Agrégateur de flux

I. Introduction

It was the 3rd of March 1989, when an announcement was published in the Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, stating that the Brussels Convention would finally enter into force on April 1, 1989. Why finally? Because it took the state nearly a decade after the accession to the EC [1.1.1981] to activate the Brussels Convention in the country. After a long hibernation time, Law Nr. 1814/1988 was published in November 11, 1988, marking the official ratification of the Convention. In less than a year, the Convention became operative in the Greek legal order. Since that time, a great number of judgments were published in the legal press, some of them with elucidating notes and comments. Commentaries and monographs paved the path for widespread knowledge and ease of access to the new means of handling cross border cases within the EC.

Almost 12 years later, Regulation 44/2001 replaced the Brussels Convention. On the whole, the application of the Regulation in the country can be described as satisfactory. Courts proved to be open minded in exequatur proceedings, thus fulfilling the mandate for a free circulation of judgments dictated by the EU. Only minor issues cause some skepticism, the majority of which could have been solved by means of an implementing act to the Regulation. Regrettably enough, Greek governments persistently omit to issue any such acts in the course of communitarization in civil and commercial matters. Consequently, primarily academics, and later courts, were called to find viable solutions to problems faced or potentially confronted in the future.

II. Problems faced / solutions given

A problem causing doubts and confusion in Greece was the exact definition of the term used under Art. 36 Brussels Convention. Unlike the English version, where the same terminology is used [“may be appealed”], the Greek text showed a discrepancy, causing contradictory rulings. The issue reached the Supreme Court, which finally clarified the problem in 2001. In particular, the wording used in Articles 36.1, 37-40 Brussels Convention did not make specific reference to an appeal. Instead, the terminus used was the equivalent of “recourse”. For the purposes of Art. 37 Brussels Convention, the Hellenic Government declared that the “recourse” shall be filed at the Court of Appeal. It is an elementary rule in Greek civil practice, that all remedies against first instance decisions are filed with the secretariat of the court rendering the decision challenged. In light of this fact, several lawyers lodged the “recourse” there, i.e. at the competent 1st instance court. In the ensuing process before the CoA however, they were in for a surprise: Many appellate courts in the country repeatedly dismissed the “recourse” as inadmissible, because it was not filed properly. As a result, courts followed different directions which can be summarized as follows: The first view considered the “recourse” as a blend of 1st and 2nd instance legal remedies; consequently it reached the conclusion that ordinary rules of appeal proceedings are to be used in the process at hand, with the exception that the “recourse” shall be filed with the secretariat of the CoA, which was the competent one according to Art. 37 Brussels Convention. Furthermore, given the fact that the appellant is not obliged to serve the appeal under Greek law, the terms set under Art. 36.2 Brussels Convention & 43.5 Brussels I Reg. relate to the act of filing, not serving the document. The opposite view however confers to the recourse the nature of third party proceedings, thus changing the procedural requirements. In particular, by adopting this position, the appellant is burdened with the duty to serve the document within the term of one or two months respectively. The latter view has finally prevailed.

Following the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation, the above issue has been made redundant, given that the Greek wording was streamlined to that of the English text. The Greek version of the Brussels I bis Regulation follows suit.  However, it still affects the adjacent area of the Lugano Convention. A recent ruling of the Supreme Court bears witness to this assumption [SC 2078/2017, confirming Thessaloniki CoA 1042/2015, published in: Civil Procedure Law Review 2015, 351, note Anthimos: Filing does not suffice; service of the appeal to the appellee is imperative, otherwise the remedy is dismissed as inadmissible].

III. The Brussels I bis Regulation

Entering into the era of the Brussels I bis Regulation, we see however a remarkable absence of case law in regards to Chapter III on recognition and enforcement: For more than 4 years after the Regulation entered into force, there isn’t a single judgment reported in the country, most notably on Section 3, which established the new system of the application for refusal of recognition and enforcement [Articles 45 et seq.]. In the sole case found, the creditor followed erroneously the previous system of exequatur, which led the court to dismiss the application as inadmissible [lack of locus standi].

Hence, the question: Is Greece the sole exception to other Member States’ practice? I could associate the lack of case law with the devastating situation my country suffered over the last years: The Grexit-nightmare, financial instability and capital restrictions could serve as an explanation for this plunge.

However, to the extent of my ability to follow the German literature, I do not see any application of Chapter III in Germany either. It would be very interesting to find out by the readers of this blog, whether there’s already some ‘action’ in other Member States.

