Agrégateur de flux

Tribunal correctionnel de Briey, 12 mai 2020

Tribunal de commerce de Saint-Nazaire, 29 mai 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Riom, 28 novembre 2019

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Rennes, 6 novembre 2019

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Douai, 13 et 28 mai 2020

Cour d'appel d'Amiens, 26 septembre 2019

Tribunal correctionnel de Valence, 9 juin 2020

Cour d'appel de Paris, 4 juin 2020

Acte clair is in the eyes of the beholder, I assume. However a confident judge would have sufficient CJEU authority to help them hold on the A24(1) BIa issues in C‑433/19 Ellmes Property Services in which Szpunar AG opined last week. (No EN version available at the time of publication of this post).

Do actions brought by a co-owner seeking to prohibit another co-owner from carrying out changes to his property subject to co-ownership, in particular to its designated use, arbitrarily and without the consent of the other co-owners, concern the assertion of a right in rem? In the negative, is the forum contractus per A7(1)(a) Brussels Ia the location of the property? The less clear issue in my view is the forum contractus element.

The location is Zell am Zee, contested use is, not surprisingly, tourist accomodation. Applicant in the national proceedings is an individual who lives in the apartment building. Defendant is a UK corporation who uses it for short-term lets despite the residential designation assigned to the building as a whole in the co-ownership agreement.

From CJEU authority including C-438/12 Weber v Weber it should be clear that other than the hardcore cases of ownership of real estate, the erga omnes v in personam character of rights in real estate depends on national law. The Advocate General in this respect points out that for the rights of co-owners in the case at issue to be rights in rem, Austrian law would have to be enable them to exercise these rights not just vis-a-vis the other co-owners, but also vis-a-vis third parties such as tenants. Whether this is the case in Austrian law has not been sufficiently explained in the reference, it seems.

For the impact of entry in the land register (where third parties can consult the co-ownership agreement), Szpunar AG reviews and contrasts C‑417/15 Schmidt v Schmidt, and C-630/17 Milivojević v Raiffeisenbank. Mere registration does not always entail erga omnes impact.

The Advocate General reminds us of the overall interpretation of Article 24, including the need for restrictive interpretation, and flags (with reference inter alia to the Handbook, p.73, for which I am, as always, sincerely humbled) that it is not just, or not even so much sound administration of justice which underlies A24. At least partially, Member States’ strategic interests are served by the issues listed in the Article.

Ellmes Property Services does not seem to raise additional issues such as we saw in C-25/18 Kerr. The Austrian courts could have dealt with this on their own, and seeing as the referring judge did not provide the kind of detail for the CJEU to judge, the AG’s suggestion is to leave it up to them to verify the erga omnes character.

That leaves (whether it will be needed depends on what the eventual insight will be on the erga omnes element), the forum contractus under A7(1). Parties differ as to the qualification of the contractual duty: is it a positive one (do!) or a negative one (must not!). The AG opts for the latter, with reference to CJEU 14/76 De Bloos: A7(1) refers to the contractual obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings. I find the precedent value of De Bloos problematic in light of the many changes that have been made to Article 7 since, and in light of the engineering possibilities it hands to parties.

The AG advises that forum contractus will have to be determined by the Italian judge following the conflicts method per CJEU 12/76 Tessili v Dunlop, with little help from European harmonisation seeing i.a. as the initial co-ownership agreement dates back to 1978.

I am curious to see how far the Court will go in entertaining the issues at stake.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.1 (cited by the AG) and Heading 2.2.11.1.

Aaron D. Simowitz (Willamette University College of Law) has posted Convergence and the Circulation of Money Judgments on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

For half a century at least, the several states of the United States have taken a liberal attitude toward the recognition and enforcement of foreign country money judgments. The U.S. Supreme Court invoked the “grace” of sovereign nations to justify a restrictive approach to the recognition of judgments in the famous case of Hilton v. Guyot. The New York Court of Appeals laid out a more generous approach based in the vindication of private rights. Simply put, private rights won. In 1962, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which codified a liberal approach to the cross-border circulation of money judgments. The many U.S. states that adopted the uniform act were trying to lead by example. The hope was that, if they accepted incoming judgments, judgments exported to the rest of the world would be accepted, recognized, and enforced. For decades, this effort was regarded as a failure. The European Union continued to draw a sharp distinction between E.U. judgments and U.S. judgments—though acceptance of U.S. judgments by E.U. member states crept up over time. Some of the world’s largest economies—most notably, China—outright rejected recognition of U.S. money judgments.

