The first issue of 2023 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) is out. In addition to recent case law and other materials, it features three contributions.
Francesco Salerno, L’impatto della procedura di interpretazione pregiudiziale sul diritto internazionale privato nazionale (The Impact of the Preliminary Rulings of the Court of Justice on National Private International Law)
The European Court of Justice’s uniform interpretation of private international law concerns mainly – even though not only – the EU Regulations adopted pursuant to Art 81 TFEU: in the context of this activity, the Court also takes into account the distinctive features of EU Member States. The increasing number of autonomous notions developed by the Court greatly enhanced the consistency and the effectiveness of the European rules. Against this background, the Italian judicial authorities implemented such a case-law even when it ran counter well-established domestic legal principles. Moreover, the European institutions rarely questioned the case-law of the Court, but when they did so, they adopted new rules of private international law in order to “correct” a well-settled jurisprudential trend of the Court.
Cristina Campiglio, La condizione femminile tra presente e futuro: prospettive internazionalprivatistiche (The Status of Women between Present and Future: Private International Law Perspectives)
One of the Goals of the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is gender equality (Goal 5), which can also be achieved through the elimination of “all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage” (Target No 3) and the protection of women reproductive rights (Target No 6). This article addresses these two issues in a conflict-of-laws perspective, identifying the legal mechanisms through which legal systems counter the phenomenon of early marriages celebrated abroad and tackle the latest challenges related to the so-called reproductive tourism. After analyzing the role played by public policy exceptions and by the principle of the best interest of the child, it summarizes the Court of Justice’s case-law on the recognition of family situations across borders. In fact, the recognition of the possession of an EU status – meeting the social need to have a personal status which accompanies individuals anywhere within the EU area – is gaining ground. Such status is a personal identity merely functional to the exercise of EU citizens’ freedom of movement (Art 3(2) TEU, Art 21 TFEU and Art 45 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The result is the possession, by EU citizens, of a split personal identity – one functional to circulation, while the other one to its full extent – whose compatibility with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights principles and with the ECHR may be called into question.
Marco Farina, I procedimenti per il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni straniere nella recente riforma del processo civile in Italia (Proceedings for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Recent Italian Reform of Civil Procedure)
In this article, the author comments on the new Art. 30-bis of Legislative Decree No 150/2011, introduced by Legislative Decree No 149/2022 reforming Italian civil procedure and aimed at regulating “proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments provided for by European Union law and international conventions”. The author analyses the new provision, focusing on the different procedural rules applicable, depending on the relevant EU Regulation or international convention concerned, to the proceedings that the EU Regulations listed in Art. 30-bis of Legislative Decree No 150/2011 provide for obtaining the recognition and enforcement of the judgments rendered in a Member State other than the one in which they were rendered. In commenting on this new provision, the author offers a reasoned overview of the problems generated by it with the relative possible solutions.
Written by: Aditya Singh, BA.LL.B. (Hons) student at the National Law School of India University(NLSIU), Bengaluru and line editor at the National Law School Business Law Review (NLSBLR)
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding the composite approach i.e., the approach of accommodating the application of both the law applicable to the substantive contract and the Lex Fori to the arbitration clause has recently resurfaced with Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II (“Westbridge”). In this case, the Singapore Court of Appeal paved way for application of both the law governing substantive contract and the Lex Fori to determine the arbitrability of the concerned oppression and mismanagement dispute. The same was based on principle of comity, past precedents and s 11 of the International Arbitration Act. The text of s 11 (governing arbitrability) does not specify and hence limit the law determining public policy to Lex Fori. In any event, the composite approach regardless of any provision, majorly stems from basic contractual interpretation that extends the law governing substantive contract to the arbitration clause unless the presumption is rebuttable. For instance, in the instant case, the dispute would have been rendered in-arbitrable with the application of Indian law (law governing substantive contract) and hence the Singapore law was inferred to be the implied choice.[1]
The test as initially propounded in Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros v Enesa Engenharia (“Sulamerica”) by the EWCA and later also adopted in Singapore[2] states that the law governing the substantive contract will also govern the arbitration clause unless there is an explicit/implicit choice inferable to the contrary. The sequence being 1) express choice, 2) determination of implied choice in the absence of an express one and 3) closest and the most real connection. The applicability of Lex Fori can only be inferred if the law governing the substantive contract would completely negate the arbitration agreement. There have been multiple criticisms of the approach accumulated over a decade with the very recent ones being listed in (footnote 1). The aim of this article is to highlight the legal soundness and practical boons of the approach which the author believes has been missed out amidst the rampant criticisms.
To that end, the author will first discuss how the composite approach is the only legally sound approach in deriving the applicable law from the contract, which is also the source of everything to begin with. As long as the arbitration clause is a part of the main contract, it is subject to the same. To construe it as a separate contract under all circumstances would be an incorrect application of the separability doctrine. Continuing from the first point, the article will show how the various nuances within the composite approach provide primacy to the will and autonomy of the parties.
II. TURE APPLICATION OF THE ‘SEPARABILITY’ PRINCIPLEThe theory of separability envisages the arbitration clause to be separate from the main contract. The purpose of this principle is to immunize the arbitration clause from the invalidity of the main contract. There are various instances where the validity of a contract is contested on grounds of coercion, fraud, assent obtained through corruption, etc. This, however, does not render the arbitration clause inoperable but rather saves it to uphold the secondary obligation of resolving the dispute and measuring the claims arising out of the breach.[3]
It is imperative to note from the context set above that the doctrine has a specific set purpose. What was set as its purpose in seminal cases such as Heyman v Darwins Ltd has now been cemented into substantive law with Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model law which has further been adapted by multiple jurisdictions such as India, Singapore and the UK also having a version in s 7. The implication of this development is that separability cannot operate in a vague and undefined space creating legal fiction in areas beyond its stipulated domain. Taking into consideration this backdrop, it would be legally fallacious to strictly follow the Lex Fori i.e., applying the substantive law of the seat to the arbitration clause as a default or the other extreme of the old common law approach of extending the law applicable to the substantive contract as a default. The author submits that the composite approach which was first taken in Sulamerica and recently seen in Westbridge to determine the law applicable to arbitrability at a pre-award stage, enables the true application and effectuation of the separability doctrine.
