Agrégateur de flux

Airhelp
Transport
Une grève organisée par un syndicat du personnel d’un transporteur aérien et destinée notamment à obtenir des augmentations de salaire ne relève pas de la notion de « circonstance extraordinaire » susceptible de libérer la compagnie aérienne de son obligation de payer des indemnités d’annulation ou de retard important pour les vols concernés

Kurt Siehr (formerly MPI Hamburg) has posted Mandatory Rules of Third States: from Ole Lando to Contemporary European Private International Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

On 18 October 2016 the European Court of Justice, in the case Greece v. Nikiforidis, decided: ‘Article 9 (3) of the Regulation No. 503/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations must be interpreted as precluding overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being applied, as legal rules, by the court of the forum, but as not precluding it from taking such other overriding mandatory provisions into account as matters of fact in so far as this is provided for by the national law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation’. Ole Lando already anticipated this development when he dealt with this problem arising under the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations still in force in Denmark.

The paper was published in the European Review of Private Law 2020.

Le collège de cinq juges de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme vent de rejeter la première demande d’avis adressée par la Cour suprême slovaque au titre du Protocole n° 16. La décision, qui précise les conditions de mise en œuvre de la demande d’avis, pourrait à terme dissuader les hautes juridictions des États de jouer la carte du dialogue.

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Licenciement

Readers of this blog may be interested in the book (in Chinese) entitled, The Development and Perfection of Chinese Inter-Regional Conflict of Laws: From the Perspective of the Achievements of Hague Conference on Private International Law. click here (angle.com.tw), written by Meirong Zhang, associate professor at UCASS (University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) Law School, Beijing.  It should be noted that this book was published in early 2020.

The book has four Parts: 1. The development of Chinese inter-regional conflict of laws and HCCH achievements, 2. Inter-regional civil and commercial jurisdiction, 3. Interregional choice of law rules, and 4. Inter-regional judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters. From the preface (in English) by Hans van Loon (former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH)):   

“Mainland China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macao SAR and Taiwan not only all have their own systems of substantive civil, commercial and procedural law, they also have their own rules of private international law or conflict of laws. As a result, each region has its own rules to determine whether its courts and authorities have jurisdiction to deal with a civil or commercial issue, what law applies to such issues, whether, and under what conditions, a foreign judgment may be recognised and enforced, and how to organize administrative and judicial assistance to foreign jurisdictions. Moreover, these rules apply, in principle, not only in the relations between each region and third States, but also in the relations between the four regions.

In this pioneering work, Meirong Zhang analyses the existing diversity of private international law systems in the four Chinese regions, and explores ways to better coordinate these rules, and improve communication and cooperation among the regions. In our days of increasing mobility of persons, goods, services, capital and information, both among the Chinese regions and in their relations with third States resulting in multiple and manifold cross-border legal issues, this is a question of eminent practical importance. Central to this study are the daily interests and concerns of individuals, families, companies and other entities in our increasingly interconnected, complex world.

The author has wisely chosen an approach to her research that is principled and pragmatic at the same time. Her starting point is the Chinese concept of “regional pluralism of legal systems”.

She points out that this principle has three dimensions: “first, equality between different legal regions; second, understanding and respect for each legal region’s characteristics and its autonomous public policy; third, mutual progress and benefits for all four legal regions based upon cooperation between the people across all four legal regions”. Therefore, mutual respect, based on the recognition of equal value of each legal system, and cooperation grounded in mutual respect should govern the future of interregional private international law in China.

Whilst “regional pluralism of legal systems” is the starting point, Meirong Zhang adds a second pillar to support her proposals: “Chinese inter-regional conflict of laws should also be the carrier of the good values and spirit of mankind”. It would be a mistake to view this as an expression of naive idealism, and to think that it would suffice to focus on the interregional situation isolated from the rest of the world. Firstly, the increase in interregional cross border contacts among the four Chinese regions is in part the result of increased global interaction. Indeed contemporary globalization blurs the boundaries between local including interregional, and global affairs as never before. Secondly, and in part as a result of globalization, people all over the world are increasingly faced with challenges common to humankind, whether one thinks of the risks to which children around the world are exposed in cross-border situations, the global financial system, or the global climate. Global issues should preferably [be] solved globally. Common global approaches based on sound values are not only desirable but in the end also more effective.

