In Generali Italia & Ors v Pelagic Fisheries & Anor [2020] EWHC 1228 (Comm) the claimants-insurers commenced these proceedings seeking declarations that they are not liable to the Insureds. Pelagic had already commenced proceedings in Treviso, Italy on the basis of what it claims to be choice of court in favour of Italy. The first instance Italian court stayed the Treviso Proceedings (the insureds have appealed; the appeal is yet to be heard) pending a determination by the English court as to whether the Treviso Policies are subject to an exclusive English jurisdiction clause. The Stay order readers in relevant part:
‘the lis alibi pendens defence which has been raised requires that these proceedings are suspended in order to allow the High Court of London to rule on the exclusive English jurisdiction clause pursuant to art 31.2 of EU Reg 1215/2012. That since, in the light of what is established by the said provisions, it is irrelevant that the Italian Judicial Authority has been seised first, …. Indeed article 31 of the above mentioned regulation represents an exception to the operation of the ordinary rule of priority in matter of lis alibi pendens, in order to allow the judges chosen by the parties in contractual terms (cover notes) to be the first to rule on the validity of the clause itself (according to the law chosen by the parties). In the concerned case all the cover notes, in the special insurance conditions, contain the clause ‘English jurisdiction. Subject to English law and practice”, with consequent waiver to the general insurance conditions provided in Camogli Policy 1988 form”.’
Other parties are part of the proceedings, too – readers best refer to the facts of the case. They clarify that chunks of the proceedings bear resemblance to the kind of split stay scenario applied by the CJEU in C-406/92 The Tatry.
Foxton J refers to the good arguable case test viz Article 25 Brussels Ia of BNP Paribas v Anchorage, recently also further summarised by the Court of Appeal in Kaefer Aislamientos and further in Etihad Airways PJSC v Flöther.
The case essentially puts Article 31 BIa’s anti-torpedo mechanism to the test in related ways as the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal did in Ablynx. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether A31(2) obliges the English Court to stay proceedings unless and until there is a determination in the Treviso Proceedings that the Italian courts do not have jurisdiction. There are 3 core questions: i) Should the English Court proceed to determine whether there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of this Court, in circumstances in which Pelagic is contending in Italy that the Italian courts have jurisdiction, or should it await a ruling on jurisdiction in the Treviso Proceedings? ; ii) If it is appropriate to determine the issue, is there an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement in the Treviso Policies for the purposes of Article 25?; iii) Should the Court stay the remainder of the proceedings under Article 30?
At 65 counsel for the insureds take a similar position as Ms Lane did in Ablynx: he argues that the only issue which the High Court should consider is whether it is satisfied that there is a prima facie case that the Italian court has jurisdiction (which he says there is on the basis that the parties agreed that both the English and Italian courts would have jurisdiction) and that if it is so satisfied, it should stay the English proceedings, pending the outcome of Pelagic’s appeal in the Italian proceedings.
Foxton J however at 68 ff highlights the inadequate nature and limitations of A25(4), as also pointed out by the last para of recital 22 which accompanies it: in the face of conflicting choice of court provisions (typically, as a result of overlapping clauses in overlapping contractual relations between the parties), A25(4) loses its power and the more classic lis alibi pendens rules take over. At 70 he points to the ping-pong that threatens to ensue:
in circumstances in which the Italian court has stayed its proceedings to allow the English court to determine if it has exclusive jurisdiction, it would be particularly surprising if the English court was then bound to stay its proceedings pending a decision on jurisdiction by the Italian court. This approach, in which the dispute might become caught in the self-perpetuating politeness of an Alphonse and Gaston cartoon, is not consistent with enhancing “the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements” and avoiding “abusive litigation tactics” which Article 31(2) is intended to achieve. It does not matter for these purposes that the decision of the Italian court granting such a stay is presently under appeal.
He holds therefore at 79 that his task is essentially to review whether there is a good arguable case that the Treviso Policies (the ones subject of the English litigation, GAVC) are subject to exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of the English court which satisfy the requirements of A25 BIa. At 95 he finds there is such case. At 113 ff he holds obiter he would have stayed the remainder of the claims under A30, had he held in favour of a stay under A31(2).
Fun with conflict of laws.
Geert.
(Handbook of ) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.7, Heading 2.2.9.5.
