Agrégateur de flux

José Angelo Estrella Faria (UNCITRAL) has published his Hague Lectures on the protection of religious cultural property in public international law and private international law (La protection des biens culturels d’intérêt religieux en droit international public et en droit international privé) in the Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law (volume 421). 

The author has kindly provided the following English abstract:

The protection of religious cultural property has three dimensions: physical conservation and preservation of the property (material protection); measures aimed at guaranteeing access to cultural property and maintaining their religious or liturgical function (intangible protection); and finally, protection against dissipation and dispersion (localization and physical attachment). Public law protects these three dimensions through various preventive and repressive measures, which are supplemented by rules of private law governing the conditions of circulation of these goods. The course addresses certain aspects of the legal treatment of cultural property with implications for religious cultural property, both at the international and national level, and the way in which national law takes the specific rules and needs of religious communities into consideration. The course is divided in two chapters: the first focusing on the protection of “religious cultural property” under public international law; the second part dealing with their treatment under private international law. 

After an introduction that discusses the notion of “cultural property” and “religious cultural property”, the first section of chapter I summarizes the evolution of the relevant rules of public international law from the first codifications of the law of war until the development of a framework for the protection of “world heritage”.  The chapter explains the protection of “historical monuments”, “works of art” and other cultural property in the customary law of armed conflict and in the special regime of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.  It then focuses on the special treatment of “places of worship” in the customary law of armed conflict, in international humanitarian law and in international criminal law as reflected in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. The second section of chapter I deals with the international framework for the protection of religious cultural property in times of peace.  It begins by discussing the place of religious cultural property in the 1972 UNESCO Convention on Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and the possible tension between obligations to preserve cultural heritage and the worship or liturgical use of religious cultural heritage.  The role of the protection of religious cultural property in bilateral agreements is also considered, notably from the in the practice of concordats of the Holy See.  The section concludes with an analysis of the territorial attachment of religious cultural property within the framework of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and of Ownership of Cultural Property, preventing the illicit import, export and transfer and the mechanisms for repatriation following wrongful removal.

The first section of chapter II examines the law applicable to the circulation of religious cultural property in private law and considers, in particular:  limits to the application abroad of mandatory rules concerning religious property and to the extraterritorial effect of export restrictions; the inalienability of cultural property religions; international application of the lex originis and the legal effect of internal rules of religious communities governing the management of their cultural heritage. The course concludes in the second section of chapter II discussing the conditions for a civil restitution or return action, including the right to sue and limitation periods, the law applicable to transfers of ownership and rules on good faith acquisition of religious cultural property. It presents several cases that illustrate the difficulty that religious communities and groups may face to obtain restitution of cultural property removed from places of worship and related premises in violation of rules governing their religious function and use. It also considers the conditions for the return of goods to the country of origin in the event of theft or illicit export and the effect of restitution on the right of ownership under the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 19995 and the European Union Directive 2014/60 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State.

More details, including the table of contents, can be found here.

Although it has in fact been out for several months now, there are few books more deserving of recognition on this blog than Étienne Farnoux’ impressive work on the substantive considerations that inform the rules on international jurisdiction.

Across the book’s 700+ pages, Farnoux launches a sustained attack on the principe de proximité as the foundation of most rules on international jurisdiction, including, most importantly, the forum delicti. He does so in two steps (as any serious French scholar would do): He first discusses the insufficiencies of the proximity-based status quo before developing an alternative approach to international jurisdiction based on procedural and, more importantly, substantive (i.e. policy) considerations.

In the first part, Farnoux explains how localised connecting factors are regularly manipulated to achieve a certain result, most often to create a forum actoris, a practice particularly prevalent in the case law of the CJEU. His analysis is based on a wide range of judgments – Shevill, Kronhofer, Kolassa, Löber, eDate, Bolagsupplysningen, Wikingerhof, Gtflix Tv, … – but does not fail to acknowledge the occasional nuance, as reflected, i.a., by the recent decisions in Vereniging van Effectenbezitters and Mittelbayerischer Verlag. Farnoux deconstructs the alleged objectives of the the principe de proximité – ease of evidence, foreseeability, and effective administration of justice – and demonstrates their inability to justify the allocation of adjudicative jurisdiction in a growing number of inherently delocalised torts.

In the second part, Farnoux therefore proposes a complete change of perspective for international jurisdiction on torts. Rather than chasing an ever more elusive proximity, two sets of considerations should drive the search for the appropriate connecting factor: la justice procédurale, i.e. the just allocation of procedural advantages between claimant and defendant, and la justice substantielle, i.e. the substantive interests of both parties, and of the potential forum. Based on these considerations, Farnoux develops a set of two propositions: First, he suggests to replace the forum delicti by a forum victimae (or forum actoris contrôlé), which would vest jurisdiction in the domicile of the claimant provided that their claim passes a prima-facie exam of its substantive merit – a proposition that certainly holds a claim to intellectual honesty if compared to the practically similar status quo of the Brussels Ia regime, but comes with its own set of problems, including the challenge of examining the merits of a claim before jurisdiction has been established (admittedly a common exercise in English law, though). Alternatively, he proposes to create a new forum protectionis in tort for structurally weaker parties, a proposition that may have a wider appeal, not least for avoiding to abolish the principle of actor sequitur entirely. In the final part of the book, these proposals are supplemented by some thoughts on how the interests of the prospective fora also influence the rules on international jurisdiction.

