Agrégateur de flux

Thank you Jonathan Cocker for flagging Ontario’s stakeholder consultation on renewable fuel standards, aka biofuels. Current thinking, outlined in the discussion paper, is to make the standards ‘performance based’: ie without pushing one or rather additive and exclusively focus on achieved (documented) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Biofuels are known to create international trade tension. Argentina and the EU are still formally in consultation over the EU’s approach. Various WTO dispute settlement concerns anti-dumping duties on biofuels. Finally one or two elements of WTO dispute settlement on support for renewable energy touch upon fuel standards.

With all that in mind one particular element of the Ontario regime caught my attention: the intention to regulate GHG emissions ‘well to wheel’: ie ‘to assess emissions performance across the fuel’s full well-to-wheel lifecycle, from extraction to processing, distribution and end-use combustion.’(p.6). Canada does that already for  diesel, with its 2014 greener diesel Regulation, employing what is known as the ‘GHGenius’ model.

What I have not been able to gauge from my admittedly limited research into that model: does it at all and if so how, apply to particularly extraction outside of Canada indeed outside Ontario? For the EU, much of the biofuel production (let alone biofuel imports) at some point or another involves extra-EU elements. How does a well to wheel method in such case work under WTO rules?

Geert.

Il diritto societario europeo e internazionale, edited by / a cura di M. Benedettelli, M. Lamandini, Utet, 2016, ISBN 9788859814733, 832 pp., EUR 90.

Pur non esistendo di fatto un diritto societario europeo codificato, la legislazione dell‘Unione prevede norme minime applicabili alle imprese in tutto il territorio. Due importanti strumenti legislativi adottati dal Consiglio hanno portato alla creazione della figura della “società europea” che avrebbe dovuto essere regolata da un diritto sovranazionale, mentre invece gli Stati membri continuano ad applicare norme societarie proprie, modificandole di tanto in tanto, per conformarsi alle direttive e ai regolamenti emanati. In un contesto economico nel quale società e imprese operano sempre più in differenti contesti, all’interno dell’Unione europea e non, l’opera rappresenta un importante strumento per l’approfondimento dei regimi normativi vigenti a livello comunitario e internazionale. 

 

La grande chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme juge que la procédure de réexamen des peines de perpétuité réelle au Royaume-Uni est désormais conforme à l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme relatif à l’interdiction des traitements inhumains et dégradants.

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Pour écarter l’exception de litispendance, le juge ne peut pas se borner à retenir, en matière de divorce, que la décision de l’autorité religieuse saisie à l’étranger par l’un des époux ne pourra pas, en tant que telle, être reconnue, alors que le divorce relevait de la juridiction de cette autorité et que le litige se rattachait bien à elle, qui avait été saisie en premier lieu.

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L’interdiction faite aux citoyens américains d’adopter des enfants russes constitue une discrimination fondée sur la nationalité en contradiction avec le droit à la vie privée et familiale protégé par l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

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Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005) - Déclaration des créances - Créance d'une personne morale de droit public

Société commerciale - Scission - Garantie autonome

Contrats et obligations conventionnelles - Exception de nullité -
Mise en oeuvre

Prêt - Taux effectif global -
Date à laquelle l'emprunteur a connu ou aurait dû connaître l'erreur

Entreprise en difficulté (loi du 26 juillet 2005) - Déclaration des créances - Organisme de sécurité sociale

Cautionnement - Mentions manuscrites figurant dans l'acte -
Contradiction

 

The fourth issue of 2016 of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, is dedicated to Private International Law and Intellectual Property. It includes papers on the law applicable to copyright infringements on the Internet, how to handle multiple defendants in intellectual property litigation, the incorporation of the Unified Patent Court into the Brussels I bis regulation,  principles of private international law and aspects of intellectual property law and the territoriality principle in intellectual property.

Sierd J. Schaafsma, ‘Editorial: Private International law and intellectual property’, p. 685-686 (guest editor)

Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘The Law applicable to copyright infringement on the Internet’, p. 687-695

This article looks at the law applicable to copyright infringement on the Internet. In order to do so we need to look first of all at the rules concerning the applicable law for copyright infringement in general. Here the starting point is the Berne Convention. Its provisions give an indication of the direction in which this debate is going, but we will see that they merely provide starting points. We then move on to the approach in Europe under the Rome II Regulation and here more details become clear. Essentially, the existing rule boils down to a lex loci protectionis approach, which is in conformity with the starting point that is found in the Berne Convention. It is however doubtful whether such a country by country approach can work well in an Internet context and suggestions are made to improve the legal framework by adding a rule for ubiquitous infringement and a de minimis rule. Finally, we also briefly look at the issues surrounding the cross-border portability of online content services and the impact that the current focus on these may have in terms of the choice of law.

