Le traité prévoit notamment la création d’un comité de coopération transfrontalière ainsi que la possibilité d’adopter des dispositions juridiques et administratives permettant de faciliter la réalisation de projets transfrontaliers.
Dário Moura Vicente (University of Lisbon) has published the second edition of his monograph on international intellectual property (A Tutela Internacional da Propriedade Intelectual).
The books covers the traditional issues of jurisdiction and applicable law. It also discusses the merits and limits of international harmonisation in the field, and extra-judicial remedies.
More details are available here.
The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé for 2019 has just been released. It contains numerous casenotes and one article by Poul F. Kjaer (Copenhagen Business school) on the sociological idea of connectivity and private international law (L’idée de “connectivité” et le droit international privé).
The article is a revised translation of a paper by the same author titled Constitutionalizing Connectivity: the Constitutional Grid of World Society.
Global law settings are characterized by a structural pre‐eminence of connectivity norms, a type of norm which differs from coherency or possibility norms. The centrality of connectivity norms emerges from the function of global law, which is to increase the probability of transfers of condensed social components, such as economic capital and products, religious doctrines, and scientific knowledge, from one legally structured context to another within world society. This was the case from colonialism and colonial law to contemporary global supply chains and human rights. Both colonial law and human rights can be understood as serving a constitutionalizing function aimed at stabilizing and facilitating connectivity. This allows for an understanding of colonialism and contemporary global governance as functional, but not as normative, equivalents.
A full table of contents is available here.
Le 14 février 2020, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a adopté de nouvelles instructions pratiques aux parties relatives aux affaires portées devant la Cour (JOUE n° L 421). Elles ont notamment pour effet de développer les règles relatives à la protection des données à caractère personnel.
Readers of our blog may be pleased to learn (if they have not already noticed) that since the beginning of the year, all our posts are automatically published to our brand-new Twitter account.
Whether you want to share and discuss our content or simply to receive all our latest posts directly in your Twitter feed, feel free to follow @PrIL_Blog!
Readers of our blog may be pleased to learn (if they have not already noticed) that since the beginning of the year, all our posts are automatically published to our brand-new Twitter account.
Whether you want to share and discuss our content or simply to receive all our latest posts directly in your Twitter feed, feel free to follow @PrIL_Blog!
News item by Dr Orsolya Toth, Assistant Professor in Commercial Law, University of Nottingham
The University of Nottingham Commercial Law Centre will hold its inaugural Nottingham Arbitration Talk on Wednesday 18 March at 2 pm. The Centre is delighted to welcome distinguished speakers to the event drawn from both academia and practice. The Keynote address will be given by Professor Sir Roy Goode, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Oxford. The speaker panel will host Angeline Welsh (Essex Court Chambers), Timothy Foden (Lalive) and Dr Martins Paparinskis (University College London).
The theme of the event will be ‘Procedure and Substance in Commercial and Investment Treaty Arbitration’. It will address current and timeless issues, such as the influence of procedure on the parties’ substantive rights, the recent phenomenon of ‘due process paranoia’ in arbitration and the current state of the system of investment treaty arbitration. For detailed programme and registration please visit https://unclcpresents.eventbrite.co.uk
News item by Dr Orsolya Toth, Assistant Professor in Commercial Law, University of Nottingham
The University of Nottingham Commercial Law Centre will hold its inaugural Nottingham Arbitration Talk on Wednesday 18 March at 2 pm. The Centre is delighted to welcome distinguished speakers to the event drawn from both academia and practice. The Keynote address will be given by Professor Sir Roy Goode, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Oxford. The speaker panel will host Angeline Welsh (Essex Court Chambers), Timothy Foden (Lalive) and Dr Martins Paparinskis (University College London).
