Agrégateur de flux

This Thursday AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in an Austrian case pertaining to the interpretation of the Succession Regulation and in particular to its Articles 69 (Effects of the European Certificate of Succession)  and 70 (Certified copies of the Certificate), namely in the case Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank, C-301/20.

As the Opinion itself clarifies it at its point 2, the Court asked its AG to elaborate only on the third preliminary question, which reads as follows:

Must Article 69 read in conjunction with Article 70(3) of the EU Succession Regulation be interpreted as meaning that the legitimising effect of the certified copy of [an ECS] must be recognised if it was still valid when it was first submitted but expired before the requested decision of the authority, or does that provision not preclude national law if the latter requires the certificate to be valid even at the time of the decision?

According to Article 70(3) of the Regulation, the certified copies issued shall be valid for a limited period of six months, to be indicated in the certified copy by way of an expiry date.

As AG clarifies, the preliminary question seeks to determine the precise moment in relation to which the authority to which the certified copy is presented must verify the validity of this copy (point 25). In principle, two solutions already hinted in the preliminary question seem to be possible for AG: the certified copy has to be valid at the time of its submission to the authority or it has to be valid at the time of the decision (point 26).

However, as AG acknowledges, it has to be first decided whether the Succession Regulation determines itself the moment relevant for the validity of a certified copy or this issue is left for the Member States to decide (point 44).

Ultimately, he concludes that it is the Regulation itself that determines such relevant moment (point 46) and that the legitimising effect of the certified copy of an ECS must be recognized if it was still valid when it was first submitted to an authority, even where subsequently the validity of this certificate has expired (point 63).

This interpretation is accompanied by a caveat to the effect that, by way of exception, if there are reasonable grounds for considering that the ECS has been rectified, modified, withdrawn or suspended as to its effectiveness prior to the adoption of the requested decision, the authority may call for the production of a new certified copy or a certified copy with an extended period of its validity (point 76).

The Opinion can be consulted here (no English version yet).

Cressida Mawdesley-Thomas has overview of the facts and issues in Johnson v Berentzen & Anor [2021] EWHC 1042 (QB) here. Stacey J essentially confirms the conclusions of Tipples J in Pandya.

The case concerns the extent of the ‘evidence and procedure’ exclusion from the Rome II Regulation on applicable law in the event of non-contractual obligations.  For the reasons I outlined in my review of the latter (readers please refer to same), I continue to disagree. With counsel for claimant I would suggest Pandya wrongly interpreted A15(h) Rome II in concluding that the provisions of A15 (‘scope of the law applicable) are to be construed widely , and the evidence and procedure exclusion (not: ‘exception’), narrowly.

Something for the Court of Appeal to look into, I would suggest.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.79 ff.

 

Benedikt Windau, the editor of a fabulous German blog on civil procedural law, www.zpoblog.de, recently interviewed Federal Judge Dr Harmut Rensen, Member of the Tenth Panel of the division for civil and commercial matters at the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) on the experiences with video hearings in national an international patent matters in the pandemic. I allow myself to pick up a few elements from this fascinating interview in the following for our international audience:

The Tenth Panel functions as a court of first appeal (Berufungsgericht) in patent nullity proceedings and as a court of second appeal for legal review only (Revisionsgericht) in patent infringement proceedings. In both functions, particularly in its function as court of first appeal, actors from all over the world may be involved, and indeed, Judge Rensen reported about parties and their respective representatives and teams from the USA, Japan, South Korea, the UK, France, Italy and Spain during the last year.

Obviously, the start of the pandemic raised the question how to proceed, once physical hearings on site could no longer take place as before, since particularly in the appeal proceedings parties had usually appeared with several lawyers, patent lawyers, technical experts, interpreters etc., i.e. a large number of people had gathered in rather small court rooms, to say nothing of the general public and media. Staying all proceedings until an expected end of the pandemic (for which we are still waiting) would indeed have infringed the parties‘ fundamental procedural right to effective justice, abstaining from oral hearings and resorting to submission and exchange of written documents instead, as theoretically provided as an option under section 128 (2) German Code of Civil Procedure, would evidently not have been satisfying in matters as complex as patent matters (as well as probably in most other matters).

