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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 2, chambre 6, 25 avril 2017

Pourvoi c/Cour d'appel de Paris, 7e chambre correctionnelle, 03 mars 2017

This is effectively my second posting today on Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast.

In C-560/16 Dědouch, Wathelet AG Opined last week, on the scope of the exclusive jurisdictional rule of (now) Article 24(2) of Regulation 1215/2012. The issue arose in proceedings between Michael Dědouch et al, a group of minority shareholders on the one hand, and Jihočeská plynárenská a.s. (established in the Czech Republic) and E.ON Czech Holding AG (‘E.ON’) [established in Germany] on  the other, concerning the reasonableness of the sum which, in a procedure for removing minority shareholders (‘squeeze-out’), E.ON was required to pay Mr Dědouch et al following the compulsory transfer of their shares in Jihočeská plynárenská.

Mr Dědouch et al are suing both companies and are asking the Regional Court, České Budějovice, Czech Republic to review the reasonableness of the sum. In those proceedings E.ON raised an objection that the Czech courts lacked jurisdiction. E.ON argue that, in view of the location of its seat /domicile, only the German courts had international jurisdiction per (now) Article 4.

The regional court initially accepted jurisdiction on the basis of (now) Article 8(1): the anchor defendant mechanism (one of the two defendant companies being a Czech company). Eventually the High Court, Prague found that the Czech courts had jurisdiction under (old) Article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation: the special jurisdictional rules for contracts.

Wathelet AG suggests the case raises the complex issue of litigation in intra-company disputes. At 21 he writes that the facts highlight a structural problem in the Regulation, namely ‘the absence of a basis of jurisdiction dedicated to the resolution of internal disputes within companies, such as disputes between shareholders or between shareholders and directors or between the company and its directors.’ That is not quite correct: it is not because the Regulation has no tailor-made regime for this type of dispute that is has no jurisdictional basis for it. That a subject-matter is not verbatim included in the Regulation does not mean it is not regulated by it.

The AG then (at 23) considers that the issue under consideration is complicated by the difficulty of applying (now) Articles 7(1) and (2), ‘since the removal of the minority shareholders and the consideration decided by a resolution of the general meeting are neither a contract nor a tort, delict or quasi-delict.’ I am not so sure. Is there no ‘obligation freely assumed’ between minority and other shareholders of the same company? Are they not bound by some kind of ‘contract’ (in the broad, Jakob Handte sense) when becoming shareholders of one and the same company? That (at 24) ‘The principle of a procedure for squeezing out the minority shareholders is that the principal shareholder can start it without their consent‘ I do not find convincing in this respect. Plenty of contractual arrangements do not limit contracting parties’ freedom to act: except, their actions may have contractual consequences. The AG in my view focuses too much on the squeeze out being one-sided. An alternative view may see a wrongful deployment of squeeze-out a breach of an earlier contractual, indeed fiduciary duty between /among shareholders.

Unlike the AG (at 26), neither do I see great obstacle in the difficulty in determination of a specific place of performance of such contractual duties between shareholders in the company law context. They may not fit within the default categories of Article 7(1), however I can see many a national judge not finding it impossible to determine a place of performance.

On the basis of these perceived difficulties the AG dismisses application of Articles 7(1) and (2) and then considers, and rejects, a strict application of Article 24(2). In other words in the AG’s view Article 24(2) is engaged here.

This is a tricky call. Justified reference is made by the AG to C‑372/07 Hassett, in which (then) Article 22(2) was held no to apply to a decision made by the Board of the Health Organisation not to indemnify two of their members in cases of medical negligence: this was found by the CJEU to be an action relating to the way in which a company organ exercises its functions – not covered by Article 24(2). In Dědouch, the action relates to the amount which the General Meeting of the company fixed as the compensation E.ON was required to pay the minority shareholders following the transfer of the shares. Notwithstanding Czech company law being the lex causae in assisting the GM in that decision, I am not convinced this engages Article 24(2) (hence reserving jurisdiction to the Czech courts).

In summary, I believe the Court should reject application of Article 24(2), and instruct the national courts to get on with the determination of jurisdiction per Article 7, or indeed 8.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.11.1, Heading 2.2.12.1.

 

I reported on submission to jurisdiction in the English legal context in re Golden Endurance, and on the issue of the application of (now) Brussel I Recast’s Article 24’s exclusive jurisdictional rules in Dal Al Arkan. In Dennis v TAG Group [2017] EWHC 919 (Ch) the High Court first of all revisits the issue of submission to jurisdiction in the context of injunction proceedings, and also held that permission for service out of jurisdiction is not required since the (now) Article 24 rules apply regardless of domicile of the parties. Clyde & Co have summary of the facts here.