Basing her proposals on the two pillars “regional pluralism of legal systems” and “a community with a shared future for humanity”, the author turns to the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law for inspiration for the future development of private international law among the four regions of China. She has good reasons to do so. Firstly, as she points out, to a various extent and in various ways, the private international law systems of all four regions have already been influenced by the work of the Hague Conference. Secondly, as she also reminds us, arrangements have recently been concluded between Chinese regions, namely Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR, which have borrowed provisions and language from Hague Conventions. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the Hague instruments reflect both the spirit of the Chinese concept of “regional pluralism of legal systems” – mutual respect, based on the recognition of equal value of each legal system, and the need for close cooperation on that basis – and globally accepted values. All Hague instruments are carefully crafted texts, and the result of inclusive negotiations among experts and delegates representing States from all continents, based on sound comparative research and input from stakeholders from across the world.

Hague Conventions are primarily aimed to provide common legal frameworks for relations between States, and provide expressly that ratifying States are not bound to apply them to conflicts solely between different legal systems with such States. Therefore, when China joins a Hague Convention, the rules of that Convention do not thereby apply to the relations between Mainland China and the other three regions. However, as the arrangements between Mainland China and Hongkong SAR demonstrate, they may provide a model for a private international law regime for interregional relations. A model, not a straightjacket: Hague Conventions have always made room for specific local including regional needs.

It is on this basis that Meirong Zhang then examines whether and to what extent the work of the Hague Conference could serve as inspiration for a common private international law framework for the four Chinese regions. Successively, she deals with the issue of jurisdiction of the courts and authorities of the four regions (Chapters 2-3), interregional choice of law rules (Chapters 4-7), administrative and judicial cooperation, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Chapters 8-10). She does not advocate to slavishly copy the content of Hague Conventions into an interregional system. For example, and interestingly, she suggests that the specific characteristics of Chinese family realities may qualify or colour the notion of “the child’s best interests” (Conclusion Part II).

Obviously, an innovative work like this can only lay the foundation for more detailed reflections and research. But because the study is both principled and pragmatic, the groundwork it lays is strong. One senses the firm commitment of the author to the good causes of removing outdated and parochial obstacles to cross-border relationships and transactions, of facilitating the life of citizens in a complex mobile world, of safeguarding their civil interest and rights, of protecting weaker parties and vulnerable people and vital public interests and common global goods. Meirong Zhang has written a seminal study that will inspire many readers. It deserves a wide readership.” (Our emphasis)

 

In Re G (Abduction: Consent/Discretion) judgment issued on 9 February 2021 the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) of England and Wales ruled on an appeal proceeding following an order to return issued by the High Court of Justice (Family Division) based on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The importance of the case is related to the interpretation of the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention, the existence of consent and the exercise of discretion by the requested court in ordering the return of the child when consent is established.

The proceedings were initiated by the father who consented to the mother bringing the children to England. In first instance the High Court ordered the return of the two children to Romania to their father. Following an appeal by the mother, the Court of Appeal reversed the order.

Background

Between 2015 and 2018, the parents and their children I and P have relocated twice from Romania to England. In 2018, the father returned to Romania while the mother and the two girls remained in England. In February 2019 the parents agreed to divorce in Romania. On 14 March 2019 the parents entered into a notarised agreement by which the mother could travel out of Romania with the children, without the father, for a period of three years.

During the divorce procedure the parents discovered that if they wanted their children to live in England with the mother, they had to go through a court divorce. In order to avoid this on 15 April 2019 they entered into a notarised agreement that parental authority would be exercised by both parents and that after the divorce the children would live with the mother in Romania. This is required by Article 375(2) Romanian Civil Code for the finalisation of the divorce procedure. However, in fact, the parents agreed that the children would continue to live with the mother in England.

In an attempt to reconcile, the parents agreed that the girls will spend a trial period with the father in Romania, while the mother remained in England. Thus, for a period of five months (September 2019 – February 2020) the children were with the father in Romania. The mother continued to work in England and the father and children visited for Christmas. During this period the parents agreed that it would be better overall for the children to return to live in England with the mother.