A. Lex ForiTo substantiate the above made assertion, the author will first look at the Lex Fori paradigm. Any legal justification for the same will first have to prove that an arbitration clause is not subject to the main contract. This is generally carried out using the principle of separability. However, when we examine the text of article 16, Model law or even the provisions of the impugned jurisdictions of India and Singapore (in reference to the Westbridge case), separability can only be operationalised when there is an objection to the validity or existence of the arbitration clause. It would be useful to borrow from Steven Chong, J’s reading of the doctrine in BCY v BCZ, which is also a case of the Singapore High Court that applied the composite approach of Sulamerica. Separability according to them serves a vital and narrow purpose of shielding the arbitration clause from the invalidity of the main contract. The insulation however does not render the clause independent of the main contract for all purposes. Even if we were to examine the severability provision of the UK Arbitration Act (Sulamerica’s jurisdiction), the conclusion remains that separability’s effect is to make the arbitration clause a distinct agreement only when the main contract becomes ineffective or does not come into existence.
To further buttress this point, it would be useful to look at the other contours of separability. For instance, in the landmark ruling of Fiona Trust and Holding Corp v Privalov (2007), both Lord Hoffman and Lord Hope illustrated that an arbitration clause will not be severable where it is a part of the main contract and the existence of consent to the main contract in itself is under question. This may be owing to the fact that there is no signature or that it is forged, etc. To take an example from another jurisdiction, arbitration clauses in India seize to exist with the novation of a contract and the position remains even if the new contract does not have an arbitration clause. In these cases, the arbitration clause seized to be operational when the main contract turned out to be non-est. However, the major takeaway is that as a general norm and even in specific cases where the arbitration clause is endangered, it is subject to the main contract and that there are limitations to the separability doctrine. Hence, it would be legally fallacious to always detach arbitration clauses from the main contract and apply the law of the seat as this generalizes the application of separability, which in turn is contrary to its scheme. It is also imperative to note that the Sulamerica test does not impute the law governing the substantive contract when the arbitration clause is a standalone one hence treating it as a separate contract where ever necessary.
B. Compulsory Imposition of Law of Substantive Contract
Having addressed the Lex Fori approach, the author will now address the common law approach of imputing the law governing the main contract to the arbitration clause. The application and reiteration of which was recently seen in Enka v Chubb and Kabab-ji v Kout Food Group. If we were to just examine the legal tenability of a blanket imposition of the governing law on the main contract, the author’s stand even at this end of the spectrum would be one that the approach is impeding the true effectuation of separability. While it is legally fallacious to generalize the application of separability, the remark extends when it is not operationalized to save an arbitration clause. There may be circumstances as seen in Sulamerica and Westbridge wherein the arbitration clause will be defunct if the law of the main contract is applied. In such circumstances the arbitration clause should be considered a distinct contract and the law of the seat should be applied using a joint or even a disjunctive reading of prongs 2 and 3 of the Sulamerica test i.e., ‘implied choice’ and ‘closest and most real connection’. Although, in the words of Lord Moore-Bick, J, the two prongs often merge in inquiry as “identification of the system of law with which the agreement has its closest and most real connection is likely to be an important factor in deciding whether the parties have made an implied choice of proper law” [para 25]. In any event, when the law governing substantive contract is adverse, the default implication rendered by this inquiry is that the parties have impliedly chosen the law of the seat and the arbitration clause in these circumstances has a more real connection to the law of the seat. This is because the reasonable expectation of the parties to have their dispute resolved by the stipulated mechanism and the secondary obligation of resolving the dispute as per the contract (apart from the primary obligation of the contract) can only be upheld by applying the law of the seat.
When we specifically look at Enka v Chubb and Kabab-ji, it is imperative that these cases have still left room for the ‘validation principle’ which precisely is saving the arbitration clause in the manner described above. While the manner in which the principle was applied in Kabab-ji may be up for criticism, the same is beyond the scope of this article. A narrow interpretation of the validation principle is nonetheless avoidable using the second and third prongs of the Sulamerica test as the inquiry there gauges the reasonable expectation of the parties. Irrespective, Kabab-ji is still of the essence for its reading of Articles V(I)(a) of the New York Convention(“NYC”) r/w Article II of the NYC. Arguments have been made that the composite approach (or the very idea of applying the law governing substantive contract) being antithetical to the NYC. However, the law of the seat is only to be applied to arbitral agreements referred to in Article II, ‘failing any indication’. This phrase is broad enough to include not just explicit choices but also implicit choices of law. The applicability of Lex Fori is only mentioned as the last resort and what the courts after all undertake is finding necessary indications to decide the applicable law. Secondly, statutory interpretation should be carried out to give effect to international conventions only to the extent possible (para 31, Kabab-ji). An interpretation cannot make redundant the scheme of separability codified in the statute. Lastly, even if the approach were to be slightly antithetical to NYC, its domain of operation is at the enforcement stage and not the pre-arbitration stage. Hence, it can never be the sole determining factor of the applicable law at the pre-arbitral stage. While segueing into the next point of discussion, it would be imperative to mention amidst all alternatives and criticisms that the very creation of the arbitral tribunal, initiation of the various processes, etc is a product of the contract and hence its stipulation can never be discarded as a default.
