Agrégateur de flux

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Nogueira e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice COJC
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, les litiges relatifs aux contrats de travail d’hôtesses de l’air et de stewards relèvent de la compétence du juge du lieu « où ou à partir duquel » ceux-ci s’acquittent principalement de leurs obligations à l’égard de leur employeur

The first issue of a new periodical, called Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, is now on-line.

In addition to the inaugural editorial by Angela Di Stasi, the issue hosts contributions (some written in Italian, others in English) by Maria Caterina Baruffi (on international child abduction), Dominik Düsterhaus (on mutual trust), Caterina Fratea (on the labour mobility), Angela Maria Romito (on cross-border debt recovery), Valentina Faggiani (on fundamental guarantees in criminal proceedings), Maria Font i Mas (on the movement of public documents across borders), Sílvia Morgades-Gil (on forced migration) and Alfredo Rizzo (on the external dimension of the European area of freedom, security and justice).

 

 

Concurrence - Procédure - Compétence exclusive

Stichting Brein
La vente d’un lecteur multimédia qui permet de regarder gratuitement et facilement, sur un écran de télévision, des films disponibles illégalement sur Internet peut constituer une violation du droit d’auteur

The University of Ferrara will host on 5 May 2017 a seminar titled ‘Universal Civil Jurisdiction – Which Way Forward?‘, in cooperation with the Interest Groups on International and European Human Rights Law and Private International Law of the Italian Society of International and EU Law (ISIL).

The seminar will be chaired by Judge Giorgio Gaja (International Court of Justice). Speakers and discussants include Beatrice Bonafè (University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’), Francesco Costamagna (University of Turin), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University of London), Serena Forlati (University of Ferrara), Pietro Franzina (University of Ferrara), Patrick Kinsch (University of Luxembourg), Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (University of Macerata), Makane Moïse Mbengue (University of Geneva), Cesare Pitea (University of Parma), Chiara Ragni (University of Milan), Cedric Ryngaert (University of Utrecht), Andrea Saccucci (University of Campania ‘Luigi Vanvitelli’). 

Si svolgerà a Ferrara, il 5 maggio 2017, un seminario intitolato “Universal Civil Jurisdiction – Which Way Forward?”, organizzato in cooperazione con i Gruppi di interesse sul Diritto internazionale ed europeo dei diritti umani e sul Diritto internazionale privato e processuale della Società italiana di diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea (SIDI).

I lavori saranno coordinati dal Giudice Giorgio Gaja (Corte internazionale di giustizia). Interverranno: Beatrice Bonafè (Università di Roma‘La Sapienza’), Francesco Costamagna (Università di Torino), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University di Londra), Serena Forlati (Università di Ferrara), Pietro Franzina (University di Ferrara), Patrick Kinsch (Università di Lussemburgo), Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (Università di Macerata), Makane Moïse Mbengue (Università di Ginevra), Cesare Pitea (Università di Parma), Chiara Ragni (Università di Milano), Cedric Ryngaert (Università di Utrecht), Andrea Saccucci (Università della Campania ‘Luigi Vanvitelli’).

Charles Oellermann has excellent analysis of Spizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. (In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp. 562 B.R. 601 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply outside the U.S. because, on the basis of the language and context of the provisions, Congress did not intend for them to apply extraterritorially. In so holding, it applied the Morrison test which was central to the United States’ Supreme Court ruling in Kiobel, which of course has been the subject of repeated analysis on this blog.

Whether an avoidance action (which in civil law jurisdictions would be tackled by an actio pauliana) is extraterritorial in and of itself, is not easily ascertained. In his review, Charles has superb overview of case-law applying a centre of gravity test: depending on the facts of the case, parties’ action does or does not take place outside the US in relation to the parties’ domicile, the subject of the transaction, etc.  He also rightfully highlights that courts are aware that even if one were to apply the provisions extraterritorially, a US judgment might not be easily enforced against foreign debtors.