Sierd J. Schaafsma, ‘Multiple defendants in intellectual property litigation’, p. 696-705

One of the key provisions in international intellectual property litigation is the forum connexitatis in Article 8(1) of the Brussel I bis Regulation. This jurisdiction provision makes it possible to concentrate infringement claims against various defendants, domiciled in different EU Member States, before one court: the court of the domicile of any one of them. The criteria of Article 8(1) are, however, complicated and the case law of the Court of Justice is not always very clear. This contribution seeks to explore, evaluate and comment on the current state of affairs in respect of Article 8(1) in the context of intellectual property litigation.

Michael C.A. Kant, ‘The Unified Patent Court and the Brussels I bis Regulation’, p. 706-715

According to the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), the establishment of a Unified Patent Court (UPC) for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect also depends upon amendments to the Brussels I bis Regulation (BR) concerning its relationship with the UPCA. In light of this, the European legislator established new Articles 71a to 71d BR. Unfortunately, these provisions have effected uncertainties and schematic inconsistencies within the Brussels system. Besides, inconsistencies have been established between jurisdiction rules of the BR and competence rules of the UPCA. The most notable flaws in this respect are discussed in this contribution.

Michelle van Eechoud, ‘Bridging the gap: Private international law principles for intellectual property law’, p. 716-723

This past decade has seen a veritable surge of development of ‘soft law’ private international instruments for intellectual property. A global network has been formed made up of academics and practitioners who work on the intersection of these domains. This article examines the synthesizing work of the International Law Association’s Committee on intellectual property and private international law. Now that its draft Guidelines on jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement are at an advanced stage, what can be said about consensus and controversy about dealing with transborder intellectual property disputes in the information age? What role can principles play in a world where multilateral rulemaking on intellectual property becomes ever deeply politicized and framed as an issue of trade? Arguably, private international law retains it facilitating role and will continue to attract the attention of intellectual property law specialists as a necessary integral part of regulating transborder information flows.

Dario Moura Vicente, ‘The territoriality principle in intellectual property revisited’, p. 724-729

This essay revisits territoriality as the founding principle of international IP law. Both copyright and rights in patents and trademarks were essentially conceived by the drafters of the Berne and Paris Conventions as territorial rights which should be governed by the law of the country for which their protection is claimed. This is still the starting point of the relevant provisions in several recent soft law instruments adopted, inter alia, by the American Law Institute and the European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in IP. An important deviation therefrom has, however, been enshrined in conflict of jurisdictions rules that allow for the extraterritorial enforcement of IP rights. Other relevant developments in this respect concern Internet uses of protected works, with regard to which certain restrictions to territoriality have been adopted in order to promote the applicability of a single law to online infringements. The liability of Internet service providers should, in turn, be governed by the law of the country where the centre of gravity of their activities is located, not necessarily the lex protectionis. Other alternatives to the lex protectionis, such as the lex originis or the lex contractus, have gained prominence concerning the initial ownership of unregistered IP rights. And a choice of the applicable law by the parties has been allowed in respect of remedies for infringement acts, as well as of contracts providing for the creation or the transfer of securities in IP rights. A mitigated form of territoriality has thus emerged in recent IP law instruments, which allows for greater diversity and flexibility in conflict of laws solutions in this field.

Lounani
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une demande d’asile peut être rejetée si le demandeur a participé aux activités d’un réseau terroriste

Plusieurs compagnies ont interdit l’embarquement, depuis la France vers les États-Unis, de passagers ressortissants des pays visés par le décret du président américain Donald Trump. Une association d’avocats a décidé d’assister et de conseiller ces personnes.

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Where does one look first? : as I reported last week, Ms Kiobel is now taking her US case to The Netherlands (this case essentially involves human rights), at a time when Shell is still pursued in the Netherlands by Milieudefensie, in a case involving environmental pollution in Nigeria. That case now is being mirrored in the High Court in London. The dual proceedings are squarely a result of the split listing of Shell’s mother company, thus easily establishing jurisdiction in both The Netherlands and London, under Article 4 Brussels I Recast.

The only preliminary issue which the High Court had to settle at this early stage was whether Shell’s holding company, established in the UK, can be used as anchor defendant for proceedings against Shell Nigeria. It held that it could not. The questions dealt with are varied and listed as follows:

1. Do the claimants have legitimate claims in law against RDS?

2. If so, is this jurisdiction the appropriate forum in which to bring such claims? This issue encompasses an argument by RDS that it is an abuse of EU law for the claimants to seek to conduct proceedings against an anchor defendant in these circumstances.