III. PLACING PARTY AUTONOMY & WILL ON A PARAMOUNT PEDESTALThe importance of party autonomy in international arbitration cannot be reiterated enough. It along with the will of the parties constitute the very fundamental tenets of arbitration. As per Redfern and Hunter, it is an aspiration to make international arbitration free from the constraints of national laws.[4] There will always be limitations to the above stated objective, yet the aim should be to deliver on it to the most possible extent and it is safe to conclude that the composite approach does exactly that. Darren Low at the Asian International Arbitration Journal argues that this approach virtually allows party autonomy to override public policy. Although they state this in a form of criticism as the chronology in their opinion is one where the latter overrides the former. However, even they note that the arbitration in Westbridge was obviously not illegal. It is imperative to note that the domain of various limitations to arbitration such as public policy or comity needs to be restricted to a minimum. When the parties are operating in a framework which provides self-determining authority to the extent that parties the freedom to decide the applicable substantive law, procedure, seat, etc, party autonomy is of paramount importance. The Supreme Court of India in Centrotrade Minerals v Hindustan Copper concluded party autonomy to be the guiding principle in adjudication, in consideration of the abovementioned rationale.
As stated in Fiona Trusts, the insertion of an arbitration clause gives rise to a presumption that the parties intend to resolve all disputes arising out of that relation through the stipulated mechanism. This presumption can only be discarded via explicit exclusion. An arbitration clause according to Redfern and Hunter gives rise to a secondary obligation of resolving disputes. Hence, as long as the parties intend to and have an obligation to resolve a dispute, an approach that facilitates the same to the most practicable extent is certainly commendable.
This can be further elucidated by taking a closer look at the line of cases on the topic. The common aspect in all these cases is that they have paved way for the application of laws of multiple jurisdictions which in turn has opened the gates to a very pro-validation approach. For There are multiple reasons for parties to choose a particular place for arbitration, including but not limited to neutrality, quality of adjudication, cost, procedure applicable to arbitration, etc. And while it may be true that an award passed by a following arbitration may not be enforceable in the venue jurisdiction, it can still be enforced in other jurisdictions. There are 2 layers to be unravelled here – the first one being that it is a well settled principle in international arbitration that awards set aside in one jurisdiction can be enforced in the others as long as they do not violate the public policy of the latter jurisdiction. This was seen in Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt, wherein the award was set aside by the Egyptian Court of Appeal yet it was enforced in the U.S.A. The same principle although well embedded in other cases was recently reiterated in Compania De Inversiones v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua wherein the award for an arbitration seated in Bolivia was annulled there but enforced by the Tenth Circuit in the U.S.A. The second ancillary point to this is the practicality aspect. The parties generally select the law governing the substantive contract to be one where the major operations of the company, its assets related to the contract are based and hence that is also likely to be the preferred place of enforcement. This is a good point to read in Gary Born’s proposal of imputing the law of a jurisdiction that has “materially closer connections to the issue at hand”.[5]
Apart from the pro-validation approach which upholds the rational expectation of the parties, there are other elements of the composite approach that ensure the preservation of party autonomy and will. For instance, the courts will firstly, not interfere if it can be construed that the parties have expressly stipulated a law for the arbitration clause. Secondly, as has been mentioned above, the courts will impute the law governing the substantive contract as the applicable law when the arbitration clause is a standalone one. What can be observed from here is that the approach maintains a proper degree of caution even while inferring the applicable law. And lastly, the very idea of maintaining a presumption of the same law being applicable to both the main contract and the arbitration clause also aligns with upholding the will and autonomy of the parties. Various commentators have observed that parties in practice rarely stipulate a separate clause on the substantive law applicable to the arbitration clause. As observable, model clauses of the various major arbitral institutions do not contain such a stipulation and certain commentators have even gone as far as to conclude that the inclusion of such a clause would only add to the confusion. In light of this background, it was certainly plausible for Steven Chong, J in BYC v BCZ to conclude that “where the arbitration agreement is a clause forming part of a main contract, it is reasonable to assume that the contracting parties intend their entire relationship to be governed by the same system of law. If the intention is otherwise, I do not think it is unreasonable to expect the parties to specifically provide for a different system of law to govern the arbitration agreement” [para 59]. However, it has been shown above that the composite approach has not left any presumption irrebuttable in the presence of appropriate reasoning, facts and will trigger separability if necessary to avoid the negation of the arbitration agreement.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKSIn a nutshell, what can be inferred from this article is that the composite approach keeps at its forefront principles and characteristics of party autonomy and pro-arbitration. The approach is extremely layered and well thought out to preserve the intention of the parties to the most practicable extent. It delivers on all of this while truly effectuating the principle of separability and ensuring its correct application. Hence, despite all the criticisms it is still described as a forward-looking approach owing to its various characteristics.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] For recent literature and more detailed facts, See Darren Jun Jie Low, ‘The Composite Approach to Issues of Non-Arbitrability at the Pre-Award and Post-Award Stage: Anupam Mittal v. Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1’, in Lawrence Boo and Lucy F. Reed (eds), Asian International Arbitration Journal (Kluwer Law International 2023, Volume 19, Issue 1), 83 – 94; Khushboo Shahdapuri and Chelsea Pollard, ‘Dispute over Matrimonial Service Website: Singapore Adopts Composite Approach in Declaring Dispute to be Arbitrable’, (Kluwer Arbitration, 2023) < Dispute over Matrimonial Service Website: Singapore Adopts Composite Approach in Declaring Dispute to be Arbitrable – Kluwer Arbitration Blog>; Nisanth Kadur, ‘Determining Arbitrability at the Pre-Award Stage: An Analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s “Composite Approach”’, (American Review of International Arbitration, 2023) <Determining Arbitrability at the Pre-Award Stage: An Analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s “Composite Approach” – American Review of International Arbitration (columbia.edu)>
[2] See BCY v BCZ [2016] SGHC 249; BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142; Anupam Mittal v Westbridge II [2023] SGCA 1.
[3] Martin Hunter and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (6th edn, 2015 OUP) [2.101 – 2.104].
[4] Redfern and Hunter (n 1) [1.53].
[5] Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, (3rd Ed, Kluwer Law International 2021) §4.05 [C] [2].
Some EAPIL members are reporting they receive e-mails allegedly sent on my behalf requesting help for the Association.