All in all, Farnoux masterfully combines a thorough, yet very timely analysis of the existing rules on international jurisdiction for torts through the lens of the principe de proximité with some innovative, well-argued propositions on how the latter could be replaced. The book has deservedly won a series of prizes already and is all but certain to become a staple in the library of any scholar working on international jurisdiction.

The Journal of Private International Law will be holding its 9th Conference at the Singapore Management University from 3 to 5 August 2023.

All those interested in making a presentation at the conference and in producing a final paper to be submitted for publication in the Journal are invited to provide for an abstract that should be up to 500 words in length and should clearly state the name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s). Abstracts can fall within any subject matter the Journal deal with and can be offered by people at any stage of their career, including postgraduate students.

Since there will be a mixture of plenary (Friday) and parallel panel sessions (Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning), it is to be indicated on the abstract whether you are willing to present in either or are only willing to do so in one or the other.

Presentation at the conference will depend on whether your abstract is selected by the Editors of the Journal (Jonathan Harris KC, King’s College, and Paul Beaumont FRSE, University of Stirling) and the Conference Organiser (Adeline Chong, Singapore Management University). The subsequent article should be submitted to either of the editors of the Journal before the end of 2023. Publication in the Journal will be subject to the usual system of refereeing by two experts in the field.

Abstract shall be submitted by 16 December 2022 at jpil2023@smu.edu.sg.

More information on the conference and the related registration can be found here.

A new Report on EU Policy Guidelines was just posted on the website of EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU), an EU-funded Project conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The Report was authored by Marco Buzzoni, Cristina M. Mariottini, Michele Casi, and Carlos Santaló Goris.

Building upon the outcomes of the national and international exchange seminars and the Project’s analytical reports, this Report formulates policy guidelines addressed to EU policymakers and puts forth suggestions to improve the current legal framework provided under the EFFORTS Regulations (namely: the Brussels I-bis Regulation and the Regulations on the European Enforcement Order, the European Small Claims Procedure, the European Payment Order, and the European Account Preservation Order) with regard to the enforcement of claims.

This Report was among the outputs and findings discussed at the Project’s Final Conference, hosted by the University of Milan on 30 September 2022, which provided an international forum where academics, policymakers, and practitioners discussed the Project’s key findings and exchanged their views on the national implementation of – and the path forward for – the EFFORTS Regulations. The content of the Final Conference will enrich the Final Study, which is forthcoming on the Project’s website.

Regular updates on the EFFORTS Project are available via the Project’s website, as well as LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union

A quick update related to the public consultation launched by the French Ministry of Justice last June on the draft code of private international law to gather feedback from all stakeholders (announced here).

The deadline has been extended to 30 November 2022.

More information is available here.

Various posts have been published on this blog regarding the draft: see here for some general remarks, and here as regards specifically renvoi, foreign law, the recognition of marriages and companies. A German perspective on the draft is offered here.

Lorsque le défunt avait la nationalité française et possédait des biens en France, les juridictions françaises sont compétentes pour statuer sur l’ensemble de sa succession en application de l’article 10 du règlement européen du 4 juillet 2012, même s’il n’y était pas domicilié.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit et pratique de la procédure civile 2021/2022 Voir la boutique Dalloz

en lire plus

Several years ago, I published a paper that examined how U.S. courts interpret choice-of-law clauses. That paper contains a detailed discussion of the most common interpretive issues—whether the clause selects the tort laws of the chosen jurisdiction in addition to its contract laws, for example—that arise in litigation. There was, however, one important omission. The paper did not consider the question of whether the word “laws” in a choice-of-law clause should be interpreted to select the laws of the chosen jurisdiction (1) at the time the contract was signed, or (2) at the time of litigation.

In declining to address this issue, the paper was in good company. Neither the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (§ 2) nor the draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws (§ 1.02) discuss the relationship between choice-of-law and time. Nevertheless, the omission bothered me.

In the spring of 2021, I saw that Jeff Rensberger at the South Texas College of Law had posted a paper to SSRN entitled Choice of Law and Time. After downloading and reading the paper, I discovered that it contained no discussion of choice-of-law clauses. It was devoted solely to the question of how courts should address the issue of temporality in cases where the parties had declined to select a law in advance. After reading the paper, I wrote to Jeff to propose that we collaborate on a second paper that specifically addressed the temporal question in the context of choice-of-law clauses. When we spoke on the phone to discuss the project, however, we did not agree on the answer. Jeff argued for the laws at the time of signing. I argued for the laws at the time of litigation.

In early 2022, Jeff sent me a draft of his new paper, Choice of Law and Time Part II: Choice of Law Clauses and Changing Law, which makes the case for interpreting choice-of-law clauses to select the law at the time of signing. In response, I drafted an essay arguing that they should be interpreted to select the law at the time of litigation. A draft of my essay, The Canon of Evolving Law, is now available for download on SSRN.

If you happen to be one of the small number of people in the world interested in this fascinating (though obscure) interpretive issue, I would encourage you to download both papers and decide for yourself who has the better of the argument.

[This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog.]

All private international law events at the Court of Justice this month will take place on the same day, namely on 20 October.

To begin with, we will get to know AG Szpunar’s opinion on C-423/21, Grand Production.

The Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) has lodged a request for a preliminary ruling with two questions on Directive 2001/29/CE (on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society) alone, and another one on the combined interpretation of provisions of said Directive and of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, in a claim for injunctive relief of worldwide scope:

I. Is the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (…) to be interpreted as meaning that such communication is made by the direct operator (not established in the EU in this case) of a streaming platform, whereby that operator

– alone decides on the content and blacking out of TV programmes broadcast by it and implements them from a technical point of view,

– has sole administrator rights for the streaming platform,

– an influence which TV programmes can be received by the end user via the service, but cannot influence the content of the programmes,

– and is the sole point of control as regards which programmes and content can be watched in which territories and when,

where, in each case,

– the user is provided with access not only to broadcasting content whose online use has been authorised by the respective rightholders, but also to protected content for which rights clearance has not been obtained, and

– the direct operator of the streaming platform is aware that its service also enables the reception of protected broadcasting content without the consent of the rightholders by virtue of the fact that the end customers use VPN services which give the impression that the IP address and device of the end customers are located in areas for which the consent of the rightholder has been obtained, but

– the reception of protected broadcasting content via the streaming platform without the consent of the rightholders was in fact possible for several weeks even without VPN tunnelling?

II. If Question I is answered in the affirmative:

Is the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC to be interpreted as meaning that such communication is also carried out by third parties (having, in this case, their registered offices in the EU) which are related, contractually and/or under company law, to the platform operator described in Question I., and which, without themselves having any influence on the blackouts and on the programmes and content of the broadcasts brought to the streaming platform,

– advertise the operator’s streaming platform and its services, and/or

– offer trial subscriptions to customers that automatically end after 15 days, and/or

– support the customers of the streaming platform as a customer service provider, and/or

– offer on their website paid subscriptions to the streaming platform of the direct operator and then act as the contracting partner of the customers and as the recipient of payment, whereby the paid subscriptions are created in such a way that an express reference to the fact that certain programmes are not available is made only if a customer explicitly indicates at the time of conclusion of the contract that he or she wishes to see those programmes, but, if customers do not express that wish or specifically enquire about such programmes, they are not informed of that fact in advance?

III. Are Article 2(a) and (e) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC, read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (…) to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an allegation of infringement of copyright and related rights guaranteed by the Member State of the court seised, that court has jurisdiction only to rule on the damage caused in the territory of the Member State to which it belongs – because the territoriality principle precludes domestic courts from having competence to determine and examine the facts in relation to foreign acts of infringement – or can or must that court also rule on offences committed outside that territory (worldwide), as alleged by the infringed author?

In a nutshell, the third question seeks clarification regarding the principle of territoriality, in accordance with which the protection claimed by an applicant under Austrian copyright law relates only to Austria, and the applicant can therefore only claim injunctive relief which is limited to Austria.

Two further opinions are scheduled on the same day, one from AG Szpunar and the other from P. Pikamäe.

In C-291/21, Starkinvest, the Tribunal de première instance of Liège is asking the Court of Justice to interpret Articles 4, 7 and 8 of Regulation No 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure.

In the case at hand, in 2015 the Court of Appeal of Liège had ordered a company incorporated under Irish law, subject to a penalty payment, to stop committing trademark infringements. Some years after the judgement was handed down and (allegedly) served, the claimant issued an order for payment in the sum of EUR 86 694.22, which included EUR 85 000 in penalty payments. Now, he has asked a first instance court to make a European Account Preservation Order in the principal amount of EUR 85 000, over such sums as may be held in the French bank account of the defendant. The claim is based on penalty payments alleged to be due from the defendant pursuant to the 2015 judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal of Liège.

The national court refers the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling:

1. Does a judgment which has been served, ordering a party to make a penalty payment in the event of breach of a prohibitory order, constitute a decision requiring the debtor to pay the creditor’s claim within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 655/2014 (…)?

2. Does a judgment ordering a party to make a penalty payment, although enforceable in the country of origin, fall within the meaning of ‘judgment’ in Article 4 of Regulation No 655/2014 (…) where there has been no final determination of the amount in accordance with Article 55 of Regulation 1215/12 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters?’

In case C-393/21, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey, AG Pikamäe has been asked to give an opinion on a request for a preliminary ruling by the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania). Four out of five questions concern the notion of ‘exceptional circumstances’ under Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims. The fifth question focuses on the relationship between Regulation Brussels Ibis and Regulation No 805/2004 as regards the suspension of enforcement proceedings when the enforceability of a court decision is suspended in the Member State of origin:

‘1.  How, taking into account the objectives of Regulation No 805/2004 (…), inter alia the objective of accelerating and simplifying the enforcement of judgments of Member States and effective safeguarding of the right to a fair trial, must the term ‘exceptional circumstances’ in Article 23(c) of Regulation No 805/2004 be interpreted? What is the discretion that the competent authorities of the Member State of enforcement have to interpret the term ‘exceptional circumstances’?

2. Are circumstances, such as those in the present case, related to judicial proceedings in the State of origin which decide a question regarding the setting aside of the judgment on the basis of which a European Enforcement Order was issued to be regarded as relevant when deciding on the application of Article 23(c) of Regulation No 805/2004? According to what criteria must the appeal proceedings in the Member State of origin be assessed and how comprehensive must the assessment of the proceedings taking place in the Member State of origin that is carried out by the competent authorities of the Member State of enforcement be?