German civil procedural law allows for video hearings under section 128a (1) German Code of Civil Procedure. It reads (in the Governments official, yet may be not entirely perfect translation): „The court may permit the parties, their attorneys-in-fact, and advisers, upon their filing a corresponding application or ex officio, to stay at another location in the course of a hearing for oral argument, and to take actions in the proceedings from there. In this event, the images and sound of the hearing shall be broadcast in real time to this location and to the courtroom.“ The key word is „permit“. If the court „permits“ the parties etc. to proceed as described, it does not mean that the parties are required to do so. And indeed, parties applied for postponing scheduled hearings instead of going into video hearings. The presiding judge of the court has to decide on such a motion according to section 227 on „changes of date for scheduled hearings“. Section 227 (1) Sentence 1 reads: „Should substantial grounds so require, a hearing may be cancelled or deferred, or a hearing for oral argument may be postponed“. Sentence 2 reads: „The following are not substantial grounds: No. 1: The failure of a party to appear, or its announcement that it will not appear, unless the court is of the opinion that the party was prevented from appearing through no fault of its own“. Is this enough ground to reject the motion in light of the offer to go into video hearings? The Tenth Panel was brave enough to answer this question positively. Further, it was brave enough to overcome the friction between section 128a – permission for video hearings to be decided by the entire bench of the court at the opening of the first hearing – and section 227 (1) – decision about the motion to postpone a scheduled hearing by the presiding judge prior to that hearing. In the interest of progress in e-justice and effective access to justice in times of the pandemic, this is to be applauded firmly, all the more because the Panel worked hard, partly on its own initiative (as the general administration of the court would have been far too slow), to equip the court room with the necessary video technology: several cameras showing each judge and the entire bench, at the same time making sure that no camera reveals internal notes, the same for each party and team. The video conference tool that is currently used is MS Teams (despite all obvious concerns) as being the most reliable one in terms of broadcasting image and sound. The Panel invited to technical rehearsals the day before the hearing and for feed-backs afterwards, in order to improve itself and in order to build up trust, which seemed to have been quite successful. The specific nature of patent proceedings resulted in the insight that the function „screen sharing“ is one of the most helpful tools which will probably continue to be used in post-pandemic times. Sounds to me like examples of best practice. In sometimes rather „traditional“ environments of the German administration of justice, this is not a matter of course.

In relation to sovereignty issues when foreign parties are involved, the Panel takes the view that the territorial sovereignty of a foreign jurisdiction is not affected by a mere permission in the sence of section 128a because the place of the hearings can be considered still as being the locus of the court, i.e. Karlsruhe, Germany. Judge Rensen reported about talks between the Federal Ministry of Justice and its counterparts on the level of the states to the opposite, but as Judge Rensen pointed out, these are ongoing talks amongst ministerial officers, no court decisions or specific legislations that would bind the Panel. Things are cetainly more difficult when it comes to the taking of evidence. The Panel has done this only once so far, apparently within the scope of application of the EU Taking of Evidence Regulation. This case was specific, insofar as the testimony appeared to be entirely in line with and supported by undisputed facts and other testimonies, and these circumstances established a particularly solid overall picture about the point. This is why the Panel held the video testimony to be sufficient, which might mean that in mixed pictures the Panel might tend towards insisting on testimony in physical presence. In general, Judge Rensen supported judge-made progress, as opposed to specific legislation on legal assistance, as such legislation (like the EU legislation, including its latest recast on the matter) might lead to the misconception that such legislation would be required as a matter of principle in all cases to allow video hearings with foreign participants. For this reason, he pleaded for taking this factor into account before reforming section 128a (if at all), as such legislation would not be in sight in relation to a number of third states. At the same time the work of e.g. the HCCH on improving and modernising legal assistance under the HCCH 1970 Convention on the Taking of Evidence may be helpful nevertheless to promote and support video hearings in legal certainty, see e.g. the HCCH 2020 Guide to good practice on the use of video-link under the Hague Evidence Convention, but indeed the approach towards states staying outside these legal frameworks must be considered likewise.

Comité Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne
Agriculture
Avocat général Pitruzzella : les produits bénéficiant d’une AOP sont protégés contre toute forme de parasitisme commercial

X (Mandat d’arrêt européen - Ne bis in idem)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La Cour clarifie la portée du principe ne bis in idem applicable lors de l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen pour des faits qui ont déjà fait l’objet d’une condamnation antérieure dans un pays tiers

Ubezpieczeniowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny
Rapprochement des législations
La conclusion d’un contrat d’assurance de la responsabilité civile automobile est obligatoire lorsque le véhicule concerné est immatriculé dans un État membre et qu’il n’a pas été régulièrement retiré de la circulation

