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Procédure civile ; Propriété littéraire et artistique

As a follow up to my post on the 25th Meeting of the GEDIP in Luxembourg I would like to add now the final document containing the Declaration on the Legal Status of Applicants for International Protection from Third Countries to the European Union, which Prof. van Loon has very kindly provided.

 

DECLARATION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF APPLICANTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FROM THIRD COUNTRIES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

 THE EUROPEAN GROUP FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

At its Twenty-fifth meeting held in Luxembourg, from 18 to 20 September 2015,

Considering that the current influx of applicants for international protection, among other migrants, from third countries to the European Union and their presence – even of a temporary character – in the Member States gives rise to urgent and important questions concerning their legal status, including in civil law, and requires that special attention be given to the clarification, and consistency across the European Union, of this status;

Recalling that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice of the European Union covers both policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters;

Considering that it is crucial that the measures to be taken meet both the immediate and future challenges arising from the influx of migrants from third countries;

Recalling, in particular:

– the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the United Nations Convention of 20 November 1989 on the Rights of the Child, and the United Nations Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol of 31 January 1967, all of which apply across the European Union,

– the Directives of the European Parliament and Council 2011/95/EU, 2013/32 and 2013/33/EU as well as Council Directive 2001/55/EC [1],

– Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of the Council [2] and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children of 19 October 1996[3] and on the Protection of Adults of 13 January 2000 [4] ;

CALLS ON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ON THE MEMBER STATES

1. TO ENSURE

Recording and recognition of facts and documents relating to civil status

– a) regarding any national of a third country and any stateless person present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union having presented an application for recognition of refugee status or granting of subsidiary protection status, or having obtained such status, registration as soon as possible – even provisionally – of the important facts relating to their personal status, such as births, marriages and deaths, as well as recognition of these records and documents relating thereto within the European Union;

Exercise of jurisdiction by national authorities to take measures of protection in civil matters

– b) regarding any child, especially when unaccompanied or separated from his or her parents, and any vulnerable adult, seeking or having obtained international protection, the exercise by the authorities of the Member State on whose territory that person is present of their jurisdiction to take measures of protection in civil matters whenever his or her situation so requires;

Refugee status, subsidiary protection status and provisional residence permits

– c) the coordination and mutual recognition, to the extent possible, of decisions on the recognition of refugee status, the granting of subsidiary protection status as well as the granting of provisional residence permits to applicants for international protection.

2. TO TAKE INITIATIVES WITH A VIEW

 Promotion of the instruments of private international law relating to personal status

 – a) to promoting the universal ratification of instruments of private international law aimed at ensuring legal certainty and mutual recognition of personal status, including the Hague Convention on Protection of Children (1996) [5] .

Common ratification of existing instruments and enhancing their effectiveness

 – b) to considering the possibility of signing and ratifying existing instruments at the global level, adopted by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, that may contribute to establishing a coherent global legal framework for migration, including of workers and their families, and the possibility of strengthening coordination and cooperation among States needed for the effective implementation of these instruments.

 Footnotes

[1] Directives 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals and stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), and 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast). These directives apply across the European Union with the exception of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ireland and the United Kingdom are nevertheless bound by the preceding versions (2004/83/EC, 2008/85/EC and 2003/9/EC) of these directives. In respect of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, it is to be noted that no decision has (yet) been taken by the Council to make the directive applicable by a decision establishing “the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons” as foreseen in Article 5.

[2] Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of the Council of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 (“Regulation Brussels II A”). This Regulation applies across the European Union with the exception of Denmark.

[3] Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. This Convention applies across the European Union (for Italy as of 1 January 2016).

[4] Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults. This Convention is applicable in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Scotland only), and has been signed by Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. Outside of the European Union the Convention is applicable in Switzerland.

 [5] Currently this Convention, outside of the European Union, is applicable only in the following States: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Ecuador, Georgia, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uruguay. The Convention has been signed by Argentina and the United States

Si terrà a Milano il 30 ottobre 2015, nel quadro delle iniziative promosse per celebrare la Giornata europea della giustizia civile, un convegno dal titolo La tutela del credito e la cooperazione giudiziaria in Europa (su altre iniziative legate alla dodicesima edizione della Giornata europea, si veda questo post).