3. What is the subject matter of the assessment when deciding on the application of the term ‘exceptional circumstances’ in Article 23 of Regulation No 805/2004: must the impact of the respective circumstances of the dispute when the judgment of the State of origin is challenged in the State of origin be assessed, must the possible potential benefit or harm of the respective measure specified in Article 23 of the regulation be analysed, or must the debtor’s economic abilities to implement the judgment, or other circumstances, be analysed?

4. Under Article 23 of Regulation No 805/2004, is the simultaneous application of several measures specified in that article possible? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, what criteria must the competent authorities of the State of enforcement rely on when deciding on the merits and proportionality of the application of several of those measures?

5. Is the legal regime laid down in Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (…) to be applied to a judgment of the State of origin regarding the suspension (or cancellation) of enforceability, or is a legal regime similar to that specified in Article 44(2) of that regulation applicable?

The facts of the case can be summarized as follows.

In enforcement proceedings, a bailiff operating in Lithuania is executing an order of the Amtsgericht Hünfeld (Local Court, Hünfeld, Germany), on the basis of which an enforcement order and a European Enforcement Order certificate had been issued regarding the recovery of a debt of the debtor for the benefit of the party seeking enforcement.

The debtor applied to the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany) for withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate and termination of enforcement. It claimed that the certificate had been issued unlawfully because the procedural documents of the Local Court, Hünfeld, had not been duly served on it. He also requested the bailiff to stay the enforcement proceedings in the Republic of Lithuania until its claims for withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate and termination of enforcement had been examined in a final procedural decision of the court in Germany.

The bailiff refused to stay the enforcement proceedings, on the basis that the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure do not provide for a stay of the enforcement of a final judgment on the ground that claims for withdrawal have been made before a court of the State of origin. The District Court of Kaunas, Lithuania, before which an action regarding this refusal was brought, did not upheld the action. The Regional Court of Kaunas, exercising appellate jurisdiction, set aside the order of the court of first instance, upheld the action brought by the debtor and ordered the stay of the enforcement proceedings pending a full examination of the debtor’s claims by a final judgment of the German competent court.

The other party brought an appeal on a point of law before the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania).

Finally, the Court of Justice will hand down its judgment in case C-604/20, ROI Land Investments, also on 20 October. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) has requested the interpretation of rules on jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation, as well as of conflict of law provisions in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I):

1. Is Article 6(1) read in conjunction with Article 21(2) and Article 21(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (…) to be interpreted as meaning that an employee can sue a legal person – which is not his employer and which is not domiciled in a Member State within the meaning of Article 63(1) of the Brussels I Regulation but which, by virtue of a letter of comfort, is directly liable to the employee for claims arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party – in the courts for the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work in the employment relationship with the third party or in the courts for the last place where he did so, if the contract of employment with the third party would not have come into being in the absence of the letter of comfort?

2. Is Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that the reservation in respect of Article 21(2) of the Brussels I Regulation precludes the application of a rule of jurisdiction existing under the national law of the Member State which allows an employee to sue a legal person, which, in circumstances such as those described in the first question, is directly liable to him for claims arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party, as the ‘successor in title’ of the employer in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work, if no such jurisdiction exists under Article 21(2) read in conjunction with Article 21(1)(b)(i) of the Brussels I Regulation?

3. If the first question is answered in the negative and the second question in the affirmative:

(a)  Is Article 17(1) of the Brussels I Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘professional activities’ includes paid employment in an employment relationship?

(b)  If so, is Article 17(1) of the Brussels I Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that a letter of comfort on the basis of which a legal person is directly liable for claims of an employee arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party constitutes a contract concluded by the employee for a purpose which can be regarded as being within the scope of his professional activities?

4. If, in answer to the above questions, the referring court is deemed to have international jurisdiction to rule on the dispute:

(a)   Is Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (…) to be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘professional activities’ includes paid employment in an employment relationship?

(b)   If so, is Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that a letter of comfort on the basis of which a legal person is directly liable to an employee for claims arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party constitutes a contract concluded by the employee for a purpose which can be regarded as being within the scope of his professional activities?

I reported here on the facts of the case. Interestingly, AG Richard de la Tour’s opinion of April 28, 2022, not yet available in English, offers the Court two possibilities. My translation for the first one would be:

1) Article 21, sections 1 and 2, of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (…) must  be interpreted in the sense that a natural or legal person, whether or not domiciled in the territory of a Member State, with whom an employee has concluded, not his employment contract, but an agreement that forms an integral part of said contract, by virtue of which said person is responsible for fulfilling the obligations of the employer towards the employee, can be classified as “employer” when it has a direct interest in the correct execution of the contract. The referring court must assess the existence of this direct interest globally, taking into account all the considerations of the case at hand.

2) Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the application of the jurisdictional rules of national law must be excluded when the conditions of application of Article 21(2) of said Regulation are met.

In the event that the Court of Justice considers the dispute does not fall within the scope of application of Article 21(2) of Regulation No. 1215/2012, Mr. Richard de la Tour suggests answering that:

3) Article 17, paragraph 1, of Regulation No. 1215/2012 and article 6, paragraph 1, of Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008, must be interpreted in the sense that the concept of “professional activity” includes work for another’s account in an employment relationship.