These e-mails were not sent either by me or any EAPIL official.
Please ignore them.
The European Parliament on 11 July 2023 adopted its negotiating position on the proposal for a directive on the protection of persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings, also known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).
The Parliament will now start discussions on this basis with the European Council, whose first position has been analysed by Pietro Franzina in a previous post on this blog.
The text resulting from the Council’s general approach departs from the initial proposal (analysed by Marta Requejo in a previous post on this blog), in various respects.
The most significant innovations include the following.
Subject MatterParliament specified that the directive poses a set of minimum standards of protection and safeguards against manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings in civil matters, as well as the threats thereof, with cross-border implications brought against natural and legal persons engaging in public participation. No specification on journalists and human rights defenders is provided.
ScopeThe scope of the proposed directive should apply to matters of a civil or commercial nature having cross-border implications, including interim and precautionary measures, counteractions or other particular types of remedies available under other instruments, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. Parliament, then, specified the directive tool as posing minimum requirements. Member States, indeed, may introduce or maintain more favourable provisions than the safeguards provided for in this directive against manifestly unfounded and abusive court proceedings in civil matters. As a result, the implementation of this directive shall in no circumstances constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of safeguards already afforded by Member States in the matters covered by this directive.
DefinitionsParliament clarified the definition of ‘public participation’ to mean any statement or activity by a natural or legal person expressed or carried out in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information, academic freedom, or freedom of assembly and association, and preparatory, supporting or assisting action directly linked thereto, on a matter of public interest. This includes complaints, petitions, administrative or judicial claims, the participation in public hearings, the creation, exhibition, advertisement or other promotion of journalistic, political, scientific, academic, artistic, satirical communications, publications or works.
Also the ‘matter of public interest’ is deepened by the Parliament, adding fundamental rights including gender equality, media freedom and consumer and labour rights, as well as the already indicated public health, safety, the environment or the climate. Activities of a person or entity in the public eye or of public interest includes governmental officials and private entities too. Allegations of corruption and fraud are extended, comprising also embezzlement, money laundering, extortion, coercion, sexual harassment and gender-based violence, or other forms of intimidation, or any other criminal or administrative offence, including environmental crime. All activities aimed to protect the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the principle of non-interference in democratic processes, and to provide or facilitate public access to information with a view to fighting disinformation are included.
The ‘fully or partially unfounded’ element related to these proceedings is better explained, that is when characterised by elements indicative of a misuse of the judicial process for purposes other than genuinely asserting, vindicating or exercising a right and have as their main purpose to abusively prevent, restrict or penalize public participation. Indications of such a purpose are added and further clarified, as follows. It is added the misuse of economic advantage or political influence by the claimant against the defendant, leading to an imbalance of power between the two parties. Intimidation, harassment or threats on the part of the claimant or his or her representatives can occur before or during the proceedings, as well as any previous history of legal intimidation by the claimant. It is then added also the use in bad faith of procedural tactics, such as delaying proceedings, and choosing to pursue a claim that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court that will treat the claim most favourably, or the discontinuation of the cases at a later stage of the proceedings.
Matters with Cross-Border ImplicationsThe aim is to cover as many cases as possible, working on the cross-border notion in order to enlarge it. Cross-border implications, indeed, occur for the Parliament if the act of public participation is relevant to more than one Member State, either due to the cross-border dimension of the act itself or due to the legitimate interest which the public may take in the matter concerned by the act, including if the act is accessible via electronic means. The other element, i.e. the filing of concurrent or previous proceedings against the same or associated defendants in another Member State, is confirmed by the Parliament.
Providing expeditious court proceedings is outlined. Member States shall ensure that courts or tribunals seised with an application for procedural safeguards in the proceedings in relation to which the application has been sought using the most expeditious procedures available under national law, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.
According to the Parliament, then, Member States shall (not ‘may’) provide that measures on procedural safeguards in accordance with chapters on early dismissal and remedies can be taken by the court or tribunal seised of the matter ex officio.
Assistance to natural or legal persons engaging in public participation is added. Member States shall ensure that natural or legal persons engaging in public participation have access, as appropriate, to support measures, in particular the following: (a) comprehensive and independent information and advice which is easily accessible to the public and free of charge on procedures and remedies available, on protection against intimidation, harassment or threats of legal action, and on their rights; and (b) legal aid in accordance with Directive 2003/8/EC, and, in accordance with national law, legal aid in further proceedings, and legal counselling or other legal assistance; (c) financial assistance and support measures, including psychological support, for those targeted by abusive court proceedings against public participation.
Third Party InterventionThe third party intervention is strengthened: in addition to widening the audience of interveners, their role is increased. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a court or tribunal seised of court proceedings against public participation may accept that associations, organisations and other collective bodies, such as trade unions, and any other legal entities which have, in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in safeguarding or promoting the rights of persons engaging in public participation may take part in those proceedings, either on behalf or in support of the defendant, with his or her approval or to provide information, in any judicial procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this directive. This provision is without prejudice to existing rights of representation and intervention as guaranteed by other Union or national rules.
SecuritySecurity for procedural costs, or for procedural costs and damages, is remodelled as security for costs of the proceedings, including the full costs of legal representation incurred by the defendant and damage. Where national law provides for such possibility, security may be granted to the defendant at any stage of the court proceedings.
Early DismissalMember States shall (not ‘may’) establish time limits for the exercise of the right to file an application for early dismissal. The time limits shall be also reasonable.
Award of CostsThe claimant who has brought abusive court proceedings against public participation is to be ordered to bear all the costs. Where national law does not guarantee the award in full of the costs of legal representation beyond statutory fee tables, Member States shall ensure that such costs are fully covered by other means available under national law, and, where appropriate, through compensation of damages in accordance with Article 15.
Full compensation for harm is clarified covering material or non-material harm, including reputational harm, without the need to initiate separate court proceedings to that end.
