Agrégateur de flux

The HCCH is seeking to retain a Consultant who will conduct a study and draft a further Report on specific aspects relating to the HCCH’s ongoing legislative project on Tourists and Visitors.

Interested? For more information, follow this link to the vacancy announcement.

As I continue to dabble in research and talks about the innovation ‘principle’ (not in existence), and find myself in court (an attachment procedure following judgment in Israel) discussing the common law principle that ‘he who comes to equity must approach the court with clean hands’, the CJEU (General Court) yesterday in T-883/16 held Poland v EC a first test of the TFEU Energy title’s ‘principle of energy solidarity’. Note Poland’s litigant friends (Latvia; Lithuania), and the EC’s (Germany). This tells you something about energy security of supply on our Eastern borders.

Article 194 TFEU: ‘1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:…’

The gas pipeline Ostseepipeline-Anbindungsleitung ﴾OPAL) is the terrestrial section to the west of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline. Its entry point is located in Germany and its exit point is in the Czech Republic. In 2009, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, the German regulatory authority) notified the Commission of two decisions that exempted the capacities for cross-border transmission of the planned OPAL pipeline from the application of the rules on third party access and tariff regulation laid down in Directive 2003/55. Those decisions concerned the shares belonging to the two owners of the OPAL pipeline. The same year, the Commission adopted a decision by which it requested the BNetzA to modify its decisions by adding certain conditions. Under those conditions, in particular, a dominant undertaking, such as Gazprom, could reserve only 50% of the cross-border capacities of the OPAL pipeline, unless it released onto the market a
volume of gas of 3 billion m³/year on that pipeline (‘the gas release programme’). In accordance with those three decisions of 2009, the capacities of the OPAL pipeline were exempted from the application of the rules on regulated third-party access and tariff regulation on the basis of Directive 2003/55. This decision was later (2016) slightly amended albeit not in substance.

Poland argue that the grant of a new exemption relating to the OPAL pipeline threatens the security of gas supply in the European Union, in particular in central Europe. Poland suggests that the 2016 decision breaches the principle of energy solidarity in that it enables Gazprom and undertakings in the Gazprom group to redirect additional volumes of gas onto the EU market by fully exploiting the capacities of the North Stream 1 pipeline. Taking into account the lack of significant growth in demand for natural gas in central Europe, according to Poland, that would, as its only possible consequence, influence the conditions of supply and use of transmission services on the pipelines competing with OPAL.

The General Court yesterday (the case no doubt may be appealed) held that the application of the principle of energy solidarity does not mean that the EU energy policy must never have negative impacts on the particular interests of a Member State in the field of energy. However, the EU institutions and the Member States are required to take into account, in the context of the implementation of that policy, the interests both of the European Union and of the various Member States and to balance those interests where there is a conflict. In neither the preparation of the 2016 decision nor its actual content is there any trace of the EC having considered the principle and its impact: the Decision is therefore annulled.

The case adds to the corpus of judgments where the CJEU is called upon to apply ‘principles’ and clearly emphasises preparatory due diligence, rather than second-guessing the actual application of the principle in substance.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Environmental Law (with Leonie Reins), 2017, Part I Chapter 2.

Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) University will host a conference on November 21 on jurisdiction clauses: “La clause attributive de juridiction : de la prévisibilité au désordre”.

The first part of the conference is dedicated to the factors of disorder, such as the application of the clauses in financial matters, the implications of personal data protection, and other limits to the clauses’ effectiveness. The second part will discuss ways to enhance the protection afforded to the parties by jurisdiction clauses.

The conference will take place in the Salle des Conseils, 12 place du Panthéon 75005, Paris.

Registration is open until November 8th.

The full programme is available here

written by Tobias Lutzi

Last week’s decision by the CJEU in Case C-172/18 AMS Neve has rightly received a lot of attention from IP lawyers (see the comments by Eleonora Rosati on IPKat; Terence Cassar et al. on Lexology; James Nurton on ipwatchdog.com; see also Geert van Calster on gavclaw.com). As it adds another piece to the puzzle of international jurisdiction for online infringements of IP rights, it also seems suitable for discussion on this blog.

The EU Framework of International Jurisdiction for Online Infringements of IP rights

The rules on international jurisdiction established by EU instruments differ depending on the specific type of IP right in question.

Jurisdiction for infringements of IP rights that are protected through national law (even where it has been harmonised by EU Directives) is governed by the general rule in Art 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Accordingly, both the courts of the place of the causal event – understood as the place where the relevant technical process has been activated (Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger, [34]–[35], [37]) – and the courts of the place of the damage – understood as the place of registration (for trademarks: Wintersteiger, [28]) or access (for copyright: Case C-441/13 Hejduk, [34]), limited to the damage caused within the forum (Hejduk, [36]) – can be seised.