4) Article 17(1) of Regulation No. 1215/2012 and Article 6(1) of Regulation No. 593/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that a letter of comfort that forms an integral part of a employment contract, by virtue of which a person is responsible for fulfilling the obligations of the employer towards the worker, is included in the concept of “professional activity”.

The decision will be delivered by the 3rd Chamber with M. Safjan reporting, sitting together with Ms. Jürimäe, M. Jääskinen, M. Piçarra and M. Gavalec.

Written by Mayela Celis

On 30 September 2022, a US District Court in Boston (Massachusetts, USA) dismissed the case filed by Mexico against the US weapons manufacturers regarding non-contractual obligations (among them, negligence and unjust enrichment). According to Reuters, the reason given by the judge to dismiss the case is that “federal law [Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act] ‘unequivocally’ bars lawsuits seeking to hold gun manufacturers responsible when people use guns for their intended purpose” and that none of the exceptions contained therein applied.

One statement worthy of note as stated in multiple news media is: “While the court has considerable sympathy for the people of Mexico, and none whatsoever for those who traffic guns to Mexican criminal organizations, it is duty-bound to follow the law.”

The full case citation is Estados Unidos Mexicanos (plaintiff) vs. SMITH & WESSON BRANDS, INC.; BARRETT FIREARMS MANUFACTURING, INC.; BERETTA U.S.A. CORP.; BERETTA HOLDING S.P.A.; CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARMS, INC.; COLT’S MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; GLOCK, INC.; GLOCK GES.M.B.H.; STURM, RUGER & CO., INC.; WITMER PUBLIC SAFETY GROUP, INC. D/B/A INTERSTATE ARMS (defendants), Case 1:21-cv-11269, filed in 2021.

In a nutshell, the allegations made by Mexico are the following (as stated in the complaint):

1. Defendants have legal duties to distribute their guns safely and avoid arming criminals in Mexico;
2. Defendants are fully on notice that their conduct causes unlawful trafficking to Mexico;
3. Defendants actively assist and facilitate trafficking of their guns to drug cartels in Mexico:
4. Defendants actively assist and facilitate the unlawful tracking because it maximizes their sales and profits;
5. The Government has taken reasonable measures to try to protect itself from defendants’ unlawful conduct;
6. Defendants cause massive injury to the government.

Claims for relief are (as stated in the complaint):

Negligence, public nuisance, defective condition – unreasonably dangerous, negligence per se, gross negligence, unjust enrichment and restitution, violation of CUTPA [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act], Violation of Mass. G.L. c. 93A [Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act], punitive damages.

In addition to the argument given by the judge, I believe that it would be very hard to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Think for example of the minimum contacts and the reasonableness test, in particular what are the contacts of the defendants with the state of Massachusetts (but see for example: Smith & Wesson is indeed based in Massachusetts until 2023), the existence of justified expectations that may be protected or hurt, and the forum State’s [the United States of America} interest in adjudicating the dispute.

Moreover, and aside from jurisdictional issues, given that the actual damage occurred overseas, an important issue would be to prove the causation link between the conduct of the defendants and the damage. This will prove particularly difficult considering all the intermediaries that exist in the weapons’ trade (legal and illegal, second-hand sales, pawn shops, etc.).

Nevertheless, this is a very interesting initiative and perhaps it is a battle worth fighting for (if only to raise public awareness). One thing is for sure: the Mexican Government has shown its increasing concern about the illicit traffic of firearms in its territory and its commitment to end it.

The Mexican Federal Government will appeal the judgment.  The official statement is available here.

We will post any new updates on this blog. Stay tuned!

Meetings & Events

On 1-2 September 2022, the HCCH Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean organised a judicial training on the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and 1996 Child Protection Convention in Barbados, attended by judges and senior practitioners in the field of child abduction from Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago.

On 8 September 2022, the HCCH Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean organised a judicial training on the 1980 Child Abduction Convention in Trinidad and Tobago, attended by judges in the field of child abduction from Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas.

From 12 to 16 September 2022, the online HCCH CODIFI Conference brought together panelists and participants from a range of backgrounds to examine issues of private international law in the commercial, digital and financial sectors, highlighting developments in the digital economy and fintech industries as well as clarifying the roles of core HCCH instruments: the 1985 Trusts Convention, the 2006 Securities Convention, and the Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts. More information is available here, and recordings of all the sessions are available here.

From 19 to 23 September 2022, the third meeting of the Working Group on Matters Related to Jurisdiction in Transnational Civil or Commercial Litigation was held in hybrid format. The Group made further progress on the development of draft provisions on parallel litigation in civil or commercial matters, which may occur when separate proceedings are instituted before the courts of different States. More information is available here.

 

Upcoming Events

Registrations are now open for HCCH Asia Pacific Week 2022, to be held from 18 to 20 October in Manila, the Philippines. The conference will act as a forum for the exchange of ideas and viewpoints from across Asia and the Pacific on some of the most prominent HCCH Conventions and instruments, as well as on the HCCH’s ongoing normative projects and possible future work, in the areas of transnational litigation and legal cooperation, international family and child protection law, and commercial, digital and financial law. More information is available here.

 

Vacancies

Applications are now open for the position of Legal Officer within the Transnational Litigation & Apostille Division of the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH. The deadline for the submission of applications is 14 October 2022. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Priskila Pratita Penasthika (Assistant Professor in Private International Law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia) has just published her PhD dissertation with Eleven under the title Unravelling Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts. Indonesia as an Illustrative Case Study.