Change has been recent and dramatic. In 2017, a Chinese court recognized and enforced a U.S. money judgement for the first time. Chinese law requires reciprocity between nations in order to recognize a foreign money judgment. The United States has no reciprocal judgment recognition treaty with any country. A U.S. district court recognized and enforced a Chinese judgment in 2009. This “reciprocity in fact” was sufficient for a Chinese court. A few months later, China announced that it would sign The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“COCA”), obligating Chinese courts to recognize and enforce judgments rendered under a choice of court clause selecting the courts of any contracting state. The COCA has already entered into force between the European Union, Mexico, and Singapore. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the agreement. Meanwhile, The Hague Judgments Project gathers steam to require the free circulation of judgments arising in all but a few contexts. The drivers of this apparent convergence are obscure and likely diverse. This Article will analyze the causes of this recent, dramatic shift and will attempt to assess the likelihood of further convergence.

The paper is forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review.

According to the judgment in Blijdenstein, delivered by the Court of Justice in 2004, a public body which seeks reimbursement of sums paid under public law to the original maintenance creditor, to whose rights it is subrogated against the maintenance debtor, cannot rely on Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention. It cannot, therefore, sue the debtor before the courts for the place of domicile/habitual residence of the original maintenance creditor.

In 2009, the EU legislator adopted the Maintenance Regulation. As it follows from Article 68 of this Regulation, it replaced the provisions of the Brussels regime relating to maintenance obligations. The Regulation contains a provision that seems to be somehow similar to Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention. Its Article 3(b) allows to bring the proceedings in matters relating to maintenance obligations before the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident.

Is that similarity sufficient to justify faithful application of interpretation provided in the judgment in Blijdenstein in relation to the provisions of the Maintenance Regulation? This is, in essence, the question at stake in the case WV, C-540/19. This Thursday, 18 June 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona presented his Opinion in which he addresses that question.

Facts of the case and the question referred

In proceedings before a German court, a social assistance institution being a public body asserts claims for parental maintenance against the defendant who lives in Austria. The public body contends that the parental maintenance claim has been transferred to that body because it regularly granted the defendant’s mother social assistance benefits. Indeed, the defendant’s mother lives in Germany where she receives regular social assistance. The defendant submits that the German courts lack international jurisdiction.

In line with the submission of the defendant, the first instance considers that the German courts have no international jurisdiction. It argues that jurisdiction under Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation is excluded because the creditor within the meaning of that provision is only the maintenance creditor itself, and not a state body asserting maintenance claims legally transferred to it by way of recovery. The second instance court disagrees and, ultimately, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) decides to refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. It submits a following question:

Can a public body which has provided a maintenance creditor with social assistance benefits in accordance with provisions of public law invoke the place of jurisdiction at the place of habitual residence of the maintenance creditor under Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation in the case where it asserts the maintenance creditor’s maintenance claim under civil law, transferred to it on the basis of the granting of social assistance by way of statutory subrogation, against the maintenance debtor by way of recourse?

Advocate General’s Opinion…

In his Opinion, Advocate General proposes to answer the preliminary question in the affirmative. In his view, Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation can be relied on by a public body who contends that it has subrogated the original maintenance creditor.

At point 34, the Opinion recalls the judgment in Blijdenstein and explains that the Court held in its judgment, in essence, that a maintenance creditor is regarded as the weaker party in the proceedings in matters relating to maintenance obligations and therefore that creditor can rely on a rule of jurisdiction which derogates from this general principle of actor sequitur forum rei. The original maintenance creditor could therefore rely on Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention. A public body which brings an action for recovery against a maintenance debtor is not in an inferior position with regard to the latter and it cannot bring its actions before the courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction under Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention.