On 5 February the mother traveled to Romania to take the children back to England. When meeting the father in Romania she told him that she formed another relationship with another man. Although upset, the father gave the mother the children traveling documents, birth certificates and helped with the packing of the children’s belongings. The mother and the children remained with the mother’s parents the evening before returning to England.

Without the mother knowledge the father visited a notary on 5 February and executed a document revoking his agreement from March 2019 allowing the mother to travel with the children. The father gave the documents to his Romanian lawyer who sent it to the border authority, but did not inform the mother of the revocation of content although he bound himself to do so and was aware that the revocation was only effective from the moment of its communication to her.

By the time the revocation was registered by the Romanian authorities the next day, the mother together with the children already flew to England.

Proceedings in Romania

On 16 March 2020 the mother begun proceedings in Romania seeking an order that she did not require the father’s permission for the children to travel. She has since made further applications and the proceedings are ongoing. The Romanian Judge was aware of the proceedings in England.

Proceedings before the High Court

On 17 July 2020, the father issued proceedings in England seeking the children’s summary return to Romania. Before the judge he argued that he had showed the revocation of consent document to the mother when they first met on 5 February. However, the Judge found that while the mother was in Romania the father neither gave her the revocation document nor informed her of its existence, and she had only learned about it when she saw it on the family’s shared photo drive five days after she returned to England.

Further, the mother argued that the children were not habitually resident in Romania on 6 February 2020 so that their removal was not wrongful, that the father had consented to the removal, and that the older child objected to the return. The child’s objections defence was scarcely pursued, and the Judge rejected it.

The High Court Judge concluded that at the time of their removal the girls were habitually resident in Romania, the father consented to the removal, but based on the exercise of his discretion granted by the Convention the Judge would order to return of the children to Romania as the jurisdiction that should determine the issues related to their welfare.

Appeal Judgment

The mother sought permission to appeal on three grounds. The Judge stayed the return order and granted permission to appeal on two grounds: (1) assessment of habitual residence of the children and (2) the exercise of judge discretion in ordering the return of the children. The father thought to uphold the same order for additional reasons.

Habitual residence

With regard to the assessment of the habitual residence. The appeal judges in paragraph 22 considered that the High Court Judge:

directed himself correctly by reference to the summary of principle contained in Re B (A Child) (Custody Rights: Habitual Residence) [2016] EWHC 2174 (Fam) at [16-19], as approved with one significant amendment by this court in Re M (Children) (Habitual Residence: 1980 Child Abduction Convention) [2020] 4 WLR 137; [2020] EWCA Civ 1105 at [63]. His task was to assess the degree of the children’s integration in their Romanian social and family environment, and in doing so to focus firmly on their actual situation as opposed to weighing their comparative connections with the two jurisdictions. (…) But here they had oscillated between two countries with which in both cases they had strong social and family connections. Up to 5 February they were living with their father and grandparents under arrangements that might, had their parents reconciled, have continued along similar lines. The conclusion that they were significantly integrated, and accordingly habitually resident, in Romania is one that was clearly open to the Judge.

Therefore this ground of appeal was reject by the Court.

Consent

With regard to assessment of existence of consent, the analysis focused on the following exception in Article 13 of the Convention:

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – 1. the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child… had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; …

In summarising the Court’s practice in previous case law – Re P-J (Children) (Abduction: Consent) [2009] EWCA Civ 588 [2010] 1 WLR 1237, drawing on the decisions in Re M (Abduction) (Consent: Acquiescence) [1999] 1 FLR. 174 (Wall J); In re C (Abduction: Consent) [1996] 1 FLR 414 (Holman J); In re K (Abduction: Consent) [1997] 2 FLR 212 (Hale J); and Re L (Abduction: Future Consent) [2007] EWHC 2181 (Fam); [2008] 1 FLR 914 (Bodey J). Other decisions of note are C v H (Abduction: Consent) [2009] EWHC 2660 (Fam); [2010] 1 FLR 225 (Munby J); and A v T [2011] EWHC 3882 (Fam); [2012] 2 FLR 1333 (Baker J) – the Judge concluded that the key point of analysis rested on whether the giving or withdrawing of consent by the remaining parent must have been made known by words and/or conduct to the removing parent and whether the consent or withdrawal of consent of which a removing parent is unaware can be effective. This remained to be clarified by the Court as this did not arise for consideration in the above reported cases.