L’evento, organizzato dalla Scuola Superiore della Magistratura – Struttura territoriale di formazione decentrata del Distretto di Milano, dall’Ordine degli Avvocati di Milano e dall’Associazione dei laureati in Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Milano, coinvolgerà, fra gli altri, Roberta Clerici, Alberto Malatesta, Manlio Frigo, Luigi Fumagalli e Lidia Sandrini (tutti Univ. Milano).

Fra gli argomenti oggetto dell’incontro, si segnalano la circolazione delle sentenze nello spazio giudiziario europeo secondo il regolamento Bruxelles I bis, l’ingiunzione di pagamento europea, la cooperazione fra autorità di Stati membri diversi nell’assunzione di prove e l’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo di conti bancari, istituita dal regolamento n. 655/2014.

Per maggiori informazioni, compreso il programma, si veda qui.

Le Conseil de l’Union européenne n’apportant pas la preuve de leurs liens réels avec le régime biélorusse condamné, le Tribunal de l’Union européenne contrôle et annule des décisions de gel de fonds à l’encontre de certaines personnes physiques et morales. 

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La législation française excluant la prime de précarité aux jeunes effectuant un contrat de travail à durée déterminée durant leurs vacances universitaires/scolaires et ayant vocation à reprendre leur formation, n’est pas contraire au droit de l’Union.

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Le règlement n° 2201/2003 du 27 novembre 2003 doit être interprété en ce sens que l’approbation d’un accord de partage successoral conclu par le tuteur d’enfants mineurs constitue une mesure relative à l’exercice de la responsabilité parentale relevant du champ d’application ce texte.

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Divorce (Effets personnels)

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Protection des consommateurs

This post has been written by Eva De Götzen.

On 10 September 2015, the ECJ delivered its judgment in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie (C-47/14), a case concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).

More specifically, the case involved the interpretation of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of the Regulation, which provide, respectively, for special heads of jurisdiction over contractual matters and matters relating to a tort or delict, as well as the interpretation of the rules laid down in Section 5 of Chapter II (Articles 18 to 21), on employment matters. The said provisions correspond, today, to Articles 7(1) and (2) and Articles 20 to 23 of Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (Brussels Ia Regulation).

The request for a preliminary ruling arose from a dispute involving a German national resident in Germany, Mr Spies von Büllesheim, who had entered a Dutch company’s service as a managing director, in addition to being a shareholder of that company. He had also been involved in the managing of three German subsidiaries of the company, for which he served as a director and an authorised agent.

The company brought a declaratory action and an action for damages in the Netherlands against Mr Spies von Büllesheim, claiming that he had performed his duties as director improperly, that he had acted unlawfully and that, aside from his capacity as a director, he had acted deceitfully or recklessly in the performance of the contract of employment under which the company had hired him as a managing director.

The Dutch lower courts seised of the matter took the view that they lacked jurisdiction either under Article 18(1) and Article 20(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, since the domicile of the defendant was outside the Netherlands, or under Article 5(1)(a), to be read in conjunction with Article 5(3).

When the case was brought before the Dutch Supreme Court, the latter referred three questions to the ECJ.

The first question was whether the special rules of jurisdiction for employment matters laid down in Regulation No 44/2001 preclude the application of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 5(3) of the same Regulation in a case where the claimant company alleges that the defendant is liable not only in his capacity as the managing director and employee of the company under a contract of employment, but also in his capacity as a director of that company and/or in tort.

The ECJ observed in this respect that one must ascertain, at the outset, whether the defendant could be considered to be bound to the company by an “individual contract of employment”. This would in fact make him a “worker” for the purposes of Article 18 of Regulation No 44/2001 and trigger the application of the rules on employment matters set forth in Section 5 of Chapter II, irrespective of whether the parties could also be tied by a relationship based on company law.

Relying on its case law, the ECJ found that the defendant performed services for and under the direction of the claimant company, in return for which he received remuneration, and that he was bound to that company by a lasting bond which brought him to some extent within the organisational framework of the business of the latter. In these circumstances, the provisions of Section 5  would in principle apply to the case, thereby precluding the application of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3).

