Agrégateur de flux

In a judgment of 16 September 2015, in the case of Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd v. Dau Si Senh and others (Case C‑519/13), the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Regulation No 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (the Service Regulation).

The judgment originated from a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Supreme Court of Cyprus in the framework of proceedings initiated by a Cypriot bank against, inter alia, individuals permanently resident in the UK.

The latter claimed that the documents instituting the proceedings had not been duly served. They complained, in particular, that some of the documents they had received (namely the order authorising service abroad) were not accompanied by a translation into English and that the standard form referred to in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 was never served on them.

Pursuant to Article 8 of the Service Regulation, the “receiving agency”, ie the agency competent for the receipt of judicial or extrajudicial documents from another Member State under the Regulation, must inform the addressee, “using the standard form set out in Annex II”, that he has the right to refuse to accept a document if this “is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, either of the following languages: (a) a language which the addressee understands; or (b) the official language of the Member State addressed”.

In its judgment, the ECJ held that the receiving agency “is required, in all circumstances and without it having a margin of discretion in that regard, to inform the addressee of a document of his right to refuse to accept that document”, and that this requirements must be fulfilled “by using systematically … the standard form set out in Annex II”. The Court also held, however, that, where the receiving agency fails to enclose the standard form in question, this “does not constitute a ground for the procedure to be declared invalid, but an omission which must be rectified in accordance with the provisions set out in that regulation”.

The ECJ based this conclusion on the following remarks.

Regarding the binding nature of the standard form, the Court noticed that the wording of Article 8 of the Regulation is not decisive, and that the objectives of the Regulation and the context of Article 8 should rather be considered.

As regards the objectives of the Regulation, the Court stated that the uniform EU rules on the service of documents aim to improve the efficiency and speed of judicial procedures, but stressed that those objectives cannot be attained by undermining in any way the rights of the defence of the addressees, which derive from the right to a fair hearing, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Article 6(1) of the ECHR.

The Court added, in this regard, that “it is important not only to ensure that the addressee of a document actually receives the document in question, but also that he is able to know and understand effectively and completely the meaning and scope of the action brought against him abroad, so as to be able effectively to assert his rights in the Member State of transmission”. It is thus necessary to strike a balance between the interests of the applicant and those of the defendant by reconciling the objectives of efficiency and speed of the service of the procedural documents with the need to ensure that the rights of the defence of the addressee of those documents are adequately protected.

As concerns the system established by the Service Regulation, the ECJ began by noting that the service of documents is, in principle, to be effected between the “transmitting agencies” and the “receiving agencies” designated by the Member States, and that, in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Regulation, it is for the transmitting agency to inform the applicant that the addressee may refuse to accept it if it is not in one of the languages provided for in Article 8, whereas it is for the applicant to decide whether the document at issue must be translated.

For its part, the receiving agency is required to effectively serve the document on the addressee, as provided for by Article 7 of Regulation No 1393/2007. In that context, the receiving agency must, among other things, inform the addressee that it may refuse to accept the document if it is not translated into one of the languages referred to in Article 8(1).

By contrast, the said agencies “are not required to rule on questions of substance, such as those concerning which language(s) the addressee of the document understands and whether the document must be accompanied by a translation into one of the languages” specified in Article 8(1). Any other interpretation, the ECJ added, “would raise legal problems likely to create legal disputes which would delay or make more difficult the procedure for transmitting documents from one Member State to another”.

In the main proceedings, the UK receiving agency considered that the order authorising service of the document abroad should not be translated and deduced from that that it was not required to enclose with the document at issue the relevant standard form.

In reality, according to the ECJ, the Service Regulation “does not confer on the receiving agency any competence to assess whether the conditions, set out in Article 8(1), according to which the addressee of a document may refuse to accept it, are satisfied”. Actually, “it is exclusively for the national court before which proceedings are brought in the Member State of origin to rule on questions of that nature, since they oppose the applicant and the defendant”.

The latter court “will be required, in each individual case, to ensure that the respective rights of the parties concerned are upheld in a balanced manner, by weighing the objective of efficiency and of rapidity of the service in the interest of the applicant against that of the effective protection of the rights of the defence on the part of the addressee”.