The court proceeded to analyse the interpretation of the text of the Convention on this point in paragraph 26 as following:

there are compelling reasons why the removing parent must be aware of whether or not consent exists. The first is that as a matter of ordinary language the word ‘consent’ denotes the giving of permission to another person to do something. For the permission to be meaningful, it must be made known. This natural reading is reinforced by the fact that consent appears in the Convention as a verb (“avait consenti/had consented”): what is required is an act or actions and not just an internal state of mind. But it is at the practical level that the need for communication is most obvious. Parties make important decisions based on the understanding that they have a consent to relocate on which they can safely rely. It would make a mockery of the Convention if the permission on which the removing parent had depended could be subsequently invalidated by an undisclosed change of heart on the part of the other parent, particularly as the result for the children would then be a mandatory return. Such an arbitrary consequence would be flatly contrary to the Convention’s purpose of protecting children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal, and it would also be manifestly unfair to the removing parent and the children.

In applying this reasoning to the case before them, the judges found that Judge’s primary findings of fact could not be challenged. The appeal judges agreed that although the father had developed misgivings, given his action to remove the consent by the notary, this actions showed otherwise. But, in fact, his behaviour the evening before their departure showed that he had not in fact withdrawn his consent, he had delivered the children and their passports to the mother on the eve of travel and he did not show the revocation document to the mother.

The Court agreed that the ‘best guide to the father’s eventual state of mind was to be found in his own actions’ (paragraph 29) and although having second thoughts he had not in fact withdrawn his consent. Therefore, the High Court Judge was not obliged to give weight to the sending of the revocation by the lawyer to the border authority because the revocation had been made known to the mother.

The Court concluded that ‘[c]onsent under the Convention is more than a private state of mind. Even if the father had in fact decided to withdraw his consent, it was necessary for the mother to have been made aware of that before the children departed’; therefore, the finding of the first Judge was upheld in appeal.

Discretion

On the exercise of discretion with regard to ordering a summary return of the children to Romania, the appeal judges acknowledged that the exercise of the discretion under the Convention is highly case-specific and has to be carried out within a framework of policy and welfare considerations.

Therefore, the court proceeded to weight in all relevant factors: the desirability of a swift restorative return of abducted children; the benefits of decisions about children being made in their home country; comity between member states; deterrence of abduction generally; the reasons why the court has a discretion in the individual case; and considerations relating to the child’s welfare.

By relying on Re J (A Child) (Custody Rights: Jurisdiction) [2006] 1 AC 80 at [12], the appeal judges found that the High Court Judge made an error of approach in attaching significant weight to the Convention considerations favouring the return based on a theoretical assessment rather than weighting in the relevant factors to the particular circumstance of the case. Thus, the Court considered it is bound to intervene for the following reasons (paragraph 49):