However, Advocate General develops a series of arguments in support of non-application of the interpretation provided for in the judgment in Blijdenstein within the framework established by the Maintenance Regulation.

First, at points 37 to 42, the Opinion lays down some arguments of systemic interpretation and stresses that the Maintenance Regulation establishes a complete system: while the Brussels regime is in principle not applicable in relation to the third-State defendants, the circumstance that the defendant is habitually resident in a third State does not entail the non-application of the Maintenance Regulation. If the public bodies could not rely on Article 3(b) of the Maintenance Regulation, the complete character of the system established by the Regulation would be affected. In all the scenarios where the debtor is a third-State defendant, a public body would most likely have to assert its claim before the courts of that third-State.

Next, at points 43 to 45, the Opinion adds that unlike in the Brussels regime, under the Maintenance Regulation the place of jurisdiction at the habitual residence of the maintenance creditor is conceptualized not as an exception, but as an alternative general place of jurisdiction.

Then, at points 46 to 47, the Opinion elaborates on the judgment in R. At paragraph 30 of this judgment, it is stated that the objective of the Maintenance Regulation consists in preserving the interest of the maintenance creditor, who is regarded as the weaker party in an action relating to maintenance obligations; Article 3 of that Regulation offers that party, when it acts as the applicant, the possibility of bringing its claim under bases of jurisdiction that do not follow the actor sequitur forum rei principle. In his Opinion, Advocate General emphasizes that the formulation of paragraph 30 of the judgment in R must have been influenced by the factual context of that case. It should not, however, be understood as preventing the public bodies from relying on some specific grounds of jurisdiction of Article 3.

After that, at point 51, the Opinion has recourse to an argument based on historical interpretation: even though a proposal endorsing a solution according to which a public body could bring action only before the courts for the place of habitual residence of the defendant was brought up during the drafting of the Maintenance Regulation, that proposal is not reflected in its final version.

Finally, at points 54 to 60, the Opinion addresses the objectives of the Maintenance Regulation. In particular, at point 59, Advocate General points out that Blijdenstein case law should be discontinued as it seems to contradict the logics of the Regulation – it does not reinforce the protection of the maintenance creditor. In fact, it favors the maintenance debtors once the maintenance of a creditor is covered by the payments of the public body: the debtor is no longer at risk of being sued before the courts of a Member State other than the Member State of his habitual residence.

… and insights on the lessons that may be learned from it:

The above presentation of the arguments developed by Advocate General in his Opinion is far from being extensive. It is best to recommend giving it an attentive lecture as there is much more to bite into. In addition to that, the Opinion raises some arguments that may be relevant in other contexts than that of the case WV, C-540/19.

continuity / adequacy of case law and its reversals

As mentioned before, the Opinion is structured around the question whether Blijdenstein case law should be still applied despite the modification of legal framework. It is interesting to note that, at point 69, the Opinion even anticipates a scenario in which the Court would decide not to follow the proposal of Advocate General. In this context, Advocate General puts forward some modifications that, according to him, should be introduced into the Blijdenstein case law.

The importance of the debate that this question may inspire extends far beyond the scope of the case reported here. When it comes to the interpretation of EU private international law instruments, what factors should be taken into account in assessing whether a pre-existing case law should be reversed? 

coordination between forum and ius

At points 61 to 66, the Opinion offers an additional argument in favor of discontinuation of Blijdenstein and allowing the public bodies to sue before the courts for the place of the creditor’s habitual residence. It argues that the interpretation proposed in the Opinion allows to ensure coordination between forum and ius – a court having jurisdiction under the Maintenance Regulation will, as far as possible, apply its own law.

In fact, since Blijdenstein times, not only the instrument containing the rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to maintenance obligations has changed. The legal landscape was profoundly altered by the common conflict of laws rules of the Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. Under the general rule on applicable law of Article 3(1) of the Protocol, obligations shall be governed by the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor. As the Opinion notes, according to Article 64(2) of the Maintenance Regulation, a right of a public body to act in place of an individual to whom maintenance is owed or to seek reimbursement of benefits provided to the creditor in place of maintenance shall be governed by the law to which the body is subject. In most instances, a public body subrogating the original maintenance creditor is arguably established in the Member State of that creditor’s residence.

