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Cour d'appel de Paris, Chambre des appels correctionnels, 11 mai 2016.

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel d'Aix en Provence, 16eme chambre, 18 juillet 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Dijon, chambre correctionnelle, 16 novembre 2017

Cour d'appel de Paris, deuxième chambre de l'instruction, le 1er juin 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Versailles, Chambre de l'instruction, 16 mai 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Pau, Chambre sociale, 29 juin 2017

Coty Germany
Concurrence
Un fournisseur de produits de luxe peut interdire à ses distributeurs agréés de vendre les produits sur une plate-forme Internet tierce telle qu’Amazon

At the end of October the Rechtbank Amsterdam held that ‘booze bikes’ can be kept from parts of Amsterdam. The municipality had resorted to the ban both to address congestion (the bikes are slow and chunky; the roads in the part of Amsterdam concerned, narrow) and rowdiness (the bikes are often used for stag parties and let’s just say that the ‘bike’ part of the trip is not the one that attracts its users). In my experience (from a resident’s point of view) these bikes are a bit like Brexit: attractive for five minutes to some; a right nuisance for the remainder of the journey.

In 2009 I wrote a short piece reflecting on use restrictions from an EU point of view. In it I refer ia to C-142/05 Mickelsson and to C-110/05 Commission v Italy (motorcyle trailers) – my analysis and that of Peter Oliver may be applied here mutatis mutandis. The degree to which lawfully marketed products may be restricted in their use has so far not entertained the Court of Justice in great numbers. Yet the use of such restrictions is bound to increase, with local authorities in particular imposing restrictions for environmental, public health and other ‘sustainable development’ purposes. Witness e.g. Venice banning wheeled suitcases, historic city centres banning diesel cars etc.

In the booze bike case the Court at Amsterdam (at 2.9) simply said that applicants should have provided detail of their argument as to why the ban might contravene EU law. Expect a second round on similar cases at some point.

Geert.

 

Le 28 novembre 2017, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) condamne la Russie, au visa de l’article 3 de la Convention, pour l’usage de box vitrés en audience. Un augure pour la France ?

en lire plus

The vacancy for the position of Diplomat Lawyer at the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has been reopened. The deadline for applications is 22 January 2018. For more information, click here.

As announced, the responsibilities of the selected candidate will be as follows:

“The selected candidate will oversee the completion of the “Judgments Project” and subsequent efforts to promote the Convention. His or her portfolio will also include work relating to the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Principles, and any other legal work of the Permanent Bureau as required. He or she will be part of the senior management team and assure a good, co-operative working atmosphere, conducive to team work and efficient communications, both within the Permanent Bureau and in relations with representatives of States and Organisations (respect of the Permanent Bureau’s core values is essential). The selected candidate will represent the HCCH in dealings with Members as well as other stakeholders and interested parties. He or she will also be expected to assist with the administration of the Permanent Bureau.”

 

Xiaomi / EUIPO - Apple (MI PAD)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Apple parvient à faire échec à l’enregistrement de « MI PAD » comme marque de l’Union européenne pour des appareils électroniques et des services de (télé)communication

Others have studied the EU’s legal basis for energy policy much better than I have. Chiefly among them prof Leonie Reins. e.g.  for RECIEL here and in her Phd here. The impact of this discussion is high: since the introduction of an energy Title in the EU Treaties (following Lisbon) whether so designed or not, the prospect of that Title’s requirement on unanimity for measures which ‘have a significant effect on a Member State’s choice between different energy sources’ looms heavily over the EU’s environment policy. The EU’s emissions trading system – ETS is the prime candidate for falling victim to an extensive interpretation of Article 192(2)c TFEU, which harbours the unanimity requirement.

In C-5/16 Poland v EP and Council Mengozzi AG Opined last week. At issue is Poland’s opposition to a MSR – a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme, essentially a long-term parking for surplus allowances to enable the ETS to safeguard collapse of prices in the event of excess supply. The resulting increase in the price of allowances was inter alia intended to encourage fuel switching and to discourage investments in coal-fired power stations (hence of course Poland’s interest).

Relevant to future reference is especially the AG’s view at 25, which I include in full: ‘as a derogation, Article 192(2)(c) TFEU is to be interpreted strictly, especially since an efficient modern environment policy cannot ignore energy questions. I share the fears expressed by the defendants and the interveners that the applicant’s proposed interpretation of Article 192(2)(c) TFEU and the conclusions which it draws from that interpretation for the examination of the legal basis of the contested decision would effectively block any legislative initiative by recognising a right of veto for Member States, as the Union would adopt measures inviting them only to rationalise their CO2-consuming activities. Furthermore, such an interpretation would doom the ETS to failure as it would prevent the EU legislature from correcting its structural deficiencies. In addition, although I would point out that the goal of introducing the MSR is not to form the price of allowances but simply to ensure the efficiency of the ETS, in any event, an operator’s choice of a certain energy source or production technology cannot depend on that price alone, which does not in itself define the production costs, which are determined by a variety of factors. Even with the introduction of the MSR, the choice of technology still remains in the hands of operators and is not dictated by the European Union.’

I am not sure to what degree the Court’s judgment will enable us to draw criteria with wider impact than just the current case – but it would certainly be helpful. Mengozzi AG firstly emphasises strict interpretation of the ‘energy mix’ exception. Further, in the paras preceeding the aforecited one, links amendments to existing laws largely to the latter’s legal basis. Supports the Institutions and Spain, France and Sweden (intervening; the position of Germany, also intervening, was not made clear) in their warning against veto power in the energy /climate change context; and finally further dilutes the exception by looking at policies as they work in practice, not just in theory. On this point, the AG looks at the ETS specifically however his view has broader appeal: it would essentially mean that when Member States’ and individuals’ /undertakings’ behaviour is determined by regulatory intervention, some of which clearly based on a legal basis other than Article 192(2)c TFEU, the latter is not determinant in deciding proper legal basis.

This is an important case for the future of EU environment and energy policy.

Geert.