Agrégateur de flux

[2018] EWCA Civ 1889 Committeri v Club Med , appeal against Dingeman J’s findings in [2016] EHWC 1510 (QB) featured in a recent resit exam of mine, slightly later reporting therefore. Dingeman J’s analysis was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Mr Committeri lived and worked in London. He was injured when climbing an ice wall in Chamonix in France in 2011. He brought proceedings in England against Club Med and their insurers: they had provided the relevant travel and accommodation pursuant to a ‘team-building’ contract with the appellant’s employers, a Bank. The claim is pleaded by reference to that contract and Article L211-16 of the French Code de Tourisme (which imposes strict (safety) liability upon the providers of tourist accomodation: une obligation de résultat); contrary to English law which foresees in une obligation de moyens).

French law has considered that “proper performance of the contract” in a package holiday setting requires the absolute safety of the consumer, so that (unless the exceptions in the Code apply) when there is an injury on a package holiday the organiser will be liable.

The central issue is the proper characterisation of that claim. If it is a contractual claim then English law applies (the lex contractus agreed between the Bank and Club Med) and it is common ground that it will fail. If it is properly characterised as a non-contractual claim, French law applies and it is agreed that it will succeed.

CJEU authorities considered by Coulson LJ were in particular Brogsitter, Ergo, Verein Fur Konsumenteninformation v Amazon, and flightright. 

At 52 Coulson LJ summarises the modus operandi per the European precedents as follows:

‘(a) The mere fact that a contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other party does not by itself mean that the claim concerns “matters relating to a contract” but it will be sufficient if the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract (Brogsitter [24]) or if the purpose of the claim is to seek damages, the legal basis for which can reasonably be regarded as a breach of the rights and obligations set out in the contract (Brogsitter [26]).

(b) Only an obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based is a ‘matter relating to contract’ (Ergo [44]).

(c) The classification of an obligation for the purposes of Rome I or Rome II depends on the (contractual or non-contractual) source of that obligation (Amazon, AG’s opinion [48]). A contractual obligation implies at the very least an actual and existing commitment (Amazon [50]).’

I would have added what I called Sharpston AG‘s ‘pedigree’ (one of my students seems to have mistakenly noted this down as ‘Paddy Pee’), ‘ancestry’, or ‘centre of gravity’ test in Ergo.

At 53: ‘On an application of all or any of those principles, it is clear that the pleaded strict liability claim can only be characterised as a contractual claim. …That contract is the source of the relevant obligations and imposed the necessary commitments. To put it another way, to use Judge Waksman’s words in AXA ([2015] EWHC 3431 (Comm), the contract was not “a stepping stone to the ultimate liability of [the respondent but] the basis for the obligation actually relied upon…”.

A very useful reminder of the relevant precedents.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1.

The conference Challenge Accepted! Exploring Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe will take place at Erasmus School of Law on 19-20 November. You are invited to join us and young researchers are reminded to send in their poster. The deadline is 1 October.

Young researchers will have the possibility to present and discuss their work during the poster on 20 November. Posters should focus on the topics of the conference, and show originality. We invite PhD researchers or young academics to present their research in a poster format. The three best posters will be awarded a prize during the closing drinks.

More information on submitting a poster proposal can be found here.

This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law at Rotterdam University under the ERC project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’ (www.euciviljustice.eu).

For more information, do not hesitate to contact us at hoevenaars@law.eur.nl (Jos) or biard@law.eur.nl (Alexandre).

Wahl AG advised  last week in Case C-497/17, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs. In this case an NGO requests a certification body to stop certifying as ‘organic’, products obtained from religious slaughter, even though neither Council Regulation 834/2007 nor the Commission implementing Regulation 889/2008 on organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control, mention stunned or unstunned slaughter.

I suggested earlier that the case turns around scope of application, albeit that the shadow of the human rights implications hangs over it. The Advocate General agrees: at 33: ‘the Court is therefore not strictly speaking required to rule on a question of interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion’. In essence, what is not forbidden is allowed: the legislation on organic farming is silent on the question of ritual slaughter; (at 91) this silence on the matter is not the result of oversight for the ‘slaughter’ of animals is mentioned on several occasions in the legislation – is it just simply not regulated.

I believe the AG is right. I also, on substance, believe that unstunned slaughter, properly carried out, meets with the ethos of organic farming.

Geert.