Case-law is evidently not settled and one imagines that the extraterritoriality of bankruptcy laws will in some form further end up at the USSC.

Geert.

 

Non lieu à renvoi

Rendu à propos de la marque Laguiole, un arrêt de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) du 5 avril 2017 précise que, conformément au droit français applicable en l’espèce, la protection de la dénomination sociale d’une société s’étend exclusivement aux activités exercées par celle-ci à la date de la demande d’enregistrement de la marque.

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Dans deux décisions du 4 avril 2017 de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, concernant la Belgique, il est question de détention d’étrangers.

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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Montpellier, 20 octobre 2016

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Reims, chambre des appels correctionnels, 01 septembre 2016

Silvia Pfeiff,  La portabilité du statut personnel dans l’espace européen, Bruylant, 2017, ISBN 9782802757429, pp. 718, EUR 150

Opposer un refus de reconnaissance au statut personnel d’un individu revient à renier une partie de son identité. Le fait que des citoyens européens puissent subir les inconvénients liés, par exemple, à un refus de reconnaissance de leur mariage, de leur partenariat ou de leur filiation lors de l’exercice de leur liberté de circulation est-il compatible avec les droits et libertés garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les traités européens ? Cette question a mené l’auteur à s’interroger sur l’étendue des droits et libertés européens, tels qu’ils découlent de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, et à explorer les pistes de solutions que recèle aujourd’hui le droit européen en tant que cadre supranational pour l’ensemble des États membres. Sur base de cet acquis européen est élaborée une méthode européenne de la reconnaissance. Celle-ci impose aux autorités nationales d’intégrer la logique européenne dans leur raisonnement lorsqu’elles sont saisies de la question de la reconnaissance d’un élément du statut personnel cristallisé par l’intervention d’une autorité publique d’un État membre. Ce faisant, elle ambitionne de réduire la survenance de statuts personnels boiteux et de contribuer ainsi à faciliter la circulation des citoyens. Cet ouvrage s’inscrit dès lors à la croisée du droit de la famille, du droit international privé, du droit européen et des droits fondamentaux.

Koray Söğüt and Suha Yılmaz reported recently on Turkish Supreme Court case-law in the area of choice of court. The report is very much worth a read. On choice of court agreements, what the Supreme Court seems to say is that when choice of court is made away from Turkey,  Turkish law will make that choice subject to a de facto forum conveniens assessment: if Turkey is a suitable forum especially when the eventual judgment will be easily enforced against Turkish assets, a defendant’s insistence on exercising the clause must be seen as violating Turkey’s general provision on bad faith (a form of fraus omnia corrumpit).

It is also reported that the Supreme Court accepted a unilateral /asymmetric jurisdiction clause – the issues surrounding these clauses are a regular feature on this blog.

More cases for the comparative law class! (At least if and when I get hold of an English translation).

Geert.

 

Des circonstances exceptionnelles peuvent justifier l’octroi d’une satisfaction équitable pour préjudice moral et ce malgré l’absence d’une « demande » formée de manière appropriée devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme.

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Le 4 avril 2017, le comité des ministres du Conseil de l’Europe en charge de la surveillance de l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) a rendu son 10e rapport annuel pour l’année 2016, illustrant entre autres l’impact des efforts déployés pour garantir l’efficacité du système de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

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Many of the issues in [2017] EWHC 161 (Comm) Commerzbank v Liquimar Tankers were also raised in Perella v Codere,  albeit there, as I reported, obiter. In current case, they were very much dicta, and they amount to the English courts viewing (properly constructed) asymmetric clauses as being exclusive. As such they fall under the new anti-torpedo provisions of Article 31(2).

Applications of defendants Liquimar Tankers (registered in Liberia but with head office in Athens) are being made in the course of proceedings in London by Commerzbank  in two separate actions in relation to the repayment of loans which the Bank extended for the building of a number of ships. There are ongoing proceedings taken by the defendants against the Bank in Piraeus, Greece concerning the same and/or related issues.