It seems that a similar point has been already tackled in the judgment in Kainz. At paragraph 20, it addresses the question relating to the necessity to ensure coordination between, on the one hand, jurisdiction to settle a dispute on the liability for damage caused by a product [under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation] and, on the other hand, law applicable to a non-contractual obligations arising to such damage [under Article 5(1) of the Rome II Regulation]. In the judgment in Kainz, that question is answered in the negative.

Yet, the Maintenance Regulation/the Hague Protocol duo seem to follow different logics than the aforementioned Regulations. There must have been a reason to extract the rules on jurisdiction in matters relating to maintenance from the Brussels regime and adopt a new Regulation.

It is true that the Protocol does not set a general rule according to which the maintenance obligation is governed by the law of the forum. As it follows from Article 3(1), it relies heavily on the law for the place of the creditor’s habitual residence.

However, one the one hand, even with its general rule on applicable law of Article 3(1), it can be argued that the Protocol does indirectly promote a coordination between ius and forum. That is the case as long as one accepts that, in practice, the application of the rules of jurisdiction of the Maintenance Regulation leads to the conferral of jurisdiction to the courts for the place of the creditor’s habitual residence (see, to that effect, paragraph 49 of the judgment in KP). On the other hand, as the Opinion remarks at its footnote 47, at least in some scenarios where it would reinforce the situation of the maintenance creditor, the Hague Protocol provides for a subsidiary application of the law of the forum. According to Articles 4(2) and (3) of the Protocol, the law of the forum applies when the creditor is ‘unable to obtain maintenance’ under the law primarily applicable to the maintenance obligation.

Moreover, striving to ensure that a court applies its own law somewhat echoes Recital 27 of the Succession Regulation. As a reminder, this Recital explains, inter alia, that the Regulation is devised so as to ensure that the authority dealing with the succession will, in most situations, be applying its own law.

At point 61 of the Opinion, Advocate General himself qualifies his argument drawn from the existence of the Maintenance Regulation/the Hague Protocol duo as being of a lesser theoretical importance, yet having practical bearing. However, the argument provokes also a more general question: to what extent the coordination of ius and forum is – and if so, in which constellations – a point of consideration in EU private international law? 

 

The Opinion is available in Spanish [original language] and, inter alia, in German and French. There is not English version yet.

 

Erasmus School of Law (Erasmus University Rotterdam) is recruiting five researchers (two postdocs, two PhDs and one parttime associate/endowed/full professor) for the research project Affordable Access to Justice: towards sustainable cost and funding mechanisms for civil litigation in Europe. 

This five year project is funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), and led by Prof. Xandra Kramer. This five year project will assess new pathways to civil justice funding and cost schemes, with a view to developing a balanced financing system securing access to justice in Europe. It builds onto the ongoing ERC consolidator project Building EU Civil Justice: challenges of procedural innovations – bridging access to justice.

Please contact Xandra Kramer (kramer@law.eur.nl) for more information on the project, and see Vici vacancies 2020 for for the vacancy descriptions, application requirements and procedure. You can apply here till 17 July 2020.

 

By Olivia Tambou

On 12-14 October 2020, the 2nd international Open Search Symposium (OSSYM 2020) will be hosted by the CERN (Geneva). The event is organised by the Open Search Foundation, which militates for the creation of an independent, free and self-determined access to information on the Internet.

You may participate to the Symposium in different ways: with scientific papers, sharing of practical experiences or by introducing concepts and positions during presentations and in the different interactive sessions. Full papers and abstracts presented at the OSSYM 2020 will be published in online proceedings following the event. Interested contributors should send their extended abstract (1 page) or full paper (4-6 pages) for any poster or oral presentation until 6 July 2020 at the following address: https://indico.cern.ch/e/ossym-2020.