• The judge had ‘approached the balancing exercise incorrectly’ with regard to his discretion.
• ‘He then gave significant, indeed predominant, weight to policy considerations without explaining why he was doing so. He noted that the mother had been entitled to remove the children but he did not take into account that there was in consequence no reason for restorative or deterrent action. As to comity and home-based decision-making, he gave no weight to the fact that England is at least as much their “home country” as Romania – apart from the interrupted period of 20 weeks, these young children aged 6 and 3 had lived here for the last 2½ years. Nor did the Judge explain why it would be beneficial for the children to be in Romania while the Romanian court made its decisions. On the information now available, that can happen wherever the children are living, and there was no contrary information before the Judge. Moreover, as the leading proposal for the children’s future is for them to live with their primary carer in England, it might be thought that there was some advantage in the assessment being made while the children are here.
• In contrast, the Judge gave no identifiable weight to the reason for his being invested with a discretion, namely that the father had agreed to the removal, nor to the inherent unfairness of his then succeeding in summoning the mother and children back.
• The only other positive reason for a return order was that the children could have contact with their father in the interim, but that had to be balanced against the other consequences of summary return and the fact that it had been the father’s original decision to live in a different country to the children. The other matters (that some delay had been due to the pandemic, that the children are used to travelling, and that the mother would return with them) were not reasons in favour of a return, but factors that might mitigate its disadvantages. The Judge also accepted the father’s offer of protective measures at face value, even though his evidence had been fundamentally untruthful and he had already shown himself to have taken legal measures behind the mother’s back.
• The welfare analysis did not address the negative impact of a summary return at all. The children appear to be settled in the colloquial sense and the fact that they have been backwards and forwards in the past is not a reason why that should continue. The Judge noted that the mother would return and could apply to relocate, but he attached no weight to the limbo in which the children would meanwhile be living, or to their important relationship with their maternal grandmother, or to the disruption caused to their mother, who is resident in England and upon whose employment the children depend, or to the prospect of the children being sent to Romania only to return to England if the mother was given permission to relocate, or to I’s wishes. All in all, an effective summary survey of the welfare issues in this case was not carried out; had it been, it would have pointed strongly towards maintaining the interim status quo’.

The Court concluded that in this case the child-centre welfare considerations outweigh policy considerations’ and that the children current situation gave rise to no obvious concerns, and there were no advantage (and considerable disadvantage) in them being moved from where their father had agreed they should be in order for a decision to be taken about their future. Therefore, the Court of Appeal set aside the order for return finding that the exercise of the discretion was erroneous.

by Apostolos Anthimos

By virtue of Law Nr. 3858/2010, Greece has adapted its legislation to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The appearance of the law in practice is scarce; so is the case with respect to legal scholarship. A recent judgment by the Chamber of the Piraeus 1st Instance court [date of publication: 15/12/2020] demonstrates the pitfalls in the field of recognition.

THE FACTS

The applicant is a foreign company registered in the USA. It requested the recognition of an order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The order was issued in accordance with Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, following a motion for entry of an order authorising rejection of certain unexpired leases and granting related relief. The motion was submitted by the applicant and a number of subsidiary companies. The applicant clarified that it acts as a trustee of the business, in his capacity as debtor in possession. There’s no direct reference in the judgment’s text, but I presume that the applicable provision must have been § 1107, 11 U.S. Code [Rights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession].

THE RULING

The Greek court confirmed its jurisdiction by a simple reference to the Law 3858/2010 and domestic procedural rules. Despite the lack of reasoning, the court was indeed competent: all subsidiary companies were apparently registered in Greece. In addition, the applicant had presumably assets in the jurisdiction.

Moving ahead however, the court dismissed the request as inadmissible, referring to Articles 9 and 15(1) of the Law (same numbering with the Model Law). In particular, the court considered that the application was not filed by a foreign representative for the purposes of Article 15(1). The applicant failed to furnish the documents provided for in Article 15(2), or any other documents which would prove the above. The sole documents submitted were the US order and its notification (does not explain to whom); the latter do not suffice for proving the capacity of the applicant to act as a trustee in bankruptcy (= foreign representative).

In addition, the request was also unfounded and contrary to Greek public policy. In accordance with Greek perceptions, it is not admissible to request jointly recognition for the entire group of companies (as the court notes). Hence, the request contravenes Article 6, and is to be dismissed.

SHORT NOTE

The judgment of the court proves that the subject matter needs extensive elaboration in Greece. First, a sheer reference to the US statutes would have convinced the Greek court to overcome the first hurdle. § 1107, 11 U.S. Code reads as follows: (a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.

Second, the dismissal of the request by clinging to public policy is a recipe often followed when a court is faced with a different approach compared to domestic legislation. Unfortunately, the exceptional nature of the provision (see Article 6: …if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this State) did not convince the court to delve into the matter, and  discover some useful material tackling with the issue in question [see the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law – Part three: Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, p. 88: Although the Model Law has limited application in the enterprise group context, it is desirable that the access to courts and recognition of foreign proceedings it provides with respect to individual debtors also be provided with respect to insolvency proceedings involving members of the same enterprise group].