Agrégateur de flux

Joseph Lookofsky, Ketilbjørn Hertz, EU-PIL: European Union Private International Law in Contract and Tort, 2a edizione, Juris Publishing, 2015, pp. 216, ISBN 9781578234455, USD 75.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Experienced practitioners in Europe realise the increasing commercial significance of the discipline known as Private International Law (Conflict of Laws). As indicated by its title, the focus of this book is on the Private International Law rules applied by courts and arbitral tribunals in the European Union, but by including numerous concrete examples, the authors emphasise the interdisciplinary nature of the subject and thus the many relevant ‘connections’ between private international law and substantive commercial law, especially as regards contractual and delictual matters (e.g.) in cases concerning contracts for the international sale of goods, cross-border claims relating to product liability, etc. This second edition has been revised to consider the new ‘recast’ of the Brussels I Regulation on Jurisdiction and Judgments (2012). This new edition also incorporates a number of important decisions which the Court of Justice of the European Union has had occasion to render as regards the proper interpretation of key rule-sets covered in this volume.

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The CJEU yesterday confirmed the Opinion of Cruz Villalón AG in Holterman: please refer to my posting on the Opinion for background.

In particular of course, a contract for employment needs to be distinguished from a contract for the provision of services. ‘Contract of employment’ was addressed in the abstract by the CJEU in Shenavai, Case 266/85, where the Court identified a double requirement for it referred to the need for a contract to be qualified as a contract of employment: there must be durable relation between individual and company: a lasting bond, which brings the worker to some extent within the organisational framework of the business; and a link between the contract and the place where the activities are pursued, which determines the application of mandatory rules and collective agreements. However precedent value of Shenavai for the Brussels I and recast Regulation is necessarily incomplete, for a the time employees as a protected category did not yet exist in the Regulation and the Court’s findings on contracts of employment took place within the need to identify a ‘place of performance’ under the Brussels Convention’s special jurisdictional rule on contracts.

The Jenard and Möller report to the 1988 Lugano Convention suggested the relationship of subordination of the employee to the employer.

In Holterman the Court throws into the mix reference to its interpretation of secondary EU law on health and safety at work as well as European labour law, holding that ‘the essential feature of an employment relationship is that for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction of another in return for which he receives remuneration’ (at 41).

Consequently the national courts now have quite a number of criteria which need to apply in practice: it is not for the CJEU to do so in an individual case. In Holterman the Court does seem to suggest that once a worker finds himself qualified as an employee, for the purposes of the application of the Jurisdiction Regulation, that qualification will trump any other roles which that individual may play in the organisation (at 49: ‘the provisions of Chapter II, Section 5 (Articles 18 to 21) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the application of Article 5(1) and (3) of that regulation, provided that that person, in his capacity as director and manager, for a certain period of time performed services for and under the direction of that company in return for which he received remuneration, that being a matter for the referring court to determine.’).

In light of the deference to the factual assessment of the national court, the CJEU does complete the analysis with respect to (now) Article 7(1): if the contract is not one of employment, then the special jurisdictional rule of Article 7(1) needs to be applied. The director of a company, the Court holds, provides a service to the company within the meaning of Article 7(1)b. In the absence of any derogating stipulation in the articles of association of the company, or in any other document, it is for the referring court to determine the place where Mr Spies in fact, for the most part, carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ intentions as indicated by what was agreed. For that purpose, it is possible to take into consideration, in particular, the time spent in those places and the importance of the activities carried out there, it being a matter for the national court to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the light of the evidence submitted to it (at 64).

Finally, should national law also allow for an action in tort against the director of a company, the locus delicti commissi is the place where the director carries out his duties for the company (at 76). The locus damni is the place where the damage alleged by the company actually manifests itself; it cannot be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences can be felt of an event which has already caused damage actually taking place elsewhere (at 77-78).

All in all, a useful completion of the Shenavai criterion, and in the main a referral to the national court for factual analysis.

Geert.

The Supreme Court of Canada has released its decision in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje (available here).  The issue before the court was whether the Ontario courts have jurisdiction to recognize and enforce an Ecuadorian judgment (for over $US 18 billion) where the foreign judgment debtor Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”) claims to have no connection with the province, whether through assets or otherwise.  On one view, because the process for enforcing a foreign judgment is to commence a new domestic proceeding and thereby sue on the foreign judgment, the enforcement proceeding must have its own independent analysis of jurisdiction.  Put another way, there cannot be a proceeding in respect of which the court does not have to have jurisdiction.  On a different view, because the analysis of the claim on the foreign judgment considers, among other things, the sufficiency of the rendering court’s jurisdiction (Chevron defended on the merits in Ecuador), that is the only required analysis of jurisdiction and there is no need for a separate consideration of the enforcing court’s jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court of Canada, agreeing with the Court of Appeal for Ontario, has held that the latter view is correct.

