The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:
H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: European conflict of laws 2018: Final Spurt!
This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2018 until December 2018. It provides an overview of newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article treats current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.
C. Kohler: Lis pendens of a complaint seeking to join a civil claim for damages to criminal proceedings before the investigating magistrate
Case C-523/14 raised the issue whether a complaint seeking to join a civil claim for damages to criminal proceedings before the investigating magistrate is lis pendens in respect of subsequent proceedings brought in another Member State involving the same cause of action. The ECJ held at the outset that such a complaint falls within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 in so far as its object is to obtain monetary compensation for harm allegedly suffered by the complainant. On the point of lis pendens the ECJ ruled that under Art. 27(1) of the Regulation proceedings are brought when the complaint seeking to join the civil action has been lodged with an investigating magistrate, even though the judicial investigation of the case at issue has not yet been closed. The Court further held that according to Article 30 of the Regulation, where the complaint seeking to join a civil action is initiated by lodging a document which need not, under the applicable national law, be served before that lodging, the relevant time for holding the investigating magistrate to be seised is the time when the complaint was lodged. The author approves the ECJ’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of Regulation No 44/2001. However, he considers that the rule which gives jurisdiction to the court seised of criminal proceedings to rule on a civil claim for damages deserves criticism. That rule is an alien element within the Brussels-Lugano system which favours the plaintiff whereas the defendant may be sued in exorbitant jurisdictions and cannot oppose the recognition and enforcement of the civil judgment given by the criminal court.
S. Kurth: Determining the habitual residence of a testator who alternately lived in two states
The article critically analyses the decision of the German Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) Hamm (reference number: 10 W 35/17) on the interpretation and application of the habitual residence concept to establish jurisdiction under Art. 4 (EU) Regulation No 650/2012. The Court relies on the concept to determine the habitual residence of a German testator who for several decades spent extended periods of time on the Spanish Costa Brava and in the German backcountry. The author argues for an autonomous interpretation of the Regulation and expresses regret over the approach taken by which the “habitual residence of the deceased” as the connecting factor under the Regulation is construed in line with national law. Moreover, the article examines the two definitions of habitual residence used by the Court and demonstrates that on closer scrutiny none of them is persuasive in light of the established canons of interpretation. The author argues to instead define the habitual residence of the deceased as the place where he is primarily integrated as well as regularly and consistently spends time. Further, the article criticises the Court’s findings on circumstantial evidence and, among others, demonstrates the importance of the deceased’s re-lationships with family and friends as pieces of circumstantial evidence neglected by the Court.
D. Coester-Waltjen: Marriages of Minors – Against the Legislative Furore
The German law against “child marriages” of 2017 was the subject matter of some recent court decisions. The German Supreme Court doubts in its decision the constitutionality of the “Law against Child Marriages” regarding the invalidation of marriages validly formed under the applicable foreign law, but void under the new German law in case one of the spouses was below the age of fourteen at the time of formation. The other cases concerned marriages each validly formed under the applicable law by two EU citizens in their respective home country. Since the bride in both cases was only 16, respectively 17 years old, the new German law obliges the German courts to invalidate these marriages, unless under extraordinary circumstances such invalidation would cause extreme hardship to the still minor spouse (or the spouse has reached majority and wants to stay in the marriage). Only in those cases, by way of exception, no invalidation should take place. Despite the pitfalls of the new law the courts succeed in reaching a sensible and adequate result. This article analyses how the courts struggle with the interpretation of the relevant provisions. Emphasis is placed on the European dimension of the topic as well as on the constitutional aspects in the relevant situations.