Penalties and National RegisterParliament added that Member States shall ensure that courts or tribunals imposing penalties take due account of: (i) the economic situation of the claimant; (ii) the nature and number of the elements indicating an abuse identified.
In addition, Member states shall take appropriate measures to establish a publicly accessible register of relevant court decisions falling within the scope of this directive, in accordance with Union and national rules on the protection of personal data.
Jurisdiction for Actions Against Third-Country JudgementsParliament modified this matter, stating that the concerned person shall (not ‘may’) have the right granted under Article 18.
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Relations with Union Private International Law InstrumentsOn jurisdiction matters, a new article has been included stating that in defamation claims or other claims based on civil or commercial law which may constitute a claim under this directive, the domicile of the defendant should be considered to be the sole forum, having due regard to cases where the victims of defamation are natural persons. With the exception of the latter new added Article, this directive then shall not affect the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
On the applicable law, in claims regarding a publication as an act of public participation, the applicable law shall be the law of the place to which that publication is directed to. In the event of it not being possible to identify the place to which the publication is directed, the applicable law shall be the law of the place of editorial control or of the relevant editorial activity with regard to the act of public participation. With the exception of the latter new added Article, this directive shall not affect the application of the Rome II Regulation.
Union RegisterThe Commission shall take appropriate measures to establish a publicly accessible Union register, on the basis of the information provided in accordance with the Article concerning the national register, of relevant court decisions falling within the scope of this directive, in accordance with Union rules on the protection of personal data.
Awareness-RaisingA new addition by the Parliament. Member States shall take appropriate action, including via electronic means, aimed at raising awareness about strategic lawsuits against public participation and the procedural safeguards set out in this directive against them. Such action may include information and awareness-raising campaigns and research and education programmes, where appropriate in cooperation with relevant civil society organisations and other stakeholders.
One-Stop ShopParliament included a new article establishing a ‘one-stop shop’ comprising dedicated national networks of specialised lawyers, legal practitioners and psychologists, which targets of SLAPPs can contact, and through which they can receive guidance and easy access to information on, and protection against SLAPPs, including regarding legal aid, financial and psychological support.
Training of PractitionersTo foster prevention of the initiation of SLAPPs and protection of targeted natural or legal persons, it is crucial to promote relevant information, awareness-raising, campaigns, education and training, including on their rights and protection mechanisms. Parliament proposed that, with due respect for the independence of the legal profession, Member States should recommend that those responsible for the training of lawyers make available both general and specialist training to increase the awareness of strategic lawsuits against public participation and the procedural safeguards against them provided for in this directive. Training should also be provided to legal professionals in order to increase awareness of abusive court proceedings and be able to detect them at a very early stage.
Cooperation and Coordination of ServicesMember States should take appropriate action to facilitate cooperation between Member States to improve the access of those targeted by manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation to information on procedural safeguards provided for in this directive and under national law. Such cooperation should be aimed at least at: (a) the exchange of current practices; and (b) the provision of assistance to European networks working on matters directly relevant to those targeted by manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings against public participation.
Deontological Rules for Legal ProfessionalsMember States shall, with due respect for the independence of the legal profession, encourage the adoption by professional associations of deontological rules that guide the conduct of legal professionals to discourage the taking of abusive lawsuits against public participation, and where appropriate, considering measures to address any violation of those rules.
Data CollectionMember States shall, taking into account their institutional arrangements on judicial statistics, entrust one or more authorities to be responsible to collect and aggregate, in full respect of data protection requirements, data on abusive court proceedings against public participation initiated in their jurisdiction. Data referred to shall include, in particular, many specified criteria.
Transposition into National LawMember States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive according to the Parliament by 1 years, compared to the 2 years of the original Commission text.
In addition, Member States shall apply this directive also to cases pending before a national court at the time of entry into force of the national rules transposing this directive.
I have reported before on the European Commission’s reasoning to refuse to support the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention. Leigh Day and Daniel Leader in particular report here on a recent initiative of note: a letter by Dr Yeophantong, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, has written to the European Commission asking it to explain its refusal to endorse the UK request to join.
Dr Yeophantong suggests the EC recalcitrance “may limit the legal accountability of UK domiciled businesses’ behaviour outside the UK, for which she refers in particular to the expected trend post Brexit, for even UK incorporated business to try and deflect jurisdiction in the UK courts viz claims pursuing these corporations for their or others’ business and human rights record outside the UK. The vehicle for this to happen is of course forum non conveniens. As readers know (otherwise try ‘CSR’ or ‘forum non’ or ‘Article 34’ in the search box), the UK have for a long time applied forum non conveniens, a mechanism not known in the Brussels regime other than in the reduced form of Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia, and not known at all in the Lugano Convention.
As Leigh Day summarise, Dr Yeophantong posed six questions in her letter, including asking Ms Von der Leyen, Commission President:
At first sight it may seem odd to ask the EU to justify its actions vis-a-vis a mechanism (forum non) that is part of all of the UK’s common laws: rather, one might say, the obvious target is UK law itself. However politically speaking, it is most certainly correct that EU support for UK Lugano accession would with one swoop pull the carpet from underneath an important mechanism for UK corporations to try and avoid discipline for human rights abuses abroad. This is arguably in line with the EU’s committments under human rights law. Moreover, there is as I suggested here, inconsistency in the Commission’s approach to external judicial cooperation policies of relevance to Lugano.
To be continued.
Geert.
EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 1.7.
Working Group is concerned that the EC’s refusal to the UK’s accession to the Convention “may limit the legal accountability of UK domiciled businesses’ behaviour outside the UK https://t.co/MLCgbWIUlr
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 4, 2023
The author of this post is Lydia Lundstedt, who is a Senior Lecturer at Stockholm University.
The United States has long differed from other countries by applying its trademark law (Lanham Act) to acts of infringement in foreign countries. Indeed, in the seminal case, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS or Court) upheld the application of the Lanham Act to acts of infringement in Mexico when a U.S. defendant took essential steps in the U.S. and caused consumer confusion in the U.S. and injured the right holder’s reputation in the U.S. and abroad. In Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, decided on 29 June 2023, the Court put an end to this and held that § 1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) (the infringement provisions) of the Lanham Act are not extraterritorial and apply only to infringing uses of protected marks in U.S. commerce.