In summarizing its conclusion (para 3) the court stated “In an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment where the foreign court validly assumed jurisdiction, there is no need to prove that a real and substantial connection exists between the enforcing forum and either the judgment debtor or the dispute.  It makes little sense to compel such a connection when, owing to the nature of the action itself, it will frequently be lacking. Nor is it necessary, in order for the action to proceed, that the foreign debtor contemporaneously possess assets in the enforcing forum.  Jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment within Ontario exists by virtue of the debtor being served on the basis of the outstanding debt resulting from the judgment.”

While the court does not say that NO jurisdictional basis is required, it states that the basis is found simply and wholly in the defendant being served with process (see para 27).  This runs counter to the court’s foundational decision in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 which separated the issue of service of process – a pure procedural requirement – from the issue of jurisdiction.  To say the service itself founds jurisdiction is arguably to have no jurisdictional requirement at all.

Interestingly, a recent paper (subsequent to the argument before the court) by Professor Linda Silberman and Research Fellow Aaron Simowitz of New York University (available here) considers the same issue in American law and concludes that the dominant view of courts there remains that an action to enforce a foreign judgment requires a “jurisdictional nexus” with the enforcing forum.  They note that only a minority of countries allow enforcement of a foreign judgment without any jurisdictional threshold for the enforcement proceedings.  They argue that the New York decisions which subsequently are relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada (para 61) are the outliers.

Had the Supreme Court of Canada required a showing of jurisdiction in respect of the enforcement proceeding, it would have had to address how that requirement would be met.  Of course, in most cases it would be easily met by the defendant having assets in the jurisdiction.  The plaintiff would not have to prove that such assets were present: a good arguable case to that effect would ground jurisdiction.  Evidence that assets might, in the future, be brought into the jurisdiction could also suffice.

While the court is correct to note that the considerations in defending the underlying substantive claims are different from those involved in defending enforcement proceedings (para 48), the latter nonetheless allow reasonable scope for defences to be raised, such as fraud, denial of natural justice or contravention of public policy.  With no threshold jurisdiction requirement, judgment debtor defendants will now be required to advance and establish those defences in a forum that may have no connection at all with them or the judgment.

The enforcement proceedings were also brought against Chevron Canada, an indirect subsidiary of Chevron that does have a presence in Ontario, although it is not a named defendant in the Ecuadorian judgment.  The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ontario court had jurisdiction over Chevron Canada based on its presence, with no need to consider any other possible basis for jurisdiction.  The decision is thus important for confirming the ongoing validity of presence-based jurisdiction (see paras 81-87).

On a pragmatic level, eliminating an analysis of the enforcing court’s jurisdiction may simplify the overall analysis, but hardly by much.  The court notes (para 77) that ” Establishing jurisdiction merely means that the alleged debt merits the assistance and attention of the Ontario courts.  Once the parties move past the jurisdictional phase, it may still be open to the defendant to argue any or all of the following, whether by way of preliminary motions or at trial: that the proper use of Ontario judicial resources justifies a stay under the circumstances; that the Ontario courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens; that any one of the available defences to recognition and enforcement (i.e. fraud, denial of natural justice, or public policy) should be accepted in the circumstances; or that a motion under either Rule 20 (summary judgment) or Rule 21 (determination of an issue before trial) of the Rules should be granted.”  And in respect of Chevron Canada (para 95), the “conclusion that the Ontario courts have jurisdiction in this case should not be understood to prejudice future arguments with respect to the distinct corporate personalities of Chevron and Chevron Canada.  [We] take no position on whether Chevron Canada can properly be considered a judgment-debtor to the Ecuadorian judgment.  Similarly, should the judgment be recognized and enforced against Chevron, it does not automatically follow that Chevron Canada’s shares or assets will be available to satisfy Chevron’s debt.”

Irrecevabilité

Pourvoi c/ Tribunal des affaires de sécurité sociale de Paris, 25 juillet 2014

Uglješa Grušić, The European Private International Law of Employment, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 382, ISBN: 9781107082946, GBP 79,99.