The abstract reads as follows:

Despite the paramount role of choice of law in international contractual relationships, its implementation in various countries remains disparate. Many countries have acknowledged and given effect to choice of law, but some other countries persist in opposing it. The lingering reluctance in enforcing choice of law remains a challenging impediment to cross-border commercial relationships.

Strict adherence to the territoriality principle, absence of special provisions or clear guidelines of choice of law, and difficulties in confirming the content of the chosen foreign law are among the reasons for the reluctance to give effect to choice of law. These circumstances are encountered by some countries, including Indonesia.

This book not only unravels the reasons for Indonesia’s reluctance and its subsequent lack of advancement on choice of law, but also examines possible solutions to the problem. Building on in-depth doctrinal research, supported by qualitative interviews, this research will serve as an essential point of reference for academics, practitioners, and policymakers interested in private international law and cross-border commercial litigation.

The book offers a thorough analysis into why and to what extent Indonesia deviates from applying choice of law in international commercial contracts and identifies related factors to this situation. The study makes use of various research methods to analyse in-depth the situation of choice of law in international commercial contracts. The doctrinal method allows the scholar to explore and describe the theoretical and regulatory frameworks of choice of law that are available at the global, regional, and national levels. This is complemented by an empirical part based on qualitative interviews carried out with practitioners and experts in Indonesia, and a detailed analysis of national case law after 2002 concerning contracts where parties made use of a choice of law clause. The interviews allowed the researcher to gain a better understanding of the problems and difficulties facing the Indonesian judicial practice with regard to choice of law.

This publication could not have been more timely given that it has taken Indonesia around 55 years since its independence to finally have a statutory provision that acknowledges the freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to a contract.

Nevertheless, the prevailing provisions appear insufficient to deal with the complexity of international commercial transactions. The academic discussion on the topic has been rather sluggish for a long period in Indonesia.

With the ongoing reforms and the national policy vision (Visi Indonesia 2045) aiming to encourage international trade, this book has the potential to bring back into the arena advanced discussions on the topic. It is certainly a valuable study for international readers interested in choice of law who would otherwise not be able to easily access decisions of Indonesian courts in this area of private international law as well as gaining a detailed understanding of the complexity of the national system.

Additionally, it is a useful tool for Indonesian policymakers, practitioners, and scholars as it highlights a number of improvements that could be embarked upon in the future. This will also assist courts to secure parties’ access to justice, and promote certainty and predictability in the settling of international commercial contract disputes.

The second issue of 2022 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) is out. In addition to recent case law and other materials, it features two essays and one shorter paper

Costanza Honorati, Giovanna Ricciardi, Violenza domestica e protezione cross-border (Domestic Violence and Cross-Border Protection)

Domestic violence has drawn increasing attention both from the lawmaker and legal scholars. Legal means to prevent domestic violence and protect women have been promoted and implemented at the national and supranational levels. This article concentrates on seeking and enforcing civil protection measures in cross-border family conflicts. Protective measures are often sought and taken in the State where the prospective victim (and often also the tortfeasor) is habitually resident. PIL issues are however rarely addressed. Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters provides a useful instrument when the need for recognition and enforcement in a different Member State arises at a later stage. Less dealt with is the issue of selecting an appropriate ground for jurisdiction, which is not governed by the mentioned Regulation. The latter issue becomes especially relevant in the very peculiar case of protection measures to be issued in the so-called State of refuge when a mother challenges a situation of domestic violence as a ground for leaving the State of a child’s habitual residence and searches for protection elsewhere. The interplay between domestic violence and abduction cases, a situation quite frequent in practice but rarely addressed in legal literature, is further explored and dealt with.

Ilaria Viarengo, The Coordination of Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Proceedings Related to Economic Aspects of Family Law

This article addresses the complex features and problems arising from the combined application of all European and international instruments dealing with divorce and the economic aspects of family law. The need to avoid litigation proceedings in different jurisdictions, entailing the duplication of proceedings and costs and the need to have divorce and all the financial aspects governed by the same law are of central importance from a practical point of view. This article provides an analysis of whether and to what extent these two needs can be satisfied with the combined application of the EU family law regulations at issue. Firstly, it deals with some general issues whose solution could have an impact on the coordination among all these instruments. Consequently, it examines the interplay among rules on jurisdiction and applicable law, including the role of party autonomy in pursuing coordination.

Curzio Fossati, La residenza abituale nei regolamenti europei di diritto internazionale privato della famiglia alla luce della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia (Habitual Residence in EU Private International Law Regulations in Family Matters in View of the Case-Law of the Court of Justice)

This article deals with the concept of habitual residence, which is in widespread use in the EU Regulations in the field of family law. Firstly, the article gives an overview of these Regulations, and then it analyses the case-law of the CJEU on the criterion of habitual residence referred to children, deceased persons, and spouses. The contribution examines two fundamental elements of the concept of habitual residence identified both by CJEU and scholars: the objective element, i.e. a sufficiently stable presence of a person in a Member State, and the subjective element, i.e. the intention of the person concerned to establish the permanent or habitual centre of his or her interests in that place. The article also tries to identify the most suitable method of interpretation of the concept of habitual residence and, in particular, it investigates which approach is more desirable between a uniform approach (which fosters a uniform definition of habitual residence in EU law) and a functional one (which implies an interpretation that takes into account the aim of the disposition in which the concept is used). Ultimately, the Author endorses the solution adopted by the CJEU in the IB case, which combines the aforementioned approaches.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme retient une violation de l’article 3 de la Convention à l’encontre de la Croatie, face à l’incapacité des services de police d’assurer la protection d’une victime d’un crime vis-à-vis de son agresseur bénéficiant de permissions de sortie d’un établissement carcéral.