The Liquimar guarantee contained a governing law and an asymmetric jurisdiction clause, which was essentially similar in the other loan agreements. It provided:

“16 Law and Jurisdiction

16.1 This Guarantee and Indemnity shall in all respects be governed by and interpreted in accordance with English law.

16.2 For the exclusive benefit of the Lender, the Guarantor irrevocably agrees that the courts of England are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Guarantee and Indemnity and that any proceedings may be brought in those courts.

16.3 Nothing contained in this Clause shall limit the right of the Lender to commence any proceedings against the Guarantor in any other court of competent jurisdiction nor shall the commencement of any proceedings against the Guarantor in one or more jurisdictions preclude the commencement of any proceedings in any other jurisdiction, whether concurrently or not.

16.4 The Guarantor irrevocably waives any objection which it may now or in the future have to the laying of the venue of any proceedings in any court referred to in this Clause and any claim that those proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient or inappropriate forum, and irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any proceedings commenced in any such court shall be conclusive and binding on it and may be enforced in the courts of any jurisdiction …”.

 

Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast reads:

‘where a court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seized, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seized on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’

Cranston J held that the concept of ‘exclusivity’ should be autonomously interpreted under the Brussels I (Recast) regime. He did not however refer for preliminary reference to the CJEU: as such, the High Court’s finding continues to be vulnerable until we have precedent from Luxembourg. The judgment as a whole is worth a read – readers in for concise summary, please refer to Herbert Smith’s analysis.

Summing up is done in para 70, with justifiable emphasis on parties’ and the Regulation’s intentions (but as noted with considerable reference to precedent and principles of statutory interpretation): Thus with the asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in the present case, the defendants agreed to sue only in the courts of one EU Member State, England. Instead, they have enabled another court, the Greek court, to be seized of the matter. It would undermine the agreements of the parties, and foster abusive tactics, if the jurisdiction clauses in these agreements were to be treated not as exclusive, but as non-exclusive.’ 

Of note is also the discussion on the role of recitals (eg. at 69; also at 77 ff). Justice Cranston’s arguments are supported by reference to a number of recitals. Defendant in my view has a valid point in principle where they argue at 77 that ‘a recital cannot constitute a rule when it is not reflected in the words of Article 31(2).‘ (Although they were wrong on substance).

A subsidiary argument in the case also merits further attention. Defendants argue that Article 25 requires the parties to have designated the courts of a Member State to enable the law applicable to the substantive validity of a jurisdiction clause to be identified and to provide certainty as to the forum in which a putative defendant can expect to be sued. That, they submit, is not achieved by a clause which designates the courts of all other competent states, including those of non-Member States, outside the territorial competence of the EU, which could mean suits in multiple jurisdictions. Although the argument could be phrased more precisely, I do agree with it: in the absence of a nominatim lex contractus for the choice of court clause specifically, the new lex fori prorogati rule in Article 25 Brussels I Recast, combined with recital 20 (yet again the troublesome habit of EU private international law to include substantive rules in recitals only) does create a vacuum in the case of hybrid, asymmetric or even non-exclusive choice of court.

An important case. Not the last we have heard of the issues.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Ch.2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.4.1, Heading 2.2.9.5.

 

La Cour de Strasbourg a déclaré irrecevable, à l’unanimité, une requête formée par une société française qui contestait la régularité d’opérations de visite et de saisie effectuée par l’Autorité de la concurrence.

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La grande chambre de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) valide des mesures restrictives prises par le Conseil ainsi que le prononcé de sanctions pénales nationales en application de la réglementation européenne, eu égard aux actions de la Russie déstabilisant la situation en Ukraine.

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La France peut refuser de verser une allocation à une personne au motif qu’elle ne réside pas sur le territoire, dès lors que cette allocation a pour objet de garantir un minimum de ressources aux personnes qui vivent sur le territoire national.

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