The wide range of courts that this approach makes available to potential claimants in internet cases has however been somewhat balanced out through an additional substantive requirement. Starting with Case C-324/09 L’Oréal, [64], the Court of Justice has repeatedly found an IP right in a given member state to be infringed only where the online activity in question had been directed or ‘targeted’ at consumers in that member state. The Court has also made clear, though, that this requirement is to be distinguished from the requirements for jurisdiction under Art 7(2) Brussels Ia, which could still be based on the mere accessibility of a website, regardless of where it was targeted (see Case C-170/12 Pinckney, [41]–[44]).

Turning to the second group of IP rights, those that are protected under ‘uniform’ EU instruments, the rules of the Brussels Ia Regulation are displaced by the more specific rules contained in the relevant instrument. Under Art 97(1) of the EU Trademark Regulation 207/2009 (now Art 125(1) of Regulation 2017/1001) for instance, jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the member state in which the defendant is domiciled; in addition, certain actions, including actions over infringements, can also be brought in the courts of the member state in which ‘the act of infringement’ has been committed or threatened pursuant to Art 97(5) (now Art 125(5)). While this latter criterion may have appeared to simply refer to the place of the causal event of Art 7(2) Brussels Ia in light of the Court of Justice’s decision in Case C-360/12 Coty Germany, [34] (an interpretation recently adopted by the German Federal Court (BGH 9 Nov 2017 – I ZR 164/16)), the Court of Justice had never specified its interpretation in cases of online infringements.

The Decision in AMS Neve

This changed with the reference in AMS Neve. The CJEU was asked to interpret Art 97(5) of Regulation 207/2009 in the context of a dispute between the UK-based holders of an EU trademark and a Spanish company that had allegedly offered imitations of the protected products to consumers in the UK (and elsewhere) over the internet. While the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court (which is part of the High Court) had held that it had no jurisdiction because the ‘place of infringement’ referred to in Art 97(5) was the place in which the relevant technical process had been activated, i.e. Spain, ([2016] EWHC 2563 (IPEC)), the Court of Appeal (Kitchen LJ and Lewison LJ) was not persuaded that this conclusion necessarily followed from the CJEU’s case law and submitted the question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling ([2018] EWCA Civ 86).

The Court of Justice has indeed confirmed these doubts and, held that the ‘place of infringement’ in Art 97(5) must be understood as ‘the Member State within which the consumers or traders to whom that advertising and those offers for sale are directed are located’ (AMS Neve, [65]). To arrive at this conclusion the Court had to drastically limit the scope of the relevant section in Coty (see AMS Neve, [44]) and to extend the substantive criterion of ‘targeting’ established in L’Oréal (which the Court has since relied on in numerous contexts, typically involving internet activities: see Case C-191/15 VKI, [43], [75]–[77]) to the question of international jurisdiction, at least as far as the Trademark Regulation is concerned.

In addition to improving the protection of trademark owners (see AMS Neve, [59] and [63]), the decision seems to rely on two considerations.

First, unlike a general instrument on jurisdiction such as the Brussels Ia Regulation, Regulation 207/2009 defines itself the relevant infringements (in Art 9), which include acts of advertising and offers for sale (see AMS Neve, [54]). Therefore, even though the wording of Art 97(5) does not make any reference to a requirement of targeting (as Eleonora Rosati rightly notes), there may at least be some indirect reference to the concept.

Second, and more importantly, Art 97 is followed by Art 98, which specifies the territorial scope of jurisdiction based on Art 97; it distinguishes between full jurisdiction (of the courts of the member state of the defendant’s domicile, Art 98(1)) and territorially limited jurisdiction (of the courts of the place of infringement, Art 98(2)). This distinction, which is reminiscent of the Court’s decision in Case C-68/93 Shevill and the following case law, indeed seems to provide a strong argument not to limit Art 97(5) to the place of the causal act, where a territorial limitation would make rather little sense.

Still, it seems questionable if the Court’s decision in AMS Neve does not run counter to the idea of vesting jurisdiction in clearly identifiable courts so as to reduce the risk of irreconcilable decisions. As the Court acknowledges (see AMS Neve, [42]), its interpretation of Art 97(5) allows the holder of an EU Trademark to bring multiple actions against an alleged online infringer, which would not fall under constitute lis pendens as they would concern different subject matters (i.e. infringements in different member states).