Specifically, as regards the use of the standard forms, the ECJ observed, based on the Preamble of the Regulation, that the forms “contribute to simplifying and making more transparent the transmission of documents, thereby guaranteeing both the legibility thereof and the security of their transmission”, and are regarded by the Regulation as “instruments by means of which addressees are informed of their ability to refuse to accept the document to be served”.

The wording of the Regulation and of the forms themselves makes clear that the ability to refuse to accept a document in accordance with Article 8(1) is “a ‘right’ of the addressee of that document”. In order for that right to usefully produce its effects, the addressee of the document must be informed in writing thereof.

As a matter of fact, Article 8(1) of the Regulation contains two distinct statements. On the one hand, the substantive right of the addressee of the document to refuse to accept it, on the sole ground that it is not drafted in or accompanied by a translation in a language he is expected to understand. On the other hand, the formal information about the existence of that right brought to his knowledge by the receiving agency. In other words, in the Court’s view, “the condition relating to the languages used for the document relates not to the information given to the addressee by the receiving agency, but exclusively to the right to refuse reserved to that addressee”.

The ECJ went on to stress that the refusal of service is conditional, in so far as the addressee of the document may validly make use of the right only where the document at issue is not drafted in or accompanied by a translation either in a language he understands or in the official language of the receiving Member State. It is ultimately for the court seised to decide whether that condition is satisfied, by checking whether the refusal by the addressee of the document was justified. The fact remains, however, that the exercise of that right to refuse “presupposes that the addressee of the document has been duly informed, in advance and in writing, of the existence of his right”.

This explains why the receiving agency, where it serves or has served a document on its addressee, “is required, in all circumstances, to enclose with the document at issue the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 informing that addressee of his right to refuse to accept that document”. This obligation, the Court stressed, should not create particular difficulties for the receiving agency, since “it suffices that that agency enclose with the document to be served the preprinted text as provided for by that regulation in each of the official languages of the European Union”.

Moving on to the consequences of a failure to provide information using the standard form, the ECJ noted, at the outset, that it is not apparent from any provision of that regulation that such a failure leads to the invalidity of the procedure for service.

Rather, the Court reminded that, in Leffler — a case relating to the interpretation of Regulation No 1348/2000, the predecessor of Regulation No 1393/2007 — it held that the non-observance of the linguistic requirements of service does not imply that the procedure must necessarily be declared invalid, but rather involves the necessity to allow the sender to remedy the lack of the required document by sending the requested translation. The principle is now laid down in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1393/2007.

According to the ECJ, a similar solution must be followed where the receiving agency has failed to transmit the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation to the addressee of a document.

In practice, it is for the receiving agency to inform “without delay” the addressees of the document of their right to refuse to accept that document, by sending them, in accordance with Article 8(1), the relevant standard form. In the event that, as a result of that information, the addressees concerned make use of their right to refuse to accept the document at issue, it is for the national court in the Member State of origin to decide whether such a refusal is justified in the light of all the circumstances of the case.

In Roonse Recycling & Serice BV v BSS Heavy Machinery GmbH, the Court at Rotterdam first of all discussed the factual circumstance of a possible choice of court agreement between parties, in favour of the courts at Eberswalde (Germany). Such choice of court is made in the general terms and conditions of seller, BSS. whether parties had actually agreed to these, was in dispute. Roonse suggests the reference on the front page of the order form to the general terms and conditions on the backside (‘umseitiger‘) was without subject for that back page was blank. The court therefore suggests that agreement depends on whether, as was suggested, the standard terms and conditions were attached (stapled, presumably) to the order form. Whether this was the case is a factual consideration which Rotterdam does not further entertain for even if the choice of court agreement is invalid, the court found it would not have jurisdiction under the only other alternative: Article 7(1) special jurisdictional rule for ‘contracts’.

Roonse suggest that the parties had agreed that the contract, a delivery of good, is performed in Rotterdam for that, it argues, is where delivery took place per the Incoterm CPT (carriage paid to). The CJEU has flagged the inconclusive effect of the mere use of Incoterms for the purposes of finding an agreement between parties under Article 7, in Electrosteel Case C-87/10 (in that case with respect to the use of ‘ex works’) and has generally insisted, per Car Trim Case C-381/08 that the courts need to make reference to all relevant terms and conditions in the agreement so as to determine the place of delivery.