The theme of the event will be ‘Procedure and Substance in Commercial and Investment Treaty Arbitration’. It will address current and timeless issues, such as the influence of procedure on the parties’ substantive rights, the recent phenomenon of ‘due process paranoia’ in arbitration and the current state of the system of investment treaty arbitration. For detailed programme and registration please visit https://unclcpresents.eventbrite.co.uk
A short post to flag the French Conseil d’Etat’s final ruling in which on 7 February it held that organisms obtained via in-vitro mutagenesis techniques should be subject to GMO regulation and that consequently as EurActiv summarise the French authorities must update regulation to include such crops within six months, which includes identifying the agricultural plant varieties which have been obtained by these techniques and subjecting them to the assessments applicable to GMOs.
The ruling follows the CJEU’s mutagenesis finding in C-528/16, reviewed at the time on Steve Peers’ blog here and subsequently by KJ Garnett in RECIEL here. The ruling put agro-bio industry narrators in a spin but in essence is an utterly logical consequence of EU law.
Geert.
No hearings on requests for a preliminary ruling concerning private international law are scheduled for March 2020. Conversely, several opinions and one judgment will be delivered.
Case C-249, JEOn March 24, AG Tanchev (Bulgaria) will give his Opinion in JE. The case concerns the interpretation of Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. The issue is whether the expression ‘the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ is to be interpreted as merely referring to a situation where the applicable foreign law makes no provision for any form of divorce, or rather as including a situation where the applicable foreign law permits divorce, but does so in extremely limited circumstances.
The original action was brought in Romania in 2016. The applicant filed a petition for divorce claiming that the parties’ marriage should be dissolved, the applicant should return to using the name borne prior to the marriage, parental responsibility in respect of the minor child should be exercised jointly, the minor child should reside with the mother in Italy, and the defendant should be required to pay maintenance and the costs of proceedings.
After some hesitations regarding the general jurisdiction of the Romanian courts and the specific venue, the point was settled and the discussion moved to the applicable law under the Rome III Regulation. According to the court, the matter was governed by Italian law pursuant to Article 8(a) of the Regulation, since the parties were habitually resident in Italy. The court considered that the criteria laid down in Article 8(a) are framed in a hierarchical manner: if the conditions of the first criterion are satisfied, there is no need to look at the following ones.
The national court considered that that the grounds for divorce raised by the applicant are not available under the Italian legislation on divorce, and that that grounds different to those foreseen by the provision can be applied for only where there has been a legal separation of the spouses, which must be established or ordered by a court, and that the delay prescribed by the said legislation has passed since the legal separation itself. Since no provision is made for legal separation proceedings under Romanian law, the Romanian court concluded that those proceedings must be conducted before the Italian courts and therefore any application to that effect made before the Romanian courts is inadmissible.
The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment, pointing out that, from her point of view, the criteria provided for in Article 8 of the Rome III Regulation are alternative in nature. She also stated that in the light of Italian legislation, the first sentence of Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation is applicable in the case (in my view, if I understand correctly the arguments of the Romanian court, she could have added that the absence of provisions on separation under Romanian law does not allow the court to declare itself incompetent).
Case C-215/18, Primera Air ScandinaviaThe judgment in Primera Air Scandinavia is scheduled for 26 March 2020. The request for a preliminary ruling comes from District Court of Prague. It concerns the interpretation of in Article 5(1) and Articles 15 to 17 of the Brussels I Regulation.
The issue submitted to the CJEU arose in the context of an action for compensation brought under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 by a passenger domiciled in the Czech Republic against an airline established in Denmark, on account of the long delay of a flight operated by that airline, but sold to that passenger, in conjunction with accommodation, by a Czech travel agency.
The opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe (Denmark), of 7 November 2019, proposes the CJEU to answer that Article 5(1) covers an action for compensation brought by a passenger against the operating air carrier, even though those parties had not entered into a contract between them, and although that flight formed part of a package of services supplied under a contract entered into between the applicant and a third party.
On the contrary, Articles 15 to 17 of that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that they are not applicable to such an action. No surprise, considering the previous case law of the Court.
Case C-80/19, EEThe Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona regarding the EE case, on the Succession Regulation, will also be issued on 26 March 2020.
The Supreme Court of Lithuania referred six question to the CJEU. Questions number 2 and 3, on the characterization of notaries as “courts” for the purposes of the Regulation, have already been addressed in the case of WB, still pending at the time of the referral.