Stadt Karlsruhe (Reconnaissance d’un permis de conduire renouvelé)
Transport
Un État membre peut refuser de reconnaître un permis de conduire simplement renouvelé dans un autre État membre après qu’il a interdit à son titulaire de conduire sur son territoire

Natumi
Agriculture
Le droit de l’Union interdit l’ajout de l’algue Lithothamnium calcareum dans la transformation de denrées alimentaires biologiques telles que des boissons biologiques à base de riz et de soja aux fins de leur enrichissement en calcium

As the dust settles, the consequences of the British departure from the EU are becoming clearer, including those for British parties litigating on the Continent. Two of Germany’s highest courts have recently ordered litigants with a habitual residence in the UK to provide security for the likely costs of the defendants, which the claimants would have to pay under the German loser pays-system. The decision was taken by both the Federal Supreme Court on 1 March 2021 and by the Federal Patent Court on 15 March 2021. Both rulings have been discussed on the Dispute Resolution Germany blog by Peter Bert here and here.

Duty to Provide Security for Costs under German Procedural Law

Although German procedural law in principle envisages the possibility of an obligation to provide security if demanded by the defendant (see e.g. sec. 110 of the German Code of Civil Procedure and sec. 81(6) of the German Patent Code), the requirement for a UK resident claimant to post security for costs had been illegal as long as the UK was part of the EU. Already in 1997, the ECJ outlawed such demands by German courts in case C-323/95, David Charles Hayes and Jeannette Karen Hayes v Kronenberger GmbH. This decision was based on the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality (today Art 18 TFEU, ex Art 12 TEC).

As a consequence, litigants with a residence in the EU or the wider EEA have been exempted from the requirement to provide security for costs under sec. 110 of the German Code of Civil Procedure. With Britain now having left the EU and the the transition period having expired, it is reasonably clear the exemption no longer covers UK based claimants, who as of 1 January 2021 may need to provide security for costs upfront.

Exceptions to the Obligation to Provide Security for Legal Costs

Sec. 110(2) no 1 of the German Code of Civil Procedure and by reference also sec. 81(6) 1 German Patent Code provides an exception from the claimant’s obligation to post security for costs where “due to international Treaties, no such security deposit may be demanded”. This exception caused the Federal Patent Court to examine more deeply the legal relations between the UK and Germany post-Brexit.

The Court first analyses the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure 1954, which bans   security for costs in Art. 17. This Convention has however not been signed by the UK.

Next, the Federal Patent Court mentions the 1928 Convention Between His Majesty and the President of the German Reich regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters. Besides matters such as cross-border service and taking of evidence, the Convention also provides in its Art. 14 that the subjects or citizens of one contracting party “shall not be compelled to give security for costs in any case where a subject or citizen of such other Contracting Party would not be so compelled”. Yet this clause applies only under the proviso “that they are resident in any such territory”, which means the territory of the contracting party where a claim is brought. Since the British claimants in the cases at hand were not resident in Germany, they could not rely on this clause.

The Court further analyses the European Convention on Establishment, which was concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1955 and binds a number of states, including Germany and the UK. Its Art. 9 and 30 set out exceptions from the requirement to post security for costs. Yet these provisions are limited to natural persons, whereas the claimant in the case discussed was a corporation.

Finally, the Federal Patent Court also discusses the Trade and Corporation Agreement concluded between the EU and the UK on Christmas Eve 2020. Its Art. IP.6 provides for some special rules with regard to the protection of IP rights. But they only cover the “availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, and enforcement of intellectual property rights” as well as matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically addressed in the TCA. Security for costs is not among them.

Since there was thus no international treaty in the sense of sec. 110(2) no 1 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, the Federal Patent Court decided that the British claimant had to provide security for costs.

The Relevance of the Brussels Convention 1968

Peter Bert discusses in the Dispute Resolution Germany Blog whether the continued applicability of the Brussels Convention 1968, which has been debated various times in this blog, might change the outcome. From my point of view, this is not the case, as the Convention does not address the issue of security for costs but is focused on issues of jurisdiction as well as recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Conclusion

The two German court decisions illustrate the complexity of international litigation post-Brexit. Courts and parties need to deal with a plethora of often dated international conventions concluded before the UK’s accession to the EU. The decisions clearly show the weaknesses of the lack of international agreements and the disadvantages of Brexit for claimants in Germany who are habitually resident in the UK. The situation in other Member States might well be different from Germany’s, possibly giving rise to even further complications.