Rotterdam in casu held the Incoterm CPT Rotterdam as being mostly a reference to costs, not place of delivery. Where it is impossible to determine the place of delivery on that basis, without reference to the substantive law applicable to the contract, that place at least for the sale of goods, the CJEU held, is the place where the physical transfer of the goods took place, as a result of which the purchaser obtained, or should have obtained, actual power of disposal over those goods at the final destination of the sales transaction. In casu, this was found to be in the geographical jurisdiction of the courts at Den Haag. Given that Article 7(1) does not merely identify the courts of a Member State but rather a specific court within a Member State, Rotterdam has no jurisdiction.

The case is a good reminder of the limited power of Incoterms to determine jurisdiction. Better have a specific choice of court clause (which here may or may not have presented itself here in the general terms and conditions of seller).

Geert.

En matière de responsabilité contractuelle, la personne lésée peut agir directement contre l’assureur de la personne devant réparation si la loi applicable à l’obligation contractuelle ou la loi applicable au contrat d’assurance le prévoit.

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Compétence internationale (Procédure civile)

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L’absence d’enregistrement n’est assortie d’aucune sanction et aujourd’hui de nombreuses salles ne sont pas équipées. Y a-t-il rupture d’égalité ?

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Néant

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Uno degli obiettivi sottesi all’imminente riforma del regolamento n. 861/2007, istitutivo del procedimento europeo per le controversie di modesta entità, segnalata in un post recente, è quello di assicurare a tale modello, nella pratica, una fortuna maggiore di quella registratasi in questi anni.

Poche, specie in Italia, sono infatti le decisioni pubblicate, rese in applicazione del regolamento, che pure è applicabile dal 1° gennaio 2009.

Vale dunque la pena di dar conto, a titolo di esempio, di un provvedimento pronunciato sulla base del regolamento n. 861/2007, segnalato alla redazione di Aldricus dall’avv. Grazia Ferdenzi di Parma. Si tratta della decisione con cui il 6 febbraio 2014 il Giudice di pace di Parma ha condannato la compagnia aerea EasyJet al pagamento di una somma per il ritardo prolungato subito da alcuni passeggeri.

Questi ultimi avevano basato le proprie richieste sul regolamento n. 261/2004 che istituisce regole comuni in materia di compensazione ed assistenza ai passeggeri in caso di negato imbarco, di cancellazione del volo o di ritardo prolungato, ed avevano convenuto la compagnia aerea di fronte al Giudice di pace di Parma instaurando, appunto, un procedimento europeo per le controversie di modesta entità.

Nella domanda, redatta compilando il Modulo A allegato al regolamento n. 861/2007 (tutti i formulari relativi al procedimento sono reperibili qui), gli attori hanno invocato, per affermare la giurisdizione italiana, le norme europee che disciplinano la competenza giurisdizionale in materia di contratti conclusi con in consumatori. Se è pur vero che il passeggero, in Italia, può essere associato alla figura del consumatore (tanto che sono proprio le associazioni a protezione dei consumatori che si occupano di salvaguardare i diritti dei passeggeri di trasporti aerei alla luce della normativa europea), ai fini dell’individuazione dell’organo competente in controversie a carattere transnazionale che coinvolgano un consumatore, questa nozione deve essere intesa in maniera autonoma.

L’art. 15, par. 3 (“competenza in materia di contratti conclusi dai consumatori”), del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (qui applicabile ratione temporis, oggi sostituito dal regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012), esclude espressamente l’applicazione della sezione relativa ai contratti conclusi da consumatori “ai contratti di trasporto che non prevedono prestazioni combinate di trasporto e di alloggio per un prezzo globale”.

Varrebbe, semmai, il foro del contratto, come determinato in base all’art. 5, punto 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001. Nello specifico, nel caso Peter Rehder (9 luglio 2009, causa C‑204/08), la Corte di giustizia ha chiarito che il contratto di trasporto concluso con una compagnia aerea deve essere interpretato quale contratto di prestazione di servizi, ai fini del quale la competenza giurisdizionale deve essere individuata nell’autorità giurisdizionale del luogo “situato in uno Stato membro, in cui i servizi sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere prestati in base al contratto” (art. 5, punto 1, lett. b), secondo trattino). Ciò premesso, la Corte ha specificato che il giudice competente a conoscere di una domanda di compensazione pecuniaria basata sul contratto di trasporto concluso da un passeggero con una compagnia aerea e sul regolamento (CE) n. 261/2004, che istituisce regole comuni in materia di compensazione ed assistenza ai passeggeri in caso di negato imbarco, di cancellazione del volo o di ritardo prolungato, è quello “a scelta dell’attore, nella cui circoscrizione si trovano il luogo di partenza o il luogo di arrivo dell’aereo quali indicati in detto contratto”.