The Court of Justice appears to have attached more significance to these concerns when interpreting Art 8(2) Rome II in Joined Cases C-24/16 and C-25/16 Nintendo, which similarly refers to the country ‘in which the act of infringement was committed.’ In this regard, the court had explained that

the correct approach for identifying the event giving rise to the damage is not to refer to each alleged act of infringement, but to make an overall assessment of that defendant’s conduct in order to determine the place where the initial act of infringement at the origin of that conduct was committed or threatened. (Nintendo, [103])

It is unfortunate that this reasoning has not been extended to Art 97(5) of the Trademark Regulation.

Hier, le Conseil constitutionnel a eu à examiner une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité relative à l’utilisation de la visioconférence devant la chambre de l’instruction.

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Action civile

As my fellow editor Thalia Kruger has already signaled earlier, the final conference for the EU-funded IC2BE project on the cross-border enforcement of claims in the EU will take place in Antwerp (Belgium) on 21 and 22 November 2019. The conference will try to assess how the European framework of cross-border enforcement can be made more coherent and effective. In particular, the conference will discuss the application of the Regulations on the European Enforcement Order, the European Payment Order, the European Small Claims Procedure and the Account Preservation Order in various Member States as well as by the Court of Justice of the EU. This event brings together high-level practitioners from the European Commission, the CJEU as well as from Member State courts and authorities with distinguished scholars from across the EU.

The case law database of the IC2BE project is available here.

The current programme looks as follows:

Day 1, 21 November 2019

• 12.30-13.45 Registration and light lunch
• 13.45 Welcome (Johan Meeusen, University of Antwerp)

Section 1: Survey and Evaluation (Chair Stefania Bariatti, University of Milan)

• 14.00-14.30 IC2BE: Research Methodology, Key Findings and Best Practices (Jan von Hein, University of Freiburg)
• 14.30-15.00 CJEU case law on Cross-Border Enforcement (Veerle Van Den Eeckhout, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg)
• 15.00-15.30 Discussion
• 15.30-16.00 Coffee Break
• 16.00-17.30 Country reports Belgium (Fieke van Overbeeke, University of Antwerp), The Netherlands (Alina Ontanu, Erasmus University Rotterdam), Poland (Agnieszka Guzewicz and Agnieszka Lewestam-Rodziewicz, University of Wroc?aw), Spain (Samia Benaissa Pedriza, University of Complutense, Madrid)
• 17.30-18.00 Discussion

Day 2, 22 November 2019

Section 1 (continued) (Chair Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska, University of Wroc?aw)

• 9.00-10.00 Country Reports Germany (Tilman Imm, University of Freiburg), France and Luxembourg (Carlos Santaló Goris, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg), Italy (Valeria Giugliano, University of Milan)
• 10.00-10.15 Discussion
• 10.15-10.45 Coffee Break

Section 2: Perspectives (Chair Francesca Villata, University of Milan)

• 10.45-11.15 Towards a more coherent EU framework for cross-border enforcement (Burkhard Hess, Max Planck Institute, Luxembourg)
• 11.15-11.35 Making cross-border enforcement more effective for creditors (Gilles Cuniberti, University of Luxembourg)
• 11.35-11.55 Ensuring an adequate protection of debtors, in particular consumers, in cross-border enforcement (Fernando Gascón Inchausti, Complutense University, Madrid)
• 11.55-12.15 Third-state relations and cross-border enforcement after “Brexit” (Paul Beaumont, University of Stirling)
• 12.15-12-30 Comment by CJEU judge Camelia Toader
• 12.30-13.00  Discussion
• 13.00-14.00 Lunch
• 14.00-14.20 Technological progress and alternatives to the cross-border enforcement of small claims (Giesela Rühl, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena)
• 14.20-14.40 Improving access to information about cross-border enforcement (Xandra Kramer, Erasmus University Rotterdam)
• 14.40-15.00 Discussion

Section 3: Stakeholders’ views (Chair Carmen Otero, Complutense University, Madrid)

• 15.00-16.00 Stakeholder panel discussion
  • Ilse Couwenberg of the Belgian Court of Cassation,
  • Dr. Bartosz Sujecki, lawyer, Utrecht
  • Dr. Katarzyna Guzenda, German-Polish Center for Consumer Information, Brandenburg (Germany)
  • Patrick Gielen, huissier (Belgium)
• 16.00-16.15 Break

Section 4: Policy (Chair Marta Requejo, CJEU, Référendaire Cabinet de l’Avocat Général M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona)

• 30-17.30 Policy makers

• • Dr. Andreas Stein, European Commission, DG Justice, Head of Unit
  • Paulien van der Grinten, Ministry of Justice of The Netherlands
  • European Parliament, Legal Affairs Committee (tbc)
• 17.30-18.00 Discussion and closing remarks (Chair Thalia Kruger, University of Antwerp)

See here for further details on registration, which is free (only the dinner is to be paid by attendees). Antwerp is close to Brussels and Amsterdam and can easily be reached by train from either of those cities.