[Dal sito dell’editore] The European Private International Law of Employment provides a descriptive and normative account of the European rules of jurisdiction and choice of law which frame international employment litigation in the courts of EU Member States. The author outlines the relevant rules of the Brussels I Regulation Recast, the Rome Regulations, the Posted Workers Directive and the draft of the Posting of Workers Enforcement Directive, and assesses those rules in light of the objective of protection of employees. By using the UK as a case study, he also highlights the impact of the ‘Europeanisation’ of private international law on traditional perceptions and rules in this field of law in individual Member States. For example, the author demonstrates that the private international law of the EU is fundamentally reshaping English conflict of laws by almost completely merging the traditionally perceived contractual, statutory and tortious claims into one claim for choice-of-law purposes.

Il sommario dell’opera può essere consultato qui. Ulteriori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) juge que la simple mise en place d’une procédure d’identification ne suffit pas à exclure l’existence d’une expulsion collective.

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Néant

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Dans une décision rendue le 14 juillet 2015, la Cour constitutionnelle de la Fédération de Russie rappelle que la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ne saurait remettre en cause la primauté de sa Constitution.

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme

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Contrats et obligations conventionnelles

Contrats et obligations conventionnelles ; Prêt

Officiers publics ou ministériels

Séparation des pouvoirs

Irrecevabilité

Divorce, séparation de corps

Conflit de loi

FCD et FMB
Rapprochement des législations
Les articles incorporés en tant que composant d’un produit complexe doivent faire l’objet d’une notification auprès de l’Agence européenne des produits chimiques, lorsqu’ils contiennent une substance extrêmement préoccupante dans une concentration supérieure à 0,1 %

Federación de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras
SOPO
Les déplacements que les travailleurs sans lieu de travail fixe ou habituel effectuent entre leur domicile et le premier ou le dernier client de la journée constituent du temps de travail

H&M Hennes & Mauritz / OHMI - Saint Laurent (Forme de sacs à main)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal de l’UE rejette les recours formés par H&M contre l’enregistrement de deux modèles de sac d’Yves Saint Laurent

EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles, a cura di Bob Wessels, Eleven International Publishing, 2015, pp. 136, ISBN 9789462365865, Euro 32,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] This publication contains a set of 26 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles (‘EU JudgeCo Principles’) and 18 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Communications Guidelines (‘EU JudgeCo Guidelines’). These EU JudgeCo Principles will strengthen efficient and effective communication between courts in EU Member States in insolvency cases with cross-border effects. They have been produced in a period of two years (2013-2014), developed by a team of scholars of Leiden Law School and Nottingham Law School, in collaboration with some 50 experts, including 25 judges representing just as many different EU countries. The principles are set in EU stone, in that they especially function within the framework of the EU Insolvency Regulation. The texts have been aligned with the text of the recast of the Regulation, as published early December 2014. The EU JudgeCo Principles try to overcome present obstacles for courts in EU Member States such as formalistic and detailed national procedural law, concerns about a judge’s impartiality, uneasiness with the use of certain legal concepts and terms, and, evidently, language. The texts further build on existing experience and tested resources, especially in cross-border cases in North America, but tailor-made into an EU insolvency law context. These Principles include a set of very practical EU JudgeCo Guidelines to facilitate communications in individual cross-border cases. The project was funded by the European Union and the International Insolvency Institute (III) (www.iiiglobal.org) and we thank both sponsors for their continued support.

Ulteriori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Towards the end of July, the Court at Amsterdam applied the recent CJEU judgment in CDC, on the application of (now) Article 8’s rule on anchor defendants. The case also involved CDC – busy bees on the competition enforcement front, this time pursuing inter alia Kemira, a Finnish company, using Akzo Nobel NV, domiciled in The Netherlands, as anchor defendants.

The court referred in extenso to the CJEU’s CDC case, noting inter alia that it is not up to CDC to show that the suit was not just introduced to remove Kemira from the Finnish judge: that Kemira suggests that introduction of the suit in The Netherlands is not very logical given the absence of factual links to that Member State, does not suffice. The court also adopted the CJEU’s finding on choice of court and liability in tort. In the absence of specific proviso in standard contractual choice of court, liability such as here, for infringement of competition law, cannot be assumed.

Finally, at 2.18, the Court also referred to argument made by Kemira that Finish and Swedish law ought to apply to the interpretation (not: the validity) of the choice of court agreement. That would have been an interesting discussion. However in light of the court’s earlier judgment on the irrelevance of the court of choice, the court did not entertain that issue.

Geert.