The ECJ conceded, however, that if the defendant, in his capacity as a shareholder in the claimant company, was in a position to influence the decisions of the company’s administrative body, then no relationship of subordination would exist, and the characterisation of the matter for the purposes of jurisdiction would accordingly be different.

The second question raised by the Hoge Raad was whether Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation applies to a case where a company director, not bound by an employment relationship with the company in question, allegedly failed to perform his duties under company law.

The ECJ noted that, generally speaking, the legal relationship between a director and his company is contractual in nature for the purposes of Article 5(1), since it involves obligations that the parties have freely undertaken. More precisely, a relationship of this kind should be classified as a “provision of services” within the meaning of the second indent of Article 5(1)(b). Jurisdiction will accordingly lie, pursuant to the latter provision, with the court for the place where the director carried out his activity.

To identify this place, one might need to determine, as indicated in Wood Floor Solutions, where the services have been provided for the most part, based on the provisions of the contract. In the absence of any derogating stipulation in any other document (namely, in the articles of association of the company), the relevant place, for these purposes, is the place where the director in fact, for the most part, carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ agreed intentions.

Finally, inasmuch as national law makes it possible to base a claim by the company against its former manager simultaneously on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, the ECJ, answering the third question raised by the Hoge Raad, stated that such a claim may come under “tort, delict or quasi-delict” for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation whenever the alleged conduct does not concern the legal relationship of a contractual nature between the company and the manager.

The ECJ recalled in this connection that the Regulation, by referring to “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”, intends to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Insofar as the place of the event giving rise to the damage is concerned, reference should be made to the place where the director carried out his duties as a manager of the relevant company. For its part, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the damage alleged by the company actually manifests itself, regardless of the place where the adverse consequences may be felt of an event which has already caused a damage elsewhere.

This post has been written by Eva De Götzen.

On 10 September 2015, the ECJ delivered its judgment in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie (C-47/14), a case concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).

More specifically, the case involved the interpretation of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of the Regulation, which provide, respectively, for special heads of jurisdiction over contractual matters and matters relating to a tort or delict, as well as the interpretation of the rules laid down in Section 5 of Chapter II (Articles 18 to 21), on employment matters. The said provisions correspond, today, to Articles 7(1) and (2) and Articles 20 to 23 of Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (Brussels Ia Regulation).

The request for a preliminary ruling arose from a dispute involving a German national resident in Germany, Mr Spies von Büllesheim, who had entered a Dutch company’s service as a managing director, in addition to being a shareholder of that company. He had also been involved in the managing of three German subsidiaries of the company, for which he served as a director and an authorised agent.

The company brought a declaratory action and an action for damages in the Netherlands against Mr Spies von Büllesheim, claiming that he had performed his duties as director improperly, that he had acted unlawfully and that, aside from his capacity as a director, he had acted deceitfully or recklessly in the performance of the contract of employment under which the company had hired him as a managing director.

The Dutch lower courts seised of the matter took the view that they lacked jurisdiction either under Article 18(1) and Article 20(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, since the domicile of the defendant was outside the Netherlands, or under Article 5(1)(a), to be read in conjunction with Article 5(3).

When the case was brought before the Dutch Supreme Court, the latter referred three questions to the ECJ.

The first question was whether the special rules of jurisdiction for employment matters laid down in Regulation No 44/2001 preclude the application of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 5(3) of the same Regulation in a case where the claimant company alleges that the defendant is liable not only in his capacity as the managing director and employee of the company under a contract of employment, but also in his capacity as a director of that company and/or in tort.

The ECJ observed in this respect that one must ascertain, at the outset, whether the defendant could be considered to be bound to the company by an “individual contract of employment”. This would in fact make him a “worker” for the purposes of Article 18 of Regulation No 44/2001 and trigger the application of the rules on employment matters set forth in Section 5 of Chapter II, irrespective of whether the parties could also be tied by a relationship based on company law.