National seminars will also take place in the participating countries. See here for the dates.

The HCCH just released a short documentary on the adoption of the 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention.

Shot during the 22nd Diplomatic Session of the HCCH, which took place in June / July 2019, this documentary gives unprecedented insights into the finalisation of the negotiations of this game changing treaty. Follow the delegates during the negotiations and join them at the ceremonial signing of the Convention on 2 July 2019.

This documentary is also a unique opportunity to hear the Secretary General, Dr Christophe Bernasconi; the Chair of the Commission of the Diplomatic Session on the Judgments Convention, David Goddard QC; as well as H. E. Maria Teresa Infante, Ambassador of the Republic of Chile to the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and Professor Elizabeth Pangalangan, University of the Philippines, share first hand their experiences and impressions during the Diplomatic Session, and explain the key elements of the 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention as well as the benefits it will offer.

The video is now available on the HCCH’s YouTube channel (https://youtu.be/DTlle58s64s).

This is a reminder that the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) seeks high-achieving interns for January to July 2020.

An internship with the HCCH offers a unique opportunity to deepen the knowledge of private international law, better understand how the HCCH functions, and contribute to the work of the Organisation.

Interested? Then lodge your application by Monday 30 September 2019.

For more information, including the application requirements, check out the HCCH website at: https://www.hcch.net/en/recruitment/internships#legal.

Ils ont présenté leur demande mercredi 4 septembre devant le TASS de Paris, demandant le paiement de leurs cotisations sociales par leur employeur, l’État, en infraction depuis près de vingt ans en ne payant pas les cotisations patronales pour ces collaborateurs occasionnels du service public dont il requiert les services.

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Apostolos Anthimos

THE FACTS

There is no need to repeat the facts which are already reported in my previous posts (see links above). There are however some novelties: The application for recognition concerned indeed the divorce between the same parties, as in the first case; however, this time the request referred to a judgment of the Abdeen Court of 1st Instance, which rectified the divorce issued before the notary public. In particular, the divorce was previously registered as of a revocable nature [revocable repudiation]. Given that the waiting period had expired, and the husband did not ask for his wife’s return in the marital home, a new application was filed before the Abdeen court, aiming at the rectification of the registration, i.e. from revocable to an irrevocable divorce.

THE RULING

The court began with an analysis of the pertinent provisions, i.e. Article 780 Code of Civil Procedure, which is the rule for the recognition of foreign judgments issued in non-contentious proceedings, also covering foreign legal instruments. It first underlined the obvious difficulties in accepting a divorce by repudiation, which clearly violates the equality of sexes. However, and this is the novelty of the ruling, recognition may not be denied, if the applicant is the wife; otherwise, the public policy defence would cause unfair solutions in concreto.

The court entered then into the facts of the case. It first considered the Egyptian decision as similar to a Greek final and conclusive judgment. It then examined whether the foreign court applied the proper law. In this context, it made reference to Article 16, in conjunction with Art. 14.2 Greek Civil Code, which enumerates three options: The law of common nationality; the law of the last common residence; and the law with which the parties are in the closest possible connection. Since Cairo was the last common residence, the application of Egyptian law was the proper solution.

Coming back to the public policy issue, the Thessaloniki Court reiterated that the general approach goes indeed towards a public policy violation, given that repudiation runs contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights. However, in the case at hand, the applicant has fully accepted the dissolution of her marriage in this fashion; moreover, she was the one seeking the rectification in Egypt, and filing for the recognition of the talaq in Greece. A dismissal of the application would lead to an absurd situation, i.e. the existence of a marriage which none of the spouses wishes to maintain. In addition, forcing the applicant to initiate divorce proceedings in Greece would be costly and time-consuming.

For all the reasons aforementioned, the Thessaloniki court granted the application.

[CFI Thessaloniki, 17/07/2019, Nr. 8458/2019, unreported].

