Agrégateur de flux

Ensuring the effective right to privacy regarding the gathering and processing of personal data has become a key issue both in the internal market and in the international arena. The extent of one’s right to control their data, the implications of the ‘right to be forgotten’, the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decisions on personality rights, and recent defamation legislation are shaping a new understanding of data protection and the right to privacy. This book, edited by B. Hess and Cristina M. Mariottini, explores these issues with a view to assessing the status quo and prospective developments in this area of the law which is undergoing significant changes and reforms.

Contents:
Foreword, PEDRO CRUZ VILLALÓN
The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges, CHRISTOPHER KUNER
The CJEU Judgment in Google Spain: Notes on Its Causes and perspectives on Its Consequences, CRISTIAN ORO MARTINEZ
The CJEU’s Decision on the Data Retention Directive, MARTIN NETTESHEIM
The CJEU’s decision on the Data Retention Directive: Transnational Aspects and the Push for Harmonisation – A Comment on Professor Martin Nettesheim, GEORGIOS DIMITROPOULOS
The Protection of Privacy in the Case Law of the CJEU, BURKHARD HESS
Freedom of Speech and Foreign Defamation Judgments: From New York Times v Sullivan via Ehrenfeld to the 2010 SPEECH Act, CRISTINA M MARIOTTINI

Further information is available here (English) and here (German).

Renvoi au Conseil constitutionnel et irrecevabilité

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, Pôle 5, chambre 5-7, 22 janvier 2015

Propriété littéraire et artistique

A lot of attention last week went to the CJEU’s annulment of the EC’s ‘Safe Harbour’ decision in Schrems v Facebook  (aka Austrian student takes on internet giant). I will not detail that finding for I assume, for once, that readers will be au fait with that judgment. For those who are not: please refer to Steve Peers for excellent analysis as per usual. It is noteworthy though that the CJEU’s finding in Schrems is based in the main on a finding of ultra vires: often easily remedied, as those with a background in public law will know.

Schrems (held 6 October) confirmed the Court’s approach to the EU’s prescriptive jurisdiction in data protection laws, as in Google Spain. However the Thursday before, on 1 October, the Court took a more restrictive view on ‘executive’ or ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction in Case C-230/14 Weltimmo. Lorna Woods has the general context and findings over at EU Law analysis. The essence in my view is that the Court insists on internal limitations to enforcement. It discussed the scope of national supervisory authority’s power in the context of Directive 95/4, the same directive which was at issue in Google Spain. The Court held

Where the supervisory authority of a Member State, to which complaints have been submitted in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46, reaches the conclusion that the law applicable to the processing of the personal data concerned is not the law of that Member State, but the law of another Member State, Article 28(1), (3) and (6) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that that supervisory authority will be able to exercise the effective powers of intervention conferred on it in accordance with Article 28(3) of that directive only within the territory of its own Member State. Accordingly, it cannot impose penalties on the basis of the law of that Member State on the controller with respect to the processing of those data who is not established in that territory, but should, in accordance with Article 28(6) of that directive, request the supervisory authority within the Member State whose law is applicable to act.

In other words, the supervisory authority in a Member State can examine the complaints it receives even if the law that applies to the data processing is the law of another Member State. However the scope of its sanctioning power is limited by its national borders.

This finding (I appreciate there are caveats) has important implications for the discussion on the territorial reach of the so-called ‘righ to be forgotten’. It supports in my view, the argument that the EU cannot extend its right to be forgotten rule to websites outside the EU’s domain. I have a paper forthcoming which discusses the various jurisdictional issues at stake here and the impact of Weltimmo on same.

Geert.

Cour d'appel de Lyon, 3eme chambre A, 8 octobre 2015

On the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb will host a conference, organised together with Uncitral, titled 35 Years of CISG – Present Experiences and Future Challenges.

The conference will take place on 1  and 2 December 2015.

The first day will be dedicated to the Present Experiences concerning the application of the CISG, focusing on the use of the Convention especially in Central and Eastern European countries. In particular, the main topics that will be touched by twenty national reporters relate to the personal and substantive scope of the CISG, reservations to the CISG and rights and obligations arising out of sales contracts.

The second day will be devoted to the Future Challenges of CISG. There will be panel discussions focusing on The extensive interpretation and application of the CISG beyond the contracts of sale, What the CISG would look like if it was drafted for adoption today?, The interplay between the CISG and other legal sources of contract law (or contract principles).

The panels will feature the participation of Siniša Petrović (University of Zagreb), Joseph Lookofsky (Copenhagen Center for Commercial Law, University of Copenhagen), Loukas Mistelis (Queen Mary University of London), Kasper Steensgaard (Aarhus University), Azar Aliyev (Kiel Center for Eurasian Economic Law, Kiel University), Pilar Perales Viscasillas (Carlos III University of Madrid), Ingeborg Schwenzer (University of Basel/Swiss International Law School ), Harry M. Flechtner (University of Pittsburgh Law School), Ulrich G. Schroeter (University of Mannheim), Cyril Emery (UNCITRAL), Renaud Sorieul (the Secretary of UNCITRAL), Marta Pertegás (Hague Conference on Private International Law), Mikolaj Zaleski (EU Commission), José Angelo Estrella Faria (Secretary General Unidroit), Jelena Perović (University of Belgrade).

The official program of the conference can be found here.

For the on-line registration form and the registration fees, see here.

Information regarding accommodation is available here.

En application de la Convention franco-monégasque du 1er avril 1950, les parts sociales d’une société civile immobilière monégasque propriétaire d’immeubles en France sont soumises à l’impôt sur les successions à Monaco dès lors que le de cujus y était domicilié au moment de son décès.