en lire plus

Espagne / Commission
Aide d'État
L’avocat général Pikamäe propose d’annuler partiellement l’arrêt du Tribunal ainsi que la décision de la Commission sur le « régime espagnol de leasing fiscal »

LOT (Indemnisation imposée par l’autorité administrative)
Transport
L’autorité nationale chargée de l’application du règlement sur les droits des passagers aériens peut, à la suite de plaintes individuelles, obliger un transporteur à indemniser des passagers

By judgment of 28 September 2022 – XII ZR 7/22 (so far, only the press release is available, on which the following considerations are based), the German Federal Court of Justice held that Hungarian street tolls can be claimed before German courts.

The claimant is a Hungarian company that collects Hungarian street tolls, the defendant a domestic car rental company. According to Hungarian regulation, it is the registered keeper of the car that owes the toll. If the toll is not paid by a virtual vignette (e-Matrica), an „increased substitute toll“, five times higher than the vignette, must be paid within 60 days, afterwards additonally a large „processing fee“. The first instance rejected the claim, on appeal the defendant was ordered to pay the claimed amount, the second appeal, on issues of law alone, confirmed the judgment on first appeal (except on the issue of which currency could be claimed, Hungarian Forinth or also Euros optionally).

The main point on the second appeal was whether the public policy exception in Article 21 Rome I Regulation applies. This analysis implies that the claim is characterised as contractual and that the Hungarian law on street tolls applies. The first issue was rather whether imposing liability solely on the part of the registered keeper would conflict with German public policy in case that this keeper is a car rental company whose business obviously is renting out its registered cars to the respective driver. As German law (section 7 German Road Traffic Act) prescribes, rather similarly, at least a subsidiary liability of the registered keeper, the Court rightly rejected a violation of German public policy. Since this result was obvious, the issue must have been dealt with upon party submission with which the Court has to deal with as a matter of fair proceedings (right to be heard, extending to a right to see the Court dealing with the Party’s core points).

More interestingly, the „increased substitute toll“ was seen as a contractual penalty which was – again rightly – considered as „not entirely unknown under German law“, referring to similar substitute tolls indeed used in contracts for tramway or underground railroad traffic etc. if the traveller does not have a valid ticket. One is tempted to add that a contractual practice does not necessarily indicate the legal validity of this practice, but as this practice is virtually uncontested it is certainly convincing to take it as a „proof“ for how German law deals with contractual penalties. The German Civil Code provides for the basis in sections 339 et seq., combined with sections 305 et seq. (control of unfair terms).

On the issue of the currency of the claim, the Court observed that the debt in question in foreign currency can only be claimed in that foreign currency unless the applicable Hungarian law allows optional payment in Euros. In order to assess this point of Hungarian law the case was referred back to the court of first instance.

The case shows that Member State Courts continue being careful before striking down the results of a foreign applicable law as a violation of the national public policy. Had the highest instance of the German civil courts tended towards the opposite it would have had the obligation to refer the question to the ECJ whether activating the public policy exception was still within the confines of this exception as defined in its outer limits by European Union law. Rejecting a public policy violation in the sense of Article 21 Rome I Regulation (and comparable provisions in EU PIL) puts this decision in a (small) series of decisions of Member State courts, compared to almost none that actually assessed a violation. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the court of appeal gave leave for a second appeal on the grounds that the questions on Article 21 Rome I Regulation would be of fundamental relevance („von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung“). Otherwise, the case could not have reached the Federal Court of Justice, as complaints against not giving leave are only admissible beyond a value of the appeal of EUR 20.000, and the total sum of the claim here was not more than approximately EUR 1.300.

Perry Dane (Rutgers) law schools has posted Party Autonomy and the Challenge of Choice of Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

A perennial question in choice of law is whether parties to a contract can select the jurisdiction whose law will govern their contract. This so-called “party autonomy” problem is vexing and intriguing, in part because contemporary discussions often overlook in contemporary discussions.

The party autonomy problem is more consequential than most issues in choice of law. But it is also important as a singular window into the intellectual fabric of choice of law and as a leading edge for new and potentially subversive insights.

This essay is a chapter in an Oxford University Press volume on the “Philosophical Foundations of Conflict of Laws.” The essay argues that party autonomy does not have one comprehensive justification, but that it might be justified by a set of distinct if overlapping arguments that point to vital ideas often overlooked in the contemporary conversation. If choice of law doctrine embraces party autonomy, it might be in part because its shapers instinctively and inchoately recognize those considerations.

The most speculative and problematic argument is based on a version of natural law. Another argument relies on an important distinction between what I have called second-order and first-order choice of law. Yet another builds on an effort at a more sophisticated understanding of what it means for persons to be attached (or to attach themselves) to the legitimate governance of a legal system. The last argument is grounded in legal pluralism, though not of the usual sort.