FactsHetronic International, Inc (Hetronic), a U.S. company, manufactures radio remote controls for heavy-duty construction equipment. For many years Hetronic had a distributorship agreement with six foreign related parties (collectively Abitron) to distribute Hetronic’s products in Europe. The relationship soured when Abitron claimed ownership to much of Hetronic’s intellectual property rights and began manufacturing their own products—identical to Hetronic’s—and selling them using Hetronic’s trademarks. Abitron mostly sold its products in Europe, but it also made some sales to buyers in the U.S. Hetronic sued Abitron alleging infringement under the Lanham Act seeking worldwide damages and a global injunction. Abitron argued that the Act could not apply to its foreign sales. The district court rejected this argument and Hetronic was awarded approximately 96 million dollars in damages. Abitron was also enjoined from using Hetronic’s trademarks anywhere in the world. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, apart for narrowing the injunction to the countries in which Hetronic actually markets or sells its products. Abitron appealed to SCOTUS.
SCOTUSThe Court applied its longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality, which holds that, unless the U.S. Congress has clearly instructed otherwise, U.S. legislation applies only within the U.S. territory. The Court recalled that this presumption serves to avoid international discord with foreign countries and recognizes that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.
The Court’s modern extraterritoriality framework consists of two steps. First, the Court determines whether there is a clear indication that Congress intended to rebut the presumption with respect to the provision at issue. If the answer is no, step two determines whether the case involves a domestic (permissible) application of the provision or a foreign (impermissible) application of the provision. This involves identifying the statute’s focus and whether the object of the focus is located in the U.S.
While all the justices agreed that the answer at step one was no, the justices were almost evenly divided (5-4) at step two in how to draw the dividing line between a domestic and a foreign application of the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions.
The majority (opinion of the Court) held that the relevant criterion was the location of the conduct, that is, the infringing use of the mark must occur in U.S. commerce. They observed that the Court’s previous precedent, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., which they called “narrow and fact-bound”, implicated both domestic conduct and a likelihood of domestic confusion so it was not helpful when determining which of the two criteria were relevant. Looking instead to the text and context of the infringement provisions, the majority explained that while the conduct must create a risk of confusion, confusion was not a separate requirement but a necessary characteristic of the infringing use. In addition, the majority reasoned that a conduct criterion was easy for the lower courts to apply and it was consistent with the territorial nature of trademarks enshrined in international law.
In contrast, the concurring justices argued that the relevant criterion was consumer confusion. They maintained that the focus of the statute was protection against consumer confusion in the U.S. In their view, an application of the Lanham Act to activities carried out abroad when there is a risk of confusion in the U.S. was a permissible domestic application.
The concurring justices argued that the Court’s precedents do not require a conduct only criterion. They argued that the focus of a statute can be parties and interests that Congress seeks to protect. In addition, they chided the majority for putting aside Steele v. Bulova Watch, which has guided the lower courts for more than 70 years. They also argued that the majority exaggerated the risk for international discord and that applying the Act when there was a likelihood of U.S. consumer confusion was consistent with the international trademark system.
The justices were unanimous in agreeing that the Court of Appeals’ judgment be vacated.
New QuestionsThe majority opinion raises questions concerning the localization of infringing use. Indeed, its focus on conduct suggests that the location of the actor is relevant. That said, there was no dispute that the Lanham Act applied to the products that Abitron sold directly into the U.S. But what if the products were delivered abroad but marketed to U.S. buyers? Under European Union law, for instance, an infringing use of a trademark takes place in the EU if an offer for sale of a trade-marked product located in a third State is targeted at consumers in the EU (L’Oréal and others (C-324/09).
Now that the Lanham Act no longer applies to foreign infringing acts, right holders will need to rely on foreign trademarks. As many right holders will undoubtably seek to enforce foreign rights in U.S. courts, the question arises whether the U.S. courts will hear foreign trademark claims. Historically, U.S. courts have been reluctant to hear infringement claims based on foreign registered rights for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or forum non conveniens. It will be interesting to see how SCOTUS rules on these questions in the future.
The latest issue of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law (NIPR) has been published.
NIPR 2023 issue 2
Editorial
C.G. van der Plas / p. 197
Articles
K.C. Henckel, Issues of conflicting laws – a closer look at the EU’s approach to artificial intelligence / p. 199-226
Abstract
While newly emerging technologies, such as Artificial intelligence (AI), have a huge potential for improving our daily lives, they also possess the ability to cause harm. As part of its AI approach, the European Union has proposed several legislative acts aiming to accommodate and ensure the trustworthiness of AI. This article discusses the potential private international law impact of these legislative proposals. In doing so, it – inter alia – addresses how the newly proposed legislative acts interact with existing private international law instruments, such as the Rome II Regulation. In addition, it questions whether there is a need for specific rules on the private international law of AI.
Silva de Freitas, The interplay of digital and legal frontiers: analyzing jurisdictional rules in GDPR collective actions and the Brussels I-bis Regulation / p. 227-242
Abstract
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has provided data subjects with the possibility to mandate representative organizations to enforce rights on their behalf. Furthermore, the GDPR also contains its own jurisdictional scheme for the enforcement of the rights of data subjects. In this context, judicial and scholarly discussions have arisen as to how the procedural provisions contained in the GDPR should interact for properly assigning jurisdiction in GDPR-related collective actions. In this article, I will address this question to argue that both jurisdictional grounds provided by the GDPR are available for representative organizations to file collective actions: the Member State in which the controller or processor is established and the Member State in which the data subjects reside. Furthermore, in order to exemplify the impact of national law on such interaction, I will also assess how some legal provisions contained in the WAMCA may impinge upon the rules on jurisdiction contained in the GDPR.