C. Benicke: The need for Adaptation (Anpassung) to cure deficiencies in the protection of the child’s financial interests caused by the parallel application of German inheritance law and English child custody law
The decision of the Munich Higher Regional Court raises the question of the extent of the father’s power of representation for his minor son under English law when he sells the interest in a German partnership which the son has inherited under German law. The parallel application of English law for the parental responsibility issues on the one hand and of German law as inheritance law for the acquisition of the partnership interest on the other hand leads to a legal gap in respect to the provisions aiming at the protection of the child’s financial interests. As German law regulates this issue in its child custody law through provisions limiting the extent of the parents’ powers to act as legal representatives, and English law protects the child’s interests in its inheritance law through provisions about the administration of the estate, neither of these provisions are invoked by the relevant choice of law rules. This raises the question of adaptation (Anpassung) as an instrument of private international law to avoid outcomes that are inconsistent with both legal orders at stake.
L. Rademacher: Multilocal Torts, Favor Laesi, and Renvoi
In the case of a multilocal tort, the defendant commits the tortious act in a state different from the state in which the claimant suffers the resulting injury. In such a scenario, identifying the applicable law can prove difficult. Under Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation, the defendant’s liability is determined by the law of the state in which the claimant was injured. By contrast, Art. 40 para. 1 sent. 1 EGBGB (Introductory Act to the German Civil Code) relies on the location of the defendant’s tortious act as the relevant connecting factor. The injured party, however, can demand the application of the law of the state where the injury was sustained according to Art. 40 para. 1 sent. 2 EGBGB. Since the codification of German international tort law in 1999, it has been in dispute whether in the case of a multilocal tort the references in Art. 40 para. 1 EGBGB encompass a foreign legal system’s conflict-of-laws rules or refer to foreign substantive law only. This case note, on the occasion of a decision of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm, critically evaluates the arguments for and against the acceptance of renvoi in this context. Contrary to the court, it argues in favour of a reference that includes foreign private international law. It is submitted that only this view can be reconciled with the general rule on renvoi laid down in Art. 4 EGBGB and with the absence of a strict notion of favor laesi in Art. 40 para. 1 EGBGB.
P. Hay: Foreign Law as Fact in American Litigation – Foreign Government’s Interpretation of Its Own Law is Not Conclusive
The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed unanimously that foreign law is to be treated as fact, not law, in federal civil litigation. In determining the content and in interpreting foreign law, the lower court may consider all relevant materials. The interpretation of the foreign government of its own law is to be received with respect under principles of comity, but it is not conclusive. The Court reversed and remanded an appellate court’s decision that had concluded that courts were “bound to defer” to the “reasonable” interpretation of the Chinese government of its own law. The Supreme Court ruled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 does not go this far, but continues to embody the traditional American fact-orientation with regard to foreign country law.
M. Stürner/A. Hemler: Recognition of a French astreinte in California
The French astreinte is a private penalty payable to the creditor designed to bend the debtor’s will. In the case discussed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examines the enforceability of a French judgement condemning Californian editor Wofsy to pay an astreinte in favour of French publisher de Fontbrune. First, the Court of Appeals considers the determination of foreign law in accordance with Rule 44.1 FRCP, which permits the decision on foreign law using “any relevant material or source”, thus classifying it as “question of law”. Given this explicit departure from the question of fact doctrine, the Court of Appeals holds that the ascertaining of foreign law is permitted outside the pleading stage as well. Since foreign penal judgements are not enforceable under Californian law, the Panel also examines whether the astreinte is punitive in nature. In view of its characterisation as predominantly inter partes and its connection to the fulfilment of the debtor’s obligation, the Court of Appeals concludes that the enforcement of the astreinte in question cannot be denied.
With the accession of Guyana, the HCCH Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Child Abduction Convention”) has reached the milestone of 100 Contracting Parties.
For acceding States, it is important to bear in mind that a bilateralisation regime applies. Under Article 38(4) of the Child Abduction Convention, an accession “will have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and such Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession. Such a declaration will also have to be made by any Member State ratifying, accepting or approving the Convention after an accession [see Art. 37 of the Convention]. Such declaration shall be deposited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; this Ministry shall forward, through diplomatic channels, a certified copy to each of the Contracting States.”