These distinct bases for party autonomy are not only of theoretical interest. They also generate different answers to some of the material subsidiary questions that arise in any doctrinal consideration of party autonomy. That in turn suggests that the doctrine of party autonomy might require more nuance and fine-grained distinctions than most current treatments have given it.

The paper is forthcoming in Philosophical Foundations of Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, Roxana Banu, Michael Green, Ralf Michaels, eds., 2022).

The Institute for German and International Civil Procedure at the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University of Bonn, Germany, is looking for a highly skilled and motivated PhD candidate and fellow (Wissenschaftliche/r Mitarbeiter/in) to work in the fields of Private International Law, International Civil Procedural Law and/or International Commercial Arbitration on a part-time basis (50%) as of 1 April 2023.

The successful candidate must hold the First or Second German State Examination in law with distinction (“Prädikat”) and is interested in the international dimensions of private law, in particular private international law, international civil procedural law, and/or international commercial arbitration.

The successful candidate will be given the opportunity to conduct her/his PhD project (according to the Faculty’s regulations) under the supervision of the Director of the Institute Prof Dr Matthias Weller, Mag.rer.publ. (https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/professur-prof-dr-weller/professor-dr-weller-magrerpubl/). The position is paid according to the German public service salary scale E-13 TV-L, 50%. The initial contract period is one year at least and up to three years, with an option to be extended. Responsibilities include supporting research and teaching on Private International Law, International Civil Procedure and/or International Commercial Arbitration as well as a teaching obligation of two hours per week during term time.

If you are interested in this position, please send your application (cover letter in German; CV; and relevant documents and certificates, notably university transcripts and a copy of the German State Examination Law Degree) to Prof Dr Matthias Weller (weller@jura.uni-bonn.de). The University of Bonn is an equal opportunity employer.

Agrofert / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
La décision du Parlement de refuser l’accès à deux documents relatifs à l’enquête contre M. Andrej Babiš, ancien Premier ministre tchèque, pour utilisation abusive des fonds européens et conflits d’intérêts potentiels est valide

The (first instance) court at Rotterdam has upheld anchor jurisdiction and refused an application for an Article 34 Brussels Ia stay. The case concerns victims of earthquakes in the Brasilian Maceió region, which they argue are caused by the mining activities of Braskem. The judgment is only available in Dutch.

The Dutch anchor defendants are intra-group suppliers of ia specialty chemicals, and finance. The main target of the claim of course is the Brasilian mother holding. Whether the latter can be brought into the proceedings is not subject to Brussels Ia but rather to Dutch residual rules. However just as in e.g. Shell, the Dutch rules are applied with CJEU authority on Article 8(1) Brussels Ia firmly in mind. In much more succinct terms than the English courts in similar proceedings, the Dutch courts [6.16] finds the cases so ‘closely related’ that it is expedient to hear the cases together. It emphasises that while the respective roles and liabilities of the various undertakings concerned is likely to be very different, there is a bundle of legal and factual questions that runs jointly throughout the various claims. [6.18] it emphasises that the decision to base the European headquarters of the group, and the finance activities at Rotterdam, implies that the concern reasonably could have foreseen it would be sued here.

Equally succinctly [6.19 ff] the Court rejects the argument that the use of the Dutch corporations as anchor defendants is an abuse of process. Such abuse must be narrowly construed and  it is far from obvious that the claim against the anchors is entirely without merit.

Seemingly defendants tried to argue forum non conveniens however [6.23] the court points out such construction does not exist in The Netherlands and obiter it adds (like the Court of Appeal in Municipio) that practical complications in either hearing of the case or enforcement of any judgment are not a reason to dismiss jurisdiction.

Request for a stay in the procedures viz the Brasilian corporations [6.26] is rejected on (Dutch CPR) lis pendens rules for the parties in the proceedings are not the same. Article 34 is dealt with in two paras (quite a contrast with the E&W courts). The pending procedures vis-a-vis Article 34 are not, it seems, Brasilian Civil Public Actions – CPAS (these were at issue in Municipio de Mariana (of some interest is that the law firm behind the claims is the same in both cases)). Rather, pending liquidation proceedings are considered as the relevant assessment points. [6.28] obiter the court finds that the cases are most probably not related. It grounds  its decision however on a stay not being in the interest of the sound administration of justice. The court holds that the Brasilian proceedings are not likely to be concluded within a reasonable time. Defendants’ commitment at hearing to speed up the process in Brasil, are met with disbelief by the court given the defendants’ attitude in the Brasilian procedures hitherto.

[6.32] permission to appeal the interim judgment on jurisdiction is denied. This means that, like in Airbus, discussion on the private international law issues is likely only to resurface at the stage of appealing the judgment on the merits, too.

An important judgment: other than Petrobas, there are to my knowledge no continental judgments discussing Article 34 in this intensity (there are E&W judgments, as readers of the blog will know).

Geert.

See also ‘Dude, where’s my EU court? On the application of Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia’s forum non conveniens- light rules’, Journal of Private International Law, forthcoming 2022.

 

Dutch court refuses Article 34 Brussels Ia lis pendens applicationhttps://t.co/F46tkOlcRe
Pollution case against #braskem will go ahead in home of Dutch mother corporation. More on the blog soonhttps://t.co/jfa1Sb5o3t @PogustGoodhead

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 26, 2022