By the remaining questions, the Lithuanian court conveys to the CJEU doubts related to the cross-border nature of a given succession (linked to that, to the applicability of the regulation when, in the light of the circumstances, its application would not facilitate the assertion of the rights of the heir, but rather the contrary); to the choice of law (implicit, and made during the transitional period), and to the choice of court.
The case concerned the estate of a Lithuanian national, married to a German national, who had moved to live in Germany together with her son (EE, also a Lithuanian national).
While living in Germany, EE’s mother had drawn up a will at a notary office in Kaunas (Lithuania), whereby she designated EE as the heir to her entire estate – an apartment in the same country. After the death of his mother, E.E. moved back to Lithuania, where he contacted the notary office in the City of Kaunas requesting the succession procedure be initiated, and the issuance of a certificate of succession rights. The notary refused to perform the notarial act, for, according to the Succession Regulation, the habitual place of residence of the testatrix was Germany. EE challenged the notary’s refusal before the court of first instance.
The Kaunas district court ruled in favour of EE, annulled the notary’s decision refusing to perform the notarial act, and ordered the notary to open the succession procedure in accordance with the place where the property was registered and to issue a certificate of rights of succession to the estate of the deceased mother.
The court stated that, even though the appellant’s mother had declared her departure to Germany, she was still a Lithuanian national and, on the day of her death, owned immovable property in Lithuania; she had not severed her links with Lithuania, and had visited the country and drawn up her will there.
The Kaunas regional court set aside the ruling of the court of first instance following an appeal lodged by the notary and turned down the appellant’s application. Among other, it stated that the court of first instance had, in annulling the notary’s decision under challenge, unreasonably relied on general principles. The appellant lodged an appeal in cassation against this judgment.
Case C-186/19, Supreme Site ServicesAG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s Opinion in this case is scheduled for 26 March 2020, as well.
The Dutch referring court asks about the Brussels I bis Regulation and the meaning of “civil and commercial matters” in a case where an international organisation brings an action to (i) lift an interim garnishee order levied in another Member State by the opposing party, and (ii) prohibit the opposing party from levying, on the same grounds, an interim garnishee order in the future and from basing those actions on immunity of execution.
A public hearing was held in Luxembourg on 12 December 2019, where the CJEU learnt that the Dutch Appellate Court had granted immunity of jurisdiction to Shape and JCFB only two days before. The judges and AG wondered whether a reply to the preliminary reference would still be of any use. The Dutch decision on immunity, the request to the CJEU and the hearing in Luxembourg have been addressed by Geert van Calster in his blog, with a last update on January 2020.
Le Parlement est actuellement saisi en procédure accélérée d’un projet de loi qui vise à permettre la ratification de trois protocoles additionnels à la Convention européenne d’extradition, protocoles adoptés respectivement en 1978, en 2010 et en 2012. Une réponse au Brexit (le mandat d’arrêt européen n’étant plus applicable au Royaume-Uni), mais qui aura des incidences avec d’autres pays hors-UE.
Coronavirus outbreak and force majeure certificate
Due to the outbreak, China has adopted a number of public health measures, including closing schools and workplaces, limiting public gatherings, restricting travel and movement of people, screening , quarantine and isolation. At least 48 cities were locked down by 14 Feb 2020. (here) More than two thirds of China’s migrant workers were unable to return to work, (see here) leaving those firms that have restarted operation running below capacity.
Coronavirus and the emergency measures significantly affect economic activates in China. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a quasi-governmental entity, issued 3,325 force majeure certificates covering the combined contract value of $38.5bn to exempt Chinese companies from their contractual obligations.