Relying on its case law, the ECJ found that the defendant performed services for and under the direction of the claimant company, in return for which he received remuneration, and that he was bound to that company by a lasting bond which brought him to some extent within the organisational framework of the business of the latter. In these circumstances, the provisions of Section 5  would in principle apply to the case, thereby precluding the application of Article 5(1) and Article 5(3).

The ECJ conceded, however, that if the defendant, in his capacity as a shareholder in the claimant company, was in a position to influence the decisions of the company’s administrative body, then no relationship of subordination would exist, and the characterisation of the matter for the purposes of jurisdiction would accordingly be different.

The second question raised by the Hoge Raad was whether Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation applies to a case where a company director, not bound by an employment relationship with the company in question, allegedly failed to perform his duties under company law.

The ECJ noted that, generally speaking, the legal relationship between a director and his company is contractual in nature for the purposes of Article 5(1), since it involves obligations that the parties have freely undertaken. More precisely, a relationship of this kind should be classified as a “provision of services” within the meaning of the second indent of Article 5(1)(b). Jurisdiction will accordingly lie, pursuant to the latter provision, with the court for the place where the director carried out his activity.

To identify this place, one might need to determine, as indicated in Wood Floor Solutions, where the services have been provided for the most part, based on the provisions of the contract. In the absence of any derogating stipulation in any other document (namely, in the articles of association of the company), the relevant place, for these purposes, is the place where the director in fact, for the most part, carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ agreed intentions.

Finally, inasmuch as national law makes it possible to base a claim by the company against its former manager simultaneously on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, the ECJ, answering the third question raised by the Hoge Raad, stated that such a claim may come under “tort, delict or quasi-delict” for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation whenever the alleged conduct does not concern the legal relationship of a contractual nature between the company and the manager.

The ECJ recalled in this connection that the Regulation, by referring to “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”, intends to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Insofar as the place of the event giving rise to the damage is concerned, reference should be made to the place where the director carried out his duties as a manager of the relevant company. For its part, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the damage alleged by the company actually manifests itself, regardless of the place where the adverse consequences may be felt of an event which has already caused a damage elsewhere.

Portnov / Conseil
Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule le gel de fonds de M. Andriy Portnov, l’ex-conseiller de l’ancien président ukrainien Viktor Ianoukovytch

The third issue of 2015 of the Dutch Journal on Private international Law, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, contains contributions on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, financial losses under the Brussels I Regulation, Recognition of Dutch insolvency orders in Switzerland, and Indonesian Private International Law.

Marta Pertegás, ‘Guest Editorial: Feeling the heat of disputes and finding the shade of forum selection’, p. 375-376.

Tomas Arons, ‘Case Note: On financial losses, prospectuses, liability, jurisdiction (clauses) and applicable law. European Court of Justice 28 January 2015, Case C-375/13 (Kolassa/Barclays Bank)’, p. 377-382.

The difficult question of where financial losses are directly sustained has been (partly) solved by the European Court of Justice on 28 January 2015. In Kolassa the ECJ ruled that an investor suffers direct financial losses as a result of corporate misinformation (i.e. misleading information published by a company issuing (traded) shares or bonds) in the place where he holds his securities account. The impact of this ruling is not limited to the question of international jurisdiction. The Rome II Regulation prescribes that the law applicable to tort claims is the law of the country in which the direct losses are sustained. The second part deals with the question whether an investor can be bound by an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the prospectus or other investor information document. In the near future the ECJ will rule on this matter in the Profit Investment SIM case. [free sample]

Raphael Brunner, ‘Latest Legal Practice: Switzerland discovers the Netherlands on the international insolvency map’, p. 383-389.

By a decision of March 27, 2015 the Swiss Federal Court ruled for the first time in a leading case that the Swiss Courts have to recognize Dutch insolvency orders. It is astonishing that up until now Dutch insolvency orders have not been recognised by the Swiss Courts and hence Dutch insolvency estates and liquidators or trustees (hereafter referred to as liquidators) neither had access to the assets of a Dutch insolvency estate in Switzerland nor to the jurisdiction of the Swiss Courts. The reason for this is that the private international laws of Switzerland and the Netherlands pursue completely different approaches in international insolvency matters. The new decision by the Swiss Federal Court is interesting both from a (theoretical) perspective of private international law as well as from the (practical) perspective of a Dutch liquidator of a Dutch insolvency estate having assets in Switzerland or claims against debtors in Switzerland.

