article 18(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation). The Austrian courts therefore lacked jurisdiction. The action was dismissed.

The case raises a number of interesting questions about Bitcoin transactions and jurisdiction. In particular, it illustrates the importance of the question of whether or not Bitcoin can be characterised as money for the purposes of EU Private International Law. If Bitcoin were money, the applicability of the rules on sales or service contracts for performances paid with Bitcoin could be envisaged. If, on the contrary, Bitcoin lacks the legal characteristics of money, any transaction in Bitcoin can only be qualified as a contract falling under Article 7(1)(a) Brussels I bis Regulation, with the result that jurisdiction will depend on the national rules governing the transaction and their characterisation of Bitcoin.

Unfortunately, the Austrian Supreme Court was able to avoid answering the questions on the legal nature of Bitcoin by resorting to the consumer jurisdiction rules. Given the considerable and growing economic importance of Bitcoin, it would be desirable to obtain legal certainty on these questions. But at the least, the ruling underlines the need for protecting Bitcoin investors, including at the level of jurisdiction. It can hardly be doubted that the result reached by the Austrian Supreme Court was appropriate. Investors should not have to sue at a place of domicile of the counterparty simply because an investment can only be paid for in cryptocurrency and not in legal tender.

From 22 to 27 January 2021, the Applicable Law Working Group on the Hague Conference Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations met via videoconference. The Conclusions & Recommendations summarising the outcomes of the meeting are attached to this post.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=783