Negli atti del procedimento dinanzi al Giudice di Parma, rileva anche il fatto che il provvedimento non sia stato emesso mediante la compilazione del Modulo D, come (non solo raccomandato, ma) formalmente prescritto dal regolamento n. 861/2007. La mancata osservanza della forma pregiudica l’elevato grado di standardizzazione che connota questo regolamento e, di conseguenza, la circolazione delle decisioni emesse all’esito del relativo procedimento.

In Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed the country’s flexible approach to the jurisdictional stage of recognition and enforcement actions. I have reported on the case’s overall background before. More detail on the case is provided here by Border Ladner Gervais, as do McMillan (adding a critical note) here, and I am happy to refer – suffice to say on this blog that an accommodating approach to the very willingness of courts to entertain a recognition and enforcement action is not as such unusual to my knowledge. It is very much a case of comity to at least not blankly refuse to hear the case for enforcing a judgment issued by a foreign court.

Much more challenging will be the merits of the case, for one imagines the usual arguments against will certainly exercise the Canadian courts.

Finally, even if Chevron assets in Canada were not to suffice to meet the considerable award (in particular if the courts further down the line were to keep the mother company out of the action), any success in Canadian courts, however small, no doubt will serve applicants’ case for recognition in other jurisdictions.

Geert.

 

 

 

Les mesures ordonnées à la suite d’une déclaration d’irresponsabilité pénale pour cause de trouble mental ne sont pas des peines au sens de l’article 7, § 1, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le principe de non-rétroactivité n’a donc pas vocation à s’appliquer.

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Néant

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Après avoir souverainement estimé, hors toute dénaturation, qu’aucun document de nature à servir à la motivation défaillante n’avait été produit, l’attestation du juge étranger ayant statué n’étant pas de nature à en constituer un, la cour d’appel en a exactement déduit que la décision étrangère n’était pas conforme à la conception française de l’ordre public international de procédure.

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Exequatur

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van der Lans
Transport
Même en cas d’annulation du vol en raison de problèmes techniques imprévus, les transporteurs aériens sont tenus d’indemniser les passagers

Total / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour ramène l’amende infligée à Total conjointement et solidairement avec Total France de 128 à 125 millions d’euros

Commission / Italie
Aide d'État
Pour avoir tardé dans la récupération d’aides incompatibles avec le marché commun, l’Italie est condamnée à une somme forfaitaire de 30 millions d’euros et à une astreinte de 12 millions d’euros par semestre de retard

Il terzo fascicolo del 2015 di Internationales Handelsrecht ospita un articolo di Kasper Steensgaard intitolato Battle of the forms under the CISG – one or more solutions? (p. 89-94), dedicato alle soluzioni ricavabili dalla Convenzione di Vienna sulla compravendita internazionale di beni mobili del 1980 (CISG) circa il conflitto fra condizioni generali di contratto, o “battaglia dei formulari”, cioè la situazione che si verifica allorché, in sede di formazione del contratto, le parti si richiamino a condizioni generali fra loro divergenti.

Il problema, che dev’essere affrontato nell’ottica dell’art. 19 CISG, relativo all’accettazione della proposta contrattuale, consiste fondamentalmente nello stabilire se per effetto dell’emissione di dichiarazioni negoziali corredate da un richiamo alle rispettive condizioni generali, si sia formato un vincolo contrattuale fra le parti e, laddove la risposta sia positiva, quale ne sia il contenuto.

L’autore dell’articolo, attraverso un’indagine incentrata soprattutto sulla giurisprudenza sviluppata negli Stati Uniti e in Germania, analizza le due principali soluzioni proposte in quest’ambito, costituite, rispettivamente, dalla last-shot rule e dalla knock-out rule.

