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This post has been written by Martina Mantovani.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

Par un arrêt de Grande Chambre du 28 septembre 2015, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a considéré que la gifle portée aux deux requérants par des agents des forces de l’ordre, alors qu’ils se trouvaient sous leur contrôle, était constitutive d’une violation de l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’interdiction des traitements inhumains et dégradants.

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Néant

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The up-date version of two papers of Veerle Van Den Eeckhout has been published on SSRN.

The first up-dated paper, entitled “Choice and Regulatory Competion: Rules on Choice of Law and Forum”, analyzes the Rules of Private International Law from the perspective of “Choice and Regulatory Competition”. The up-dated version is to be found here.

The second up-dated paper, entitled “The “Right” Way to Go in International Labour Law – and Beyond”, discusses several current issues in international employment law. The up-dated version is to be found here.
The final papers will be published each in the books of the conferences in the context of which they have been written (a conference in Maastricht and in Antwerp respectively).

Si terrà a Trier il 10 e 11 dicembre 2015 un incontro di formazione organizzato da ERA – Academy of European Law, intitolato European Cross-border Procedures: How to Apply Them in Practice?

Il programma del workshop, specificamente rivolto ad avvocati, è disponibile qui.

Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Il 23 ottobre 2015 si terrà presso l’Università di Verona un incontro su La gestazione per altri.

[Dalla presentazione dell’evento] – La giornata di studi prevede un attivo dialogo fra esperti di diversi settori, con brevi relazioni per area disciplinare in ciascuna delle sessioni di approfondimento e discussione a mo’ di tavola rotonda. L’evento intende favorire una ricostruzione sistemica del fenomeno e affrontare questioni che la dottrina non ha ancora considerato adeguatamente, quale la responsabilità dei diversi soggetti che possono essere coinvolti al di là dei committenti (legali, personale medico, ecc.), e le interazioni di un sistema multilivello, con particolare riguardo al contesto unionale e a quello euroconvenzionale.

Tra i relatori, Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Davide Diverio (Univ. Milano),  Alexander Schuster (Univ. Trento), Cristiana Fioravanti (Univ. Ferrara).

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Élection des présidents des chambres à cinq juges de la Cour de justice

M. Antonio Tizzano est élu Vice-président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

M. Koen Lenaerts est élu Président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

Nella sentenza resa il 6 ottobre 2015 nel caso Marie Matoušková (causa C‑404/14), la Corte di giustizia si è pronunciata sulla portata applicativa del regolamento n. 2201/2003 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), in particolare per quanto concerne le misure concernenti la responsabilità genitoriale.

Nel caso di specie si trattava di stabilire se rientrasse nella sfera del regolamento l’approvazione, da parte delle autorità giudiziarie della Repubblica Ceca, di un accordo relativo alla divisione dell’eredità di uno dei genitori concluso dal curatore dei figli minori di quest’ultimo per loro conto.

I dubbi nascevano dal fatto che, per un verso, l’art. 1, par. 1, lett. b), del regolamento riconduce sotto la nozione di responsabilità genitoriale le questioni relative “all’attribuzione, all’esercizio, alla delega, alla revoca totale o parziale della responsabilità genitoriale”, ritenendo altresì applicabile il regolamento a “la tutela, la curatela ed altri istituti analoghi”, e che, per altro verso, ai sensi dell’art. 1, par. 3, lett. f), il regolamento non si applica “ai trust e alle successioni”.

La Corte è giunta alla conclusione che la misura in discorso costituisce, ai fini del regolamento Bruxelles II bis, una misura relativa all’esercizio della responsabilità genitoriale e ricade pertanto nell’ambito di applicazione di quest’ultimo, e non una misura relativa alle successioni.

A sostegno di tale ricostruzione, la Corte ha rilevato, innanzitutto, che l’approvazione di un accordo di divisione dell’eredità, nelle circostanze del caso di specie, è una misura adottata “in considerazione della capacità del minore, che mira a tutelare l’interesse superiore del minore e che è richiesta, ai sensi del diritto ceco, per gli atti giuridici relativi all’amministrazione dei beni che eccedono l’ordinaria amministrazione”.

Avuto riguardo agli interessi a cui è asservita, la misura in esame “riguarda direttamente la capacità della persona” e si inserisce in “un’azione finalizzata a soddisfare i bisogni di protezione e di assistenza dei figli minori”. La capacità e le questioni attinenti alla rappresentanza ad essa collegate, ha allora aggiunto la Corte, “devono essere valutate in base a criteri autonomi, e non devono essere trattate come questioni preliminari dipendenti dai relativi atti giuridici”: osservata da questa angolatura funzionale, la nomina di un curatore per i figli minori e il controllo dell’esercizio della sua attività “sono così strettamente legati che sarebbe inopportuno applicare regole di competenza differenti, che cambino a seconda della materia dell’atto giuridico considerato” (nel caso considerato, un atto concernente una successione mortis causa).

Per la Corte, l’esito interpretativo ora riferito trova conferma nella relazione di Paul Lagarde sulla Convenzione dell’Aia del 1996 concernente la competenza, la legge applicabile, il riconoscimento, l’esecuzione e la cooperazione in materia di responsabilità genitoriale e di misure di protezione dei minori, “il cui ambito di applicazione ratione materiae corrisponde, in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, a quello del regolamento n. 2201/2003″.