Mr Dennis was the CEO of the England and Wales incorporated McLaren Technology Group Ltd. He claims he has suffered unfair prejudice as a result of suggested Board resolutions to be passed (and now passed) and relies on purported breaches of the Companies Act 2006, articles of association, shareholder agreement and service agreement to support his petition: this arguably engages Article 24(2) of the Brussels I Recast.

Application for injunctive relief sought to restrain Respondents from placing Plaintiff on garden leave and delegating the authority of the board to an interim committee. At issue first is whether Respondents’ engagement with the injunctive proceedings amounted to submission of jurisdiction. Briggs CR held that it so did: language in isolated correspondence reserving rights as to jurisdiction amounts to nothing if parties keep schtum about it when it really matters: at the injunctive hearings and forms relating to same.

Briggs held that even in the alternative, had there not been submission, Article 24 (I assume what is meant is Article 24(2) given the subject of the claim) applies regardless of the domicile of the parties hence submission is irrelevant (and indeed permission for service out of jurisdiction not required  – one assumed to the (insurance) relief of Respindents’ counsel. On that point Dal Arkan had already been confirmed Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc & Alexander Vik [2017] EWHC 459 .

A good and attractively concise ruling.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.

 

La règle selon laquelle le prévenu ou son avocat doivent toujours avoir la parole en dernier s’applique à la personne redevable pécuniairement d’une amende.

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Un époux qui a sa résidence habituelle sur le territoire d’un État membre ou est ressortissant d’un État membre ne peut être attrait devant les juridictions d’un autre État membre qu’en vertu des articles 3 à 5 du Règlement du 27 novembre 2003.

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L’article 132-23-1 du code pénal permet d’ordonner la confusion d’une peine prononcée par une juridiction française et d’une peine prononcée par une juridiction d’un État membre de l’Union européenne dès lors que la seconde a été intégralement exécutée au jour où il est statué sur la requête en confusion.

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Assurances (règles générales)

Bail (règles générales)

Bail d'habitation

Servitude

Bettina Rentsch, Humboldt-University Berlin, has authored book about the concept of “habitual residence” in European private international law (Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt im System des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts, ISBN 978-3-16-155172-7). Published by Mohr Siebeck, she sheds light on the concept as such and re-frames the ongoing academic debate with a focus on the relationship between habitual residence and party autonomy.

The book is in German, but the author has kindly provided us with the following English language summary:

European PIL has become increasingly heterogeneous in its legal foundations, shape and principles. Still, all so-called “Rome” regulations are homogeneous if not even uniform in their connecting factors: In the absence of Choice, the law applicable will determined by virtue of Habitual Residence. As a general baseline, the pairing of Party Autonomy and Habitual Residence is a common feature of all Rome regulations. While the recent rise of the former anhas given rise to widespread academic discussion, little has been said on why the EU legislator ever came to choose Habitual Residence as its primary “objective” connecting factor. Neither is there clarity on the political backgrounds nor on the secondary question of whether the former is identical in all contexts Habitual Residence is employed in.

In light of the increase of transnational migration in the EU, the present conceptual vagueness of Habitual Residence cannot be tolerated. In fact, there is both a need for reliable proxies in determining Habitual Residence and an urge to assess whether it can and must be understood and applied different in respective areas of EU Private International Law.

This publication undertakes a first, though definitely not final attempt to shape the blurry and vague notion of Habitual Residence in European Private International Law . Its objective is to, first, find overarching and general means and then to determine approproate criteria to previsibly determine the conditions for a cross-referencing between respective fields of application. Within this framework, the book presents two core arguments:

First, the threshold criteria for Habitual Residence are identical no matter its “purpose” and systematic environment. As a result, drawing the line between different instances of Habitual Residence is a question of degree.

Second, Habitual Residence must be interpreted in light of its respective neighboring choice of law-provisions. In other words, the the extent of choice of law possibilities must be understood as a proxy for interpreting Habitual Residence. Hence, the more leeway the European legislator confers to individuals and the more self-regulation through party autonomy he allows for, the less control by authorities can be required. In practical terms, the mere presence and superficial social interaction of a human being can be sufficient to determine Habitual Residence in contractual relations, the visible limitations of choice in areas like successions law indicate legislative intent.

Contrat de travail, exécution - Règlement intérieur - Restriction à la liberté religieuse

Cussens e.a.
Fiscalité
L’interdiction de pratiques abusives dans le domaine de la TVA est applicable indépendamment d’une mesure nationale lui donnant effet dans les États membres