COMMENTS

The ruling of the Thessaloniki court is very welcome for the following reasons, which I listed in my last year’s post:

1. It bypassed an Athens Court of Appeal judgement from the ‘90s, which ruled out any attempt to recognize a talaq, even if requested by the spouse.
2. It took a firm stance, triggered by a 2016 ruling of the Supreme Court’s Full Bench [Areios Pagos 9/2016], stating that the public policy clause is not targeting at the foreign legislation applied in the country of origin or the judgment per se; moreover, it focuses on the repercussions caused by the extension of its effects in the country of destination.
3. It made clear reference to the futility of fresh divorce proceedings in Greece, which would cause significant costs to the applicant and prolong the existence of a marriage no longer desired by any of the parties involved.

Written by John Coyle, the Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law

The choice-of-law clause is now omnipresent.  A recent study found that these clauses can be found in 75 percent of material agreements executed by large public companies in the United States.  The popularity of such clauses in contemporary practice raises several questions.  When did choice-of-law clauses first appear?  Have they always been popular?  Has the manner in which they are drafted changed over time?  Surprisingly, the existing literature provides few answers.

In this post, I try to answer some of these questions.  The post is based on my recent paper, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, which will be published in 2020 by the Colorado Law Review.  The paper seeks, among other things, to determine the prevalence of choice-of-law clauses in U.S. contracts at different historical moments.  The paper also attempts to determine how the language in these same clauses has evolved over time.

Prevalence

The paper first traces the rise of the choice-of-law clause in the United States over the course of the 19th  and 20th centuries.  It shows how these clauses were first adopted in the late 19th century by companies operating in a small number of industries – life insurance companies, transportation companies, and mortgage lenders – doing extensive business across state lines.  These clauses soon migrated to other types of agreements, including prenuptial agreements, licensing agreements, and sales agreements.  One can find examples of clauses in each of these types of agreements in cases decided between 1900 and 1920.  It is challenging, however, to estimate what percentage of all U.S. contracts contained a choice-of-law clause at points in the distant past.  To calculate this number accurately, one would need to know, first, the total number of contracts executed in a given year, and second, how many of these contracts contained choice-of-law clauses.  From the vantage point of 2019, it is simply not possible to gather this information.

It is possible, however, to obtain a rough sense for the prevalence of such clauses by looking to books of form contracts.  In an era before photocopiers – let alone computers and word processors – lawyers would routinely consult form books containing samples of many different types of contracts when called upon to draft a particular type of agreement.  General form books typically contained hundreds of agreements, organized by type, that could be quickly and cost-effectively deployed by the contract drafter when the need arose.  Since these books provide a historical record of what provisions were typically included from specific types of agreements at a particular time, they offer a potential means by which scholars can get a general sense for the prevalence of the choice-of-law clause in a particular era.  One need only select a well-known form book from a given year, count the number of contracts in the form book, and determine what percentage of those contracts contain choice-of-law clauses.

Using this approach, I reviewed more than two dozen form books with the aid of several research assistants.  The earliest form book dated to 1860.  The contracts in that book contained not a single choice-of-law clause.  The most recent form book dated to 2019.  Sixty-nine percent of the contracts in this book contained a choice-of-law clause.  The bulk of our time and attention was spent on form books published between these years.  With respect to each book, we recorded the total number of contracts contained therein as well as the number of those contracts that contained a choice-of-law clause.  When our work was done, it became clear that the choice-of-law clauses were infrequently used until the early 1960s, as demonstrated on the following chart.

While the clause was known to prior generations of contract drafters, it was not widely used until 1960.  This is the year in which the clause truly began its long march to ubiquity.

There are many possible explanations for why the choice-of-law clause gained traction at this particular historical moment.  One possibility is that the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) spurred more parties to write choice-of-law clauses into their agreements.  Significantly, the draft UCC contained a provision that specifically directed courts to enforce choice-of-law clauses in commercial contracts when certain conditions were met.  Although the UCC was first published in 1952, it was substantially revised in 1956 and was not enacted by most states until the early 1960s.  It may not be a coincidence that one sees an uptick in the number of choice-of-law clauses appearing in form books at the same moment when many states were in the process of enacting a statute that directed their courts to enforce these provisions.

Language

The second part of the paper chronicles the changing language in choice-of-law clauses.  This inquiry also presents certain methodological challenges.  It is obviously impossible to review and inspect every choice-of-law clause used in the tens of millions of U.S. contracts that entered into force over the past 150 years.  In order to overcome these challenges, I turned to a somewhat unusual source – published cases.  Over a period of several years, I worked with more than a dozen research assistants to comb through such cases in search of choice-of-law clauses.  Whenever we found a clause referenced in a case, we inputted that clause – along with the year the contract containing the clause was executed and the type of contract at issue – to a spreadsheet.  When the work was complete, I had collected 3,104 choice-of-law clauses written into contracts between 1869 and 2000 that selected the law of a U.S. jurisdiction.  We then set about analyzing the language in these clauses.  In conducting this analysis, I ignored the choice of jurisdiction (e.g., New York or England).  I was concerned exclusively with the other words in the clause (e.g., made, performed, interpreted, construed, governed, related to, conflict-of-laws rules, etc.).