La lettura proposta — aggiunge la Corte — rinviene un riscontro anche nel regolamento n. 650/2012, relativo al diritto internazionale privato delle successioni, pur non applicabile ratione temporis nel procedimento principale. Quest’ultimo regolamento, infatti, a norma dell’art. 1, par. 2, lett. b), dichiara di non voler disciplinare la capacità delle persone fisiche, limitandosi a regolare gli aspetti specificamente correlati alla capacità di succedere, ai sensi dell’art. 23, par. 2, lett. c), nonché la capacità a compiere una disposizione a causa di morte, ai sensi dell’art. 26, par. 1, lett. a).

Da ultimo, la Corte di giustizia si sofferma sulla preoccupazione espressa dal giudice del rinvio circa il pericolo che l’interesse del minore possa risultare compromesso dalla ripartizione del processo decisionale in materia di successione tra due Stati membri differenti, ossia, da un lato, quello dell’apertura del procedimento di successione e, dall’altro, quello della residenza abituale del minore, investito della competenza in materia di responsabilità genitoriale ai sensi dell’art. 8, par. 1, del regolamento Bruxelles II bis.

Sul punto, la Corte si limita a rilevare che il rischio così paventato può essere mitigato utilizzando il meccanismo di proroga della competenza giurisdizionale previsto dall’art. 12 del regolamento Bruxelles II bis. In pratica, là dove siano soddisfatte le condizioni previste da tale disposizione, l’approvazione dell’atto di divisione dell’eredità potrebbe essere convogliata nella competenza dell’autorità giurisdizionale adita in materia di successione ancorché tale autorità non sia quella della residenza abituale del minore.

Conflit de juridictions

Majeur protégé/Tutelle

Étranger

The official program for the November 2 event in Washington DC can be found here, as well as the online RSVP link.

The event will feature remarks by Dean William Treanor, Georgetown University Law Center, an Opening Presentation by Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private International Law, and a Keynote speech by the Hon. Rimsky Yeun, Hong Kong Secretary of Justice. The day will also feature panels concerning the operation of the Conventions in theory And practice, the work of the national Central Authorities, comparative insights from both common law and civil law lawyers, and consideration of the critical challenges that will face the Conventions over the next half-century.

The conference will be held on the campus of Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey Ave., NW, Washington D.C., on the 12th floor of the Gewirz Building.

The sponsor of this event is the Center on Transnational Business and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The event is co-sponsored by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the American Branch of the International Law Association, the American Society of International Law, the ABA Section of International Law and the International Law Institute. Contributing co-sponsors include: Covington & Burling LLP, Jones Day, and Winston & Strawn

Accorinti e.a. / BCE
Politique économique BCE
Le préjudice subi en 2012 par les détenteurs privés de titres de créance grecs dans le cadre de la restructuration de la dette publique de l’État grec n’est pas imputable à la BCE, mais aux risques économiques normalement inhérents aux activités du secteur financier

The fourth edition of the EU-Zivilprozessrecht: EuZPR by Prof. Peter Schlosser and Prof. Burkhard Hess, updated and thoroughly reworked, has just been released.

The book is an answer to a well-known fact : in a ever-closer European Union mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in the individual Member States is becoming increasingly important. In this very timely published, easy to handle commentary, the essential elements of the EU Zivilprozessrechts to date are comprehensively commented, with a look to the practice. The following  instruments are to be found therein,  annotated provision by provision:   the Brussles I bis Regulation; the Regulation on the European enforcement order; the Regulation on the European order for payment; the small claims Regulation; the Regulation establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure; the Regulation on the service of documents; the Regulation on the taking of evidence; the Hague Convention on the service of documents, as well as the one on the taking of evidence.

The book approach makes of it a very valuable tool for lawyers and notaries with an international-oriented practice, judges and other judicial authorities. Of course, also for academics.

Data sheet: in German; 623 pp. Format (B x L): 12,8 x 19,4 cm

ISBN 978-3-406-65845-7

For further information on the book and to order it on line click here.

Chypre / OHMI (XAΛΛOYMI)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal de l’UE rejette les recours formés par la République de Chypre contre les décisions de refus d’enregistrement des signes HALLOUMI et XAΛΛOYMI

Party Autonomy in European Private (and) International Law, vol. 1, a cura di Bettina Heiderhoff e Ilaria Queirolo, Aracne, 2015, vol. 1, pp. 308, ISBN: 9788854876958, Euro 20; vol. 2, a cura di Maria Elena De Maestri e Stefano Dominelli, Aracne , 2015, vol. 2, pp. 296, ISBN: 9788854876965, Euro 18.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – By bringing together PhD candidates from different EU Member States to attend four seminars of advanced learning in a Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates (PEPP), the PEPP is playing an active role in moulding law practitioners and scholars with an international and comprehensive approach. This tome comprises contributions from PhD candidates who participated in the 2013-2014 PEPP Session (held in Münster, Wroclaw, Leuven and Imperia-Genoa). The works of the Authors focus on their own research topics, connected to contract law, international and EU commerce, private international law and the protection of human rights in the European Union.

Ulteriori informazioni, compresi gli indici dei due volumi, sono disponibili, rispettivamente, qui e qui.

Infliger une peine de prison à un sans-papiers, qui, après être retourné dans son pays dans le cadre d’une procédure de retour, est entré de nouveau irrégulièrement sur le territoire en violation d’une interdiction d’entrée, n’est pas contraire à la directive « retour ».

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Néant

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Par un arrêt du 3 septembre 2015, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne estime qu’une législation nationale peut, dans la mesure où celle-ci est nécessaire à la récupération des aides d’État incompatibles avec le marché de l’Union, se baser sur une réglementation européenne non en vigueur au moment de la constatation des faits. 

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Néant

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