Issuing force majeure certificates is a common practice of trade councils or commercial chambers in the world. These certificates are proof of the existence of relevant events that may constitute force majeure and impinge the company’s capacity to perform the contract. The events recorded in the certificates would include the confirmation of coronavirus outbreak, the nature, extent, date and length of governmental order for lockdown or quarantine, the cancellation of any transportation, etc. These certificate, however, are not legal documents and do not have direct executive or legal effects. They only attest the factual details instead of certifying those events are indeed force majeure in law. They are also called ‘force majeure factual certificate’ by the CCPIT. The CCPIT states in its webpage that:
The force majeure factual certificate is the proof of objective, factual circumstances, not the ‘trump card’ to exempt contractual obligations. The CCPIT issues relevant force majeure factual certificates to Chinese enterprises that are unable to perform contracts due to the impact of the new coronavirus epidemic. The certificate can prove objective facts such as delayed resumption of work, traffic control, and limited dispatch of labour personnel. An enterprise can request for delaying performance or termination of the contract based on this certificate, but whether its obligation can be fully or partially exempt depends on individual cases. The parties should take all the circumstances and the applicable law into consideration to prove the causal link between ‘the epidemic and its prevention and control measures’ and the ‘failure to perform’.
Force Majeure in Different Governing Law
The force certificate is thus mainly used to demonstrate to the other party the existence of certain factual difficulties that hamper performance and seek understanding to privately settle the dispute. If the disputes are brought to the court, the court should consider whether the outbreak and the relevant emergency measure constitute force majeure events pursuant to the governing law, treating the force majeure certificate as evidence of fact. There is no international uniform doctrine of force majeure and different countries adopt different doctrines to allocate contractual risk in unforeseeable change of circumstances. China is a member of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which shall apply if the other party has its place of business in another contracting state, or the parties choose CISG by agreement. Article 79 of the CISG provides that a party is exempted from paying damages if the breach is due to an impediment beyond its control, and either the impediment could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or the party could not reasonably avoid or overcome the impediment or its consequences. Although the disease outbreak is unforeseeable, it can only be an impediment if it makes performance impossible. Therefore, if the outbreak only makes production more difficult or expensive, it is not an impediment. There is no consensus as to whether an event that makes performance excessively burdensome can also be counted as an impediment in CISG. In addition, the impediment must uncontrollable. If a Chinese firm could not perform its contractual obligation due to the compulsory lockdown ordered by its local government, this event is out of control. The same applies if a firm manufacturing facial masks cannot deliver on time due to government requisition. On the other hand, when the Chinese State Council announced the extension of the Chinese New Year holiday to 2 Feb 2020, it was not a compulsory ban and if a firm ‘chose’ not to operate during the extension without additional compulsory order from any authorities, substantive risk of infection in its place of business, or irreparable labour shortage, the impediment may not be considered as uncontrollable. For the same reason, if a company decided to lock down after a worker tested positive for coronavirus in order to reduce the risk of spreading the disease among its workers, without the high risk and with alternative and less extreme prevention measures available, the impossibility to perform may be considered ‘self-inflicted’ instead of ‘uncontrollable’. Consideration should always be given to the necessity and proportionality of the decision. Furthermore, if the local government imposed compulsory prohibition for work resumption to prevent people gathering, a firm cannot claim uncontrollable impediments if working in distance is feasible and possible for the performance of the contract.
If the other party is not located in a CISG contracting state, whether the coronavirus outbreak can exempt Chinese exporters from their contractual obligations depends on the national law that governs the contracts. Most China’s major trade partners are contracting states of CISG, except India, South Africa, Nigeria, and the UK. Chinese law accepts both the force majeure and hardship doctrines. The party that breaches the contract may be discharged of its obligations fully or partially if an unforeseeable, uncontrollable and insurmountable causes the impossibility to perform. (Art 117 of the Chinese Contract Law 1999) The party can also ask for the alternation of contract if un unforeseeable circumstance that is not force majeure makes performance clearly inequitable. (Art 26 of the SPC Contract Law Interpretation (II) 2009) The ‘force majeure factual certificate’ can also be issued if CCPIT considers a event not force majeure but unforeseeable change of circumstances in Art 26 of the Interpretation (II). For example, in Jiangsu Flying Dragon Food Machinery v Ukraine CF Mercury Ltd, CCPIT issued the certificate even after recognising that the poorly maintained electricity system of the manufacturer that was damaged by the rain was not a force majeure event. In contrast, other national law may adopt a more restrictive standard to exempt parties their obligations in unforeseeable circumstances. In England, for example, the court will not apply force majeure without a force majeure clause in the contract. A more restricted ‘frustration’ may apply instead.