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Professor Ronald A. Brand, the Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor and the Director of the Center for International Legal Education at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, has just posted a new article to SSRN regarding the “Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments Recognition Law.” It is available for download here. It generally deals with the history of such law from Hilton v. Guyot to the present day, demonstrates some of the problems indicated by recent cases, and comments on the federalism concerns that are delaying the ratification of the 2005 Hague Choice of Courts Convention in the United States. A more detailed abstract is below.

The substantive law of judgments recognition in the United States has evolved from federal common law, found in a seminal Supreme Court opinion, to primary reliance on state law in both state and federal courts. While state law often is found in a local version of a uniform act, this has not brought about true uniformity, and significant discrepancies exist among the states. These discrepancies in judgments recognition law, combined with a common policy on the circulation of internal judgments under the United States Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, have created opportunities for forum shopping and litigation strategies that result in both inequity of result and inefficiency of judicial process. These inefficiencies are fueled by differences regarding (1) substantive rules regarding the recognition of judgments, (2) requirements for personal and quasi in rem jurisdiction when a judgments recognition action is brought (recognition jurisdiction), and (3) the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in judgments (and arbitral award) recognition cases. Recent cases demonstrate the need for a return to a single, federal legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This article reviews the history of U.S. judgments recognition law, summarizes current substantive law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, reviews recent decisions that demonstrate the three specific problem areas, and proposes a coordinated approach using federal substantive law on judgments recognition and state law on related matters in order to eliminate the current problems of non-uniformity and inefficient use of the courts.

Cautionnement

Djakhongir Saidov, Conformity of Goods and Documents, Hart Publishing, 2015, ISBN 9781849461559, pp. 318, GBP 75.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This book provides a detailed examination of the issue of conformity of goods and documents under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG). This issue lies at the heart of sales law and is one of the most frequently litigated. The book explores the Convention’s requirements as to quality, quantity, description and packaging of the goods (conformity); the requirements flowing from the need for the goods to be free from rights or claims of third parties; and the questions of what documents the seller must deliver to the buyer and what constitutes a ‘good’ document under the CISG. The book engages extensively with a substantial body of cases decided under the CISG and academic commentary. It systematises the Convention’s experience to date with a view to turning it into an integrated, comprehensive and distinctive CISG legal regime on conformity of goods and documents. The analysis is comparative and draws on the experience of some major domestic legal systems, such as English and US law. The focus is both analytical and practical. The book will be of interest to legal practitioners, academic lawyers and students with an interest in international and comparative sales, commercial and contract law.

Ulteriori informazioni sull’opera sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Last fall, the University of Missouri Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution convened an international symposium entitled “Judicial Education and the Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology.” Panelists included judges, academics and judicial education experts from the United States, Canada and Australia.

The symposium arose out of the recognition that although there is a large and ever-increasing body of literature on matters relating to judicial appointments, judicial independence, judicial policy making and the like, there is an extremely limited amount of information on how someone learns to be a judge. The conventional wisdom in the common law world holds that judges arrive on the bench already equipped with all the skills necessary to manage a courtroom and dispense justice fully, fairly and rapidly. However, many judges have written about the difficulties they have had adjusting to the demands of the bench, and social scientists have identified a demonstrable link between judicial education and judicial performance. As a result, it is vitally important to identify and improve on best practices in judicial education.

The symposium sought to improve the understanding of judicial education by considering three related issue: (1) what it means to be a judge and what it is about judging that is different than other sorts of decision-making; (2) what the goal of judicial education is or should be; and (3) how judges can and should be educated. While most of the discussion took place within the context of common law legal systems, much of the material is of equal relevance to civil law systems.

Articles from this symposium are freely available here. The table of contents shows below.

Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest? S.I. Strong
What Judges Want and Need: User-Friendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education Federal Circuit, Judge Duane Benton and Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman
Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, Kathleen Mahoney
International Arbitration, Judicial Education, and Legal Elites, Catherine A. Rogers
Towards a New Paradigm of Judicial Education, Chief Justice Mary R. Russell
Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced, and Foreign Judges S.I. Strong
Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, Robert G. Bone
Of Judges, Law, and the River: Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role, Chad M. Oldfather
Educating Judges—Where to From Here?, Livingston Armytage
Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, T. Brettel Dawson

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Bastia, chambre sociale, 18 mars 2015

This post has been written by Martina Mantovani.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

Par un arrêt de Grande Chambre du 28 septembre 2015, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a considéré que la gifle portée aux deux requérants par des agents des forces de l’ordre, alors qu’ils se trouvaient sous leur contrôle, était constitutive d’une violation de l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’interdiction des traitements inhumains et dégradants.

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The up-date version of two papers of Veerle Van Den Eeckhout has been published on SSRN.

The first up-dated paper, entitled “Choice and Regulatory Competion: Rules on Choice of Law and Forum”, analyzes the Rules of Private International Law from the perspective of “Choice and Regulatory Competition”. The up-dated version is to be found here.

The second up-dated paper, entitled “The “Right” Way to Go in International Labour Law – and Beyond”, discusses several current issues in international employment law. The up-dated version is to be found here.
The final papers will be published each in the books of the conferences in the context of which they have been written (a conference in Maastricht and in Antwerp respectively).

Si terrà a Trier il 10 e 11 dicembre 2015 un incontro di formazione organizzato da ERA – Academy of European Law, intitolato European Cross-border Procedures: How to Apply Them in Practice?

Il programma del workshop, specificamente rivolto ad avvocati, è disponibile qui.

Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.