Mandat d'arrêt européen

Absolutely brilliant analysis of the Brexit shambles by KJ Garnett over on EU Perspectives. A poor, poor game of contract bridge.

EU Perspectives

Putin, the old cliché goes, views the international world order as a game of chess where pawns, knights, bishops and queens are played off one against the other until there is only one outright winner: Russia. Putin’s strategy is to align both his and his opponent’s pawns (the mob) with the bishops and knights (the snob) to weaken and topple his rival. His tactic has been to whip his adversary’s pawns into a state of fury through the spread of misinformation, defamation and slander thereby undermining his adversary’s legitimacy and authority. On the face of it both his strategy and his tactic appear to be working. Across the European Union we see the rise of extremism, the victory of populists in democratic elections and the phenomenal rise of an out-raged right-wing media slamming the European project as a wicked “cabal of high-priests”.

Putin has every right to feel smug. He…

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The title of this piece is optimistic. Broadly defined many of the conflicts issues I address touch upon civil procedure of course. Yet I rarely address civil procedure pur sang (see here for an example). C-637/17 Cogeco was held by the European Court of Justice yesterday.

The Court held that the EU (competition law) damages Directive 2014/104 does not apply ratione temporis to the facts at issue.

The Directive includes two recitals on limitation periods:

Recital 36 argues

‘National rules on the beginning, duration, suspension or interruption of limitation periods should not unduly hamper the bringing of actions for damages. This is particularly important in respect of actions that build upon a finding by a competition authority or a review court of an infringement. To that end, it should be possible to bring an action for damages after proceedings by a competition authority, with a view to enforcing national and Union competition law. The limitation period should not begin to run before the infringement ceases and before a claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, the behaviour constituting the infringement, the fact that the infringement caused the claimant harm and the identity of the infringer. Member States should be able to maintain or introduce absolute limitation periods that are of general application, provided that the duration of such absolute limitation periods does not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to full compensation.’

Recital 49 adds

‘Limitation periods for bringing an action for damages could be such that they prevent injured parties and infringers from having sufficient time to come to an agreement on the compensation to be paid. In order to provide both sides with a genuine opportunity to engage in consensual dispute resolution before bringing proceedings before national courts, limitation periods need to be suspended for the duration of the consensual dispute resolution process.’

Article 10 then foresees expressis verbis

1.   Member States shall, in accordance with this Article, lay down rules applicable to limitation periods for bringing actions for damages. Those rules shall determine when the limitation period begins to run, the duration thereof and the circumstances under which it is interrupted or suspended.

2.   Limitation periods shall not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know:

(a) of the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of competition law;

(b) of the fact that the infringement of competition law caused harm to it; and

(c) the identity of the infringer.

3.   Member States shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing actions for damages are at least five years.

4.   Member States shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or, depending on national law, interrupted, if a competition authority takes action for the purpose of the investigation or its proceedings in respect of an infringement of competition law to which the action for damages relates. The suspension shall end at the earliest one year after the infringement decision has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise terminated

Article 11 adds for joint and several liability

‘Member States shall ensure that any limitation period applicable to cases under this paragraph is reasonable and sufficient to allow injured parties to bring such actions.’

and finally Article 18(1) reads

‘Member States shall ensure that the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process. The suspension of the limitation period shall apply only with regard to those parties that are or that were involved or represented in the consensual dispute resolution.’

Of note in my view is first of all the unavailing nature of much of the recitals quoted above. As the overview shows, the recitals are more or less verbatim repeated in the actual rules; or the other way around: the Articles’ provisions are copy /pasted into the recitals. To that there is not much point.

Further, the minimum period imposed by the Directive (not applicable, as noted, ratione temporis) is five years. (Compare in the mooted amendment of the motor insurance Directive  2009/103: minimum 4 years is being suggested – subject to gold plating). The Court could not evidently read that minimum period as being ius commune. However it did read much of the qualitative requirements of recitals and articles effectively as ius commune using the effective enforcement of EU competition law as an anchor. It held that the Portuguese limitation period of three years, which, first, starts to run from the date on which the injured party was aware of its right to compensation, even if the infringer is not known and, secondly, may not be suspended or interrupted in the course of proceedings before the national competition authority, renders the exercise of the right to full compensation practically impossible or excessively difficult.

I realise it is a bit of a stretch to see this as a move towards a European Ius Commune on limitation periods. Yet it might be a first cautious step.

Geert.

The Conclusions & Recommendations (C&R) of the governance body of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) (i.e. the Council on General Affairs and Policy) are available in both English and French.