This inquiry generated a number of interesting insights.  First, I found that the Conflicts Revolution in the United States had little to no impact on the way that choice-of-law clauses were drafted.  The proportion of clauses referencing the place where the contract was made or the place where it was to be performed remained constant between 1940 and 2000.  Second, I found that while the proportion of clauses containing the words “interpreted” or “construed” similarly remained constant during this same time frame, the proportion of clauses that containing the word “governed” rose from 40 percent in the 1960s to 55 percent in the 1970s to 68 percent in the 1980s to 73 percent in the 1990s.  It is likely that this increase was driven in part by court decisions rendered in the late 1970s suggesting that the word “govern” was broader than the word “interpret” or “construe” in the context of a choice-of-law clause.

Third, I found that it can be extremely difficult to predict when contract drafters will revise their choice-of-law clauses.  In contemporary practice, one routinely comes across clauses that carve out the conflicts law of the chosen jurisdiction.  (“This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, excluding its conflicts principles.”)  This addition constitutes a relatively recent innovation; the earliest example of such a provision appears in a case decided in 1970.  In the 1980s, roughly 8 percent of the clauses in the sample contained this language.  By the 1990s, the number had risen to 18 percent.  While there is no real harm in adding this language to one’s choice-of-law clause, the overwhelming practice among U.S. courts is to read this language into the clause even when it is absent.  Its relatively rapid diffusion is thus surprising.

Conversely, very few contract drafters revised their clauses during this same time period to select the tort and statutory law of the chosen jurisdiction.  This omission is baffling.  U.S. courts have long held that contracting parties have the power to select the tort and statutory law of a particular jurisdiction in their choice-of-law clauses.  It stands to reason that large corporations (and other actors in a position to dictate terms) would have raced to add such language to their clauses to lock in a wider range of their home jurisdiction’s law to be invoked in future disputes.  The clauses in the sample, however, indicate that the proportion of clauses containing such language held constant at 1 percent to 2 percent throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  The failure of this particular innovation to catch on during the relevant time period is likewise surprising.

Conclusion

The foregoing history looks to contract practice as it relates to choice-of-law clauses in the United States.  There is no reason, however, why scholars in other nations could not deploy some of the same research methods to see if the choice-of-law clauses in their local contracts exhibit a similar trajectory.  (Among other things, my paper contains a detailed discussion of methods.)  Most well-resourced law libraries contain old form books that could be productively mined to determined when these provisions came into vogue across a range of jurisdictions.  A review of such books could shed welcome light on the evolution of the choice-of-law clause over time across many different jurisdictions.

[This post is cross-posted at Blue Sky Blog, Columbia Law School’s Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets]

As previously announced on this blog, the Albert-Ludwig-University of Freiburg (Germany) will host, on 10–11 October 2019, the final conference of the German branch in the framework of the research project “Informed Choices in Cross-Border Enforcement” (IC2BE). Funded by the Justice Program (2014-2020) of the European Commission, the project aims to assess the working in practice of the “second generation” of EU regulations on procedural law for cross-border cases, i.e. the European Enforcement Order, Order for Payment, Small Claims and the Account Preservation Order Regulations. As a result, a database of CJEU and national case law has been created which is available here. The project is carried out by a European consortium (the MPI Luxembourg and the universities of Antwerp, Complutense (Madrid), Milan, Rotterdam, and Wroclaw) and is coordinated by Prof. Jan von Hein, Freiburg. Confirmed speakers include Professors Eva Lein (Lausanne), Caroline Meller-Hannich (Halle), Christoph Althammer (Regensburg), Florian Eichel (Bern), Christian Heinze (Hanover) Haimo Schack (Kiel), and Michael Stürner (Konstanz). In addition, the conference will feature a panel discussion by distinguished practitioners, Prof. Dr. Andreas Baumert (Achern), Dr. David Einhaus (Freiburg), and Dr. Carl Friedrich Nordmeier (Frankfurt). The language of the conference will be German. Participation is free of charge (except for the dinner), but requires a registration which is still possible here.

The publication of Hannah L. Buxbaum‘s (Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair at Indiana University) 2013 lecture at The Hague Academy of International Law on “Public Regulation and Private Enforcement in a Global Economy: Strategies for Managing Conflict“ has finally come out as part of Volume 399 of the Collected Courses of the Academy (Recueil des cours).

