L’Università di Milano, assieme alla Fondazione Italiana del Notariato ed altri enti, organizza per il 4 marzo 2016 un convegno dal titolo Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni. Si tratta dell’evento conclusivo di una ricerca dedicata al regolamento n. 650/2012 sulle successioni mortis causa, co-finanziata dalla Commissione europea.
Il convegno si articolerà in quattro sessioni, dedicate rispettivamente all’ambito di applicazione del regolamento e alle nozioni di cui esso si serve, alle norme sui conflitti di leggi, a quelle sulla giurisdizione e il riconoscimento delle decisioni e all’impatto della disciplina uniforme sugli ordinamenti statali.
Interverranno, fra gli altri, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. Milano), Paul Beaumont (Univ. Aberdeen), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Roberta Clerici (Univ. Milano), Peter Kindler (Univ. Monaco), Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. Milano), Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Lyon), Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. Genova), Francesca Villata (Univ. Milano) e Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. Milano).
Il programma può leggersi qui.
La partecipazione – gratuita – richiede la registrazione al sito www.suxreg.eu.
At the Institute for Foreign and Private International Law of the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany), a vacancy has to be filled at the chair for private law, private international law and comparative law (chairholder: Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein), from 1 April, 2016 with
a legal research assistant (salary scale E 13 TV-L, personnel quota 50%)
limited for 2 years.
The assistant is supposed to support the organizational and educational work of the chairholder, to participate in research projects of the chair as well as to teach his or her own courses (students’ exercise). Applicants are offered the opportunity to obtain a doctorate.
Applicants are expected to be interested in the chair’s main areas of research. They should possess an above-average German First State Examination (at least “vollbefriedigend”) or a foreign equivalent degree and be fluent in German. In addition, a thorough knowledge of German civil law as well as conflict of laws, comparative law and/or international procedural law is a necessity. Severely handicapped persons will be preferred provided that their qualification is equal.
Please send your application (curriculum vitae, certificates and, if available, further proofs of talent) to Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Abt. III, Peterhof, Niemensstr. 10, D-79098 Freiburg (Germany) no later than 1 March, 2016.
As the application documents will not be returned, applicants are kindly requested to submit only unauthenticated copies. Alternatively, the documents may be sent as a pdf-file via e-mail to ipr3@jura.uni-freiburg.de.
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme condamne à nouveau la France pour n’avoir pas mis en œuvre les mesures qui auraient pu raisonnablement éviter le suicide d’un détenu signalé comme risquant d’attenter à sa vie.
En carrousel matière: Oui Matières OASIS: Détention provisoire (Conditions)Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel
Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 7, 5e chambre de l'instruction, 14 décembre 2015
Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Metz, chambre sociale, 14 septembre 2014
A collection of papers from the 11th Regional Private International Law Conference held in Osijek, Croatia, on 11-12 June 2014 is out now. The book, edited by Professor Mirela Župan, contains scientiffic contributions by prominent authors on topics ranging from analysing the role and/or meaning of different connecting factors (habitual residence, nationality, party autonomy) to commenting on the effects which ECtHR case law may have on the interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention. In addition, the book contains six national reports on the operation of the Hague Abduction Convention in the region.
The links to the books in .pdf and .epub formats are available here.
Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel
Readers of our blog might recall that Jan von Hein and I convened a conference on coherence in European private international law in Freiburg i.Br. (Germany) in October 2014 (see our previous post). Today, we are happy to report that the findings of the conference have just been published by the German publishing house Mohr Siebeck.
The volume critically assesses the current state of European private international law including the law of international civil procedure. It sheds light on existing incoherences, describes the requirements for a more coherent regulation and discusses perspectives for a future European codification in the field of Private International Law. In addition, the volume contains English language summaries of each contribution as well as detailed discussion reports.
More information is available on the publisher’s website. The table of contents reads as follows:
Part 1: Grundlagen
Part 2: Der räumliche Anwendungsbereich des europäischen IPR/IZVR
Part 3: Subjektive und personale Anknüpfungspunkte im europäischen IPR/IZVR
Part 4: Objektive Anknüpfungsmomente für Schuldverhältnisse im europäischen IPR/IZVR
Part 4: Schutz schwächerer Parteien und von Allgemeininteressen im europäischen IPR/IZVR
The November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters, is a very ambitious project which at the same time risks exposing some of the inherent weaknesses of the modus operandi of the Hague Conference. This is not the right forum for an exhaustive analysis. Rather, with input from other members (Elsemiek Apers in particular) at Leuven PIL institute, I would like to flag some areas of interest. Inevitably, an obvious point of reference is the European Union’s Brussels I (Recast) regime.
First, the text itself. The Working Group’s report, which accompanies the draft, explains the history and development of the text and the various options taken. No need to repeat it here. The approach of the Convention is the same ‘mission creep’ which the 1968 Brussels Convention had to resort to, to enhance the free movement of judgments between Member States. Given that the most widespread reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement (R&E), are accusations of excessive or inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, one can only truly co-ordinate R&E if one also co-ordinates jurisdiction. The Hague Convention takes this route in Articles 5-6, (Exclusive) bases for recognition and enforcement. Following this co-ordination of jurisdictional rules, Article 7 then limits the ground upon which R&E may be refused.
Of note is that Article 4(2)’s ban on merits review (when assessing the possibility of recognition and enforcement), probably does not extend to judgments issued by default. The Article is not clear on what is meant exactly: the first para of Article 4(2) rules out ‘review of the merits’. The second para suggests ‘The court addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default.’ Not being bound by findings of fact does not necessarily entail a possibility for merits review, and the text can probably do with clarification at this point.
Article 5(e)’s special jurisdictional rule for contracts, has been clarified compared with earlier versions, however the text remains subject to plenty of room for debate.
Article 8’s room for refusing R&E when the exclusive jurisdictional rules of the Convention were infringed, or where matters excluded from the Convention were at issue, could in our view do with tidying up. It currently mingles scope for refusal of R&E as such, in the case of infringement of the exclusive jurisdictional rules, with discussion of excluded matters as ‘preliminary issues’ only – a clear reference to the EU’s experience with arbitration. Without editorial perfection, however, this article, in combination with Article 2’s excluded matters, risks similar and protracted debate as was /is the case under Brussels I (and the Recast).
Further, the modus operandi, and institutional consequences of the Convention. As indicated, an exhaustive review of the Convention is not possible here. That is due in large part to the extensive comments which one could address vis-a-vis each individual entry of the text. Rather like in the case of each individual provision of the Brussels regime. In the case of the latter, the CJEU is exercised on a very regular basis with the determination of the precise meaning of the heads of jurisdiction. In the Hague process, there is no such institution. One has to rely on the application of the Convention by the signatory States. At some point, one has to assess whether it is tenable not to have some kind of review process at The Hague, lest one risks the Convention being applied quite differently in the various signatory States. Coupled with the additional lawyer of complication were the EU to accede (which it is bound to; however would it really be progress to create additional layers of differentiation?), the CJEU itself might have difficulty accepting a body of judicial review, where the text to be reviewed borders so closely unto the Brussels regime.
Geert.
Tribunal correctionnel de Paris, 32e chambre, 8 février 2016
Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 5e chambre 1re section, 9 février 2016
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