Key legal questions to be addressed in the context on the Symposium could be: Competition law, data security/cybersecurity law, General Data Protection Regulation, ePrivacy Regulation, national vs. European law, Private international law, EU copyright legislation, liability, traceability of intellectual property rights and ownership by individuals, organisations and SMEs/corporates, data governance issues, as well as the fairness of digital platform and more globally fundamental rights issues including freedom of expression and protection against hate speech, and interaction with future rules on European digital single market, etc.

Note that the Symposium will be held either at physical meeting or as web-based conference (the final decision is to be taken in July). Registration will open on 16 July 2020 and close on 28 September 2020 (or when maximum number of participants is exceeded).

More information on this event is available here.

In Alexander Brothers Ltd (Hong Kong SAR) v Alstom Transport SA & Anor [2020] EWHC 1584 (Comm) Cockerill J discussed inter alia (at 177 ff) the impact of EU law on the ordre public assessment for potential refusal of recognition of an arbitral award under section 103 of the 1980 New York Convention.

CJEU authority are C-126/ 97 Eco Swiss (concerning EU competition law) and C-168/ 05 Claro (unfair terms in consumer contracts). At 183 Cockerill J does not suggest the CJEU authority should no longer stand. Indeed she suggests obiter that there is no reason to suggest the CJEU’s line of reasoning should not apply to wider issues than just competition law or consumer law. However, the burden of proof of showing that particular parts of EU law are of a nature to justify the ordre public exception, lies upon the party objecting to recognition. In casu Alstom have fallen short of that duty. Yes, there is scant reference to anti-corruption in the private sector; and yes there is EU money laundering law. However (at 186) ‘the EU has, in general terms, set its face against corruption. But aside from the area of money laundering it has not put in place mandatory laws or rules. In the context of international corruption of the kind in focus here it has left it to the individual member states to adopt what measures seem good to them. There is, in short, no applicable mandatory rule or public policy.’

An interesting discussion.

Geert.

Application for refusal of #arbitration award under New York Convention section 103: ordre public. Alternatively, issue estoppel, or failure of full and frank disclosure: all dismissed.
Cockerill J discussing ia C-126/ 97 Eco-Swiss. https://t.co/YF0dB6lVah

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 18, 2020

AG Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered yesterday his opinion in case C‑540/19 (WV v Landkreis Harburg), which is about the Maintenance Regulation. Should the opinion be endorsed by the Court of Justice, the decision will be of great practical importance. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

« L’article 3, sous b), du règlement (CE) no 4/2009 […] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’un organisme public qui a fourni des prestations d’aide sociale à un créancier d’aliments et qui s’est subrogé légalement dans la créance alimentaire peut réclamer cette dette à la personne qui est tenue de la payer, au moyen d’une action récursoire, devant les juridictions de l’État où le créancier a sa résidence habituelle ».

Source : here

AG Szpunar delivered yesterday his opinion in case C‑433/19 (Ellmes Property Services Limited v SP), which is about Brussels I bis. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

« 1) L’article 24, point 1 [Bruxelles I bis] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une action d’un copropriétaire tendant à la cessation de l’usage touristique d’un appartement par un autre copropriétaire, au motif que cet usage ne correspond pas à celui convenu dans le contrat de copropriété, ne relève de cette disposition que si cet usage est opposable à l’égard de tous. Il appartient au juge national d’effectuer les ultimes vérifications à cet égard.

2) L’article 7, point 1, sous a), de ce règlement doit être interprété en ce sens que, dans le cas où l’usage convenu dans le contrat de copropriété n’est pas opposable à l’égard de tous, une telle action relève de la notion de « matière contractuelle » au sens de cette disposition. Dans ces conditions, l’obligation contractuelle litigieuse consiste en une obligation de ne pas faire et, plus précisément, de ne pas modifier, d’une manière non conforme au contrat de copropriété, l’affection d’un bien dans le lieu où celui-ci se situe. Pour vérifier si le lieu d’exécution de cette obligation correspond au lieu où se situe l’appartement soumis au régime de copropriété, il appartient au juge national de déterminer ce lieu d’exécution conformément à la loi régissant cette obligation, selon les règles de conflit de la juridiction saisie ».