Here is an overview kindly provided by the author:

The global regulatory environment has become increasingly dense. It features multiple forms of regulation, including multilateral treaties, administrative rulemaking, self-regulation, and private enforcement in domestic courts. Regulatory institutions operate on national, regional, and international scales—and in an increasing range of substantive fields. Unsurprisingly, this environment engenders frequent conflict among regulatory regimes. These conflicts involve more than just collisions of substantive legal norms. They also involve concerns about the “who” and “how” of regulation. The entity seeking to enforce a particular norm might be a public agency or a private litigant; a particular proceeding might unfold within an international treaty framework or outside it. Such factors affect the degree of resulting conflict quite significantly. Understanding that conflict, and assessing the efficacy of the tools used to resolve it, therefore requires an analysis that accounts for those factors.

The objective of these lectures is to develop a framework for examining conflicts in cross-border economic regulation, and to use it in assessing various regulatory mechanisms. The analysis employs a trans-substantive approach, providing examples from diverse areas including competition regulation, securities regulation, and data privacy. However, instead of organizing the discussion by subject matter, it classifies different categories of conflict—substantive, procedural, and political—and examines each in turn. This approach permits a nuanced analysis of cross-border regulation as it is practiced by different institutions. In particular, it uncovers the layering of different forms of conflict that makes particular modes of regulation especially problematic.

The analysis draws most heavily on the experience in the United States, which permits a special focus on one specific question of regulatory design: the role of private enforcement in transnational regulation. Historically, the United States has been an outlier in its reliance on private civil litigation as a regulatory instrument. Today, though, many other legal systems are engaged in procedural reform intended to support more robust private enforcement. That development has the potential to increase significantly the resources devoted to economic regulation. However, it also risks exacerbating conflict in cross-border cases. Accordingly, one goal of the following analysis is to use the analytical framework developed here to consider possibilities for integrating private enforcement most effectively into the transnational regulatory environment.

More information can be found here.

Le procureur de la République de Paris, Rémy Heitz, et l’archevêque de Paris, Monseigneur Michel Aupetit, ont annoncé le 5 septembre la signature d’un protocole d’accord visant à la transmission à la justice des signalements d’infractions sexuelles au sein de l’Église « paraissant vraisemblables » sans attendre le dépôt de plainte de la victime. Un magistrat référent a été désigné. Si le signalement concerne un mineur, c’est la section des mineurs du parquet de Paris qui s’occupera du dossier. La section en charge de l’action publique territoriale prendra en charge les majeurs.

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Le droit des « aéronefs sans équipage à bord », c’est-à-dire des drones, résulte d’une articulation entre une législation européenne, qui résulte de trois règlements, et un droit interne composé d’une loi et d’une série de décrets et d’arrêtés.

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By Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM(LSE), PhD(Navarra), KIMEP University

On 2 September, the First Instance Court number 24 of Palma de Mallorca (Spain) issued an auto (interlocutory decision) staying proceedings commenced against Meliá Hotels International S.A., one of the biggest Spanish hotel chains, on grounds of immunity from jurisdiction, act of state doctrine and lack of international jurisdiction.

The claimant was Central Santa Lucía L.C., a US company which considers itself the successor of two Cuban corporations: Santa Lucía Company S.A. and Sánchez Hermanos. These two legal entities owned a sugar plantation and other pieces of land in Cuba. Following the revolution of 1959 in this country, those properties were expropriated by Law 890 of 1960. The expropriated land under discussion – known as Playa Esmeralda – is now owned by Gaviota S.A. a corporation of the Cuban State. The Cuban Government authorized Meliá to manage and exploit the land for touristic purposes and Meliá now owns two hotels on that landplot. The claimants contended that Meliá was conscious of the illegitimacy of the expropriation but had nevertheless sought to profit from it. This is apparently the first such claim in Europe and the decision staying the proceedings can still be appealed.

The claim was based on the argument that, since what the claimant describes as “confiscation” had been contrary to international law, it was null and void and the US company – as successor of the original Cuban proprietors – should still be considered the rightful owner of the land. Meliá was now in possession of the land and was profiting from it in bad faith, conscious of the illegitimacy of the property title of the Cuban state. The claimant contended that under article 455 of the Spanish Civil Code, possessors in bad faith must hand over not only the profits of their illegitimate exploitation but any other fruits that the legitimate possessor could have obtained.

