Agrégateur de flux

La marque constituée des lettres HP (signe verbal et signe figuratif représentant les lettres entourées d’un rond noir) est suffisamment distinctive pour être enregistrée.

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Le Conseil d’État admet, sous conditions, l’existence de tarifs réglementés de vente de l’électricité.

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« Lorsqu’une succession comporte des immeubles situés dans l’un et l’autre de deux pays dont le défunt a la nationalité, le renvoi opéré par la loi du lieu de situation de l’immeuble impose que le critère de rattachement à la loi nationale du défunt soit apprécié selon les règles de conflit de lois prévues par la loi du pays renvoyant. »

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The School of Law of the University of Bologna is organizing the III Edition of the Summer School on European and Comparative Environmental Law, to be held in Ravenna, July 9-13, 2018.

For more information click here.

You can also get directly in touch with Prof. Lupoi [micheleangelo.lupoi@unibo.it].

In 4A_417/2017 (litigants’ names per usual unnecessarily anonimysed; Ganzoni reveal it to be Swatch AG) the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (at 2) first of all correctly reminds us that neither the Lugano Convention nor Brussels I (or indeed the Recast) capture the procedural interest required for a party to request a negative declaration (of liability; in tort, contract or otherwise). In C-113/11 Folien Fischer the CJEU held that negative declarations are covered by Article 7(2); the national court can, indeed must examine its jurisdiction under that provision (and the corresponding one in Lugano) but that does not say anything about standing requirements vis-a-vis interest. (As far as I am aware there is no similar judgment viz 7(1) but the rule must be the same).

Such negative declarations are often part of the race to court; via the lis alibi pendens rules they undercut the forum which the counterparty might have preferred.

As Walderwyss summarise, Hitherto the Swiss Supreme Court had a rather strict approach to the interest required for a negative declaration. Race to court (or ‘forum running’ as the SC calls it) alone was not a sufficient reason. With the March 2018 judgment, that has now been relaxed: Swatch Group AG’s interest in securing a Swiss forum  in a dispute against an English counterparty, was considered sufficient to grant it interest: at 5.4: ‘Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass jedenfalls im internationalen Verhältnis das Interesse einer Partei, bei einem bevorstehenden Gerichtsverfahren einen ihr genehmen Gerichtsstand zu sichern, als genügendes Feststellungsinteresse zu qualifizieren ist.‘

With race to court following Swatch no longer hindered by a restrictive approach to standing, the Swiss surely must have an advantage in this time-sensitive part of international litigation. (Not a great pun, I realise. But I am nearing the end of yet another long working week).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.6.

Thanks to Horatia Muir Watt and Hélène van Lith (Sciences Po) for this post

Moving from Paris to The Hague for the PAX MOOT Finals – Moot Court Conflict of Laws/Droit International Privé – 6th Edition
Sciences Po – Law School / école de droit

The PAX Moot Eliminatory Round took place last Tuesday in Paris with 8 universities mooting the cross border climate change moot case which addressed a number of complex transnational legal questions in Private International Law and was generously hosted by the ICC (see also our previous post).
The four winning teams who made it to the finals are Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Heidelberg, Paris I Sorbonne and Sciences Po.
The Panel of the PAX Moot Court Judges consisted of the following members:

Hans van Loon – Former Secretary General of the HCCH (The Hague)
Agnès Maitrepierre – Cour de cassation (Paris)
Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer –Nauta Dutilh (Amsterdam)/ Christine Lecuyer- Thieffry (Paris)
Clément Dupoirier – Herbert Smith Freehills (Paris)
Patrick Thieffry – Environmental Lawyer and Associate Professor. (Paris)
Alexis Foucard – Clifford Chance (Paris)
Michal Chajdukowski and Vasili Rotaru (PAX moot winning team 2017)
The PAX Moot Finals will be held on 1 June at the Peace Palace – hence the name – in The Hague, paying tribute to the city as the “legal capital of the world” and home of The Hague Conference of Private International Law, which also marks its 125th anniversary.

The winning Mooters and best pleaders will be rewarded with an internship at international commercial litigation departments of renowned law firms Nauta Dutilh in Amsterdam and Herbert Smith in Paris.
The concept and goal of the PAX Moot is to study and apply private international law for the resolution of cross border disputes through a concrete problem “the Case” and to train law students and practitioners of tomorrow in arguing and analysing complex global legal questions in international litigation.

