Agrégateur de flux

‘The algorithms of the law must keep pace with new and emerging technologies’ is the opening sentence of Hadon-Cave LJ and Swift J in R v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and others [2019] EWHC 2341.

The central issue is whether the current legal regime in the United Kingdom is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary use of AFR in a free and civilized society. the High Court finds it is. No doubt appeal will follow. I leave the assessment of the findings of the Court to others. It is the opening sentence which drew my attention as, inevitably, it did others’. It is a sentence upon which one can hinge en entire regulatory /new technologies course. Must the algorithms of the law (whatever these may be) keep pace with technology?  Or rather, guard against the challenges of same?

Discuss.

Geert.

in BVC v EWF [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB) claimant applied for summary judgment in a claim for misuse of private information and harassment. The privacy claim arises from internet publication, on a website created by the defendant, of his account of his relationship with claimant. The harassment claim arises from a series of email communications from the defendant to claimant over a period of some two years, and from publication of the website itself.

An ex parte injunction had been granted earlier. The Defendant was restrained from contacting or harassing claimant, from publishing the website or any of its contents to the world at large, and from publishing any of the information set out in a confidential schedule, or any information which was liable to or might identify the claimant as a party to the proceedings or as the subject of the confidential information

In current proceedings defendant (a UK national) submits he is domiciled in Switserland. This triggers the Lugano Convention.

Parkes J clearly had to consider Article 5(3) Lugano’s special jurisdictional rule for tort (the BIa equivalent of course is now Article 7(2), hence also applying e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen.  Steyn DJ had earlier rejected defendant’s arguments. At 33: ‘She held, in short, that the Claimant had a good arguable case that this jurisdiction was the state in which he had the centre of his interests, and that in any event a real and substantial tort (namely misuse of private information) had been committed within the jurisdiction. She also ordered that the steps already taken to bring the Claim Form and orders of 27 June and 4 July 2018 to the Defendant’s attention (namely, service by email) constituted good service on him, notwithstanding that he claimed he was domiciled in Switzerland at the date of receipt of the documents, not (as had been believed) in this jurisdiction.’

Defendant (praised nb by Parkes J for his ‘brief but enlightening written submissions’) however continues to challenge the jurisdiction, jumping at the chance to bring it up again when claimant referred to his centre of interests in his PoC (Particulars of Claim), and employing the distinction which the CPR makes between challenges to existence and exercise of jurisdiction (notwithstanding authority (see at 39) that despite the distinction claims viz the two need to be brought concurrently).

He essentially (at 43) posits the court reconsider

‘whether Article 7(2) RJR is ‘to be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who alleges that his personality rights have been infringed by the publication of information concerning him on the internet may have his centre of interests in a Member of State where he is not habitually resident, where he has no ongoing professional connections or employment, no home, no income and no immediate family’. In his letter to the court of 18 June 2019, the Defendant puts it this way: ‘… with no permission to appeal the judgment of Karen Steyn QC, if the court continues to accept the Claimant’s centre of interests is in England and Wales despite very clear evidence to the contrary then it is necessary to refer the question of interpretation to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU’.

At 44 Parkes J dismisses the suggestion of preliminary review to Luxembourg. That route is ‘not designed to provide a route of appeal against judicial evaluation of evidence of fact.’ In conclusion, re-opening of the discussion on jurisdiction is rejected, referring finally to Lord Green in Kaefer:”it would not be right to adjourn the jurisdiction dispute to the full trial on the merits since this would defeat the purpose of jurisdiction being determined early and definitively to create legal certainty and to avoid the risk that the parties devote time and cost to preparing and fighting the merits only to be told that the court lacked jurisdiction“.

Arguments on submission to the jurisdiction where not entertained: whether service of a defence, and the making of an application to strike out qualify as ‘submission’ becomes otiose when that jurisdiction has already been unsuccessfully challenged.

