Agrégateur de flux

The public policy exception is used as a shield to protect fundamental domestic values in case of a contradiction between the applicable foreign law and fundamental principles of justice of the forum. Alongside the public policy exception, the instrument of “overriding mandatory provisions” – or “public policy rules” – was established in the middle of the 20th century and is today codified in many acts of European Private International Law (see e.g. Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation). Overriding mandatory provisions are rules of outstanding importance for public order, which the legislator intends to be respected even where a case is governed by foreign law under ordinary conflict-of-laws rules.

The Book

In his PhD thesis Die Methodik der ‘Eingriffsnorm im modernen Kollisionsrecht, published in German and recently honoured with the prestigious Gerhard Kegel Prize, Adrian Hemler describes the problem of applying of overriding mandatory provisions as a symptom of numerous fundamental uncertainties in the doctrines of PIL. In his view, the theory of overriding mandatory provisions obscures the fact that PIL needs further differentiation through conflicts-of-laws rules yet to be developed. Based on this, he sees the function of the public policy exception as a safeguard of the supremacy of constitutional law. In sum, he traces overriding mandatory provisions back to the well-known principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, while also basing the public policy exception on the principle lex superior derogat legi inferiori.

Flash Back

The thesis opens with an in-depth historical analysis. Hemler points out that the distinction between the “positive” enforcement of individual rules through overriding mandatory rules on the one hand and the “negative” protection of fundamental principles through the public policy exception on the other hand has not been made until the second half of the 20th century. In addition, he shows how overriding mandatory provisions have been gradually isolated as rules that seemingly do not fit into the ordinary system of “neutral” conflicts-of-laws rules.

Overriding Mandatory Rules and Public Law

Hemler demonstrates that the isolation of overriding mandatory provisions arises from the tendency to implicitly identify these rules with national public law. He shows how this equation leads to the application of principles (seemingly) governing conflicts of public law rules. Up to now, it was widely assumed that the application of foreign public law would impossible, as it would amount to allowing a foreign state to exercise power on the national territory of another. Hemler criticises this assumption by explaining the general methodology of conflicts-of-laws rules. Following a theory developed by Boris Schinkels, he divides each legal rule analytically into a “rational” and an “imperative” element. The rational element describes a universal idea needed for the proper resolution of a legal conflict. An example of the rational element is the written form requirement for certain contracts, e.g. those concerning the transfer of land. The imperative element, in contrast, describes the state’s order to apply the rule. In the example of the written form requirement, the imperative element would be the legislator’s intent relating to the enforcement of the requirement to all land situated on its country’s territory.

Within this structure of legal provisions, Hemler views the position of autonomous conflicts-of-laws rules as follows: Since citizens have a right to decide for themselves which rules are to be applied in their country, its courts cannot just bow to the will of another state. On the other hand, it would go too far to exclude the application of foreign law altogether. Rather, the forum issues its own imperative command regarding any rules of foreign law, which leads to the exclusive applicability of the foreign rule’s rational element. The disregard of the foreign imperative is a direct consequence of the modern, autonomous structure of conflicts of laws. Hence, courts only transpose the foreign “idea of what ought to be” without any elements of foreign sovereignty. This isolated application of the foreign rational element and its combination with a domestic imperative element leads to the creation of a domestic legal norm with a foreign ratio (a “synthesised” legal norm, so to speak).

Since the applied foreign rational element is stripped of any element of the exercise of foreign sovereignty, Hemler argues that the application of foreign law does not conflict with the sovereignty of the court’s country or that of a third country whose law is applicable under ordinary rules of private international law. Hence his conclusion that courts may apply foreign public law without any restrictions, especially without the need of the foreign law being “neutral” or “pre-state”.

No Need for Special Conflicts Rules Regarding Overriding Mandatory Provisions

Going further, Hemler shows that there are no convincing reasons to treat overriding mandatory provisions differently from other norms. In particular, he opines that these provisions do not call for a separate system of conflicts-of-laws rules. Hemler shows that the whole category of overriding mandatory provisions can be dispensed with and that one should instead focus on the development of a more differentiated set of conflicts-of-laws rules. He explains in detail how such special conflicts-of laws-rules are to be developed.

A New Understanding of the Public Policy Exception

His findings allow Hemler to shed also some light on the public policy exception. Given that every application of foreign law leads to a synthesised legal norm of the forum, he concludes that the public policy exception can actually be understood as a constitutional control device regarding “synthesised” law. In Hemler’s view, such an understanding facilitates the inclusion of numerous new phenomena into the methodology of private international law.

Conclusion

As this short overview demonstrates, this is a though-provoking book. Overriding mandatory provisions have so far played the role of a black box in private international law. After many failed attempts to “domesticise” these rules, this is the most serious theory to integrate these rules into the edifice of conflict-of-laws theory. Particularly striking is the breadth of the author’s perspective, which is not limited to overriding mandatory rules, but also includes the role of constitutional law, public law in general as well as the public policy exception. For the interested reader, this book is a good reason to brush up their German or start to learn it!

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in Case C‑729/19 (TKF v Department of Justice for Northern Ireland), which is about the Maintenance Regulation:

“1. Article 75(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations must be interpreted as applying only to decisions given by national courts in States which were already members of the European Union on the date of adoption of those decisions.

2. Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that no provision of that regulation enables decisions in matters relating to maintenance obligations, given in a State before its accession to the European Union and before the date of application of that regulation, to be recognised and enforced, after that State’s accession to the European Union, in another Member State”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=239895&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8777055

Advocate General Tanchev delivered today his opinion in case C‑508/19 (M.F. v J.M., joined parties: Prokurator Generalny, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), which is about the Rule of Law:

“The right to a tribunal established by law, affirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted in the sense that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a person appointed to the position of judge of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), Disciplinary Chamber, does not comply with that requirement if his act of appointment was delivered in flagrant breach of national rules governing the procedure for the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court, which is a matter for the referring court to establish. In the context of that assessment, the referring court must appraise the manifest and intentional character as well as the gravity of the breaches in question.

The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in the light of Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that a court chamber does not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal, within the meaning of those provisions, when the objective conditions in which it was created, its characteristics as well as the manner of appointment of its members are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that chamber to external factors, and, in particular, to the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive, and as to its neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, whether they may lead to that chamber not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law. It is for the referring court to determine, in the light of all the relevant factors established before it, whether that applies to a court such as the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court).

In such a situation, the principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring the referring court to disapply national law provisions which reserve jurisdiction to rule on actions, such as the one in the main proceedings, to such a chamber, so that those actions may be examined by a court which fulfils the requirements of independence and impartiality referred to above and which would have jurisdiction were it not for those provisions”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=239898&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3157544

Rendez-vous lundi 26 avril.

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Une personne détenue en vue de l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen relève de l’article 5, § 1, f) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, de sorte que la chambre de l’instruction, saisie du contentieux de l’exécution d’un tel mandat aux fins de poursuites, n’a pas à s’assurer de l’existence d’indices graves ou concordants à l’encontre de la personne recherchée.

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Le Parquet européen, nouvel organisme chargé de lutter contre la grande criminalité transfrontière portant atteinte au budget de l’Union européenne, devrait commencer ses activités le 1er juin 2021, selon un communiqué publié le 7 avril dernier.

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Thank you indeed Gilles Cuniberti for flagging and discussing the end of March decision (Press Release only) by the Paris Court of First Instance in which it held that an action against an arbitrator for damages following his failure to disclose a conflict of interests, which led to the annulment of the award, fell within Brussels Ia despite its arbitration exception.

I have more sympathy for the decision than Gilles. At the very least I am not surprised national courts should be confused about the demarcation. Brussels Ia inserted the Smorgasbord of confusion following West Tankers, by collating an even prima facie conflicting array of ins and outs in its recital 12. Even before the entry into force of Brussels Ia, Cooke J in Toyota v Prolat held that recital 12 is of no use. Other than in fairly straightforward cases such as Premier Cruises v DLA Piper Russia, good argument might exist on many conceivable cases.

Deciding the demarcation with help from the New York Convention itself (one might have suggested that what is included in New York, should not be included in Brussels Ia) does not help in the case at issue for as ia Tadas Varapnickas notes, Uncitral and New York are silent on the status of the arbitrator.

Assuming BIa applies, there must be little doubt there is a contractual relation, even between the arbitrator and the party who did not appoint her or him, in the BIa Article 7(1) sense, following CJEU flightright.

Curial seat was Paris, yet hearings and deliberations had taken place in Germany. Forum contractus as a provision of services was held to have been Germany.

This is where Burkhard Hess, at the request of Gilles, took over: Burkhard further discusses the findings on arbitration, agrees with Germany as the forum contractus per ia CJEU Wood Floor Solutions, and suggests (see similarly Mann J in Philips v TCL) the German courts are bound by the Paris’ court’s findings per CJEU Gothaer.

Much relevant. I do not know whether appeal is being sought.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.3.4, para 2.110 ff.;

Consorzio Italian Management e Catania Multiservizi et Catania Multiservizi
DFON
Selon l’avocat général Michal Bobek, la Cour devrait revoir sa jurisprudence (les critères Cilfit) sur l’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel qui incombe aux juridictions nationales statuant en dernier ressort

FBF
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Bobek, la Cour devrait déclarer invalides les orientations sur les modalités de gouvernance et de surveillance des produits bancaires de détail de l’Autorité bancaire européenne

Sumal
Concurrence
Pour l’avocat général Pitruzzella, un juge national peut condamner une filiale à réparer les dommages provoqués par le comportement anticoncurrentiel de sa société mère, seule destinataire de l’amende infligée par la Commission

Stolichna obshtina, rayon "Pancharevo"
Citoyenneté européenne
S’agissant de la reconnaissance dans l’Union de la filiation d’un enfant d’un couple marié du même sexe, l’avocate générale Kokott préconise de trouver un équilibre entre l’identité nationale des États membres et le droit à la libre circulation de l’enfant et de ses parents

IS (Illégalité de l’ordonnance de renvoi)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Selon l’avocat général Pikamäe, sur la base de la primauté du droit de l’Union, un juge national doit écarter toute législation ou pratique juridictionnelle nationale qui porte atteinte à sa faculté d‘interroger la Cour de justice

Pays-Bas / Conseil et Parlement
Agriculture
La Cour de justice rejette le recours introduit par les Pays-Bas contre l’interdiction de la pêche au moyen de navires utilisant le courant électrique impulsionnel

Olympiako Athlitiko Kentro Athinon
SOPO
Travailleurs du secteur public placés, dans certaines conditions, sous le régime de la réserve de main-d’œuvre : la réglementation grecque n’est pas contraire au droit de l’Union

W. Ż. (Chambre de contrôle extraordinaire et des affaires publiques de la Cour suprême - nomination)
Principes du droit communautaire
Selon l’avocat général Tanchev : deux chambres nouvellement créées de la Cour suprême polonaise pourraient ne pas satisfaire aux exigences du droit de l’Union, les juges en cause ayant été nommés à ces postes en violation flagrante des lois nationales applicables aux nominations de juges à cette juridiction

Administration de l'Enregistrement, des Domaines et de la TVA
Fiscalité TVA
L’activité de protection des personnes majeures légalement incapables effectuée par un avocat constitue, en principe, une activité économique

Eutelsat
Rapprochement des législations
Service de connexion Internet à bord des avions : un système mobile par satellite qui repose principalement, en termes de capacité des données transmises, sur des éléments terrestres complémentaires installés de façon à couvrir l’ensemble du territoire de l’Union n’est pas nécessairement incompatible avec le cadre réglementaire européen

As announced in this blog (here), Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (University of Côte d’Azur and French University Institute) has just published a monograph titled “Situations in Movement and The Law – A Pragmatic Epistemology” (Les situations en mouvement et le droit – Essai d’une épistémologie pragmatique, Dalloz, 2021).

The author has provided the following abstract in English:

The ambition underpinning this text is to establish a pragmatic epistemology for each time the law faces situations in movement. 

The movement of goods and persons across territories and through space, understood in its broadest sense, challenges the law in its primary task of locking situations into predefined legal frameworks, whether at a local, national, European, international or global level (laws on the freedom of movement, transport, trade, mobility, flows, international or European situations, etc.). 

This reflection is all the more important given that phenomena in movement now come in extreme forms with the increasingly observed hypothesis of circulation provoked by humans but completely out of their control (greenhouse gas emissions, spread of products and organisms of all kinds, pandemics, and the circulation of information, persons, data, capital, waste, etc.). 

What we know and don’t know about the law on circulation and its control merit discussion. 

A renewed approach to the assumptions about and mechanics of situations in movement is perhaps needed. All sorts of antecedents – magical, liberal, social, ontological, fundamental and modal – potentially at work allow us to lay down the terms and stakes of how we address the risk, most often denied or minimised, of losing control over flows. 

This essay is intended for both legal scholars and practitioners. It may also appeal to anyone from other disciplines interested in the way in which the law can be understood through its approach to dynamic phenomena, from the smallest to the largest scale. 

More information here.