The inter-university PAX Moot organized by Sciences Po Law School is a pleading competition addressing issues of Private International Law and this year’s 6th edition has gone global to include teams from universities in Europe and beyond. The organizers thank the following institutions for their support and willingness to open the competition to their students: Sorbonne University Paris I, London School of Economics, HEC, Heidelberg University, Luxembourg University, Cambridge University, University College London (UCL), King’s College London, University of Antwerp, Erasmus University, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Sciences Po Law School and Statale University of Milan. Participation was also open to US exchange students from Harvard, Columbia, Duke, Northwestern, Northeastern, Duke and Penn law schools.

Inquiries can be addressed to Dr. Hélène van Lith by email at helene.vanlith@sciencespo.fr

In [2018] EWHC 1230 (Comm) St Vincent v Bruce Roberston et al Males J set aside a worldwide freezing order in summary judgment but that is not the trigger for this blog post. Rather, consider paras 33 and 34:

1. St Vincent (and two associated companies) attempted to stop the sale [of a chunk of assets by commencing proceedings in Cyprus against 19 defendants, including Mr Robinson, Winterbourne Pte and the other defendants to these proceedings and also HHL and HDP. On 5 August 2013 the District Court of Nicosia granted an injunction, purporting to restrain any dealings with HDP’s assets. [GAVC: for the jurisdiction of the Cypriot courts: see 12: The Shares Pledge was governed by the law of Cyprus and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that country]
2. Notwithstanding the Cyprus order, on 30 September 2013 the creditors of HDP approved the sale to KFTP. The arrangement was then approved by the District Court of Gliwice on 24 October 2013. The Polish court did not regard the order of the Cyprus court as an impediment to the sale, taking the view that it had exclusive jurisdiction over a Polish company under its supervision and was not required to recognise the Cypriot order in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Regulation. The court did not rule on any issue whether the proposed sale to KFTP was at market value and was not asked to do so.

I have tried to locate the Polish judgment but have failed to do so (which is where assistance from Polish readers would be appreciated). Presumably however the Polish courts argued that Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast was engaged, and then either per Weber ignored lis alibi pendens (were it to have found the case was still pending in Cyprus), or applied Article 45(1) e ii to ignore the Cypriot findings. In either case, the relevant point is how widely the Polish courts seem to have interpreted Article 24(2).

Come to think of it this would have been good exam material and I have one or two of those coming up (although there is plenty in the ‘exam material’ ledger).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.16.

Adoptée à l’origine aux États-Unis pour sanctionner des Russes accusés d’être impliqués dans la mort de l’avocat Sergeï Magnitski, la loi s’est élargie à tous les suspects de violation des droits de l’homme. En France, des parlementaires commencent à se mobiliser pour l’adoption d’une loi similaire.

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Incapacité

Protection de la nature et de l'environnement

Extradition - Prescription

Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005)

Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005)

Cautionnement dans la vie des affaires

Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005)

Expropriation

The 2017 Hague Lecture of Professor Burkhard Hess has been published in Recueil des Cours, vol. 388, pg. 49-266.

The Lecture addresses dispute resolution in international cases from the classical perspective of the private-public divide. This distinction is known in almost all legal systems of the world, and it operates in both domestic and in international settings. The main focus of the Lecture relates to overlapping remedies available under private international and public international law; it maps out the growing landscape of modern dispute resolution, where a multitude of courts and arbitral tribunals operating at different levels (domestic, international and transnational) is accessible to litigants in cross-border settings. Today, a comprehensive study of these developments is still missing. This Lecture does not aim to provide the whole picture, but focusses instead on some basic structures, revealing three main areas where the distinction between private and public disputes remains applicable today:

First, the divide delimitates the jurisdiction of domestic courts in cases against foreign states and international organisations (immunities); it equally limits the possibilities of foreign and international public entities to enforce public law claims in cross-border settings. As a matter of principle, public law claims cannot be brought before civil domestic courts of other states. However, this rule has been challenged by recent developments, especially by the private enforcement of (public) claims and by the cross-border cooperation of public authorities. Moreover, the protection of human rights and the implementation of the rule of law in cross-border constellations entail a growing need for a judicial control of acta iure imperii – even if only by the courts of the defendant state.