Then follows extensive discussion of the substance of the matter, which is less relevant for the purposes of this blog. Hence fast forward to 150 ff where the issue of jurisdiction to issue an injunction prohibiting re-publication of the material is discussed (in case: re-offering of the website on WordPress or elsewhere). At 158 ff this leads to a re-discussion of Bolagsupplysningen where the Court held that where a claimant seeks an injunction to rectify or remove damaging material from the internet, he can only do so only in a State with full jurisdiction. Parkes J at 160 suggests this is only in the state where the defendant is domiciled (the general rule, as stated by Art 2(1) Lugano and Art 4(1) RJR), or (by virtue of the special jurisdiction: Art 5(3) Lugano and Art 7(2) RJR) in the state where he has his centre of interests, and not before the courts of each member state in which the information is accessible.

I believe Parkes J on that point omits locus delicti commissi. At the time of my review of Bolagsupplysningen I suggssted the judgment was bound to create a need for further clarification: Shevill and e-Date confirm full jurisdiction for the courts of the domicile of the defendant, and of the locus delicti commissi, and of the centre of interests of the complainant. These evidently do not necessarily coincide. With more than one court having such full jurisdiction positive conflicts might arise.

Of more importance here is that Parkes J (obiter) at 163 suggests that the requirement of full jurisdiction, also applies to orders restraining any further publication and not just as the Grand Chamber held limited by the facts in Bolagsupplysningen, to orders for rectification and removal. In doing so he follows the in my view correct suggestion made by Dr Tobias Lutzi (‘Shevill is dead, long live Shevill!’, L.Q.R. 2018, 134 (Apr), 208-213) viz divisible cq indivisible remedies.

Conclusion: Claimant is entitled to summary judgment for a final injunction to restrain further misuse of his private information

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.

Mesures d'instruction

Procédure civile

Procédure civile - Arbitrage

Suspicion légitime

This book is published as part of Hart’s Studies in Private International Law- Asia series. It is edited by Anselmo Reyes who is a Guest Professor at the Law Faculty of Doshisha University  and an International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court.

The publisher’s blurb is as follows:

“This collection offers a study of the regimes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign commercial judgments in 15 Asian jurisdictions: mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. For practising lawyers, the book is intended as a practical guide to current law and procedures for enforcing judgments in the selected jurisdictions. However, it does not stop at describing current law and practice. Of interest to academics and students, it also analyses the common principles of the enforcement regimes across the jurisdictions, and identifies what should be regarded as the norm for enforcement in Asian countries for the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment and catalysing rapid economic development.

In light of the common principles identified, the book explores how laws in Asia may generally be improved to enable judgments to be more readily enforced, while ensuring that legitimate concerns over indirect jurisdiction, due process and domestic public policy are respected and addressed. With this in mind, the book discusses the potential impact that the adoption of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements might have on Asian jurisdictions; it also considers the potential impact of the convention for the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters presently being drafted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

This timely book argues that it is imperative to adopt a uniform system for the recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout Asia if there is to be traction for the enhanced cross-border commerce that is expected to result from endeavours such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPTPP (also known as TPP-11), and RCEP.

Anselmo Reyes is Guest Professor at the Law Faculty of Doshisha University in Kyoto and an International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court.”

Non lieu à renvoi

Non lieu à renvoi

Avec le départ du célèbre juge Renaud Van Ruymbeke, remplacé par le magistrat Marc Sommerer, le pôle financier du tribunal de grande instance de Paris tourne une page. Un changement d’époque accentué par la montée en puissance du PNF.

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Latifa Ibn Ziaten, mère de la première victime de Mohamed Merah, poursuivait le journaliste Mohamed Sifaoui en diffamation, pour avoir dit sur le plateau de Cnews que le voile porté par Latifa Ibn Ziaten « est porté par une idéologie qui a tué son propre fils ». Décision le 19 novembre.

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Abus de biens sociaux

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