On 6 July 2023 the Court of Justice issued a judgement in BM v LO (C-462/22). The ruling provides guidance as to the interpretation of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation on matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility. Specifically, it refers to the sixth indent of the provision, whereby, in matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State in whose territory the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and is a national of the Member State in question.
It is worth noting that the new Brussels II ter Regulation does not bring any changes to the rules on jurisdiction in matrimonial matters. The interpretation by the Court of Justice of those provisions accordingly remain valid under the recast Regulation.
Factual BackgroundThe request for preliminary ruling originated from the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof). The case concerned the divorce of a couple formed by a German husband and a Polish wife, who had married in Poland in 2000. The couple had twin sons born in 2003.
The facts are as follows.
After initially living in Germany for a number of years, the couple moved to Poland into a house they had built, in which the wife still lives today. They are also the joint owners of a dwelling in Warsaw, which they had rented until September 2012, after which it was at their full disposal.
The husband was a senior executive of a pharmaceuticals manufacturer. Since April 2010, he has been employed as the managing director for the Central Europe region, which includes Poland and the Netherlands, but not Germany. His activity is largely characterised by business trips and working from home. His employer provided him with staff accommodation in Aerdenhout (Netherlands), in which he resided on an occasional basis until the end of 2013. The husband has a self- contained dwelling in a house occupied by his parents, in Hamm (Germany).
The husband filed a divorce application with the District Court in Hamm (Germany) in October 2013. He submitted that his habitual residence had been in Hamm since mid-2012 at the latest. He moved out of the house in Poland in June 2012. Since June 2012, he has deepened his relationship with his new cohabiting partner in Hamm and has been caring for his parents. During his stays in Poland, he was limited to having contact with his two sons, which was always tied in with business trips.
The wife challenged the jurisdiction of the German courts and submitted that the husband did not move out of the house in Poland until the beginning of April 2013 and then lived in the jointly owned dwelling in Warsaw. They took turns picking up the two sons from school in Warsaw during the second semester of the 2012/2013 academic year. The husband resided almost exclusively in the Netherlands or Poland between April and November 2013.
The District Court in Hamm (Germany) considered that the German courts lack jurisdiction, and it dismissed the husband’s application as inadmissible. His appeal on the merits was dismissed also by the Higher Regional Court. The Higher Regional Court concluded that the husband’s habitual residence had been in Germany at the time when he filed his divorce application in October 2013. However, he had not yet been habitually resident in Germany for six months before he filed his divorce application (in April 2013). The husband’s appeal on a point of law, lodged with the referring court, is directed against the decision of the Higher Regional Court.
Preliminary QuestionIn the case at hand, the doubt concerns the provision of Article 3(1)(a) sixth indent of the Brussels II bis Regulation.
As the applicant was already habitually resident in Germany at the moment of filing a divorce claim, but not necessarily in the period of six month preceding this date, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to address the Court of Justice. The latter rephrased the preliminary question in the following way:
whether the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that that provision makes the jurisdiction of the court of a Member State to hear an application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties subject to the condition that the applicant, who is a national of that Member State, provides evidence that he or she has acquired a habitual residence in that Member State for at least six months immediately prior to the submission of his or her application, or to the condition that he or she shows that the residence which he or she acquired in that same Member State has become a habitual residence during the minimum period of six months immediately preceding the lodging of his or her application.
In simpler words the doubt in the case at hand is whether the applicant must prove habitual residence from the beginning and throughout that minimum period of six months immediately preceding the application.
The JudgmentThe Court of Justice ruled that Article 3(1)(a)
makes the jurisdiction of the court of a Member State to hear an application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties subject to the condition that the applicant, who is a national of that Member State, provides evidence that he or she has acquired a habitual residence in that Member State for at least six months immediately prior to the submission of his or her application.
The Court of Justice reminded that the criteria for jurisdiction listed in Article 3 Brussels IIbis Regulation are objective, alternative and exclusive. While the first to fourth indents of Article 3(1)(a) expressly refer to the habitual residence of the spouses and of the respondent as criteria, the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) creates a forum actoris [para. 18-19].
The latter rule seeks to ensure a balance between, on the one hand, the mobility of individuals within the EU, in particular by protecting the rights of the spouse who, after the marriage has broken down, has left the MS where the couple had their shared habitual residence and, on the other hand, legal certainty (in particular legal certainty for the other spouse) by ensuring that there is a real link between the applicant and the MS whose courts have jurisdiction [para. 20].
The Court of Justice explained that, of course, for the purpose of relying on the sixth intend, a spouse must show his habitual residence in the territory of the given Member State at the time of lodging the application [para. 24]. The doubt is whether this habitual residence must be established from the beginning and throughout that minimum period of six months immediately preceding the application [para. 25].
As indicated by the Bundesgerichtshof there is a disagreement as to how the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation are to be interpreted. According to first view, the applicant must have already had habitual residence in the MS of the court at the beginning of the six months period (referred to by the Bundesgerichtshof as “waiting period”). Pursuant to this view in order to exclude manipulation of jurisdiction to the detriment of the respondent, the applicant must prove a sufficiently close connection with the Member State of the court by virtue of habitual residence of a certain duration.
By contrast, according to the second standpoint, periods of mere de facto residence of the applicant must be included in the six-month period, as the commented provisions speaks of “residing” (and not “habitually residing”) in a Member State. Here, the Bundesgerichtshof compares the wording of Brussels II bis Regulation to the HCCH 1970 Divorce Convention, which wording is less ambiguous as to the character of residence. While establishing requirement of indirect jurisdiction, its Article 2(2)(a) provides that the requirement is fulfilled if “the petitioner had his habitual residence there and one of the following further conditions was fulfilled”, for example “such habitual residence had continued for not less than one year immediately prior to the institution of proceedings”.