This claim filed by the US company was against a legal entity domiciled in Spain. Therefore and under normal circumstances, the Spanish court would have had jurisdiction. However, the Spanish court understood that it did not. First of all, article 21 of the Spanish Judiciary Law (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and article 4 of Organic Law 16/2015 on immunities of foreign states establish that Spanish courts shall not have jurisdiction against individuals, entities and assets which enjoy immunity from jurisdiction, as provided by Spanish law and Public International Law. The Cuban State and the property owned by its company – Gaviota – were therefore and in principle protected by the rules on immunity but the Cuban State had actually not been named as a respondent in the claim and its object was not the expropriated property itself but the profits from its exploitation. The decision does not explain why the property of a commercial corporation owned by the Cuban State – as opposed to the State itself – also enjoys immunity.

The decision goes on to say that Spain subscribes to a limited understanding of immunity from jurisdiction (articles 9 to 16 of Organic Law 16/2015), so that claims arising from the commercial relations between Gaviota and Meliá for the touristic development of the land – acta iure gestionis – might not be covered by immunity. Nevertheless, the Spanish court understood that the true basis for the claim were not the relations between Gaviota and Meliá – commercial or otherwise – but the alleged illegitimacy of the expropriation – acta iure imperii –, the property title that Cuba now has over the land and any responsibility incurred by Meliá for illegitimately profiting from the situation. Santa Lucía could only have a right to the illegitimate profits if it was considered the rightful owner and this entailed a discussion about a truly sovereign act: the expropriation.

Therefore, it can be said that the court’s rationale is actually more akin to the act of state doctrine of English and US law, whereby courts should refuse to hear cases where they are called to question the conduct of foreign governments or acts of any sovereign entity within their own territory. For a finding that Meliá had illegitimately profited from Santa Lucía’s disgrace, not only the knowledge of the expropriation by the Spanish company but the illegality of the expropriation itself would have had to be discussed before the Mallorca court.

Additionally, the court explains that Spanish courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims concerning property rights – ownership or possession, in this case – over immovable assets located outside Spain. The court wrongly considers that EU Regulation 1215/2012 is applicable to this case. However, the immovable property under discussion is located outside the EU, so the Regulation actually does not apply. Similarly and as indicated above, the court considers that article 455 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable, notwithstanding the fact that article 10.1 of the same norm establishes that the law applicable to property rights will be the law of the place where they are located.

This decision and this claim by Cubans “exiled” in the US arrives after the US announced the end of the suspension of Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (aka Helms–Burton Act), which effectively opens the door to lawsuits in the US by providing a right of action for all US nationals (i.e. including naturalized Cubans and their descendants) whose property was taken by the Cuban Government after the revolution. Such claims can be directed against anybody – regardless of nationality – who “profits” from, “traffics” with or otherwise has an “interest” in such property.

European Union officials have recently voiced their concern for these potential lawsuits against European investors in Cuba and have reminded that some countermeasures were already foreseen when the law was passed in 1996. Several members of the European Commission have also warned the US Government that the EU may launch a case before the WTO and that it already has in place a “blocking statute” which bans the recognition and enforcement of any of the resulting US judgements against European companies and that also allows them to recover in EU courts any losses caused by claims under Title III, against assets that US claimants may have in the EU. The Spanish Government has also set up a special committee to study these risks, given the important commercial interests of Spanish companies in the Caribbean island. In this regard, Miami lawyers confirm that many families of Cuban origin are now requesting legal advice. The swift way in which the Spanish case here discussed has been decided may be an incentive for those families to claim in the US – and not in Europe – under the newly activated Helms-Burton act.

I reviewed Bobek AG Opinion in Case C-347/18 Salvoni v Fiermonte earlier. The referring court enquires whether the court of origin tasked with issuing the Article 53 Certificate (issued with a view to enabling swift recognition and enforcement) may, of its own motion, seek to ascertain whether the judgment whose enforcement is sought was issued in breach of the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts, so that it may, where appropriate, inform the consumer of any such breach and enable her to consider the possibility of opposing enforcement of the judgment in the Member State addressed.

The CJEU has entirely confirmed the AG’s Opinion (no English version at the time of posting): no such second-guessing of jurisdiction.

At 34 ff the Court points out an important distinction with certificates issued with a view to enforcing provisional measures: there, the court issuing the certificate does carry out jurisdictional review (whether the court ordering the measures  has jurisdiction as to the substance of the case).

At 40 ff the Court also confirms that substantive consumer protection laws (such as Directive 93/13) do not transfer to the procedural /jurisdictional rules of Brussels Ia: an important conclusion overall.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2, Heading 2.2.16.