Jurisdiction and Enforcement
In theory, a Chinese court should apply the same approach as other jurisdictions to apply the governing law and treat the force majeure certificates issued by CCPIT as evidence of fact. in practice, Chinese courts may prefer applying Chinese law if the CISG does not apply and the parties do not choose the law of another country, grant more weight to the CCPIT certificate than other courts, and be more lenient to apply the force majeure criteria to support Chinese companies’ claim in relation to the coronavirus outbreak.
Finally, if the dispute is heard in a non-Chinese court or international arbitral tribunal, the judgment holding the Chinese company liable need to be enforced in China unless the Chinese company has assets abroad. Enforcing foreign judgments in China is generally difficult, though there are signs of relaxation. If judgments can be enforced pursuant to bilateral treaties or reciprocity, they may be rejected based on public policy. The question is whether the coronavirus outbreak and the government controlling measures can be public policy. According to the precedents of the Supreme People’s Court, (eg. Tianrui Hotel Investment Co., Ltd. (Petitioner) v. Hangzhou Yiju Hotel Management Co., Ltd. (Respondent), (2010) Min Si Ta Zi 18) breach of mandatory administrative regulations per se is not violation of public policy. But public policy undoubtedly includes public health. If Chinese courts consider the Chinese company should not resume production to prevent spread of disease event without compulsory government order, the public policy defence may be supported.
Coronavirus outbreak and force majeure certificate
Due to the outbreak, China has adopted a number of public health measures, including closing schools and workplaces, limiting public gatherings, restricting travel and movement of people, screening , quarantine and isolation. At least 48 cities were locked down by 14 Feb 2020. (here) More than two thirds of China’s migrant workers were unable to return to work, (see here) leaving those firms that have restarted operation running below capacity.
Coronavirus and the emergency measures significantly affect economic activates in China. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a quasi-governmental entity, issued 3,325 force majeure certificates covering the combined contract value of $38.5bn to exempt Chinese companies from their contractual obligations.
Issuing force majeure certificates is a common practice of trade councils or commercial chambers in the world. These certificates are proof of the existence of relevant events that may constitute force majeure and impinge the company’s capacity to perform the contract. The events recorded in the certificates would include the confirmation of coronavirus outbreak, the nature, extent, date and length of governmental order for lockdown or quarantine, the cancellation of any transportation, etc. These certificate, however, are not legal documents and do not have direct executive or legal effects. They only attest the factual details instead of certifying those events are indeed force majeure in law. They are also called ‘force majeure factual certificate’ by the CCPIT. The CCPIT states in its webpage that:
‘The force majeure factual certificate is the proof of objective, factual circumstances, not the ‘trump card’ to exempt contractual obligations. The CCPIT issues relevant force majeure factual certificates to Chinese enterprises that are unable to perform contracts due to the impact of the new coronavirus epidemic. The certificate can prove objective facts such as delayed resumption of work, traffic control, and limited dispatch of labour personnel. An enterprise can request for delaying performance or termination of the contract based on this certificate, but whether its obligation can be fully or partially exempt depends on individual cases. The parties should take all the circumstances and the applicable law into consideration to prove the causal link between ‘the epidemic and its prevention and control measures’ and the failure to perform.’