Tiurma Allagan, ‘Foreign PIL – Developments in Indonesia: The Bill on Indonesian Private International Law’, p. 390-403.

This article discusses the background and contents of the proposal for an Indonesian Private International Law Act that was issued in November 2014.

If you are interested in contributing to this journal please contact the editorial manager Ms Wilma Wildeman  at w.wildeman@asser.nl.

Il 7 novembre 2015, l’Università di Messina ospiterà un convegno dedicato a La protezione dei dati personali e informatici nell’era della sorveglianza globale. 

La giornata di studi sarà articolata in due sessioni, una delle quali dedicata ai profili di diritto internazionale privato. La sessione sarà presieduta e moderata da Nerina Boschiero (Univ. Statale di Milano) ed ospiterà le relazioni di Paolo Bertoli (Univ. Insubria), Livio Scaffidi Runchella e Marcella Distefano (entrambi Univ. Messina).

Il programma completo ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Two weeks ago I had the pleasure of announcing the publication of the new edition of the EU-Zivilprozessrecht: EuZPR, authored by Prof. Schlosser and Hess. The Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg has decided to combine the launching of the book with a seminar entitled “The Departure of the European Law of Civil Procedure”, to take place next  November 11, at the MPI premises in Luxembourg. The seminar will count with the presence of Prof. Schlosser himself; other prominent speakers will be Judge Marko Ileši? (CJEU) and Prof. Jörg Pirrung. To download the full programme of the event click here.

The seminar starts at 4 pm and will be followed by a reception. It is open to all  those willing to attend upon registration (contact person: secretariat-prof.hess@mpi.lu).

Un suicide en prison n’est constitutif d’une violation du droit à la vie que s’il apparaît que les autorités auraient dû avoir conscience d’un risque réel et immédiat que le détenu attente à sa vie.

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Méconnaît le droit à l’instruction le retard dans la procédure de réintégration à l’école d’enfants ayant été diagnostiqués à tort comme atteints de la lèpre.

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Tribunal des affaires de sécurité sociale du Lot, 15 octobre 2015

Tribunal du travail de Papeete, 8 octobre 2015

Statut collectif du travail

How exactly is the EU bound by public international law? What is the justiciability of acts of foreign sovereign nations in EU courts? To what extent can an individual rely on customary or other sources of public international law, in national courts or at the CJEU?  All of these questions often puzzle non-lawyers (if something is illegal due to a higher rule, how can the lower rule still be in existence) and lawyers alike. At the EU level, things are complicated due to the hybrid (OK: sui generis) nature of the EU, and its complicated relationship with international law.

In Western Sahara Campaign UK, claimant is an independent voluntary organisation founded in 1984 with the aim of supporting the recognition of the right of the Saharawi people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence and to raise awareness of the unlawful occupation of the Western Sahara. Defendants are the Inland Revenue, challenged for the preferential tariff given on import to the UK of goods that are classified as being of Moroccan origin but in fact originate from the territory of Western Sahara. The second challenge is brought against the Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in respect of the intended application of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement to policy formation relating to fishing in the territorial waters of Western Sahara.

Essentially, it is claimed that defendants ought not to apply the relevant European agreements for these are, arguably, in violation of public international law. Claimant contends that Morocco has annexed the territory of Western Sahara and claims it as part of its sovereign territory despite decisions of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the people of Western Sahara have the right to self-determination. Accordingly it is said that Morocco’s occupation is in breach of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Under EU law, only the CJEU can establish the invalidity of EU law. Blake J decided to send the case to Luxembourg for preliminary review. Defendants opposed such reference primarily because they submit that the issues raised by the claimant are matters of public international law that the CJEU will decline to adjudicate on in the present circumstances. Precedent which they relied on is not unequivocal, however. This case therefore will be an opportunity for the CJEU (Grand Chamber, one would imagine) to clarify the relationship between EU and public international law.

Geert.