 

 

 

Rittinger e.a.
Aide d'État
L’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona propose à la Cour de déclarer que la modification du critère d’exigibilité de la contribution qui finance les organismes publics de radiodiffusion en Allemagne n’est pas constitutive d’une aide d’État illégale

Philips et Philips France / Commission
Concurrence
Dans le cadre de l’entente sur le marché des puces pour cartes, la Cour renvoie l’affaire d’Infineon Technologies au Tribunal afin que celui-ci apprécie la proportionnalité de l’amende infligée et rejette le pourvoi formé par Philips

L’exclusion d’une justiciable – simple citoyenne, ne représentant pas l’État – de la salle d’audience d’un tribunal en raison de son refus d’ôter son hijab constitue une « restriction » dans l’exercice par cette dernière du droit de manifester sa religion. Cette restriction poursuit cependant comme but légitime la « protection de l’ordre », afin notamment de prévenir les comportements irrespectueux à l’égard de l’institution judiciaire et/ou perturbateurs du bon déroulement d’une audience. À défaut de comportement irrespectueux ou ne constituant pas – ou ne risquant pas de constituer – une menace pour le bon déroulement de l’audience, la nécessité de la restriction litigieuse ne se trouve pas établie et l’atteinte portée au droit de la requérante à la liberté de manifester sa religion n’est pas justifiée dans une société démocratique.

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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 7, 4e chambre de 'l'instruction, 30 juin 2017

Conseil de prud'hommes de Paris, 12 septembre 2018

Tribunal correctionnel de Chartres, 6 septembre 2018

Tribunal correctionnel de Marseille, 10 septembre 2018

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Versailles, chambre sociale, 22 mars 2018

In C-343/17 Fremoluc the CJEU held last week. It features as counsel no less than 3 fellow faculty at Leuven Law: 4 if one counts prof Cloots whom we foolishly let escape to elsewhere. Had we had either one of my two collegae proximi who serve as judges on the CJEU assigned to the case, there would have been more residents of Collegium Falconis at Kircherg on the day of any hearing then there have recently been at Faculty meetings. But I digress.

The case essentially concerns services of general economic interests (SGEIs), as applied to the social housing sector: what kind of measures may a Member State roll-out to support the provision of such housing, in light of the free movement of not just persons but also services and capital. By extension, the case-law is also relevant to property rights restrictions across the EU.

In the case at issue applicant had seen a purchase of land torpedoed by the right of pre-emption of a relevant agency, relating to building land situated in areas earmarked for house renovation and house-building in 26 municipalities in its operating area. Fremoluc suggested the condition in the underlying decree that ‘as regards the provision of homes or land in a social housing project…, absolute priority must be given, at any stage of the project, to prospective tenants, leaseholders or buyers who have strong social, economic or socio-cultural ties with the operating area in question’, constitute an illegal condition under EU law. Consequently, it argued, the right of pre-emptive purchase itself was illegal.

The CJEU however, with reference to relevant case-law (please refer to the text of the judgment for same), held that the case was inadmissible, for it is purely internal: at 28-29: ‘it is not sufficient for the referring court to state that it is not inconceivable that nationals established in other Member States were or are interested in making use of Union provisions on fundamental freedoms to carry out activities in the territory of the Member State which enacted the national legislation in question and, consequently, that that legislation, applicable without distinction to nationals and to nationals of other Member States, is capable of producing effects which are not confined to that Member State.’ ‘The request for a preliminary ruling must clearly set out specific factors, that is, not hypothetical considerations but specific evidence, such as complaints or applications brought by operators situated in other Member States or involving nationals of those Member States, on the basis of which the required connecting link may be positively established. More particularly, the referring court may not merely submit to the Court evidence suggesting that such a link cannot be ruled out or which, considered in the abstract, could constitute evidence to that effect, and must, on the contrary, provide objective and consistent evidence enabling the Court to ascertain whether such a link exists.’

Such evidence of course in practice is easily engineered. A similar case therefore is bound to return to Luxembourg at some point soon.

Geert.

 

Psara / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme le refus du Parlement d’accorder l’accès aux documents relatifs aux indemnités journalières, aux indemnités de frais de voyage et aux indemnités d’assistance parlementaire des eurodéputés

La passionnante enquête de Fabrice Arfi, un véritable thriller, dévoile les arcanes de ce qui constitue certainement l’une des plus grandes arnaques du siècle : la fraude à la taxe carbone.

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En cas d’annulation d’un vol, la compagnie aérienne doit aussi rembourser les commissions perçues par les intermédiaires lors de l’achat de billets, pour autant qu’elle en a eu connaissance.

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