It is therefore of great importance that ratifying States and previous acceding States accept the accession of new States.
A useful excel sheet of the acceptances of accessions under this Convention is available here.
The HCCH news item is available here.
The University of Genoa, together with the Universities of Antwerp and Ghent, Missing Children Europe, Child Focus, Centrum IKO and MIKK has launched a research study, co-financed by the European Commission, for the promotion of child-friendly justice and the enhancement of the well-being of children in international child abductions cases – VOICE.
On 14 March (10.00 – 18.30) and 15 March (9.30 – 13.00) 2019, the VOICE team is organising an interactive seminar to report on some of the research results and provide a discussion among academics and practitioners.
The seminar will focus on the existing legal framework concerning international child abduction and on the hearing of the child from a practical and interdisciplinary point of view. The aim is to provide the tools necessary to evaluate and pursue the best interests of the child.
The programme is available here.
Registration is required at the following link: Registration training VOICE
The event includes a contribution of 25 euros, which can be paid locally or by bank transfer to the organizing body, as follows:
Bank: ING Belgium, Avenue Marnix, 24, 1000 Brussels – Belgium
Recipient: Missing Children Europe
IBAN: BE43 310 165 832 401
BIC: BBRUBEBB
Following the signature of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on March 2, 2017, the Hellenic Republic proceeded yesterday to its ratification. Article 1 of Law 4569/2019 reproduces the English version of the Protocol, coupled with a Greek translation. Articles 2-4 regulate formal issues, such as the procedure for submitting a request for advisory opinion (Article 1), the necessary content of the request and the latter’s notification to the parties (Article 3), and issues concerning the stay and reopening of national proceedings (Article 4).
Jonas Poell, Julianne Hughes-Jennett, Peter Hood and Lucja Nowak reported and succinctly reviewed Case No. 7 O 95/15 Jabir and Others v Kik early January – the ‘next week’ promise in my Tweet below turned out a little longer.
Survivors of a fire in a Pakistani textile supplying factory are suing Germany-based KIK as the “main retailer” of the merchandise produced in the Pakistani premises. Jurisdiction evidently is easily established on the basis of Article 4 Brussels Ia.
As Burkhard Hess and Martina Mantovani note here, claimants are attempting to have KIK held liable for not having promoted and undertaken, in practice, the implementation of “adequate safety measures” in the Pakistani factory (producing clothes), thus breaching an engagement they undertook in a Code of Conduct applicable to its relationship with its contractual counterpart.
Prof Hess and Ms Mantovani’s paper ‘Current developments in forum access: Comments on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens European Perspectives on Human Rights Litigation’ incidentally is an excellent stock taking on the issues surrounding mass tort (human rights) litigation.
The Dortmund court held that the case is time-barred under Pakistani law which was the lex causae per Rome II, Regulation 864/2007. Now, I have not had access to the full ruling (lest the 3 page ruling linked above is precisely that – which I am assuming it is not), so a little caveat here, however the court’s discussion of limitation periods is startlingly brief. Article 15 Rome II includes ‘the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription and limitation’ in the scope of application of the lex causae’. Yet as the development inter alia of relevant English statute shows (discussed ia by Andrew Dickinson in his Rome II book with OUP), there are a multitude of issues surrounding statutes of limitation. One of them being Article 1(3) Rome II’s confirmation that evidence and procedure is not within its scope, another Article 26’s ordre public exception which certainly may have a calling here.
I have reported before on the difficult relationship between A1 and A15 in Spring v MOD and in PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov.
The court at Dortmund also rejects the argument that parties’ settlement negotiations before the claims were filed amount to choice of (German) law per Article 14(1). That would have triggered the 3 year German limitation period as opposed to the 2 year Pakistani one. Dr Jungkamp, the chamber president, argues that parties did not have any reflection on the Pakistani (or indeed German) limitation period in mind when they corresponded on the ex gratia out of court settlement, hence excluding the intention (animus contrahendi) required to speak of choice of law. I would suggest that is a bit of a succinct analysis to conclude absence of choice of law. Parties need not be aware of all implications of such choice for it to be validly made.