The conclusions that are more worthy of note are the following:

The Parentage/Surrogacy Project is going ahead. The Council endorsed the continuation of the work in line with the latest report of the Experts’ Group (see my previous post here). See C&R 7-12.

The Tourist and Visitors Project is also moving forward. See C&R 14-17.

A meeting of the Experts’ Groups on these respective topics will take place in the near future.

As regards the HCCH publications, it should be noted that there were two Guides on family law, one Guide on the Evidence Convention and one WIPO-HCCH Guide on intellectual property that were submitted for approval to Council; the full titles of which are:

• The revised draft Practical Guide on the cross-border recognition and enforcement of agreements reached in the course of family matters involving children
• The revised draft Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(1)(b) of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention
• The draft Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-link under the Evidence Convention
• The WIPO-HCCH Guide on “When Private International Law meets Intellectual Property Law – A Guide for Judges”

See also my previous posts here (Child Abduction) and here (Evidence Convention).

The Council approved only one: the WIPO-HCCH Guide. With regard to the other three, the Council decided instead to put into place a procedure to obtain further comments from Members.  Importantly, there were concerns expressed by Members regarding the two family law guides, which means that further work is needed. An important issue that might have played a role in these decisions is the massive amount of information that was submitted this year to Council.

Because of the complexity of the conclusions, I prefer to include some excerpts below:

“19. In light of concerns expressed, Council did not approve the revised draft Practical Guide [on the cross-border recognition and enforcement of agreements reached in the course of family law matters involving children]. Council asked that the draft Practical Guide be re-circulated to Members to provide additional comments within a three-month period. All comments received will be made available to other Members on the Secure Portal of the HCCH website. The draft Practical Guide would then be revised by the Experts’ Group with a view, in particular, to increasing its readability for a wider audience. The finalised draft Practical Guide would be circulated to Members for approval. In the absence of any objection within one month, the draft Practical Guide would be taken to be approved; in the case of one or more objections, the draft Practical Guide would be put to Council at its 2020 meeting, without any further work being undertaken. Council requested that the Permanent Bureau immediately notify the Members of any objections.”

“24. Council thanked the Working Group and stressed the importance of the Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(1)(b). In light of concerns expressed, Council did not approve the revised draft Guide. Council asked that the draft Guide be re-circulated to Members to provide additional comments within a two-month period. All comments received will be made available to other Members on the Secure Portal of the HCCH website. The draft Guide would then be revised by the Working Group. The finalised draft Guide would be circulated to Members for approval. In the absence of any objection within one month, the draft Guide would be taken to be approved; in the case of one or more objections, the draft Guide would be put to Council at its 2020 meeting, without any further work being undertaken. Council requested that the Permanent Bureau immediately notify the Members of any objections.”

Council was more lenient with regard to the Video-link Guide:

“38. Council welcomed the preparation of the draft Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-Link under the Evidence Convention and thanked the Experts’ Group. Council asked that the draft Guide be re-circulated to Members to provide additional comments within a one-month period. All comments received will be made available to other Members on the Secure Portal of the HCCH website. The draft Guide would then be revised by the Experts’ Group. The finalised draft Guide would be circulated to Members for approval. In the absence of any objection within one month, the draft Guide would be taken to be approved; in the case of one or more objections, the draft Guide would be put to Council at its 2020 meeting, without any further work being undertaken. Council requested that the Permanent Bureau immediately notify the Members of any objections.”

All this means that these three Guides are not final and readers must await the revised versions, which might or might not need to be submitted to the next meeting of the Council in March 2020. I advise you then to be patient.

The Court held today in C-60/18 AS Tallinna Vesi and agrees with its AG re the possibility of national criteria, yet unlike Ms Kokott does not see an obligation in the WFD for the Member States to have a proactive vetting and decision procedure. It does not give much specification to its reasoning, other than a reference to the ‘circumstances of the case’. This may refer, but I am speculating, to applicant wanting the authorities generally to sign off on its production method, rather than requesting an opinion on an individual stream.

If my interpretation is right it underscores what I have remarked elsewhere on the regulatory process, for instance in the case of circular economy: in a grey regulatory zone, we need to think of mechanisms to assist industry in embracing environmentally proactive solutions, rather than driving them into incumbent technologies or worse, illegality.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, OUP, 1.166 ff and 1.189 ff.

Cour d'appel de Grenoble, 2e chambre civile, 19 mars 2019

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Nouméa, chambre civile, 5 juillet 2018

Tribunal de l'application des peines,section terrorisme, 20 février 2019