While, agreeing with the first view (and acknowledging slightly different wording of Article 3(1) in the German version) the Court of Justice underlined that the commented provision must be understood in the light of other provisions of Brussels II bis Regulation. The Court of Justice explained that under Article 3(1)(a) second indent the court of the Member State in which the spouses were last habitually resident, in so far as one of them still resides there has jurisdiction. It is clear that the expression “still resides there” implies a temporal continuity between that residence and the place where the spouses were last habitually resident. As a result, the spouse who remained in the territory of the MS concerned has his or her own habitual residence there [para. 30]. This shows that no distinction should be made between the notion of habitual residence and residence in Article 3.
Only such understanding strikes a fair balance between legal certainty, while preserving the mobility of persons within the European Union and the possibility of obtaining the divorce, without unduly favouring that applicant, even though the forum actoris is a rule already favourable to him [para. 31].
Such strict understandings is needed as the jurisdiction based on the commented provision is not subject either to the agreement of the spouses or to the existence of a particular connection with the place where they lived together, past or present. Hence, requiring the applicant to demonstrate habitual residence in the territory of the Member State of the court seised for at least six months immediately preceding the lodging of the application is based on the need for that applicant to be able to establish a real link with that Member State [para. 33].
If, in contrast, the second view would be the correct one, the sufficiency of the period of habitual residence required of the applicant in the territory of the Member State of the court seised would, by definition, vary from case to case and according to the casuistic assessment of each national court seised [para. 34].
At the same time, the requirement as understood by the Court of Justice does not impose on the applicant any disproportionate burden, which could deter from relying on the commented ground of jurisdiction.
Final RemarksGiven the very favorable to the applicant ground of jurisdiction provided for in Article 3(1)(a) sixth indent of Brussels II bis Regulation, the interpretation provided by the Court of Justice is very reasonable. As suggested by the Bundesgerichtshof in its preliminary question, such interpretation is supported by the fact that the commented rule constitutes a special privileged treatment of the applicant, with the result that there is a need for special protection of the respondent, who in most cases has no connection to the court seised.
In practice, as noticed by the referring court, an ex-post assessment of the question as to whether the residence in the MS was already “habitual” at the beginning of the six-month period might be associated with considerable factual uncertainties and difficulties.
However, such problems are likely to arise only rarely. Usually, a spouse, while separated from the other, leaves the place where the the couple was resident and moves to another MS, which usually entails the return to “home” MS, which is the MS of his / her residence before the marriage or nationality.
Hence, as suggested in the AG’s opinion to IB v FA (C-289/20) it is possible for a spouse to acquire habitual residence almost immediately or at least after a short period of time, with the result that in practice the entire residence in the other MS will constitute habitual residence.
A new volume by Deyan Draguiev on Interim Measures in Cross-Border Civil and Commercial Disputes, based on his PhD thesis supervised by Peter Mankowski, has just been published with Springer.
The blurb reads as follows:
The book focusses on applying a holistic overview of interim measures and associated procedures in the context of cross-border private law (civil and commercial) disputes that are the subject of international litigation and arbitration proceedings. It reexamines key features of said problem and outlines novel findings on interim relief in the area of international dispute resolution. The book analyses the rules of EU law (EU law regulations such as the Regulation Brussels Ibis and the rest of the Brussels regime) as the single system of cross-border jurisdictional rules, as well as the rules of international arbitration (both commercial and investment). In the process, it conducts a complete mapping of interim measures problems and explores the criteria for granting relief under national laws. For this purpose, it includes an extensive comparative law overview of many jurisdictions in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas, etc., to reveal common standards for granting interim relief.
Interim relief is a salient problem in dispute resolution, and serious international disputes usually require requests for such measures. This makes a more complete understanding all the more important. For scholars and practitioners alike, there are various ways to seek relief; precisely this complexity calls for a more complex and multilayered analysis, which does not (as is usually the case) adopt the perspective of either litigation or arbitration, but instead weighs the pros and cons and considers the viability and reliability of the different options, viewed from all angles.
Au cours des mois de mai et juin 2023, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme n’a pas rendu d’arrêts ou de décisions particulièrement retentissants, mais un bon nombre d’entre eux sont venus faire écho à des questions qui étaient au cœur de l’actualité médiatique et politique : déferlement de la haine sur les réseaux sociaux, droit des étrangers, violences policières et contre la police, violences domestiques, protection de l’environnement… Puisse leur présentation rapide apporter des repères à celles et ceux qui se précipitent devant les micros et les caméras pour les aborder en mettant en cause l’Europe toutes les dix phrases sans même connaître la différence entre la Cour de Luxembourg et la Cour de Strasbourg qui pourtant ne méritent pas, en fonction des sujets, les mêmes reproches ou les mêmes encouragements.
Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile 2023, annoté et commenté Voir la boutique DallozHolger Spamann and Daniel Klerman recently conducted a most interesting experiment on judicial behavior in the context of conflict of laws, the results of which have been pre-published by the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. They have kindly provided the following summary for the readers of this blog (who may access the full paper here):
Modern American choice of law has been much criticized for giving judges too much discretion. In particular, Brilmayer and others predict that the use of open-ended standards, such as the Restatement Second’s “most significant relationship” test, will enable judges to decide disputes in biased ways, including a bias in favor of plaintiffs. In contrast, critics argue that the more rules-based approach – such as the lex loci delicti principle that prevailed in America before the 1960s and that, in large part, continues to apply in much of the world – would be more predictable and less subject to bias. We designed an experiment involving US federal judges to test whether the modern American, standards-based approach is, in fact, less predictable and more subject to bias. We find that the rules-based approach may constrain more than the modern standards-based approach, although even under seemingly clear rules judicial decisions were less predictable than we expected. Judges under neither the lex loci rule nor that “most significant relationship” standard exhibited a bias towards the more sympathetic party, although we did detect some pro-plaintiff bias under both the rule and the standard. Somewhat surprisingly, we also found that judges who were supposed to apply the modern “most significant relationship” standard tended to decide according to lex loci delicti rule.
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