Appeal is possible and, I would suggest, warranted.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.7, Heading 4.8, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
Dortmund court found that the claims are time-barred under Pakistani law, which was applicable to the case pursuant to the Rome II Regulation.
Quite a few Rome II issues here. I have a blog post focusing on the conflicts issues forthcoming next week. https://t.co/dkcKLvugoa
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 12, 2019
Pour le commissariat aux droits de l’homme du Conseil, le gouvernement devrait revoir la doctrine d’usage de ces armes.
The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé has been released. It contains several casenotes and one article, authored by Professor Paul Lagarde (“La codification du droit international privé monégasque”).
The abstract reads as follows:
“The princedom of Monaco has just given itself a brand-new legislation, a more or less complete codification of its private international law. In doing so, it joins the trend that has developed, particularly in Europe, since the latter part of the twentieth century and for which the model (under all meanings of the term) was the Swiss Act of 18th December 1987”.
A full table of contents is available here.
The Hague Conference has posted its annual report 2018, in traditional pdf and even more traditional paper format. Much space is taken up by reminiscences of the 125th anniversary , including the publication of several speeches. Beyond that are reports of other events, as well as general information, some more useful (new ratifications and accessions in 2018), some perhaps less so (the number of followers on twitter).
The recognition of surnames determined abroad by virtue of a judgment or an administrative act has never attracted the attention of academics in Greece. The frequency of appearance concerning reported judgments is also scarce. In practice however, applications are filed regularly, mostly related with non EU-Member States. Until recently, recognition was granted by courts of law, save some minor exceptions, where the public order clause was invoked to deny recognition. A ruling of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal from 2017 brings however an unexpected problem to surface.
I. The legal status in Greece
Name and surname issues are regulated by a decree published in 1957, as amended. For a person to change her/his name, there are certain requirements and an administrative procedure to be followed. The applicant has to prove the existence of a reason, such as psychological problems due to cacophonous sound of the surname, its pronunciation difficulty or hilarious meaning, its bad reputation or connotation, the lack of any contact with the applicant’s father, whose last name she/he uses, etc. In case of acceptance, the competent Mayor issues an act, granting the right of the petitioner to carry the new surname. If the application is dismissed, the applicant may file a recourse before the General Secretary of the territorially competent Decentralized Administration unit. The Council of State, i.e. the highest administrative court in Greece, serves as the last resort for the applicant.
II. The treatment of foreign judgments / administrative acts
The above decree does not regulate the situation where a person of double nationality (one of which is of course Greek) requests the registration of a foreign judgment or administrative act, whereupon a change of surname has been determined. Being confronted with relevant petitions, the Greek administration sought the assistance of the Legal Council of State, i.e. an advisory body at the service of state authorities. By virtue of a legal opinion issued in 1991, the Legal Council stated that registration may not take place prior to court recognition of the foreign judgment, pursuant to standard procedures provided for by the Greek Code of Civil Procedure [= GCCP]. In this fashion, the ball was sent to the courts.
III. The practice of the courts
Until recently, Greek courts reacted in a rather formal and simplistic way: Reference to the applicable provisions of the GCCP, presentation of facts, brief scrutiny on the merits and the documents produced, and recognition was granted. There are two exceptions to the rule. The first one is a reported case from 1996 [Athens 1st Instance Court Nr. 4817/1996, published in: Hellenic Justice 1997, p. 452], where a court order by the Supreme Court of Queensland was denied recognition, because it was based on the applicant’s wish to give up his surname and acquire a new one, without any examination by the Australian court. The Greek court invoked the public policy clause, stating that the issue goes beyond private autonomy, and is differently regulated in Greece. The same outcome appeared 32 years later in the course of an application for the recognition of an act issued by the Civil Registry of Suchoj Log, Sverdlovsk Oblast: In a ruling from last year, the Thessaloniki 1st Instance Court refused recognition on public policy grounds, because the procedure followed in Russia contravened mandatory rules of Greek law on the change of surnames [Thessaloniki 1st Instance Court Nr. 8636/2018, unreported].
