Pourvoi c/Juridiction de proximité d'Arras, 16 décembre 2016
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Paris, 24 octobre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Paris, 29 juin 2016
Pourvoi c/Tribunal d'instance de Gap, 14/02/2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Montpellier, 18 novembre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence, 26 septembre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Rouen, 9 septembre 2019
The annual governance meeting of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) will take place from 3 to 6 March 2020. The list of documents that have been submitted to the HCCH governance body (i.e. the Council on General Affairs and Policy) is available here.
Recent documents that have not yet been mentioned in this blog that are worthy of note are the following:
A few meetings of the Special Commission (i.e. global meetings of experts) to review the practical operation of HCCH Conventions are in the pipeline and have been submitted for approval to Council concerning the following Conventions: the HCCH Apostille Convention, the HCCH Adults Convention, the HCCH Child Support Convention and the HCCH Maintenance Obligations Protocol. For the last three, if approved, it will be the first global meeting ever on their practical operation. See Prel. Docs 9, 10 and 12.
Participation in these meetings is restricted, as they are open only to delegates or experts designated by the Members of the HCCH, invited non-Member States and International Organisations that have been granted observer status.
Intersentia has recently published a monograph by Ayse Nihan Karadayi Yalim (University of Antwerp) on Interpretation and Gap Filling in International Commercial Contracts.
The blurb reads:
With the growth of cross-border business, the rather important but complex and controversial topic of interpretation and gap filling in international commercial contracts receives more and more attention. International legal instruments such as CISG, UNIDROIT Principles, PECL and DCFR provide rules in order to interpret international commercial contracts in a uniform way. However, while these instruments may bring together already existing national concepts, they must of course be understood beyond the domestic concepts and approaches as such. This book is an autonomous comparison across the above-mentioned international legal instruments, with a focus on the rules on interpretation and gap filling that provides the necessary theoretical background and case law to understand the rules in practice. Interpretation and Gap Filling in International Commercial Contracts examines the uniform and harmonised set of rules in their own right; without comparison to national laws, but in their own unique setting of international commercial contracts. It is a practical user guide for both scholars and practitioners.
For more information see here.
In GDE LLC & Anor v Anglia Autoflow Ltd [2020] EWHC 105 (Comm) (31) the Rome I Regulation does not apply ratione temporis; the Agency Agreement was concluded on about 9 April 2009 which is a few months before the kick-off date of the Regulation (note there is no default rule for agency in Article 4 Rome I in the event of lack of lex voluntatis). Dias DJ therefore turns to the 1980 Rome Convention.
Parties are in dispute as to the governing law of the Agency Agreement by which the claims should be determined. AAL alleges that the governing law is that of Ontario while the Claimants allege that the Agency Agreement is governed by English law. The point is of critical importance because the Claimants concede that, if AAL is correct, their claim is time-barred under Ontario law: although this, as readers know, assumes statutes of limitation are subject to the governing law – which is far from certain: see Jabir v KIK and Spring v MOD.
Parties’ arguments are at 10 and 11 and of course they reverse engineer. In essence (at 20) claimants say that there was an implied choice of English law. Alternatively, if that is not correct, the presumption in Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention, which would otherwise point to Georgia law, falls to be disapplied in favour of English law. The Defendant says that there was no implied choice and that application of Article 4(2) leads to Ontario law. Alternatively, if (which it denies) the presumption in Article 4(2) leads to any other governing law, the presumption is to be disapplied in favour of Ontario.
At 21 ff follows a rather creative (somewhat linked to the discussion of ex officio Rome Convention application in The Alexandros), certainly unexpected (yet clearly counsel will do what counsel must do) argument that essentially puts forward that under the common law approach of foreign law = fact hence must be proven, any discussion of a law as governing law, not suggested by the parties (here: the laws of (the US State of) Georgia) that is not English law (which clearly the English curia does ‘novit’), cannot go ahead. At 22 Dias DJ already signals that ‘once the wheels of the Convention had been put in motion, they could not be stopped short of their ultimate destination. The idea that the process dictated by the Convention should be hijacked halfway, as it were, on the basis of a pleading point was, to my mind, deeply unattractive.’
At 31 she sinks the argument. I think she is right.
Having at length considered the facts relevant to the contract formation, discussion then turns again to the Rome Convention with at 105 ff a debate on the role to be played by factors intervening after contract formation with a view to establishing [implicit, but certain: see at 117 with reference to the various language versions of the Convention and the Regulation essentially confirming the French version] choice of law or closest connection. (Dias J refers to the Court of Appeal in Lawlor v Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 365; [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98 where, at paragraphs 21-27, it pointed out that the common law approach frequently blurred the distinction between the search for the parties’ inferred intention and the search for the system of law with which the contract had its closest and most real connection).
At 120: the hurdle is high: choice of law implicitly made must have nevertheless been made: ‘The court is not looking for the choice that the parties probably would have made if they had turned their minds to the question.’ at 122: In the present case the evidence established that there was no reference by the parties to the question of governing law at all. Choice of court for England does not change that. At 160 ff therefore follows the discussion of Article 4 of the Rome Convention, leading to a finding of the laws of Ontario as the lex contractus under Article 4(1). Article 4(5) does not displace it.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.4, Heading 3.2.6.
Aucune atteinte ne saurait être reprochée à la personne qui, bénéficiant des droits d’accès et de modification des données, procède à des suppressions de données, sans les dissimuler à d’éventuels autres utilisateurs du système.
Dans un arrêt de chambre rendu dans l’affaire Yam c/ Royaume-Uni du 16 janvier 2020, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a considéré que la tenue d’audiences à huis clos lors d’un procès pour meurtre ne violait pas l’article 6, § 1 (droit au procès équitable) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Cette décision résonne également dans l’ordre juridique interne français puisque l’article 400 du code de procédure pénale autorise le prononcé du huis clos si la publicité est dangereuse pour : l’ordre, la sérénité des débats, la dignité de la personne ou les intérêts d’un tiers.
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Lyon, 25 novembre 2019
Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Riom, 16 octobre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Pau, 15 octobre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Toulouse, 24 septembre 2019
Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Rouen, 27 juin 2019
Tribunal d'instance de Valence, 26 décembre 2019
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer