Agrégateur de flux

Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005) - Déclaration des créances - Avertissement personnel

On 8-9 June 2017, the Academy of European Law (ERA) will host a conference on European Insolvency Law under the title:

“Insolvency Proceedings within the EU: Latest Developments”

at the ERA conference center in Trier (Germany).

The conference will give an in-depth analysis of the recast EU Regulation No 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings which will become applicable from 26 June 2017, in particular

• scope of the Regulation, pre-insolvency and hybrid proceedings
• main, secondary and synthetic proceedings
• groups of companies and the new group coordination proceeding
• Furthermore it will discuss the
• new Commission proposal for a Directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance, published late 2016, and
• post-Brexit implications for insolvency and restructuring

This conference aims to meet the requirements of insolvency lawyers to stay informed on the latest developments in jurisprudence and legislation in insolvency matters at EU level. It will examine practical problems in applying the recast Insolvency Regulation, consequences of Brexit and the recent EU proposal on business insolvency.

The confirmed Speakers are:

• Stefania Bariatti, Professor at the University of Milan; Of Counsel, Chiomenti Studio Legale, Milan
• Alexander Bornemann, Head of Division, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Berlin
• Florian Bruder, Rechtsanwalt, Counsel, DLA Piper, Munich
• Jenny Clift, Senior Legal Officer, International Trade Law Division, UNCITRAL Secretariat, Vienna
• Reinhard Dammann, Avocat à la Cour; Partner, Clifford Chance Europe LLP, Paris
• Francisco Garcimartín, Professor of Private International Law at the Autonomous University of Madrid
• Gabriel Moss QC, Barrister, 3-4 South Square, Gray’s Inn, London; Visiting Professor at Oxford University
• Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, Civil Justice Policy, DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission, Brussels
• Nico Tollenaar, RESOR, Amsterdam
• Michael Veder, Adviser at RESOR, Amsterdam; Professor of Insolvency Law at Radboud University Nijmegen; Chair of INSOL Europe Academic Forum
• Bob Wessels, Independent Legal Counsel, Adviser and Arbitrator; Professor emeritus at the University of Leiden

The conference language will be English. The event is organized by Dr Angelika Fuchs (ERA). The programme of the conference, together with a registration form, can be found here.

After  Shell/Okpabi, the High Court has now for the second time in 2017 rejected jurisdiction to be established against the foreign subsidiary (here: in Kenya) using the mother company as an anchor. In [2017] EWHC 371 (QB) AAA et al v Unilever and Unilever Tea Kenya ltd, Unilever is the ultimate holding company and registered in the UK. Its subsidiary is a company registered in Kenya. It operates a tea plantation there. Plaintiffs were employed, or lived there, and were the victims of ethnic violence carried out by armed criminals on the Plantation after the Presidential election in Kenya in 2007. They claim that the risk of such violence was foreseeable by both defendants, that these owed a duty of care to protect them from the risks of such violence, and that they had breached that duty.

Laing J unusually first of (at 63 ff) all declines to reject the case on ‘case management’ grounds. Unlike many of her colleagues she is more inclined to see such stay as ignoring ‘through the back door’ Owusu‘s rejection of forum non conveniens.  I believe she is right. Instead the High Court threw out the case on the basis that the claims, prima facie (on deciding jurisdiction, the Court does not review the substantial merits of the case; a thin line to cross) had no merit. Three issues had to be decided:

i) By reference to what law should the claim be decided? This was agreed as being Kenyan law.

ii) Are the criteria in Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 satisfied? (A leading English law case on the test for the duty of care). The relevance of English law on this issues comes about as a result of Kenyan law following the same Caparo test: as I have noted elsewhere, it is not without discussion that lex fori should apply to this test of attributability. Laing J held that the Caparo criteria were not fulfilled. The events were not as such foreseeable (in particular: a general breakdown in law and order). Importantly, with respect to the holding company and as helpfully summarised by Herbert Smith:

• the pleaded duty effectively required the holding to ensure that the claimants did not suffer the damage that they suffered, and not merely to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety;
• the pleaded duty also effectively imposed liability on that holding for the criminal acts of third parties, and required it to act as a “surrogate police force to maintain law and order”; and
• such a duty would be wider than the duty imposed on the daughter, as the actual occupier of the Plantation, under the Kenyan Occupiers’ Liability Act

At 103, Laing J discussed and dismissed plaintiff’s attempts at distinguishing Okpabi. In her view, like in Shell /Okpabi, the mother’s control is formal control exercised at a high level of abstraction, and over the content and auditing of general policies and procedures. Not  the sort of control and superior knowledge which would meet the Chandler test.

iii) Are the claims barred by limitation? This became somewhat irrelevant but the High Court ruled they were not. (This, under the common law of conflicts, was a matter of lex causae: Kenyan law, and requiring Kenyan expert input. Not English law, as the lex fori).

The case, like Okpabi, is subject to appeal however it is clear that the English courts are not willing to pick up the baton of court of prefered resort for CSR type cases against mother companies.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.

On 20 March 2017 the European Union Committee of the House of Lords on Judicial hast published its Report on Judicial cooperation post-Brexit (“Brexit: Justice for families, individuals and Businesses?”). The full Report is available here. The summary reads as follows (emphasis added):

“The Brussels I Regulation (recast)

1. We acknowledge and welcome the UK’s influence over the content of these three EU Regulations which are crucial to judicial cooperation in civil matters and reflect the UK’s influence and British legal culture. We urge the Government to keep as close to these rules as possible when negotiating their post-Brexit application. (Paragraph 23)

2. The predictability and certainty of the BIR’s reciprocal rules are important to UK citizens who travel and do business within the EU. We endorse the outcome of the Government’s consultations, that an effective system of cross-border judicial cooperation with common rules is essential post-Brexit. (Paragraph 37)

3. We also note the Minister’s confirmation, in evidence to us, that the important principles contained in the Brussels I Regulation (recast) will form part of the forthcoming negotiations with the remaining EU Member States. (Paragraph 38)

4. While academic and legal witnesses differed on the post-Brexit enforceability of UK judgments, it is clear that significant problems will arise for UK citizens and businesses if the UK leaves the EU without agreement on the post-Brexit application of the BIR. (Paragraph 52)

5. The evidence provided to us suggests that the loss of certainty and predictability resulting from the loss of the BIR and the reciprocal rules it engenders will lead to an inevitable increase in cross-border litigation for UK based citizens and businesses as they continue to trade and interact with the remaining 27 EU Member States. (Paragraph 53)

6. We are concerned by the Law Society of England and Wales’ evidence that the current uncertainty surrounding Brexit is already having an impact on the UK’s market for legal services and commercial litigation, and on the choices businesses are making as to whether or not to select English contract law as the law governing their commercial relationships. (Paragraph 54)

7. The Government urgently needs to address this uncertainty and take steps to mitigate it. We therefore urge the Government to consider whether any interim measures could be adopted to address this problem, while the new UK-EU relationship is being negotiated in the two year period under Article 50. (Paragraph 55)

8. The evidence we received is clear and conclusive: there is no means by which the reciprocal rules that are central to the functioning of the BIR can be replicated in the Great Repeal Bill, or any other national legislation. It is therefore apparent that an agreement between the EU and the UK on the post-Brexit application of this legislation will be required, whether as part of a withdrawal agreement or under transitional arrangements. (Paragraph 60)

9. The Minister suggested that the Great Repeal Bill will address the need for certainty in the transitional period, but evidence we received called this into question. We are in no doubt that legal uncertainty, with its inherent costs to litigants, will follow Brexit unless there are provisions in a withdrawal or transitional agreement specifically addressing the BIR. (Paragraph 61)

10. The evidence suggests that jurisdictions in other EU Member States, and arbitrators in the UK, stand to gain from the current uncertainty over the post-Brexit application of the BIR, as may other areas of dispute resolution. (Paragraph 69)

11. With regard to arbitration, we acknowledge that the evidence points to a gain for London. But, we are also conscious of the evidence we heard on the importance of the principles of justice, in particular openness and fairness, underpinned by the publication of judgments and authorities, which are fundamental to open law. It is our view that greater recourse to arbitration does not offer a viable solution to the potential loss of the BIR. (Paragraph 70)

The Brussels IIa Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation

12. In dealing with the personal lives of adults and children, both the Brussels IIa Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation operate in a very different context from the more commercially focused Brussels I Regulation (recast). (Paragraph 81)

13. These Regulations may appear technical and complex, but the practitioners we heard from were clear that in the era of modern, mobile populations they bring much-needed clarity and certainty to the intricacies of cross-border family relations (Paragraph 82)

14. We were pleased to hear the Minister recognise the important role fulfilled by the Brussels IIa Regulation and confirm that the content of both these Regulations will form part of the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. (Paragraph 83)

15. We have significant concerns over the impact of the loss of the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations post-Brexit, if no alternative arrangements are put in place. We are particularly concerned by David Williams QC’s evidence on the loss of the provisions dealing with international child abduction. (Paragraph 92)

16. To walk away from these Regulations without putting alternatives in place would seriously undermine the family law rights of UK citizens and would, ultimately, be an act of self-harm. (Paragraph 93)

17. It is clear that the Government’s promised Great Repeal Bill will be insufficient to ensure the continuing application of the Brussels II and Maintenance Regulations in the UK post-Brexit: we are unaware of any domestic legal mechanism that can replicate the reciprocal effect of the rules in these two Regulations. We are concerned that, when this point was put to him, the Minister did not acknowledge the fact that the Great Repeal Bill would not provide for the reciprocal nature of the rules contained in these Regulations. (Paragraph 97)

18. We are not convinced that the Government has, as yet, a coherent or workable plan to address the significant problems that will arise in the UK’s family law legal system post-Brexit, if alternative arrangements are not put in place. It is therefore imperative that the Government secures adequate alternative arrangements, whether as part of a withdrawal agreement or under transitional arrangements (Paragraph 98)

Options for the future

19. The balance of the evidence was overwhelmingly against returning to the common law rules, which have not been applied in the European context for over 30 years, as a means of addressing the loss of the Brussels I Regulation (recast). We note that a return to the common law would also not be the Government’s choice. (Paragraph 114)

20. A return to the common law rules would, according to most witnesses, be a recipe for confusion, expense and uncertainty. In our view, therefore, the common law is not a viable alternative to an agreement between the EU and the UK on the post-Brexit application of the Brussels I Regulation (recast). (Paragraph 115)

21. Nonetheless, in contrast to key aspects of the two Regulations dealing with family law, Professor Fentiman was of the opinion that in the event that the Government is unable to secure a post-Brexit agreement on the operation of the Brussels I Regulation (recast), a return to the common law rules would at least provide a minimum ‘safety net’. (Paragraph 116)

22. The combination of UK membership of the Lugano Convention, implementation of the Rome I and II Regulations through the Great Repeal Bill, and ratification of the Hague Convention on choice-of-court agreements, appears to offer at least a workable solution to the post-Brexit loss of the BIR. (Paragraph 126)

23. The inclusion in the Lugano Convention of a requirement for national courts to “pay due account” to each other’s decisions on the content of the Brussels I Regulation, without accepting the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, could be compatible with the Government’s stance on the CJEU’s status post-Brexit, as long as the Government does not take too rigid a position. (Paragraph 127)

24. This approach will come at a cost. In particular, it will involve a return to the Brussels I Regulation, with all its inherent faults, which the UK as an EU Member State succeeded, after much time and effort, in reforming. (Paragraph 128)

25. In contrast to the civil and commercial field, we are particularly concerned that, save for the provisions of the Lugano Convention on cases involving maintenance, there is no satisfactory fall-back position in respect of family law. (Paragraph 135)

26. Our witnesses were unanimous that a return to common law rules for UK- EU cases would be particularly detrimental for those engaged in family law litigation. The Bar Council also suggested that an already stretched family court system would not be able to cope with the expected increase in litigation. (Paragraph 136)

27. The Bar Council specifically called for the EU framework in this field to be sustained post-Brexit. But while this may be the optimal solution in legal terms we cannot see how such an outcome can be achieved without the CJEU’s oversight. (Paragraph 137)

28. Other witnesses suggested the UK rely on the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. But the evidence suggests that this Convention offers substantially less clarity and protection for those individual engaged in family law based litigation. (Paragraph 138)

29. The Minister held fast to the Government’s policy that the Court of Justice of the European Union will have no jurisdiction in the UK post-Brexit. We remain concerned, however, that if the Government adheres rigidly to this policy it will severely constrain its choice of adequate alternative arrangements. (Paragraph 142)

30. Clearly, if the Government wishes to maintain these Regulations post-Brexit, it will have to negotiate alternative arrangements with the remaining 27 Member States to provide appropriate judicial oversight. But the Minister was unable to offer us any clear detail on the Government’s plans. When pressed on alternatives, he mentioned the Lugano Convention and “other arrangements”. We were left unable to discern a clear policy. (Paragraph 143)

31. The other examples the Minister drew on, Free Trade Agreements with Canada and South Korea, do not deal with the intricate reciprocal regime encompassed by these three Regulations. We do not see them as offering a viable alternative. (Paragraph 144)

32. We believe that the Government has not taken account of the full implications of the impact of Brexit on the areas of EU law covered by the three civil justice Regulations dealt with in this report. In the area of family law, we are very concerned that leaving the EU without an alternative system in place will have a profound and damaging impact on the UK’s family justice system and those individuals seeking redress within it. (Paragraph 145)

33. In the civil and commercial field there is the unsatisfactory safety net of the common law. But, at this time, it is unclear whether membership of the Lugano Convention, which is in itself imperfect, will be sought, offered or available. (Paragraph 146)

34. We call on the Government to publish a coherent plan for addressing the post-Brexit application of these three Regulations, and to do so as a matter of urgency. Without alternative adequate replacements, we are in no doubt that there will be great uncertainty affecting many UK and EU citizens. (Paragraph 147)”

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne estime que la directive relative à la libre prestation de services par les avocats n’empêche pas les Etats-membres de réserver aux notaires la faculté d’authentifier une signature apposée sur un acte de transaction immobilière.

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Au sens du règlement du 21 avril 2004 portant création d’un titre exécutoire européen pour les créances incontestées, la juridiction appelée à statuer doit intervenir au terme d’une procédure contradictoire.

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On 16 and 17 March 2017 the Wissenschaftliche Vereinigung für Internationales Verfahrensrecht (Scientific Association of International Procedural Law) held its biennial conference, this time hosted by the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna at the Ceremony Hall of the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice (Oberster Gerichtshof).

After opening and welcoming remarks by the Chairman of the Association, Prof. Burkhard Hess, Luxemburg, the Vice President of the Supreme Court Dr. Elisabeth Lovrek, and Prof. Paul Oberhammer, speaking both as Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Vienna and chair of the first day, the first session of the conference dealt with international insolvency law:

Prof. Reinhard Bork, Hamburg, compared the European Insolvency Recast Regulation 2015/848 and the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law in respect to key issues such as the scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. Bork made clear that both instruments, albeit one is binding, one soft law, have far-reaching commonalities on the level of guiding principles (e.g. universality, mutual trust, cooperation, efficiency, transparency, legal certainty etc.) as well as many similar rules whereas in certain other points differences occur, such as e.g. the lack of rules on international jurisdiction and applicable law as well as on groups of companies and data protection in the Model Law. In particular in respect to the rules on the concept of COMI Bork suggested updating the Model Law given a widespread reception of this concept and its interpretation by the European Court of Justice far beyond the territorial reach of the European Insolvency Regulation.

Prof. Christian Koller, Vienna, then focused on communication and protocols between insolvency representatives and courts in group insolvencies. Koller explained the difficulties in regulating these forms of cooperation that mainly depend of course on the good-will of those involved but nevertheless should be and indeed are put under obligation to cooperate. In this context, Koller, inter alia, posed the question if choice of court-agreements or arbitration agreements in protocols are possible but remained skeptical with a view to Article 6 of the Regulation and objective arbitrability. In principle, however, Koller suggested using and, as the case may be, broadening the exercise of party autonomy in cross-border group insolvencies.

In contrast to the harmonizing efforts of the EU and UNCITRAL Prof. Franco Lorandi, St. Gallen, described the Swiss legal system as a rather isolationist “island” in cross-border insolvency matters, yet an island “in motion” since certain steps for reform of Chapter 11 on cross-border insolvency within the Federal Law on Private International Law of 1987 (Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht, IPRG) are being currently undertaken (see the Federal Governments Proposal; see the Explanatory Report).

In the following Pál Szirányi, DG Justice and Consumers, Unit A1 – Civil Justice, reported on accompanying implementation steps under e.g. Article 87 (establishment of the interconnection of registers) and Article 88 (establishment and subsequent amendment of standard forms) of the European Insolvency Recast Regulation to be undertaken by the European Commission as well as on the envisaged harmonization of certain aspects of national insolvency laws within the EU (see Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, see also post by Lukas Schmidt on conflictoflaws.net) and finally on the EU’s participation in the UNCITRAL Working Group V on cross-border insolvency. Szirány further explained that it is of interest to the EU to align and coordinate the insolvency exception in the future Hague Judgments Convention with EU legislation, see Article 2 No. 1 lit. e covering “insolvency, composition and analogous matters” of the 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention.

Prof. Christiane Wendehorst, Vienna, reported on the latest works of the European Law Institute, in particular on the ELI Unidroit Project on Transnational Principles of Civil Procedure, but also on the project on “Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law”, that is drawing to its close, potentially by the ELI conference in Vienna on 27 and 28 April 2017 as well as on the project on “The Principled Relationship of Formal and Informal Justice through the Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution”.

Finally, Dr Thomas Laut, German Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz) reported on current legislative developments in Germany including works in connection with the Brussels IIbis Recast Regulation, human rights litigation in Germany and the Government Proposal for legislative amendments in the area of conflict of laws and international procedural law (Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung von Vorschriften im Bereich des Internationalen Privat- und Zivilverfahrensrechts). This Proposal aims at, inter alia, codifying choice of law rules on agency by inserting a new Article 8 into the Introductory Law of the German Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, EGBGB) and enhancing judicial cooperation with non-EU states, in particular in respect to service of process.

On the second day, Prof. Hess, Luxemburg, introduced the audience to the second session’s focus on methodology in comparative procedural law and drew attention to the growing demand and relevance – reminding the audience, inter alia, of the influence of the Austrian law of appeal on the civil procedure reforms in Germany – but also to certain unique factors of the comparison of procedural law.

Prof. Stefan Huber, Hannover, took up the ball and presented on current developments of comparative legal research and methodology in general as well as possible particularities of comparing procedural law such as e.g. a strong lex fori-principle, the supplementing character of procedural law supporting the realization of private rights, a typically compact character of a procedural legal system, areas of discretion for the judge and the central role of the state – features which might make necessary a more “contextual” approach and a stronger focus on “legal concepts” as a layer between macro and micro perspectives. Huber also argued for a more substantive approach in regard to the latest efforts of the EU to compare the quality of justice systems of the Member States by its annual Justice Scoreboards since 2013. Indeed, the mere collection of economic and financial figures and other “juridical” data leaves unanswered questions of legal backgrounds and concepts in the various legal orders that might very well explain certain particularities in the data. Yet, it must be welcomed that the EU has started to embark on the delicate and methodically demanding but inevitable task of comparing the justice systems linked together under a principle of mutual trust.

Prof. Fernando Gascón Inchausti, Complutense de Madrid, continued the deep reflections on comparative procedural law with a view to the EU and illustrated the relevance in case law both of the European Court of Justice as well as the European Court of Human Rights and in the EU’s law-making and evaluations of existing instruments, see recently e.g. Max-Planck-Institute Luxemburg, “An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumer law, JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082, to be published soon.

Prof. Margaret Woo, Northeastern University Boston, closed the session with a global perspective on comparative procedural law from a US and Chinese perspective and particularly drew attention to portectionist tendencies in the US such as e.g. the recent (not entirely new) “foreign law bans” (for a general report from 2013 see here) to be observed in more and more state legislations that put the application of foreign law under the condition that the foreign law in its entirety, i.e. its “system”, does not conflict in any point of law with US guarantees and state fundamental rights. Obviously, this overly broad type of public policy clause is directed against Sharia laws and the like but goes far beyond in that it compares the entire legal system rather than the result of the point of law relevant to the case at hand. In the EU, Article 10 Rome III Regulation might have introduced a “mini” foreign law ban in case of abstract discrimination: “Where the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce or does not grant one of the spouses equal access to divorce or legal separation on grounds of their sex, the law of the forum shall apply”. It remains of course to be seen whether the ECJ interprets this provision in the sense of an ordinary public policy clause requiring a concrete discrimination with effect on the result in the particular case at hand.

In the closing discussion, the audience strongly confirmed the need and benefits of comparative research and studies in particular in times of doubts and counter-tendencies against further cooperation and integration amongst states, their economies and judicial systems. The event ended with warm words of thanks and respect to the organizers and speakers for another splendid conference. If everything goes well, interested readers will be able to study the contributions in the forthcoming conference publication before the international procedural community will meet again in two year’s time – the last conference’s volume has just been published, see Burkhard Hess (ed.), Band 22: Der europäische Gerichtsverbund – Gegenwartsfragen der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit – Die internationale Dimension des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, € 68,00, ISBN: 978-3-7694-1172-0, 2017/03, pp. 236.

L’interdiction de sortie de l’enfant du territoire sans l’accord des deux parents, prévue à l’article 373-2-6, alinéa 3, du code civil, est nécessaire à la protection des droits et libertés d’autrui en ce qu’elle vise à préserver les liens des enfants avec leurs deux parents et à prévenir les déplacements illicites, conformément aux objectifs poursuivis par le règlement (CE) n° 2201/2003 du Conseil du 27 novembre 2003 relatif à la compétence, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière matrimoniale et en matière de responsabilité parentale et la Convention de La Haye du 25 octobre 1980 sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants.

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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence, 12e chambre, 8 février 2017

This post has been written by Nicolò Nisi, Research Assistant at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg

On 10 March 2017, the German Bundestag finally voted the bill to facilitate the handling of domestic group insolvencies (Gesetzes zur Erleichterung der Bewältigung von Konzerninsolvenzen), which was initially presented in early 2013.

It is a much-awaited development, which follows the introduction in the new EU Insolvency Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/848) of specific provisions addressing the insolvency of EU groups of companies, i.e., groups where the parent company and the subsidiaries have their centre of main interests in at least two Member States.

Under current German law, each legal entity is subject to its own insolvency proceeding and the decision to open the proceedings is determined separately and independently for each entity (‘one company, one insolvency, one proceeding’). It means that different insolvency courts open separate proceedings for each insolvent group member, with the appointment – in many cases – of several insolvency practitioners. This approach has its benefits in terms of legal certainty, but it overlooks the wider picture of the group. It is, in fact, not suitable for the group restructuring or the sale of the group business as a going concern.

Although the principle that separate proceedings are to be opened in respect of different group members remains unchanged, the new provisions introduce four main innovations to the German Insolvency Code (Insolvenzordnung).

To begin with, they establish the possibility for a group company – not necessarily the (ultimate) parent – to apply for the opening of insolvency proceedings over the other insolvent group entities (so-called procedural consolidation), provided that such concentration of jurisdiction is justified by the common interests of the group’s creditors and the requesting company is not manifestly of minor importance for the group as a whole (§ 3a).

A ‘group venue’ is then established for all the group companies. In the case of more applications, a priority rule applies or, when not possible, the application made by the company with the highest number of employees in the previous financial year prevails. If a request to open insolvency proceeding against a group member is submitted afterward to a different court, the latter may transfer the proceeding to the group court (§ 3d).

Secondly, when insolvency proceedings in respect of various group members are opened in different courts, it is possible to appoint the same person as insolvency practitioner for all group companies concerned, insofar it is in the creditors’ interests and possible conflicts of interest may be covered by the appointment of a special practitioner (§ 56b). This should avoid the occurrence of frictions, inefficiencies and information asymmetries, which could endanger an optimal result.

Thirdly, the insolvency practitioners appointed in the proceedings opened in relation to different members of the same group are obliged to cooperate and share all relevant information, insofar as the interests of the creditors of the respective group company would not be prejudiced (§ 269a). Similar duties are also provided concerning insolvency courts (§ 269b) and creditors’ committees (§ 269c). Under the last provision, however, cooperation shall only take place by request of one of the creditors’ committees and through the appointment of a group creditors’ committee, which should assist the insolvency practitioners and the creditors’ committee within the individual proceedings.

Finally, each group company in whose respect an insolvency proceeding has been requested or already opened – alternatively the (preliminary) creditors’ committee of a group company – may request before the court of the group venue the opening of a ‘coordination proceeding’, which should further facilitate the coordinated liquidation or restructuring of insolvent groups (§ 269d). The coordination court shall then appoint an independent coordinator (§ 269e), who oversees the execution of the proceeding in the interest of creditors, in particular by submitting a coordination plan (§ 269f).