A different stance was however opted by the Piraeus Court of Appeal with respect to an act issued by the Mayor of Vienna: After quashing the first instance decision, which dismissed the application as legally unfounded, the appellate court stayed proceedings, requesting a legal opinion on the procedure followed for the change of surnames pursuant to Austrian law. Upon submission of the legal opinion, the court proceeded to a brief analysis, whose outcome was the recognition of the Austrian act. In particular, the court confirmed that the procedure followed was in accordance with Austrian law [Bundesgesetz vom 22. März 1988 über die Änderung von Familiennamen und Vornamen (Namensänderungsgesetz – NÄG)]. Hence, no public policy reservations were in place [Piraeus Court of Appeal Nr. 141/2017, unreported].
IV. The Game Changer
The complacency era though seems to be over: In a judgment of the Thessaloniki CoA issued end 2017, things are turning upside-down. The application for the recognition of a registration made by the Civil Registry of Predgorny, District of Stavropol, was denied recognition, this time not on public order grounds, but on lack of civil courts’ jurisdiction. The court stated that the recognition of a foreign administrative act may not be examined by a civil court, if the subject matter at stake (change of surname) is considered to be an administrative matter according to domestic law. Bearing in mind that the change of surname is a genuinely administrative procedure in Greece (see under I), civil courts have no jurisdiction to try such an application.
V. Repercussions and the way ahead
What would be the consequences of this ruling in regards to the overall landscape?
First of all, there could be a sheer confusion in practice: If the administration demands court recognition, and courts decline their jurisdiction, stagnation is at the gates. A ping pong game will start between them, and the ball will be the poor applicant, trapped in the middle. Needless to say, there is no other judicial path for recognition. The Code of Administrative Procedure does not contain any provisions on the matter.
Secondly, is it to be expected that the same stance will prevail with respect to judgments or administrative acts coming from EU Member States? A spillover effect is not to be excluded. Courts seem to be encapsulated in their national niche. It is remarkable that no reference is made to the case law of the CJEU, even in the case regarding the Austrian Mayor’s act.
Therefore, an intervention by the legislator is urgently needed, otherwise we’re heading for stormy weather.
The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law has just published the proceedings from its 30th Private International Law Day, which focused on digital platforms and their implications for the conflict of laws. The following teaser, as well as the volume’s table of contents, have been kindly provided by its editor and main organiser of the conference, Ilaria Pretelli:
Since its creation in the early 1990s, the World Wide Web has intensified its role and skills at too speedy pace for any sober reflection in human sciences.
The exponential rise of tech oligopolies is also a consequence of the “statelessness” of the platform economy, a circumstance that explains the great interest of the subject for lawyers and the choice of this topic for the 30th day conference in Private International Law of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, held on June 28th, 2018 whose proceedings, enriched by further contributions, are collected in the 86th volume of its red series.
The disruptive potential of the platform economy challenges traditional approaches based on the bilateral legal relationship and its geographical location.
It is worth asking whether the basic principles of private international law can be adapted to the immateriality of the digital space, whether a new revolution in the theory of private international law can be expected, or whether private international law is an inapt tool for platform governance and the only promising way is that of a multilateral and harmonising approach.
Collecting the proceedings of the conference, the 86th volume of our red series aims to contribute, through a multidisciplinary analysis, to the collective effort to build a legal theory adapted to digital platforms.
By presenting the first national and supranational responses to the challenges of the platform economy – still disordered and sometimes contradictory – the book attempts to synthesise the main trends in the legal developments that are forthcoming in various legal fields, with a focus on the need to protecting weak parties (workers, consumers, small and medium businesses).
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