Source : here

On 28 May 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) decided to refer a question for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ regarding Articles 80 and 84 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The case, brought by consumer protection groups, is about the alleged violation, by the operator of a social network, of the obligation to inform users about the scope and purpose of the collection and use of their data.

Background

The Irish-based defendant, Facebook Ireland Limited, operates the “Facebook” social network. On the internet platform of this network there is an “app center” in which the defendant makes free online games of other providers accessible to the users of its platform. In November 2012, several games were offered in this app center, for which the following information could be read under the button “Play now”: “Clicking on Play game above gives this application: your general information, your email address, about you, your status. This application may post on your behalf, including your score and more.” In one game, the notice ended with the phrase: “This application may post information on your status, photos, and more on your behalf”.

The plaintiff is the umbrella organization of the consumer centers of the Federal states. It claims, among other, that the presentation of the information under the “Play now” button in the app center is improper, including from the point of view of the legal requirements for obtaining effective data protection consent from the user. It considers itself entitled to enforce injunctive relief by bringing an action before the civil courts in accordance with the relevant German rules on unfair competition and consumer protection.

In the first instance, the district court ordered the defendant to refrain from presenting games on its website in an app center in such a way that users of the internet platform, by clicking a button such as “play game”, allow the game operator to use personal data stored there, and is authorized to transmit (post) information on behalf of the user (LG Berlin, 28 October 2014, 16 O 60/13). The defendant’s appeal was unsuccessful (Kammergericht Berlin, 22 September 2017, 5 U 155/14). The defendant has filed a second appeal with the BGH.

The question

The question referred to the ECJ focuses on whether the criteria set out in Chapter VIII of the GDPR, in particular in Article 80(1) and (2) and in Article 84(1), conflict with national rules granting to competitors and associations, institutions and bodies authorized under national law, the right to sue before the civil courts for infringements under the GDPR regardless of the violation of specific rights of individual data subjects, and without any mandate from a data subject.

This question is controversial in the case law of the lower courts and in legal literature. Some consider that the GDPR contains a final regulation for the enforcement of the data protection provisions made in this Regulation, and that associations are therefore only authorized to bring proceedings under the conditions of Article 80 of the GDPR (which have not been met in the case at hand). According to others, the GDPR is not exhaustive, hence associations continue to be authorized to try and enforce injunctive relief in case of an alleged violation of personal data protection rules, independently of any infringement of specific rights of individual data subjects, and without the need of a mandate from a data subject.

The Court of Justice ruled in Fashion ID that the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC (the Data Protection Directive), which was in force until the General Data Protection Regulation became applicable on 25 May 2018, do not preclude associations from having legal standing. However, this decision does not indicate whether this right to bring an action remains in force under the GDPR.

Henshaw J in  DVB Bank SE v Vega Marine Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1494 (Comm) (a substantively straightforward case on sums loaned) made some important observations on the benefits of summary judgment as opposed to a default judgment in the context of recognition and enforcement.

This a few days before publication of the thesis of Vincent Richard on the very topic.

There is no doubt the English courts have jurisdiction per a valid choice of court clause under A25 BIa. Claimants are pressing for summary judgment, citing

• Brexit. The Withdrawal Agreement extends EU law in civil procedure to proceedings issued before the end of the transition period, however claimants express anxiety over the speed of Greek enforcement proceedings given courts’ shutdown in the Covid19 era. At 61: ‘Greek counsel has advised the Claimants that the Greek courts shut down earlier this year for an indefinite period, so that obtaining an enforcement order in Greece would be likely to be delayed;’.
• More crucially however, Henshaw J notes at 61, correctly, that even under BIa, default judgments are more vulnerable:

there is a risk that an enforcement order based on a simple default judgment, even if obtained before 31 December 2020, might be set aside on public policy grounds. Greek counsel advised that the Greek courts would be much less likely to refuse to recognise and enforce a reasoned English judgment following a hearing on the merits.

Summary judgment was given against the defendants.

Geert.

Summary judgment granted.
Hanshaw J holding ia that for enforcement purposes both before and after Brexit (ordre public arguments in State of enforcement), summary judgment is to be preferred over default judgment. https://t.co/iS9Jhgjdp8

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 10, 2020