La prima soluzione è, per Steensgaard, quella preferibile, trattandosi del derivato “logico e naturale” del principio della corrispondenza fra proposta e accettazione (“mirror image principle”), sancito all’art. 19, par. 1, CISG. Di fatto, l’oblato, quando replica alla proposta richiamando le proprie divergenti condizioni generali, emette una controproposta: se l’offerente non reagisce, la dichiarazione negoziale dell’oblato (il “last shot”), se seguita dall’accettazione anche tacita dell’altra parte, condurrà alla conclusione di un contratto conforme agli standard terms richiamati dallo stesso oblato. Questi, in pratica, delinea i contenuti del contratto, in assenza di obiezioni ad opera dell’altra parte, mediante il richiamo alle proprie condizioni. Una simile conclusione si impone, peraltro, solo quando alla parte che finisce col soccombere nella “battaglia” delle condizioni generali sia imputabile un’accettazione almeno implicita, ad esempio mediante fatti concludenti, non essendo sufficiente a questo fine una mera inerzia.

La seconda soluzione, vale a dire la knock-out rule, implica invece un raffronto tra proposta e accettazione allo scopo di estrapolare dalle condizioni generali di entrambe le parti tutti e soltanto gli elementi comuni, che costituiranno il contratto, estromettendo i termini divergenti, i quali verranno sostituiti dal corrispondente regime legale. Senonché, stando all’autore dell’articolo, la knock-out rule, che pure ha il pregio di valorizzare il consenso delle parti, mal si concilia con i dati offerti dalla Convenzione.

A tal proposito, merita di essere segnalato il contrario parere del CISG Advisory Council (Opinion No 13, punto 10), favorevole al knock-out approach, in linea con quanto previsto in materia dai Principi Unidroit e nonostante il potenziale contrasto con la lettera dell’art. 19 CISG. L’applicabilità della knock-out rule viene giustificata facendo leva sull’art. 6 CISG, che consente alle parti di derogare la Convenzione, valorizzando la loro autonomia come principio generale della CISG: se esse concordano sull’applicazione di alcuni termini, comuni ad entrambe, e manifestano la volontà di incorporarli nel contratto, tale loro accordo prevale sulla CISG.

Ulteriori informazioni sul fascicolo, compreso il sommario, sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

La Commission européenne a adressé au Parlement européen et au Conseil, le 9 septembre 2015, une communication donnant une vue d’ensemble des possibilités pour les acheteurs publics de mettre rapidement à disposition les infrastructures, fournitures et services de première nécessité.

En carrousel matière:  Oui Matières OASIS:  Néant

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En subordonnant l’octroi d’un congé parental aux hommes à la condition que leur épouse ne soit pas disponible pour élever leur enfant, le code grec prive les hommes d’un droit minimal fondamental et perpétue une distribution traditionnelle des rôles qui constitue une discrimination directe fondée sur le sexe contraire à la directive sur l’égalité de traitement en matière d’emploi.

En carrousel matière:  Non Matières OASIS:  Néant

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Copropriété

Avocat

Conflit de lois ; contrat

Intellectual Property and Private International Law, a cura di Paul Torremans, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 880, ISBN 9781783471423, GBP 265.

[Dal sito dell’editore]  This collection, made possible by the recent convergence of intellectual property and private international law as critical disciplines, brings together the most important papers on these now linked subjects. More and more issues of private international law arise in the area of intellectual property, and the articles selected chart the route that both disciplines have covered together, discussing bridges built and dead-ends reached. Also looking forward to the future of the subject, with an original introduction by Professor Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law will prove to be an essential research tool for all students, academics and practitioners working in this fast-developing area.

Maggiori informazioni, compreso il sommario dell’opera, sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Commission / Slovaquie
Libre circulation des personnes
En limitant aux résidents slovaques le bénéfice des allocations liées à un handicap et la prime de Noël accordée à des personnes à faible revenu, la Slovaquie n’a pas manqué aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu d’un règlement de l’Union

Dr. Christoph Reithmann and Professor Dr. Dieter Martiny (editors) have just published a new edition of their standard treatise on international contract law: Internationales Vertragsrecht – Das internationale Privatrecht der Schuldverträge, 8th. ed., Cologne (Dr. Otto Schmidt) 2015.

This 2348-pages strong volume is universally acknowledged as one of the leading works on international contract law in the German language. It features in-depth analyses not only of the Rome I-Regulation, but also of various aspects not dealt with in Rome I, such as capacity and agency. Moreover, it also contains a chapter on choice of law under the Rome II Regulation. The book has been written by a team that is made up of renowned German and Swiss PIL scholars and practitioners. Highly recommended! For further information, see the publisher’s website here.