The second area of application of the divide relates to the delineation between domestic and international remedies. In this field, the distinction has lost much of its previous significance because nowadays individual commercial actors may bring their claims directly (often assisted by experienced actors like litigation funders) before international arbitral tribunals, claims commissions and human rights courts. In this area of law, individuals’ access to international dispute resolution mechanisms has been considerably reinforced. Here, Prof. Hess argues that it would be misleading to qualify parts of the current dispute resolution system as purely “commercial” and other parts as purely “public or administrative”. There are revolving doors between the systems and the same procedures are often applied; what really matters is the proper delineation of  different remedies which functionally protect the same interests and rights.

The third area relates to the privatization of dispute settlement, especially in the context of private ordering. At present, powerful stakeholders often regulate their activities vis à vis third parties (including public actors) by globalized standard terms. Pertinent examples in this respect are financial law (i.e. ISDA), the organization of the internet (i.e. ICANN) and sports law (i.e. CAS). In this context, there is a considerable danger that the privatization of law-making and of the corresponding dispute settlement schemes does not sufficiently respect general interests and the rights of third parties. A residual judicial control by independent (state) courts is therefore needed. Data protection in cyberspace is an interesting example where the European Union and other state actors are regaining control in order to protect the interests of affected individuals.

Finally, the Lecture argues that the private-public divide still exists today and – contrary to some scholarly opinions – cannot be given up. At the same time, one must be aware that private and public international law have complementary functions in order to address adequately the multitude of disputes at both the cross-border and the international level. In this context the private-public divide should be understood as an appropriate tool to explain the complementarity of private and public international law in the modern multilevel legal structure of a globalized world.

A pocket book of the Hague Lecture will be available in the coming months.

In [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch) MX1 and SES v Fardad Farahzad (defendant’s appeal for summary judgment) claimants are domiciled in Israel and Luxembourg respectively. Their action results from some 57 tweets published by a Twitter account going under the title “@MX1 Leaker”. The Tweets make various allegations of bribery and corruption against the First Claimant. Claimants suggest a conspiracy between the defendant and former employees (for the Tweet seemed furnished with internal information which the defendant would not have had access to).

Defendant’s domicile is not specified but for the purposes of the litigation is not relevant: for jurisdiction is seemingly undisputed and even if this were not based on the Brussels I Recast, the English courts have to apply Rome II to determine applicable law.

Defendant’s request for summary dismissal is based inter alia on the argument that if and to the extent the Claimants or either of them have suffered loss or damage as a result of the Conspiracy, the place of that loss or damage was not England. The applicable law identified by the Rome II Regulation – according to the Defendant: Israeli law – did not recognize the ‘lawful means conspiracy’ pleaded by the Claimants as a cause of action.

Arguments centred around Article 4(1) Rome II: neither 4(2) or (3) were engaged by counsel. Damage pleaded by the Claimants is as follows: (paras refer to the Particulars of Claim)

“23. Unless restrained by the court, the Defendant will cause damage to the business of the Claimants in England and Wales and elsewhere by publishing or facilitating the publication of harmful tweets pursuant to the Conspiracy.

24. Further, unless the Defendant is ordered by the court to delete the Tweets, the Claimants will suffer damage to its business in the future by reason of the continued public existence of the Tweets.

25. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Claimants have suffered loss and damage. The best particulars which the Claimants can currently give are that: (a) The Claimants have incurred the costs of investigating the Conspiracy in approximately the sum of US$350,000 including costs of at least £100,000 incurred in England in respect of the services of Kroll and of the Claimants’ lawyers which are not recoverable as part of the costs of this claim; (b) The Claimants have also incurred additional costs investigating the allegations made in the Tweets.”

It is the £100K which Smith J at 39 ff applies Article 4(1) to, and he does so with harmonious interpretation (‘resonance’) between Brussels I Recast’s Article 7(2) and Rome II in mind.

Smith J held that the costs of investigating the conspiracy were incurred when the claimants entered into the agreements with investigators and lawyers to have the conspiracy investigated, and therefore in England. It is irrelevant that those costs were not the claimants’ predominant loss (paras 40, 46). The case will undoubtedly lead to Mozaik (‘fragmentation’), but that too is resonant with Brussels I Recast (Shevill).