Jurisdiction, Brussels IA. Choice of court A25, lis alibi pendens A29/30. https://t.co/F68mMIQ1jC
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 18, 2020
19-15.380
F-P+B
A French Décret, allows, for the time of the state of emergency, notarization by a French notary without a need for parties to be physically present. Explanation and analysis is here and (briefly) here. Importantly, the possibility is also open to non-residents of France. Notaries in France had, unsurprisingly, warned of the risk of fraud, but the Conseil d’Etat approved of the decret.
Austria has a similar rule in sec. 90a of its Notary Act. In Germany, this is not (yet?)possible: Art. 40(1) of the German Notarisation Act requires physical presence of the parties; the greatest distance allowed is, apparently, the way to the parking lot. Estonia has introduced an e-notary for notarisation from abroad, but this is available only in Estonian embassies.
The French and Austrian rules raise interesting private international law questions. Usually, notarization requires physical presence – which is why so many lawyers fly from Germany to France to have contracts notarized. Can they now stay at home? If two French domiciliaries sign a contract electronically while in Switzerland, and notarization happens in France, is this a case of Art. 11(1) Rome I Regulation? That would lead to the odd result that the formal requirements would follow from either Swiss law or from the law applicable to the contract (which need not be French law) and not necessarily the law of the place where the French notary sits. And yet, Art. 11(2) seems inapplicable because the notary is not an agent of the parties. Should it be applicable by analogy? Should there be a special rule for notaries that used to be unnecessary because notarization always requires physical notaries? Or is this another reason to rethink the principle of locus regit actum for internet contracts?
DIFC Courts, the Dubai International Financial Centre’s Courts, is one of the new generation of international commercial courts. Its rulings piggyback unto recognition and enforcement treaties which the UAE concludes with third countries (India being a recent example).
In GFH Capital Ltd v Haigh & Ors [2020] EWHC 1269 (Comm) Henshaw J first of all notes that there is no such treaty between the UK and the UAE hence he considers recognition of the July 2018 DIFC judgment by Sir Jeremy Cooke under common law principles. Helpfully, these principles have been summarised in a January 2013 Memorandum of Guidance as to Enforcement between the DIFC Courts and the Commercial Court, Queen’s Bench Division, England and Wales. Under discussion in the case is mostly the condition that the foreign court be a court of competent jurisdiction; that the foreign judgment be not obtained fraudulently; and that its recognition be not incompatible with English ordre public.
The judgment is an extensive treatment of the relevant principles and therefore suited to comparative materials.
Geert.
Enforcement of @DIFCCourts judgment
Application of common law principles (no releant Treaty with the UAE). https://t.co/VHgkTw7DHG
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 20, 2020
Fernando Gascón Inchausti (Complutense University of Madrid) and Burkhard Hess (MPI Luxembourg) have edited The Future of the European Law of Civil Procedure, a book published by Intersentia.
The publisher’s blurb reads:
The European lawmaker is currently overseeing what appears to be a paradigm shift in the way that cross-border litigation is conducted within the European Union. This matter was initially conceptualised from the perspective of international judicial cooperation, based on the notion of mutual trust and mutual recognition. Recent developments, however, have introduced the option of harmonisation as a new regulatory approach.
The first part of the book is focused on the possible methodological approaches at hand. Special emphasis is placed on the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union as a “promoter” of a European Procedural Law (principle of effectiveness and principle of equivalence). The second part assesses to what extend harmonisation is already used: “vertically”, through the regulations on international judicial cooperation, for example the European Account Preservation Order; and “horizontally”, through the promotion of harmonised standards promoted by the directives on intellectual property rights and competition damages (access to information and evidence), or in the directive on trade secrets and in the field of data protection (protection of confidential information). With a view to the future, the final part examines two more recent initiatives: ELI-UNIDROIT and the proposal for a directive on common minimum standards of civil procedure in the EU.
The Future of the European Law of Civil Procedure: Coordination or Harmonisation? clearly outlines the motivations of the various national and institutional players in the regulation of civil procedural law and identifies potential obstacles likely to be encountered along the way that will be useful for every lawyer in the field.
The authors include Dominik Düsterhaus (Court of Justice of the European Union), Stefan Huber (University of Tübingen), Christoph A. Kern (University of Heidelberg), Stephanie Law (MPI Luxembourg), Patricia Llopis Nadal (University of Valencia), Janek T. Nowak (MPI Luxembourg), Marta Requejo Isidro (MPI Luxembourg), Vincent Richard (MPI Luxembourg), Elisabetta Silvestri (University of Pavia), Michael Stürner (University of Konstanz), María Luisa Villamarín López (Complutense University of Madrid), Enrique Vallines García (MPI Luxembourg).
See here for more information, including the table of contents.
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