Such plan should describe in detail all the relevant measures to be implemented within the individual insolvency proceedings, including the proposals concerning (i) the restoration of economic performances of the group members; (ii) the settlement of intra-group disputes; and (iii) the contractual arrangements among insolvency practitioners (§ 269h).

It is worth stressing that the group coordination proceeding does not have a binding effect on the individual proceedings, in that the insolvency practitioners may decide not to follow the recommendations of the coordinator, only subject to the duty to explain to the creditors the reasons for doing so (‘comply or explain’) (§ 269i). However, if the creditors are not persuaded and vote in favour of the arrangements contained in the group plan, but the practitioner does not adapt accordingly the insolvency plan at the level of individual proceeding, he may risk to be held liable for damages.

Except for the first point on procedural consolidation, which is positively considered by the prevailing literature in the case of an integrated group as a tool to simplify the going-concern sale of the business or the global group-wide restructuring, the new German rules resemble closely the ones recently adopted in the Recast Insolvency Regulation. The latter, in fact, were proposed by the German delegations within the European Parliament and the Council. Also at the European level, a group coordination proceeding has been introduced in order to facilitate the group restructuring, even though the participation of various practitioners is not binding and rests on a voluntary basis (see Articles 61 et seq.).

This solution has been the object of different evaluations, mostly skeptical. Indeed, it seems that the introduction of a coordination proceeding will not make a significant difference in the practice of group insolvencies. Even overlooking the problems arising from non-compliance with the coordinator’s recommendations, one should pay attention to limiting the costs (including the coordinator’s remuneration under § 269g) and the duration of the proceeding, in order to preserve its efficiency and to ensure its success in the interest of creditors, thus avoiding it may result in additional complexity.

The one sorry outcome of [2017] EWHC 374 (Ch) Microsoft (Nokia) v Sony is that by rejecting jurisdiction, the Commercial Court did not have an opportunity to review the application of Rome II’s provisions on applicable law in the case of infringement of competition law.

The following background is by Kirsty Wright, who also alerted me to the case: the claim centred on allegations by Microsoft (who had acquired Nokia of Finland) that the Defendants had caused loss by engaging in anti-competitive conduct relating to the sale of Li-ion Batteries over a period of 12 years. In 2001 Nokia and the Sony Corporation (the mother corporation: with seat outside of the EU) concluded a Product Purchase Agreement for Li-ion Batteries. This agreement contained an English choice of law clause and required any dispute to be resolved by way of arbitration in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Microsoft became the assignee of these rights following its purchase of parts of Nokia in 2013 and therefore could bring claims in contract against Sony Corporation and claims in tort against the other three Defendants. Sony Corporation is a subsidiary of Sony Europe Limited: it is the anchor defendant in this case: none of the corporations other than Sony Europe are domiciled in the EU.

Smith J in a lengthy judgment determined that the agreement between Microsoft and Sony Corporation to arbitrate in the ICC also extended to the parent company Sony Europe. Therefore proceedings against all defendants were stayed in favour of ICC arbitration subject to English law. This required him first of all to hold that under English law, the arbitration agreement (as opposed to, under EU law, for the issue of choice of court: see CDC) extends to non-contractual obligations (infringement of competition law evidently not being part of one’s contractual rights and obligations; see here for a review of the issues; in Dutch I’m afraid: must find time for an EN version) but also that the clause extended to the mother company: hence releasing the jurisdictional anchor.

Microsoft had anticipated such finding by suggesting such finding may be incompatible with EU law: its contention was that the operation of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) must permit the effective protection of rights derived from competition law, including private law rights of action for infringement, these being rights accorded by EU law, and that an arbitration clause which caused the fragmentation of such rights of action was, for that reason, in breach of EU law (at 76). It made extensive reference to Jaaskinen AG’s call in CDC for the Brussels I Recast to be aligned with Rome II’s ambition to have one single law apply to the ensuing tort. (The jurisdictional regime as noted leads to a need to sue in various jurisdictions).

As I have noted in my review of the CJEU’s judgment, on this point the Court however disagreed with its AG. Indeed while the AG reviews and argues the issue at length (Smith J recalls it in the same length), the Court summarily sticks to its familiar view on the application of (now) Article 7(2) in competition cases; it is the CJEU’s view which the Commercial Court of course upholds.

A great case, extensively argued.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.1; Heading 2.2.9; Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2).

Tribunal correctionnel de Lyon, 16 février 2017