A good starter introduction to Rome II.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4.

The International Conference “Pluralism or Universalism in International Copyright Law” is to be held in May 31-June 1, 2018 at the University of Cyprus. The conference is organized by Associate Professor Tatiana Eleni Synodinou.

You can check the programme and the speakers here and here. More information available here.

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website here
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1707

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) Special Issue on “Cybersecurity in International Arbitration.”

International arbitration has the advantage over litigation of allowing parties to resolve their disputes privately and confidentially if desired.  In our increasingly digitized world, attention to cybersecurity in individual arbitration matters is required in order to maintain that advantage and the confidence of parties in the integrity of the arbitral process.

International arbitration typically involves multiple participants in multiple locations, the storage and transmission of significant amounts of confidential, sensitive and commercially valuable digital data and numerous electronic communications.   Even where the proceeding is public or non-confidential in part, certain aspects, such as arbitrator deliberations and party internal communications and work product, almost always must remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process.

In a world where businesses, law firms, government entities, educational institutions and other large data custodians are under threat or already have been breached, international arbitration obviously is not immune.  There are already a few documented instances where the process has been compromised and anecdotal evidence of attempted intrusion into proceedings and data held by various participants.

There is a manifest need for the international arbitration community to begin to develop a shared understanding of the scope of the threat and the appropriate response.  There is an emerging consensus that cybersecurity is an important consideration that should be addressed early in the international arbitration process and that reasonable cybersecurity measures should be adopted.  Nonetheless, questions abound, including, to cite just a few examples, the specific responsibilities of the various participants in the process, the scope of measures that should be adopted, the scope of party autonomy to determine such measures, the availability of resources and concerns that cybersecurity requirements may increase the expense of arbitration and create a resource gap that could disadvantage less-resourced participants.

It is hoped that papers submitted for the Special Issue will advance the conversation by addressing some of the questions described here and potentially identifying issues the international arbitration community will need to consider.

Suggestions for possible paper topics include:

• Commentary on the Draft ICCA-CPR-New York City Bar Association Protocol for Cybersecurity in Arbitration (available here)
• Cybersecurity best practices for different participants in the arbitral process, including institutions, counsel, arbitrators, parties, and experts, and suggestions as to model language to be used in procedural orders, stipulations, expert engagement letters, etc. For example, what factors should parties considering using a third-party platform to share and store arbitration-related information take into account? An article on the arbitrator’s responsibility to protect the integrity of the process is linked here and here.
• What can and should be done on a systemic basis to address cybersecurity in international arbitration? Should cybersecurity be the subject of soft law, for instance? If so, in what form and who should lead?
• How should tribunals resolve party conflicts about reasonable security measures, breach notification obligations, and related costs?
• How should cybersecurity breaches or failures to implement required cybersecurity measures in the arbitral process be addressed? For example, should there be a default presumption regarding the admissibility of evidence attained from a data breach? Should arbitrators entertain applications for damages and/or sanctions?
• Are there limits to party autonomy to determine the cybersecurity measures to be applied in individual matters?  Are there institutional or tribunal interests that may in some circumstances override the parties’ agreement? If so, how are these interests defined and where does the power derive to apply them?
• What is the correct liability standard for cybersecurity breaches? Should there be a safe harbor?
• What is the correct standard to test the adequacy of cybersecurity measures? Is a reasonableness standard adequate to protect the process?
• Comparative analysis of ethical rules and obligations governing the conduct of lawyers around the globe in relation to cybersecurity and conclusions as to implications for international arbitration proceedings and the existence of either transnational norms or conflicts
• How do considerations of fairness and equality relate to the implementation of cybersecurity measures in international arbitrations? For instance, how should differences in infrastructure and party resources be taken into account in assessing the appropriate level of cybersecurity measures in individual matters?  Is there a minimum level of security required to protect the integrity of arbitration process that should be implemented in all arbitrations?
• How do data privacy regimes relate to cybersecurity and what are the implications for international arbitration proceedings?
• Arbitration of business-to-business data breaches

This special issue will be edited by independent arbitrators Stephanie Cohen and Mark Morril.