Force Majeure in Different Governing Law
The force certificate is thus mainly used to demonstrate to the other party the existence of certain factual difficulties that hamper performance and seek understanding to privately settle the dispute. If the disputes are brought to the court, the court should consider whether the outbreak and the relevant emergency measure constitute force majeure events pursuant to the governing law, treating the force certificate as evidence of fact. There is no international uniform doctrine of force majeure and different countries adopt different doctrines to allocate contractual risk in unforeseeable change of circumstances. China is a member of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which shall apply if the other party has its place of business in another contracting state, or the parties choose CISG by agreement. Article 79 of the CISG provides that a party is exempted from paying damages if the breach is due to an impediment beyond its control, and either the impediment could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or the party could not reasonably avoid or overcome the impediment or its consequences. Although the disease outbreak is unforeseeable, it can only be an impediment if it makes performance impossible. Therefore, if the outbreak only makes production more difficult or expensive, it is not an impediment. There is no consensus as to whether an event that makes performance excessively burdensome can also be counted as an impediment in CISG. In addition, the impediment must uncontrollable. If a Chinese firm could not perform its contractual obligation due to the compulsory lockdown ordered by its local government, this event is out of control. The same applies if a firm manufacturing facial masks cannot deliver on time due to government requisition. On the other hand, when the Chinese State Council announced the extension of the Chinese New Year holiday to 2 Feb 2020, it was not a compulsory ban and if a firm ‘chose’ not to operate during the extension without additional compulsory order from any authorities, substantive risk of infection in its place of business, or irreparable labour shortage, the impediment may not be considered as uncontrollable. For the same reason, if a company decided to lock down after a worker tested positive for coronavirus in order to reduce the risk of spreading the disease among its workers, without the high risk and with alternative and less extreme prevention measures available, the impossibility to perform may be considered ‘self-inflicted’ instead of ‘uncontrollable’. Consideration should always be given to the necessity and proportionality of the decision. Furthermore, if the local government imposed compulsory prohibition for work resumption to prevent people gathering, a firm cannot claim uncontrollable impediments if working in distance is feasible and possible for the performance of the contract.
If the other party is not located in a CISG contracting state, whether the coronavirus outbreak can exempt Chinese exporters from their contractual obligations depends on the national law that governs the contracts. Most China’s major trade partners are contracting states of CISG, except India, South Africa, Nigeria, and the UK. Chinese law accepts both the force majeure and hardship doctrines. The party that breaches the contract may be discharged of its obligations fully or partially if an unforeseeable, uncontrollable and insurmountable causes the impossibility to perform. (Art 117 of the Chinese Contract Law 1999) The party can also ask for the alternation of contract if un unforeseeable circumstance that is not force majeure makes performance clearly inequitable. (Art 26 of the SPC Contract Law Interpretation (II) 2009) The ‘force majeure factual certificate’ can also be issued if CCPIT considers a event not force majeure but unforeseeable change of circumstances in Art 26 of the Interpretation (II). For example, in Jiangsu Flying Dragon Food Machinery v Ukraine CF Mercury Ltd, CCPIT issued the certificate even after recognising that the poorly maintained electricity system of the manufacturer that was damaged by the rain was not a force majeure event. In contrast, other national law may adopt a more restrictive standard to exempt parties their obligations in unforeseeable circumstances. In England, for example, the court will not apply force majeure without a force majeure clause in the contract. A more restricted ‘frustration’ may apply instead.
Jurisdiction and Enforcement
In theory, a Chinese court should apply the same approach as other jurisdictions to apply the governing law and treat the force majeure certificates issued by CCPIT as evidence of fact. in practice, Chinese courts may prefer applying Chinese law if the CISG does not apply and the parties do not choose the law of another country, grant more weight to the CCPIT certificate than other courts, and be more lenient to apply the force majeure criteria to support Chinese companies’ claim in relation to the coronavirus outbreak.
Finally, if the dispute is heard in a non-Chinese court or international arbitral tribunal, the judgment holding the Chinese company liable need to be enforced in China unless the Chinese company has assets abroad. Enforcing foreign judgments in China is generally difficult, though there are signs of relaxation. If judgments can be enforced pursuant to bilateral treaties or reciprocity, they may be rejected based on public policy. The question is whether the coronavirus outbreak and the government controlling measures can be public policy. According to the precedents of the Supreme People’s Court, (eg. Tianrui Hotel Investment Co., Ltd. (Petitioner) v. Hangzhou Yiju Hotel Management Co., Ltd. (Respondent), (2010) Min Si Ta Zi 18) breach of mandatory administrative regulations per se is not violation of public policy. But public policy undoubtedly includes public health. If Chinese courts consider the Chinese company should not resume production to prevent spread of disease event without compulsory government order, the public policy defence may be supported.
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