3. If this jurisdiction is the appropriate forum, are there any grounds for issuing a stay on case management grounds and/or under Article 34 of the Recast Regulation in respect of the claim against RDS, so that the claim against SPDC can (or should) proceed against SPDC in Nigeria?

4. Do the claims against SPDC have a real prospect of success?

5. Do the claims against SPDC fall within the gateway for service out of the jurisdiction under paragraph 3.1(3) of CPR Practice Direction 6B?

This issue requires consideration of two separate sub-issues, namely (a) whether the claims against RDS involve a real issue which it is reasonable for the Court to try; and (b) whether SPDC is a necessary or proper party to the claims against RDS.

6. Is England the most appropriate forum for the trial of the claims in the interests of all parties and for the ends of justice?

7. In any event, is there a real risk the Claimants would not obtain substantial justice if they are required to litigate their claims in Nigeria?

 

In detailed analysis, Fraser J first of all seems to accept case-management as a now established route effectively to circumvent the ban on forum non conveniens per Owuso (see Goldman Sachs and also reference in my review of that case, to Jong and Plaza). Over and above case-management he refers to potential abuse of EU civil procedure rules to reject the Shell Nigeria joinder. That reference though is without subject really, for the rules on joinders in Article 8 Brussel I recast only apply to joinder with companies that are domiciled in the EU – which is not the case for Shell Nigeria.

Of specific interest to this blog post is Fraser J’s review of Article 7 Rome II: the tailor made article for environmental pollution in the determination of lex causae for torts: in the case at issue (and contrary to the Dutch mirror case, which is entirely being dealt with under residual Dutch conflicts law) Rome II does apply to at least part of the alleged facts. See here for my background on the issue. That issue of governing law is dealt with at para 50 ff of the judgment.

For environmental pollution, plaintiff has a choice under Article 7 Rome II. Either lex damni (not appealing here: for Nigerian law; the judgment discusses at some length on the extent to which Nigerian law would follow the English Common law in issues of the corporate veil), or lex loci delicti commissi. This, the High Court suggest, can only be England if two questions are answered in the affirmative (at 79). The first is whether the parent company is better placed than the subsidiary to avoid the harm because of its superior knowledge or expertise. The second is, if the finding is that the parent company is better placed, whether it is fair to infer that the subsidiary will rely upon the parent. With reference to precedent, Fraser J suggest it is not enough for the parent company simply to be holding shares in other companies. (Notice the parallel here with the application of ATS in Apartheid).

The High Court eventually holds that there is no prima facie duty of care than can be established against the holding company, which would justify jurisdiction vis-a-vis the daughter. At 106, the Court mirrors the defendant’s argument: it is the Nigerian company, rather than the holding, that takes all operational decisions in Nigeria, and there is nothing performed by the holding company by way of supervisory direction, specialist activities or knowledge, that would put it in any different position than would be expected of an ultimate parent company. Rather to the contrary, it is the Nigerian company that has the specialist knowledge and experience – as well as the necessary licence from the Nigerian authorities – to perform the relevant activities in Nigeria that form the subject matter of the claim. … It is the specialist operating company in Nigeria; it is the entity with the necessary regulatory licence; the English holding company is the ultimate holding company worldwide and receives reports back from subsidiaries.

 

Plaintiffs have been given permission to appeal. Their lawyers have indicated to rely heavily on CJEU precedent, particularly T-343/06 Shell v EC. This case however concerns competition law, which as I have reported before, traditionally has had a theory on the corporate veil more easily pierced than in other areas. Where appeal may have more chance of success, I believe is in the prima facie character of the case against the mother company. There is a thin line between preliminary assessment with a view to establishing jurisdiction, and effectively deciding the case on the merits. I feel the High Court’s approach here strays too much into merits territory.

Geert.

 

 

The following reminder has been kindly provided by Dr. Susanne L. Gössl. LL.M. (Tulane), University of Bonn.

This is a short reminder that the registration deadline for the first German young scholars‘ PIL conference on April 6th and 7th 2017 at the University of Bonn (see our previous post here) is approaching.

The conference will be held in German. Its general topic is “Politics and Private International Law”.

Professor Dagmar Coester-Waltjen has kindly agreed to deliver our conference’s opening address. Consolidated in four panels with the topics “Arbitration”, “Procedural Law and Conflict of Laws/Substantial Law”, “Protection of Individual Rights and Conflict of Laws” and “Public Law and Conflict of Laws”, a total of eight presentations and one responsio will address current aspects of the relationship between politics and PIL and invite further discussion.

Participation is free, but a registration is required.

The registration deadline is February 28th 2017.

In order to register for the conference, please use this link. Please be aware that the number of participants is limited.

Further information may be found here.

We are looking forward to welcoming many participants to a lively and thought-provoking conference!